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ABSTRACT
In the l a t e  f o r t i e s ,  m i l i t a r y  t r i b u n a l s  he ld at  Nuremberg t r i e d  
several surv iv ing  key German dip lomats, inc lud ing  Constantin von Neurath, 
Joach im von R ibben t rop ,  E r n s t  von W e iz saecke r ,  and E rn s t  Woermann, f o r  
t h e i r  p a r t  in  the s o - c a l l e d  Nazi c o n sp i r a c y  to wage wars o f  agg re ss ion .  
A l l  of  the diplomats on t r i a l  c la imed that the German Foreign O f f ice  was 
innocen t  s in ce  i t  had no i n f l u e n c e  on the f o rm u la t i o n  o f  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y :  
H i t l e r  had acted as h is  own Foreign M in i s te r .  This thes is  inves t iga tes  to 
what extent these ind iv idua ls  and other d iplomats in f luenced the making of 
f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  du r ing  the Th i r d  R e ich ,  as w e l l  as examines the Fo re ign  
O f f i c e ' s  ro le  in formulat ing po l i cy  from 1871 to 1945 in order to determine 
i f  the re  e x i s t s  any c o n t i n u i t y  in  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s .  The au tho r  uses the 
unpub l ished  Nuremberg t r i a l  papers in  the U n i v e r s i t y  o f  North Dakota 's  
Chester F r i t z  L ib ra ry  as well as numerous published d ip lomat ic  documents 
and memoirs. The study shows t h a t  the re  i s  a s t rong  case f o r  the 
con t inu i t y  argument that the Foreign O f f ice  had l i t t l e ,  i f  any, in f luence 
in  p o l i c y  making under B ism arck ,  W i lhe lm  I I ,  and H i t l e r .  A l l  th ree  men 
p r a c t i c e d ,  to va ry ing  degrees,  t h e i r  d e s i r e  to be t h e i r  own Fo re ign  
M in i s t e r .  The Fo re ign  O f f i c e  e x i s t e d  to c a r r y  out f o r e ig n  a f f a i r s ,  not 
formulate po l icy .  Only during the Weimar era, e spe c ia l l y  under Stresemann, 
did the Foreign O f f ice  exert a strong in f luence  in po l i cy  making. With the
emergence of H i t l e r ,  the d ip lomats returned to t h e i r  es tab l ished pattern o f  
s e rv in g  a s t rong  German le ade r .  Thus, when the d ip lo m a t s  on t r i a l  a t  
Nuremberg stated that H i t l e r  was h is  own Foreign M in i s t e r  and the Foreign 
O f f i c e  had no i n f l u e n c e  on h i s  d e c i s i o n s ,  they were a rgu ing  a v ie w p o in t  
that holds true fo r  much o f  the t ime during 1871 to 1945.
vi i i
INTRODUCTION
The Internat ional  M i l i t a r y  Tr ibunal ,  and l a t e r ,  the American M i l i t a r y  
Tribunal held key representat ives from the German Foreign O f f ice  as defen­
dants against  charges of conspiracy to wage wars of aggression, the actual 
waging o f  wars,  war c r im es ,  and c r im e s  a g a in s t  humanity . Th is  t h e s i s  
c on cen t ra te s  on the f i r s t  charge, t h a t  o f  c on sp i r a c y .  The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
M i l i t a r y  T r ib una l  found German Fo re ign  M in i s t e r s  Constantin von Neurath 
(1932-38) and Joachim von Ribbentrop (1938-45) both g u i l t y  of conspiracy 
in sp i te  of pleas of innocence due to t h e i r  minimal in f luence  over H i t l e r ' s  
fore ign po l icy :  Ribbentrop argued tha t  H i t l e r  was a c tua l l y  h is  own Foreign 
M in i s te r  and he only ca r r ied  out orders as a technica l  s p e c ia l i s t .  Other 
members o f  the Foreign O f f ice ,  in c lud ing  the Secretary o f  State fo r  Foreign 
A f f a i r s , 1 E rn s t  von We izsaecke r ,  were a l s o  found g u i l t y  o f  t h i s  charge 
a f t e r  le ng thy  t r i a l s  by the Amer ican M i l i t a r y  T r ib u n a l .  In the f i r s t  
p la c e ,  t h i s  paper w i l l  reexamine to what e x te n t  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  was 
a c t u a l l y  in v o lv e d  in  a Nazi c o n sp i r a c y  to wage wars o f  agg re ss ion .  
Second ly ,  in  o rder  to p lace  t h i s  s tudy  in  i t s  p roper  h i s t o r i c a l  c o n te x t ,  
t h i s  paper w i l l  a lso inves t iga te  the c o n t i n u i t y , 2 i f  any, of Foreign O f f ice  
i n f l u e n c e  on the  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  as p e r t a i n i n g  to 
in te rna t iona l  p o l i t i c a l  re la t io n s  during 1871 to 1945.
S ince  i t s  c r e a t i o n  in  1870, the German Fo re ign  O f f i c e  has had a 
h i s t o r y  o f  s t r i c t  obedience to the head o f  German a f f a i r s ,  whether i t  be
1
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Im pe r ia l  C h a n c e l lo r  Otto von B ism arck ,  who was a l s o  P ru s s ian  Fo re ign  
M i n i s t e r ,  o r  K a i s e r  W i lhe lm  I I ,  c a r r y i n g  ou t ,  not f o rm u la t in g  fo r e ig n  
p o l i c y .  Only a f t e r  the F i r s t  World War, under Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  Gustav 
Stresemann, did the Foreign O f f ice  manage to become the prime formula tor of 
German fore ign po l icy .  Stresemann, who served a short t ime as Chancel lor , 
became a fo c a l  p o in t  in  European p o l i t i c s  because o f  Germany's postwar 
s i t u a t i o n ,  as w e l l  as the combined German c i v i l i a n  and m i l i t a r y  l e ade rs  
quest to rev ise  the V e r s a i l l e s  Dik tat .  Under the au toc ra t ic  ru le  o f  Adolf  
H i t l e r ,  as R ibbent rop  argued a t  Nuremberg, the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  was aga in  
forced in to i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  subserv ient ro le  as a mere technica l  apparatus 
which ca r r ied  out fore ign po l i c y  dec is ions ,  but d id not formulate them.
An exam ina t ion  o f  the h i s t o r y  o f  the f o r e ig n  O f f i c e  r e v e a l s  the 
con t inu i t y  of the m in is t ry 's  funct ion as an organ izat ion designed to carry  
out the in s t ru c t ion s  of German leaders. Bisrnarck, Wilhelm II,  and H i t l e r  
a l l  p r a c t i c e d ,  to v a ry in g  degrees,  t h e i r  d e s i r e  to be t h e i r  own Fore ign  
M in i s t e r .  In B ism arck 's  case ,  as the Im pe r ia l  C h a n c e l l o r  and P ru s s ian  
Foreign M in i s te r ,  he had absolute contro l o f  fore ign po l icy .  He appointed 
c i v i l  s e rvan ts  and d ip lo m a t s ,  who c a r r i e d  out h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n s  w i th ou t  
quest ion, to key pos i t ions  in the Foreign O ff ice .  In 1890, Ka ise r  Wilhelm 
dismissed the Iron Chancel lor and i n i t i a l l y  replaced him with men who knew 
l i t t l e  o f  wor ld  a f f a i r s  so t h a t  he, h im s e l f ,  cou ld  g r e a t l y  i n f l u e n c e  the 
d i r e c t i o n  o f  German f o r e ig n  p o l i c y .  E v e n t u a l l y  W i lhe lm  appo in ted  the 
diplomat Bernhard von Buelow as Foreign Secretary (1397-1900), and l a t e r  as
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Im pe r ia l  C h a n c e l lo r  and P ru s s ian  Fo re ign  M in i s t e r  (1900-9), to ca r ry  out 
h is  W e i t p o l i t i k .  Although in f luenced by the m i l i t a r y ,  e sp e c ia l l y  Admi.al 
A l f r e d  von T i r p i t z ,  W i lhe lm  took f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  i n i t i a t i v e s  on h i s  own, 
^■'metimes c o n t r a r y  to the adv ice  o f  Buelow and H o l s t e i n ,  who he ld  much 
in f l u e n c e  i n s i d e  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e ,  as w e l l  as a long su cce s s io n  o f  
fore ign secre ta r ies .  The Kaiser s t rong ly  d i s l i k e d  profess ional diplomats. 
Ridding h imse l f  o f  fore ign a f f a i r s  experts,  the Ka iser approached the F i r s t  
World War under the m i l i t a r y  l e a d e r s h ip ' s  i n f l u e n c e  w i th  l i t t l e  e xpe r t  
d i p l o m a t i c  ad v ice ,  s in ce  the Im pe r ia l  C h a n c e l l o r  and P ru s s ia n  Fo re ign  
M in i s te r ,  Theobald von Bethmann-Holl wea, knew l i t t l e  o f  fore ign a f f a i r s ,  
and Foreign Secretary Go t t l ieb  von Jagow took a back seat in the Ka iser 's  
c i r c l e  of i n f l u e n t i a l  advisers.
Coming to power in 1933, H i t l e r  kept Neurath, a conservat ive e l i t e ,  as 
Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  w h i l e  he c o n s o l i d a t e d  h i s  c o n t r o l  over Germany. The 
Fo re ign  O f f i c e ,  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  c o n s i s t i n g  p r im a r i l y  of a r i s t o c ra t s ,  under 
Neurath shared common a ims, to a c e r t a i n  degree, w i th  H i t l e r :  they both 
wanted Germany to be r i d  o f  the V e r s a i l l e s  r e s t r i c t i o n s  and rega in  i t s  
s t a t u s  as a G reat  Power. For a w h i l e  both the C h a n ce l lo r  and Fo re ign  
M i n i s t e r  worked toge the r ,  e s p e c i a l l y  s in c e  H i t l e r  va lued the need o f  
m a in t a in in g  German r e s p e c t a b i l i t y  in  the d i p l o m a t i c  wor ld .  H i t l e r ,  
however, had an add it iona l  agenda, eastward expansionism, and thus sought 
u l t im a t e  c o n t r o l  over German f o r e ig n  p o l i c y .  The Fuh re r ,  who g r e a t l y  
d i s l i k e d  profess iona l  d iplomats,  employed the ambit ious and loya l  champagne
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dealer,  Ribbentrop, who knew l i t t l e  of world a f f a i r s  beyond h is  t r a v e ls ,  as 
a persona l  d ip lom a t  to not on ly  c h a l l e n g e  the a u t h o r i t y  o f  the Fo re ign  
O f f i c e ,  but to carry out h is  fore ign po l i c y  i n i t i a t i v e s .  Neurath and the 
Foreign O f f ice  opposed H i t l e r ' s  meddling in d ip lomat ic  a f f a i r s ,  but found 
the s i t u a t i o n  im p o s s ib le .  They s w i f t l y  l o s t  the i n f l u e n c e  in  the 
f o rm u la t i o n  o f  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  t h a t  the m in i s t r y  had a cqu i red  du r ing  the 
Weimar Republic. In ea r ly  1938, H i t l e r  became h is  own Foreign M in i s te r ,  
d ism iss ing  Neurath, and rep lac ing him with Ribbentrop as the token head of 
the Foreign Off ice.  Thus, under the au toc ra t ic  ru le  of H i t l e r ,  the Foreign 
O f f ice  came f u l l  c i r c l e  and c l e a r l y  resumed i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  pos i t ion  as an 
agency meant to carry  out the in s t ru c t ion s  o f  the German leadersh ip  with 
s t r i c t  obedience as during the t imes o f  Bismarck and Wilhelm II.
I f  the above t h e s i s  proves t r u e ,  then the defense arguments o f  
Ribbentrop and other diplomats at the Nuremberg t r i a l s  had a r ing  o f  t ru th  
to them. Ribbentrop, although o f f i c i a l l y  Reich Foreign M in i s te r ,  professed 
that he had l i t t l e  in f luence in the formulat ion o f  fore ign po l icy .  He, in 
f e a r  o f  h i s  l i f e  dur ing  the Nuremberg p roceed ings ,  argued t h a t  H i t l e r ,  
a c t i n g  as h i s  own Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r ,  and Hermann Goer ing were the 
c o n s p i r a t o r s  p lann ing  wars o f  aggress ion .^  E rn s t  von W e iz saecke r ,  
R ibben t rop 's  Fo re ign  S e c re t a r y ,  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  had no 
in f luence on policy.^ Could these statements be mere arguments made by men 
in the shadow of the gal lows? Bradley Smith has shown that  the A l l i e s  were 
out to t ry  and conv ic t  the much d i s l i k e d  Ribbentrop months before the end
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o f  the war. Ev idence ,  no mat te r  how c i r c u m s t a n t i a l ,  p o in t in g  toward 
Ribbentrop's involvement in a Nazi conspiracy to wage wars of aggression 
was gathered du r ing  the course  o f  the wa r .6 Norman R ich has po in ted  out 
that these documents, in t h e i r  abundance, were overwhelming to any defense 
t h a t  R ibbent rop  cou ld  manage.6 These same documents t h a t  c o n v i c t e d  the 
Foreign M in i s te r ,  as A l l i e d  lo g ic  would have i t ,  imp l ica ted  other leading 
members of the Foreign O f f ice  and were used to t ry  ind iv idua l  d iplomats, 
who su rv iv ed  the war, a t  Nuremberg. R ibben t rop  r e a l i z e d  h i s  own 
predicament. He wrote in h is  uncompleted memoirs, "Adolf  H i t l e r  i s  dead, 
and o the rs  must t h e r e fo r e  be found re spons ib le . "^  On 5 October 1946, 
sho r t ly  before h is  execution, Ribbentrop wrote to h is  wife:
Everyone knows that  the v e rd ic t  i s  qu i te  amenable, but I happen 
to  have been A d o l f  H i t l e r ' s  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  and p o l i t i c o !  
cons iderat ions therefore c a l l  fo r  my conv ic t ion .  Fate w i l l e d  that  my 
p r i n c i p a l  w i t n e s s ,  A d o l f  H i t l e r ,  i s  dead. Were he ab le  to g ive  
evidence, the whole ve rd ic t  would co l lapse .  As i t  i s ,  I must bear the 
f a t e  o f  the f o l l o w e r s  o f  such a m ighty and perhaps demoniac 
p e r s o n a l i t y  . . .
Much has been w r i t t e n  on German f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  du r ing  1871 to 1945. 
However, there e x i s t  few studies of the German Foreign O f f ice  during t h i s  
per iod.6. In regards to the Foreign M in i s te r s  o f  the Third Reich, Neurath 
has r e c e iv e d  some re cen t  a t t e n t i o n , * 6, but R ibben t rop  has been l a r g e l y  
ignored  by h i s t o r i a n s . * 1 Th is  s tudy o f  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  adds to the 
a l r e ad y  pub l i s hed  resea rch  by i n c l u d i n g  f i n d i n g s  from the unpub l ished  
American M i l i t a r y  Tribunal papers located in the Chester F r i t z  L ib ra ry  at 
the Un ive rs i ty  o f  North Dakota.
NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION
1. The German t i t l e  o f  S ta te  S e c re t a r y  f o r  Fo re ign  A f f a i r s  i s  more 
commonly referred to as Foreign Secretary in most countr ies. I w i l l  use 
these t i t l e s  interchangeably throughout t h i s  t h e s i s .  I t  i s  im po r tan t  to 
note that before 1919 the Imperial Chancel lor,  under the au thor i ty  of the 
Emperor and German cons t i tu t ion ,  was respons ib le  fo r  fore ign a f f a i r s .  The 
Chancel lor  also held the pos i t ion  of Prussian Foreign M in is te r .  There was 
no Im pe r ia l  Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r ,  but the S e c r e t a r y  o f  S ta te  served the 
Chancel lor  as the ch ie f  adm in is t ra to r  of the Foreign Off ice.  A f ter  1919, 
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CHAPTER I
BISMARCK AND THE CREATION OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE
A lthough most o f  the European Great  Powers possessed some form o f  
fore ign m in is t ry  as ea r ly  as the seventeenth century, the r e l a t i v e l y  la te  
r i s e  of Pruss ia and i t s  au toc ra t ic  nature resu lted in  the la te  e s t a b l i s h ­
ment of a Prussian Foreign M in is t ry .  Prussian ru le rs ,  e spec ia l ly  Freder ick 
W i l l iam  I (1713-40) and Frederick the Great (1740-86), preferred to manage 
t h e i r  own d ip lomat ic  a f f a i r s  with the ass is tance o f  a small s ta f f .  I t  was 
not un t i l  the reform movement of 1806 and 1807 that  Freder ick W i l l iam  III  
(1797-1840) es tab l ished the Prussian Foreign M in i s t r y  in B e r l in  to handle 
h i s  d i p l o m a t i c  a f f a i r s . 1 The m in i s t r y ,  under the d i r e c t i o n  o f  Count 
C h r i s t i a n  B e r n s t o r f f  (1 81 8 -32 ) ,  a c q u i r e d  a h e a d q u a r t e r s  on the  
Wilhelmstrasse a f te r  the Ka iser purchased the residence at Number 76 from 
the Russian government in  1819. Tsar Alexander I had used i t  to house h is  
ambassador to P r u s s i a . 2 R equ i r in g  a d d i t i o n a l  space to house an expanded 
s t a f f  a f t e r  the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  the German Empire in  1871, Otto von 
Bismarck, the Imperial Chancel lor and Pruss ian Foreign M in i s te r ,  acquired 
Number 77 in  1874 and Number 75 th ree  y ea r s  l a t e r . 2 L i k e  i t s  French 
equ iva lent,  the Quai d' Orsay, the Austr ian known as the Ba l lhausp la tz ,  and 
the B r i t i s h  r e f e r r e d  to as W h i t e h a l l ,  the newly c re a ted  German Fo re ign
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O f f i c e  became known by the name of  "the Wi 1 h e lm s t r a s se "  because o f  i t s  
physica l presence on that p a r t i c u la r  street.^
From i t s  e a r ly  beginnings the Prussian Foreign M in i s t r y  had to compete 
against the Prussian m i l i t a r y  t r a d i t i o n  to r e c r u i t  q u a l i f i e d  a r i s t o c r a t s  
f o r  s e r v i c e  as c i v i l  s e rvan ts  and d ip lom a ts .  P r u s s ia ' s  m i l i t a r i s t i c  
h i s t o r y ,  e s p e c i a l l y  under F r e d e r i c k  the Great ,  meant th a t  most t a le n te d  
Pruss ians preferred to serve the Ka iser in h is  p res t ig ious  m i l i t a r y . 5 In 
fac t ,  the Foreign M in i s t r y  became s ta f fed  by incompetent dip lomats both in 
B e r l i n  and s e rv in g  abroad. Many of these d ip lom a ts  acqu i red  t h e i r  
pos i t ions  "s imply on account of t h e i r  p ro f i c iency  in French [the language 
o f  d ip lo m a t s ] ,  w i thou t  any knowledge o f  p o l i t i c s  . . . , "5 The m in i s t r y  
became known f o r  i t s  c o r r u p t  p r a c t i c e s  and inadequate  p r o f i c i e n c y  in  
handling fore ign af fa irs .^
In 1862, K a i s e r  W i lhe lm  I (1861-88) appo in ted  Otto von B ismarck  as 
M in i s te r  Pres ident and Foreign M in i s te r  of Pruss ia. As head of the Foreign 
M in i s t r y ,  Bismarck found h imse l f  in complete charge of d ip lomat ic  a f f a i r s  
s in c e  the K a i s e r  had l i t t l e  i n t e r e s t  in managing such m a t te rs .  Tak ing 
charge of the m in i s t r y ,  B ismarck  d is co ve red  h i s  d i p l o m a t i c  s t a f f  and 
representat ives consisted o f  mediocre  personne l who were " d i s o rg a n i z e d ,  
und isc ip l ined ,  and des t i tu te  of e i t h e r  uniform method or c le a r  channels of 
c o m m u n ic a t io n . "^  B i s m a r c k  s e t  ou t  to  c o r r e c t  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  by 
e s t a b l i s h i n g  and i n s i s t i n g  upon s t r i c t  d i s c i p l i n e  w i t h i n  the f o r e ig n  
serv ice: he demanded complete subord inat ion of h is  s t a f f  and d ip lomats to
10
himse lf .  Moreover, the Foreign M in i s te r  educated the Wi lhelmstrasse and 
Pruss ia 's  representat ives abroad conce rn ing  h i s  s p e c i f i c  way o f  hand l ing  
f o r e ig n  a f f a i r s .  With B ismarck  in  f i r m  c o n t r o l ,  the W i1ne lm s t ra s se  
g radua l ly  became more e f f i c i e n t ,  which resu lted in r a is in g  the m in is t ry 's  
p r e s t i g e ,  and acted as a c a t a l y s t  f o r  d raw ing a h ighe r  c a l i b r e  o f  
app l icants  wanting to enter the fore ign serv ice.  Such e f f i c ie n c y ,  as well  
as B ism arck 's  s u c c e s s fu l  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  which led to the c r e a t i o n  o f  
Germany, made the Foreign M in i s t r y  an important part of the Pruss ian, and 
la te r ,  German government.^
B ism arck 's  success in  war and d ip lom acy  r e s u l t e d  in  u n i f y i n g  the 
German s t a t e s  as the North German Fede ra t ion  in  1867. As the newly 
appo in ted  C h an ce l lo r ,  B ismarck  needed the s e r v i c e s  o f  h i s  by now w e l l -  
estab l ished,  p ro fe s s iona l ly - t ra in ed  Prussian Foreign M in i s t r y  to admin is ter 
the much expanded scope of German re la t io n s  with the other European Great 
and Minor Powers. For several years Bismarck urged Kaiser Wilhelm I and 
the Reichstag to a l low the m in is t r y  to become the supreme federal o f f i c e  
f o r  f o r e ig n  a f f a i r s . ^  The C h a n c e l lo r  f i n a l l y  succeeded in  t h i s  task  by 
way of his great in f luence and status w i th in  the North German Federation. 
Thus, on 4 January 1870, Wilhelm I gave the Prussian Foreign M in i s t r y  the 
o f f i c i a l  t i t l e  o f  Fo re ign  O f f i c e  o f  the North German F e d e r a t i o n .^  I t  
became the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  (Au sw ae r t ig e s  Amt), w i th  the f u n c t i o n  o f  
a s s i s t in g  the Chancel lor  in d ip lomat ic  matters,  instead of gain ing status 
as a m in is t ry .  This new organ izat ion was almost t o t a l l y  created from the
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old Prussian Foreign M in is t ry .  It took over the m in is t ry 's  bu i ld ings and 
s t a f f  at the WiIhelmstrasse.^ Bismarck, who was not only Chancel lor , but 
s t i l l  held the pos i t ion  of Prussian Foreign M in i s te r ,  ensured that the new 
Fore ign  O f f i c e  was t o t a l l y  subo rd ina te  to h im .^  With the c r e a t i o n  o f  
Germany in  1871, the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  was t r a n s f e r r e d  to the new empire 
s imply by om it t ing the words "of the North German Federat ion."^ Thus, as 
Norman Rich has w r i t ten ,  the Foreign O f f ice  "was s imp ly  an expansion o f  the 
Prussian Foreign M in i s t ry .  There was no organic d iv i s io n  between them."^ 
A r t i c l e  11 o f  the Im pe r ia l  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1871 dec la red  tha t  the 
Empero r  wou ld  r e p r e s e n t  Germany in  f o r e i g n  r e l a t i o n s ,  c o n c lu d e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r e a t i e s ,  and a c c r e d i t  and r e c e i v e  envoys. Moreover,  the 
cons t i tu t ion  extended to the Kaiser the same general appoint ive power that 
he enjoyed in Pruss ia  (A r t i c le  18).^ As German Emperor, Ka iser Wilhelm I 
appointed the Imperial Chancel lor,  Bismarck, who was responsib le  only  to 
him, to d i re c t  German fore ign and domestic p o l i c i e s .  Wilhelm I solved the 
problem of the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between P r u s s ia  and the German Empire by 
u n i t i n g  the p o s i t i o n s  o f  Im pe r ia l  C h a n ce l lo r  and th a t  o f  the P ru s s ian  
Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  w i th  the appoin tment o f  B ismarck  to both. Th is  gave 
B ismarck  c o n t r o l  over the whole German Empire and i t s  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s ,  
since Wilhelm I, and la te r ,  Freder ick I I I ,  preferred to leave much of the 
d ip l o m a t i c  a f f a i r s  o f  Germany to  the Iron C h a n c e l l o r .  ' The r o l e  o f  the 
Fo re ign  O f f i c e  was to se rve  the C h a n c e l lo r  and h i s  hand l ing  o f  f o r e i g n  
a f f a i r s  w i th ou t  ques t ion .  The Fo re ign  O f f i c e  served B ismarck  as a
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bureaucrat ic  technica l apparatus: i t  was not al lowed to contr ibute  in the 
formula t ion of fore ign po l icy .
The au toc ra t ic  Bismarck ru led over the new German Foreign O f f ice  with 
complete author i ty .  He continued to demand s t r i c t  d i s c i p l i n e  and complete 
subord inat ion of h is  diplomats in B e r l in  and abroad.18 Bismarck operated 
under the b e l i e f  that he was the only one who could e f f e c t i v e l y  formulate 
and e x e r c i s e  German f o r e ig n  p o l i c y .  He had a very low op in io n  o f  h i s  
d i p l o m a t s . 19 He o f ten  compla ined  t h a t  "German d ip lom a t s  were m os t ly  
e n t h u s ia s t s  f o r  some o the r  coun t ry  . . . , "28 One h i s t o r i a n  has s ta ted ,  
"to Bismarck, many diplomats were no more than l i v e r i e d  l e t t e r  c a r r i e r s  who 
consumed s ta te ly  dinners and purveyed mal ic ious gossip."21 F r ie d r ic h  von 
H o l s t e i n ,  a Fo re ign  O f f i c e  o f f i c i a l  under the Iron C h a n c e l lo r ,  heard 
B ismarck  once s t a t e :  "P rov ided  an Ambassador can obey t h a t ' s  a l l  he 
n e e d s . " 22 O th e r  than  the  F o r e i g n  S e c r e t a r y ,  d i p l o m a t s  a t  the  
Wi lhelmstrasse had no access to Bismarck.23 Lamar Cec i l  has analyzed the 
s i tua t ion :
Bismarck was se l f - con f iden t ,  overbearing, and h yp e r c r i t i c a l  by nature, 
and he was t h e r e f o r e  i n c l i n e d  to  manage the  W i l h e l m s t r a s s e  
d i c t a t o r i a l l y ,  both because h i s  e s t im a t i o n  o f  h i s  own t a l e n t s  was 
bound less and because he had scan t  regard  f o r  a g re a t  many o f  h i s  
d ip lomat ic  servants.24
Bernhard Ernst von Buelow, the Foreign Secretary (1873-79), admitted that 
Bismarck "did not consider the Foreign O f f ice  an arena fo r  d iscuss ion  [on 
f o r e ig n  p o l i c y ]  but r a t h e r  the in s t r u m e n t  f o r  c a r r y i n g  out B i sm a r ck 's  
i n s t r u c t i o n s  to the l e t t e r . " 25 In f a c t ,  in  s p i t e  o f  h i s  i n s i s t e n c e  upon25
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d ip lomat ic  reports being accurate and concise, the Chancel lor  demanded that 
these documents contain only the fa c ts  and inc lude no speculation since he 
d i s t i n c t l y  wanted to make h is  own ana ly s i s .^
Bismarck demanded complete subord inat ion of h is  diplomats and Foreign 
O f f i c e  o f f i c i a l s  to h i s  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y .  He would not put up w i th  any 
c ha l le n ge s  to h i s  author cy, d e c l a r i n g  "I . . . am H is M a je s ty ' s  so le  
adviser on Foreign A f f a i r s . " ^  Few had the nerve to oppose h is  d ip lomat ic  
in s t ruc t ions .  As Kurt Doss stated, "those who ignored h is  warnings had the 
implacable fury  of t e Chancel lor to fear."^® Count Harry von Arnim, the 
German Ambassador to Par is ,  was one exception. He opposed Bismarck's a n t i -  
Bourbon po l i c y  with France and worked to restore  the Bourbons to the French 
throne. Bismarck made an example out of Arnim by having him charged with 
t r e a s o n  and c o n v i c t e d  in  c o u r t  f o r  d i s r e g a r d i n g  h i s  d i p l o m a t i c  
i n s t r u c t i o n s . ^  Th is  le sson  was remembered by d ip lom a t s  in  the Fo re ign  
O f f ice  fo r  many years. The Arnim case gave proof how severe the Chancel lor  
could act even against the h igh ly  p r iv i leged  members of the Wilhelmstrasse 
should they put up any res is tance to h is  p o l i c i e s .  The Chancel lor brought 
fear to even h is  most experienced counse l lo rs  in the P o l i t i c a l  Department. 
Johann Maria von Radowitz, one of Bismarck's most ta lented subordinates, 
r e a l i z e d  tha t  "to oppose B ismarck  o f  the 1870's and the 1880's in  any
on
matter would have been unthinkable to me!"JU Gordon Craig described the 
s i t u a t i o n  as such, " i t  i s  not too much to say t h a t  the atmosphere in  the
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Fo re ign  M i n i s t r y  came to  resemble  t h a t  o f  an o r i e n t a l  c o u r t  r u le d  by a
c ru e l  and c a p r i c i o u s  t y r a n t  . . . . " 31
In f i rm  control of fore ign po l i c y ,  Bismarck dominated the operations
o f  the Wi 1 he lm s t ra s se .  From 1862 to 1890, he p re s id ed  over the d a i l y
business o f  the fore ign serv ice,  putt ing  h is  own personal stamp, one rooted
in  a t h o rough  and p r o f e s s i o n a l  k now ledge  o f  d i p l o m a c y ,  on i t s
adm in is t ra t ion .  Commenting on Bismarck's management o f  the Wi lhelmstrasse,
one h is to r ian  of the Foreign O f f i c e  has wr i t ten:
He would provide them [Foreign O f f ice  personnel] with orders and t h e i r  
r o l e  would be to c a r r y  out h i s  d i r e c t i v e s  to the l e t t e r .  The r e s u l t  
was a system in which both the design o f  po l i c y  and the d i s c i p l i n e  o f  
the d ip l o m a t i c  s e r v i c e  depended on a s i n g l e  in d i s p e n s a b le  f i g u r e .  
Bismarck encountered no oppos i t ion from h is  subalterns in  the Foreign 
O f f i c e ,  f o r  German d i p l o m a t s  u n d e r s t o o d  t h a t  t h e i r  r o l e  was 
implemental, not consu l t ive .32
The Chancel lor tended to be an extremely overbearing manager o f  the Foreign 
O f f i c e .  Th is  was e v id en t  in  the t h i r t y - t w o  volumes o f  i n s t r u c t i o n s  he 
is sued  to h is  s t a f f  c o ve r in g  such m at te rs  as the s i z e  o f  b l o t t i n g  paper, 
the use o f  a b b r e v i a t i o n s ,  the c o l o r  o f  in k ,  the p ag in a t io n  o f  le ng thy
OO
reports ,  and the use of covers. He al lowed no one, with the exception of 
the S ta te  S e c re ta r y ,  access  to h im .34 From 1886 to 1890 t h i s  Fo re ign  
S e c r e t a r y  was B ism arck 's  own son, He rbe r t ,  who the C h a n c e l l o r  groomed
o r
through r a p id  p romot ions  w i th  the hope making him h i s  su cce sso r .  J The 
au toc ra t ic  operations of the Foreign O f f i c e  made a l a s t in g  impress ion on 
the young grandson of Wilhelm I, the future Ka iser  Wilhelm II,  who worked 
in  the W i1he lm s t ra s se  under H e rbe r t  B ismarck  in  1886 and 1887, as
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p a r t i c u l a r l y  d i f f e r e n t  than that of the German General S ta f f . 36 He wrote 
in h is  memoirs:
The Fo re ign  O f f i c e  was conducted w i th  the s t r i c t e s t  d i s c i p l i n e  by 
Count Herbert, whose rudeness toward h is  employees p a r t i c u l a r l y  struck 
me. The gent lemen there  s im p ly  f l e w  when they were summoned or 
d i sm is se d  by the Count,  so much so t h a t  a j o k in g  say ing  arose a t  the 
t ime  th a t  " t h e i r  coa t  t a i l s  s tood s t r a i g h t  out behind them." The 
f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  was conducted by P r in c e  B ismarck  a lone ,  a f t e r  
c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i th  Count He rbe r t ,  who passed on the commands o f  the 
C h a n c e l l o r  and had them t rans fo rm ed  i n t o  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  Hence the 
Fo re ign  O f f i c e  was no th ing  but an o f f i c e  o f  the g rea t  C h a n c e l lo r ,  
where work was done a c co rd ing  to h i s  d i r e c t i o n s .  Ab le  men, w i th  
independent ideas, were not schooled and t ra ined  there. '
The young d ip lom a t ,  Bernhard von Buelow, the son o f  one o f  B ism a rck 's
p rev ious  S ta te  S e c r e t a r i e s ,  and l a t e r  to become not on ly  a Fo re ign
S e c re ta ry  h im s e l f ,  but Im pe r ia l  C h a n c e l l o r ,  a l s o  noted the s t r i c t
d i s c i p l i n e  o f  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  under the two B ism arcks .  He made the
fo l low ing  observat ion o f  Herbert 's operation o f  the Wi lhelmstrasse:
He t r a i n e d  h i s  messengers to jump in  . . .  . He kept  them in  such a 
permanent s t a t e  o f  t en s io n  and f e a r  t h a t  when he rang the b e l l  they 
wou ld  dash i n t o  h i s  room l i k e  a t r o u t  when i t  l e a p s  o v e r  an
o b s t ru c t io n .^
With t h i s  in ten se  e f f o r t ,  n e v e r t h e le s s ,  the Chance l lor  eventua l ly  turned 
h is  fore ign serv ice  in to  one of the most o rder ly  and e f f i c i e n t  in ex is tence 
by im p r o v i n g  i t s  q u a l i t y  o f  p e r s o n n e l ,  t e c h n i c a l  e x p e r t i s e ,  and 
performance.39 Even Harold Nicolson has admitted that  from the standpoint 
of ta len t  and e f f i c i e n c y  Bismarck's fore ign se rv ice  compared favorab ly  with 
any in Europe.40
In sp i te  of Bismarck's au toc ra t ic  ru le  of the Wi lhe lmstrasse, German 
a r i s t o c ra t s ,  e sp e c ia l l y  Pruss ians,  h igh ly  des ired acqu i r ing  a pos i t ion  at
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the Foreign O f f ice  or serv ing as a dip lomat abroad. Taking t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n  
from the Prussian Foreign M in i s t r y ,  German a r i s t o c ra t s  sought to serve the 
Empire in the h ig h l y  r a t i o n a l i z e d ,  p ro fe s s iona l l y - t ra in ed  bureaucracy of 
the Fo re ign  O f f i c e .  Under B ism arck ,  as Paul Seabury has commented, "the 
p rest ige  of th i s  bureaucracy as a whole was enormous."4* But to acquire a 
post  and expe r ience  c a ree r  advancement one needed to come from noble 
l ineage.4  ̂ The Wi lhelmstrasse, as A lbe r t  B a l l i n ,  one of Germany's leading 
bourgeois businessmen in the la te  nineteenth century, observed, was a "club 
in to which one had to be admitted by and through b i r t h . I n  fa c t ,  as one 
h is to r ian  has noted, s ix t y -e ig h t  percent of the dip lomats working in the 
Foreign O f f ice  bore t i t l e s  of n o b i l i t y ,  wh i le  eighty-seven percent of the 
d ip lom a t s  abroad were o f  nob le  l i n e a g e . 44 The K a i s e r  and C h a n c e l lo r  
favored nobles since i t  was h igh ly  l i k e l y  that these ind iv idua ls  would be 
c o n s e r v a t i v e s  and support  the German monarchy.46 I t  was t r u e ,  however, 
that bourgeois app l icants ,  e s p e c ia l l y  those with cons iderable  wealth, could 
a cqu i re  a p o s i t i o n  in the Fo re ign  O f f i c e .  Cand ida tes  f o r  the Fo re ign  
O f f ice  were more l i k e l y ,  however, to be accepted i f  they held the patronage 
of the Ka iser,  Chancel lor , or important Wi lhelmstrasse o f f i c i a l s ;  came from 
Prussian m i l i t a r y  fam i l ie s ;  or possessed law degrees and had belonged to 
ce r ta in  un ive r s i t y  f r a t e r n i t i e s . 46 Nevertheless, tc gain advancement, an 
ind iv idua l  normally  had to have noble b i r th ,  wealth, s o c i a b i l i t y ,  a w e l l ­
born German wife which was acceptable to the Foreign O f f ice  leadersh ip ,  as
A  *7
w e l l  as some a b i l i t y  f o r  n e g o t i a t i o n .  ' Conce i t  and back s tabb ing  were
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prevalent.  Moreover, some dip lomats from old a r i s t o c r a t i c  f a m i l i e s  were 
in to le ra n t  o f  t h e i r  col leagues whose t i t l e s  were recent, cons ider ing them 
in  a l l  r e s p e c t s ,  except  nomenc la tu re ,  to be i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  from the 
b ou rg eo is e .48 On top o f  a l l  t h i s ,  the German government pa id  very  low 
wages to o f f i c i a l s  and diplomats who worked in  the fore ign se rv i c e .^
As already al luded to, the Chance l lor  appointed a Secretary of State 
fo r  Foreign A f f a i r s  to manage the everyday rout ine adm in is t ra t ive  a f f a i r s  
o f  the Foreign Off ice .  Bismarck created t h i s  Imperial pos i t ion  with the 
in ten t ion  that i t  should be held by a c i v i l  servant.88 With the exception 
o f  He rbe r t  B ism arck ,  no Fo re ign  S e c r e t a r y  e xe r ted  much i n f l u e n c e  on 
formula t ing German fore ign po l icy .  Lamar C e c i l ,  in  h is  study o f  the German 
d ip lomat ic  serv ice  from 1871 to 1914, wrote:
Of a l l  pos ts ,  none was so s c r u p u lo u s l y  avo ided as the s t a t e  
secretarysh ip ,  and a long f i l e  o f  Fo re ign  O f f i c e  d i g n i t a r i e s — among 
them A lv en s leben ,  H a t z f e l d t ,  Hohenlohe, H o l s t e i n ,  Jagow, Monts, 
Radow i tz ,  and W e r th e rn - -a t  one t ime  o r  ano ther  d e c l in e d  the pos t  or 
re s is ted  i t s  being th rus t  upon them. Bismarck h imse l f  admitted that 
i t  was a thankless job. The sta te  secretary  was al lowed cons iderable  
la t i t u d e  in adm in is t ra t ion ,  but in d ip lomat ic  matters he was only  the 
chance l lo r 's  spokesman.51
In 1871, when the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  the 
fore ign a f f a i r s  o f  the German Empire, i t  cons is ted o f  only two departments 
l e f t  over from i t s  days as the Pruss ian M in i s t r y  fo r  Foreign A f f a i r s :  the 
Pol i t i c a l  and the Lega l -Com m erc ia l  Depar tments .5  ̂ As d ip l o m a t i c  work 
in c r e a sed  because o f  the e x t e n s i v e  growth in  i t s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  in  response to Germany's ove rseas  expans ion  and i n d u s t r i a l  
growth, the Foreign O f f ice  expanded in  s ize  and separated in to  add it iona l
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departments. The Personnel Department s p l i t  away from the Legal-Commercial
Department and was made independent in  1879.55 Six  years la te r ,  in 1885,
the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  separa ted  le g a l  a f f a i r s  from the Lega l -Commerc ia l
Department.54 Co lon ia l a f f a i r s  was made independent  from the P o l i t i c a l
Department in 1890.55 Moreover, in 1881, Bismarck estab l ished  the post of
Undersecretary o f  State to provide a regular  deputy fo r  the State Secretary
and r e l i e v e  him o f  a l l  h i s  n o n - p o l i t i c a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . 55 The
Undersecretary of State was chosen on the bas is  o f  h is  adm in is t ra t ive  s k i l l
or h i s  competence in  n o n - p o l i t i c a l  f i e l d s . 5 '7 N e ve r th e le s s ,  the Fo re ign
O f f i c e  s t i l l  found i t  necessa ry  f o r  the S ta te  S e c re t a r y  to make a l l
im po r tan t  d e c i s i o n s  in  n o n - p o l i t i c a l  matters,  wh i le  the Undersecretary's
work tended to become a lm os t  t o t a l l y  cen te red  on the a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the
P o l i t i c a l  Department.5® Craig, however, reminds us that  "the heart o f  the
Foreign M in i s t r y  was the P o l i t i c a l  D iv is ion  . . . ."5  ̂ This department was
in  charge o f  the genera l  prob lems o f  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y ,  o f  press  a f f a i r s
( u n t i l  1915), o f  c o l o n i a l  a f f a i r s  ( u n t i l  1890), and, a f t e r  1895, o f  the
Personnel S e c t io n  o f  the D ip lo m a t i c  S e r v i c e .  Heads o f  a l l  the o the r
Foreign O f f ice  departments were required to submit a l l  matters regarding
fo r e ig n  p o l i c y  to the P o l i t i c a l  Department fo r  coord inat ion. Therefore,
the P o l i t i c a l  Department sometimes became involved in questions o f  fore ign
loans or ra i l r o ad  construc t ion  which normally  would have been handled by
60other departments.
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The German Fore ign  O f f i c e ,  because o f  B ism a rck 's  in f l u e n c e  and i t s  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p o s i t i o n ,  was in capab le  o f  f o r m u la t i n g  i t s  own f o r e ig n  
p o l i c ie s .  Even so, from 1886 onwards, F r ie d r ic h  von Holste in ,  D irec to r  of 
the P o l i t i c a l  Department, who had supported B ismarck  dur ing  the Arn im 
c r i s i s ,  1 q u ie t ly  challenged the Chance l lor with present ing h is  own fore ign 
p o l i c y  i n i t i a t i v e s .  Unaware of the en t i re  scheme of Bismarck's d ip lomat ic  
system, e sp e c ia l l y  since the Chancel lor did not confide in him, Hols te in  
bel ieved that Bismarck's d ip lomat ic  system, which was based upon the T r ip le  
A l l i a n ce  (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and I ta ly )  as well  as the Reinsurance 
Treaty with Russia, was too complex and "governed by emotion and therefore 
u n s o u n d . T h u s ,  in the l a t e  1880s, when B ismarck  was e xpe r i e n c in g  
p o l i t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  h i s  o f f i c e  as C h a n c e l l o r ,  H o l s t e in  used the 
o p p o r t u n i t y  to lead a movement w i t h in  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  aga in s t  h is  
m a s t e r .^  B ismarck  fought  back, rep roa ch ing  H o l s t e in  f o r  co r respond ing  
d i r e c t l y  with the Kaiser on d ip lomat ic  matters: the Chancel lor  had always 
fo rb idden  any Fo re ign  O f f i c e  o f f i c i a l  o the r  than h im s e l f  from d i r e c t  
contact with the Ka ise r .^  According to the Ka iser ,  Bismarck warned him 
away from Holste in ,  c a l l i n g  the young d ip lom a t  "dangerous."03 
however, remained at his post, ou t la s t ing  the Bismarck era.
H o l s t e i n ,
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CHAPTER II
KAISER WILHELM II AND THE FOREIGN OFFICE, 1888-1918
Kaiser Wilhelm II became German Emperor in 1888. Wilhelm possessed a 
keen in te res t  in fore ign re la t io n s ,  which was aroused by the fac t  that he 
was r e la t e d  to most of the monarchs in Europe, w i th  Queen V i c t o r i a  of 
B r i t a i n  as h i s  grandmother.  He a l s o  had been employed in  the Fo re ign  
O f f ice  under the Foreign Secretary, Herbert Bismarck, and had witnessed the 
absolute control that the Imperial C h a n ce l lo r  had e x e r c i s e d  over f o r e ig n  
po l i cy .  Having grown up during the era of Otto von Bismarck, Wilhelm, who 
"revered  and i d o l i z e d  the C h a n c e l l o r , "  cou ld  not but he lp become deep ly  
in terested and involved in matters of the German Empire.-  ̂ Coming in to h is  
own as Emperor, Wilhelm desired to gradual ly  assume contro l over the German 
Empire.2
Working in the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  dur ing  1886 and 1887, W i lhe lm  had 
developed a good r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i th  the C h a n c e l lo r  and had a l s o  become a 
c lose  f r iend of h is  son Herbe rt .  ̂ In his memoirs, the Ka iser wrote of h is  
r e la t io n sh ip  with the young Bismarck: "Herbert Bismarck was my in s t ru c to r  
with regard to d ip lomat ic  events of former t imes, the general questions of 
the day in f o r e ig n  p o l i t i c s ,  as w e l l  as f o r e ig n  s ta tesmen and d ip lo m a t s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  the Ambassadors in B e r l in . " 4 Wilhelm noted "Count Herbert 's 
pass ion  f o r  work, h i s  i n e x h a u s t i b l e  energy, and h i s  p o l i t i c a l  knowledge
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were amazing; w h i l e  he d id  not possess  h i s  f a t h e r ' s  gen ius ,  he was 
undoubtedly h is  most g i f ted  and important pup i l . "5 Nevertheless, a f te r  the 
sh o r t  r e ig n  o f  h i s  f a th e r ,  F r e d e r i c k  I I I  in  1888,5 W i lhe lm  g r a d u a l l y  
confronted h is  Chancel lor 's  p o l i c i e s  and eventua l ly  dismissed Bismarck in 
1890. Even so, the K a i s e r  asked Herbe r t  B ismarck  to s tay  on as h i s  S ta te  
S e c re ta r y  f o r  Fo re ign  A f f a i r s ,  but the C h a n c e l l o r ' s  son re fu sed  the 
pos i t ion  out o f  lo y a l t y  to h is  father.^
With the d i s m is s a l  o f  C h a n c e l l o r  B ism arck ,  the German government 
experienced a c r i s i s  in government because there was no s ing le  person who 
cou ld  manage the Empire. Dur ing the e a r l y  n i n e t i e s  B e r l i n ' s  complex 
c on s t i tu t iona l  government was ru led by an o l iga rchy  composed of the Ka iser,  
C h a n c e l l o r ,  c a b in e t  c h i e f s ,  P ru s s ia n  m in i s t e r s ,  s t a t e  s e c r e t a r i e s ,  
F r i e d r i c h  von H o l s t e in ,  and the K a i s e r ' s  c l o s e  f r i e n d ,  P h i l i p  von 
Eu lenbu rg .8 W i lhe lm  I I ,  however, wanted to assume f u l l  c o n t r o l  o f  the 
government, inc lud ing  the d i re c t ion  o f  German fore ign pol icy.^ For several 
y e a r s ,  n one the le s s ,  there  was much c o n fu s io n  and d i s u n i t y  in  the German 
government.10 During th i s  t ime Wilhelm worked to assert  h is  c on s t i tu t io na l  
r ig h ts  on c o n t r o l l i n g  fore ign re la t ion s .
Since Herbert Bismarck dec l ined the o f f e r  to remain as Foreign Secre­
t a r y ,  W i lhe lm  II la cked  a l e a d in g  d i p l o m a t i c  a d v i s o r  o f  h igh q u a l i t y  to 
a s s i s t  him in d i re c t in g  German fore ign po l i cy .  The Iron Chancel lor had had 
complete contro l over fore ign re la t io n s  and f a i l e d  to t r a in  anyone, other 
than He rbe r t ,  in  h i s  complex system o f  a l l i a n c e s  to f o l l o w  in  h i s  f o o t ­
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s teps .H  With both Bismarcks gone, Germany lacked a Chancel lor or State 
Secretary capable of provid ing the Ka iser with sound d ip lomat ic  advice.
From the beg inn ing  o f  h i s  r e ig n ,  the K a i s e r  b e l i e v e d  he cou ld  be h i s  
own Fore ign  M in i s t e r .  He thought he cou ld  manage d ip l o m a t i c  a f f a i r s  
through his own personal re la t ion s  with other monarchs.1  ̂ To lessen the 
chance of any m in i s t e r ia l  chal lenge to h is  au thor i ty ,  Wilhelm appointed men 
to high p o s i t i o n s  who lacked expe r ien ce  in  d ip lom acy .  In most re sp e c t s  
th i s  made the Foreign O f f ice  the d i r e c t  servant of the Kaiser.  Meanwhile, 
Wilhelm maneuvered to acquire and conso l idate h is  p o l i t i c a l  power in the 
ea r ly  n in e t ie s .
In 1890, W i l h e lm  I I  a p p o in t e d  Leo von C a p r i v i ,  a s o l d i e r  by 
p ro f e s s io n ,  as the new Im pe r ia l  C h an ce l lo r .  C a p r i v i  possessed an 
inadequate background in  f o r e ig n  a f f a i r s .  F u l l y  aware of h i s  own 
shortcoming, Capr iv i became dependent upon d ip l o m a t i c  expe r t s .  Whi le  
a c com p l i sh ing  one o f  h i s  f i r s t  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  ta sk s  the C h a n ce l lo r  met 
H o l s t e in ,  the D i r e c t o r  o f  the P o l i t i c a l  Department, who was a c t in g  as 
temporary head of the Foreign O f f ice  since the pos i t ion  of State Secretary 
was s t i l l  vacant a f te r  the res ignat ion  of Herbert Bismarck. This diplomat 
had b u i l t  up much personal power and in f luence w i th in  the Foreign O f f ice  
du r ing  the l a s t  h a l f  o f  the B ismarck  e r a . 14 One d ip lo m a t ,  Bernhard von 
Buelow, described him as a man with "extensive personal connections, wide 
experience, quickness of perception and . . . whose dec is ion ,  cunning, and 
ru th le s s n e s s  had se t  him in  a p o s i t i o n  o f  high a u t h o r i t y , " 15 w h i l e
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Eu lenburg  found H o l s t e i n  possessed " i n f i n i t e  c r a f t i n e s s "  and a " sub t le  
in t e l l i g e n c e " .^  During t h e i r  conversation Ho ls te in  impressed Capr iv i  with 
h is  knowledge of the Foreign O f f ic e 's  f i l i n g  system and understanding of 
world a f f a i r s .  Cap r iv i ,  knowing h is  own inexperience in fore ign a f f a i r s ,  
came to r e a l i z e  that he could use t h i s  expert to a s s i s t  him in matters of 
f o r e ig n  p o l i c y .  Thus, H o l s t e in  was ab le  to ga in much in f l u e n c e  over  the 
f o rm u la t i o n  o f  German f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  du r ing  the C a p r i v i  p e r i o d . 1  ̂ The 
German le a d e r s h ip  accepted H o l s t e i n ' s  adv ice  and re fu sed  to renew 
B ism arck 's  Re insurance  T rea ty  (1887) w i th  R u s s i a , 10 an agreement th a t  
W i lhe lm  II on ly  found out about when he became Emperor .1  ̂ Th is  unsound 
adv ice  pushed Russ ia  i n t o  an a l l i a n c e  w i th  F rance,  which was h o s t i l e  to 
Germany, in 1894.
The K a i s e r  sought to d i r e c t  German f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  h im s e l f .  His 
appointment of Capr iv i  as Imperial Chancel lor and Prussian Foreign M in i s te r  
gave W i lhe lm  a d d i t i o n a l  power in  the conduct  o f  f o r e ig n  a f f a i r s .  To 
f u r t h e r  in c r e a se  t h i s  power, he appo in ted  A d o l f  Baron M a r s c h a l l  vcn 
B i e b e r s t e i n ,  a law ye r  who had served as the M i n i s t e r  o f  Baden and la cked  
t r a in in g  as a diplomat, as h is  Foreign Secretary.20 Thus, the Ka iser had 
the greatest importance in the formula t ion and conduct of German fore ign 
r e l a t i o n s .  Lamar C e c i l  has commented on t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  "the young 
monarch, in  h i s  own op in io n ,  had the t r a i n i n g  f o r  d ip lom acy  t h a t  both 
C a p r i v i  and M a r s c h a l l  la cked  and he t h e r e f o r e  was dete rm ined  to manage 
Germany's r e l a t i o n s  w i th  the o th e r  powers h im s e l f , " 21 He l i s t e n e d  to
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advice coming from Holste in  and the Foreign O f f i c e ,  but the Ka iser bel ieved
th a t  they were incompetent  in  m at te rs  o f  f o r e i g n  r e l a t i o n s .  H o l s t e i n ,
h imse l f ,  admitted the d i f f i c u l t y  that  the Foreign O f f ice  had in continu ing
Bismarck's fore ign po l icy :  "the more tangled the mesh, the more d i f f i c u l t
i t  was to f ind  one's way about i t  without Pr ince Bismarck."22 The Ka iser
s in ce re ly  bel ieved he did not need the Wilhe!mstrasse. From h is  experience
in the Foreign O f f ice  Wilhelm had developed the opinion that:
In the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  . . they were on ly  the e xe cu t i v e  organs o f  a 
s ing le  w i l l :  they could o f fe r  no independent ass is tance because they 
were taught nothing, or not enough, o f  the great in te r re la t io n sh ip s  o f  
the quest ions with which i t  f e l l  to them to deal.2^
On another occasion he wrote:
The Fo re ign  O f f i c e  . . . had not r e a l l y  been t r a i n e d  under P r in c e  
Bismarck; and therefore when, a f t e r  the ret i rement of the Pr ince and 
Count Herbert, the a l l  dominating w i l l  and s p i r i t  were lack ing,  i t  was 
no t  up to  the  t a s k  o f  c o n d u c t i n g  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  on i t s  own 
independent i n i t i a t i v e . 24
On top o f  h i s  low o p in io n  o f  the work accom p l ished  by the Fo re ign  
O f f i c e ,  W i lhe lm  g r e a t l y  d i s l i k e d  most d ip l o m a t s ,  w i th  the e x cep t ion  o f  
Eu lenhurg ,  Buelow, Henr ich  Leopo ld  von T s c h i r s c h k y  und Boegendor f f ,  and 
A l f red  von Kiderlen-Waechter.26 H o l s t e i n  heard him once e x c la im :  " A f t e r  
the French, the people I hate most are d iplomats and deputies."26 Ho ls te in  
wrote in h is  memoirs that "the Ka iser 's  d i s l i k e  of the Foreign M in i s t r y  i s  
a lm os t  p a t h o lo g i c a l  and re cogn ized  as such by the people conce rned ."2 '7 
Commenting on the K a i s e r ' s  o p in io n  o f  the F o re ign  O f f i c e ,  Lamar C e c i l
stated:
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W i l l i a m ' s  language r e s p e c t in g  the Fo re ign  O f f ice  was often abusive. 
Its o f f i c i a l s  were "swine"; i t  lacked both keenness and confidence; i t  
was the department of the government f o r  which he had the le a s t  
re spe c t ;  i t  d id  noth ing  but r a i s e  o b j e c t i o n s .  "I w i l l  t e l l  you 
something," he declared in 1912 to Wilhelm von Stumm, the d i re c to r  of 
the P o l i t i c a l  D iv is ion ,  "You diplomats are f u l l  of sh i t  and the whole 
Wi lhelmstrasse s t in k s . "^
Under H o l s t e in ,  who acqu i red  f i r m  c o n t r o l  o f  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  
management during 1890 to 1906, the Wi lhelmstrasse gained some independence 
from the C h a n ce l lo r  in i t s  o p e ra t io n s .  W i th in  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  
H o l s t e i n ' s  a u t h o r i t y  was v i r t u a l l y  uncontes ted .  The D i r e c t o r  o f  the 
P o l i t i c a l  Department con tro l led  the formula t ion of fore ign p o l i c y  inputs as
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well  as the adm in is t ra t ion of the d ip lomat ic  serv ice.  His importance to 
the Wi lhelmstrasse as an adm in is t ra to r  and fore ign  re la t ion s  advisor was 
g r e a t l y  respec ted  by d ip lom a t s  because he was the on ly  one in  the inne r  
c i r c l e  of the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  who had been in  the f o r e ig n  s e r v i c e  under 
B ismarck.^ As Bernhard von Buelow commented on Hols te in 's  in f luence with 
the Chancel lor  and Foreign Secretary: "Capr iv i and Marscha l l ,  who lacked 
a l l  knowledge of d ip lomat ic  rout ine  and a l l  in s igh t  in to the in te rna t iona l  
game, even as f a r  as languages went, c lung  to H o l s t e in  l i k e  drowning 
men.
But, in 1894, W i lhe lm  II d i sm is se d  C a p r i v i  and rep la ced  him w i th  an 
expe r ienced  d ip lom a t ,  P r in c e  Ch lodw ig  H ohen lohe -S ch i11i n g s f u e r s t ,  as 
Im pe r ia l  C h a n ce l lo r  and P ru s s ia n  Fo re ign  M in i s t e r .  The new C h a n ce l lo r  
al lowed Hols te in  to continue h is  ru le  over the Foreign O f f ice ,  but treated 
the powerful P o l i t i c a l  Department leader with extreme caut ion .^ Even so,
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Hohenlohe's confidence in Hols te in  was not as high as the fore ign re la t io n s  
a d v i s o r  d e s i r e d . 33 in f a c t ,  in  1897, Hohenlohe warned h i s  new Fo re ign  
Secretary, Bernhard von Buelow, that " a l l  doubtful and bad advice emanates 
in the main from Holste in ."34
During the Hohenlohe c h a n c e l l o r s h i p ,  the K a i s e r ' s  p o l i t i c a l  power 
in c rea sed  to a p o in t  where he was ab le  to end the m i n i s t e r i a l  r u l e  o f  
Germany and create h is  own au tho r i ta r ian  government. Many leading Germans 
looked to W i lhe lm  to r e s t o r e  u n i t y  to the B e r l i n  government and German 
Empire. The Ka iser overcame m in i s t e r ia l  oppos i t ion to h is  au toc ra t ic  ru le  
by c o n t r o l l i n g  the appointments of m in is te rs  as well  as rewarding those in 
h i s  fa vo r ,  i n c l u d in g  Hohenlohe.3  ̂ W i lhe lm  appo in ted  Buelow as h i s  new 
Foreign Secretary in order to turn h is  ideas o f  W e l t p o l i t i k  (the quest fo r  
World Power status) in to act ion, wh i le  at the same time he f e l l  under the 
in f luence of Admiral A l f red  von T i r p i t z  and h is  schemes fo r  an expansion of 
the Imperial Navy.3  ̂ These men adopted W e i t p o l i t i k  to gain popu la r i ty  fo r  
the Ka iser through co lon ia l  expansion and success in fore ign adventures as 
a s t r a t e g y  to ensure the s u r v i v a l  o f  the monarchy.37 Hohenlohe, in  h i s  
l a t e  s e v e n t i e s ,  was r e l u c t a n t  to  oppose  W i l h e lm  on the  i s s u e  o f  
W e i t p o l i t i  k . Thus, W i lhe lm  by ta k in g  c o n t r o l  o f  the government and 
appoint ing loya l  men to key pos i t ions  e s s e n t i a l l y  became h is  own Chancel lor 
and Foreign M in i s t e r  during th i s  period. Imanuel Geiss,  a leading German 
h is to r ian ,  has argued that at t h i s  po int ,  the Ka iser ,  without par i iamentary
i n t e r f e r e n c e ,  e x e r c i s e d  a c o n s id e r a b le  amount o f  i n f l u e n c e  on the
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formulat ion and execution of German fore ign po l i c y  because of h is  strong 
w i l l  to ru le  besides the c r ing ing  subservience o f  many German m in is te rs ,  
ambassadors, generals, and p o l i t i c i a n s . 351 Another h is to r ian ,  Paul Kennedy, 
wrote:
W i lhe lm  . . . was . . .  a t  the c en t re  o f  the governmenta l d e c i s i o n ­
making p rocess ,  and a l l  c h a in s  o f  a u t h o r i t y  te rm ina ted  w i th  him. 
M in i s te r s  were h is  men, and not senior p o l i t i c i a n s  from the party or 
p a r t i e s  which had a cqu i red  the l a r g e s t  number o f  sea ts  in  the 
Reichstag; indeed, m in is te rs  could not be members o f  that i n s t i t u t io n .  
The e n t i r e  conduct  o f  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  was in  the hands o f  the K a i s e r ,  
and by delegation in those o f  the Chancel lor and the Auswaertiges Amt 
[Fo re ign  O f f i c e ]  . . . .40
In 1900, the Ka iser picked Foreign Secretary Buelow to become the new
Imperial Chancel lor and Prussian Foreign M in is te r .  Buelow had experienced
a rap id  advancement in  the f o r e ig n  s e r v i c e  because o f  the patronage o f
B ismarck  and H o l s t e i n . 41 P h i l i p  von Eu lenburg ,  a c lo s e  f r i e n d  o f  the
K a i s e r ' s ,  was r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  Buelow's appointment as Chancel lo r .42 The
Ka iser declared that  Buelow would become "my Bismarck."43 One d ip lomat ic
h i s t o r i a n  has po in ted  out ,  "no C h a n ce l lo r  excep t  B ism arck ,  had as v a r ie d
and thorough a t r a in in g  in fore ign a f f a i r s  . . . ."44 However, although he
was C h a n c e l lo r ,  Buelow found h im s e l f  not in  c o n t r o l  o f  German f o r e ig n
po l icy .  In his memoirs, Buelow complained that  the Ka iser had:
A m an i fe s t  tendency . . .  to handle p e r s o n a l l y  and sou modo, in  
accordance with h is  own whims and impress ions, our future r e l a t i o n ­
ships . . . [and demonstrated] the wish to be h is  own Foreign M in i s te r  
and attempt to shoulder a burden fo r  which he was in  no way equal.45
P h i l i p  von Eulenburg, wrote of the s i t u a t io n :
The Emperor o f t en  messed up our d i f f i c u l t  f o r e i g n  r e l a t i o n s  by h i s  
i n t e r f e r e n c e .  In t h a t  r e s p e c t  I g ran t  he was a f o o t b a l l - - b u t  the
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f o o t b a l l  o f  h i s  own c h a r a c t e r ,  h i s  sudden " i n s p i r a t i o n s , "  h i s  
conv ic t ion  that he must in s t an t l y  r e a l i z e  some " b r i l l i a n t  idea, before 
i t  loses a l l  i t s  g r i t  in that confounded Foreign O f f ice  melt ing-pot."  
That the unfortunate Foreign O f f i c e  had to t o i l  fo r  months at mending 
h is  broken crockery was what never occurred to him.46
N o n e t h e l e s s ,  C h a n c e l l o r  Bue low  a l o n g  w i t h  the  d i p l o m a t s  a t  the
Wilhelmstrasse knew that i f  they wanted to remain in t h e i r  pos i t ions  they
had to carry  out the Ka iser 's  po l icy .  The Ka iser  con t ro l led  the careers o f
Bueiow and the diplomats, and he expected them to a l ign  t h e i r  views with
h i s  own as bes t  as they c o u ld . 4  ̂ In f a c t ,  Buelow avo ided a rgu ing  w i th
Wilhelm over fore ign po l i cy  issues,  in c lud ing  the naval bui ldup, in sp i te
of  Foreign O f f ice  object ions to the Ka iser 's  ac t ions ,  because he rea l i z ed
that  h is  pos i t ion  as Chancel lor depended upon the continued support of  h is
master.  Buelow remembered t h a t  i t  was W i lhe lm  who had d i sm is s e d
Bismarck.48
Ope ra t ing  from the background, H o l s t e i n  served the K a i s e r  as an 
im p o r t an t  d i p l o m a t i c  a d v i s o r  in  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e .  But, as the 
pub l ica t ion  o f  The Hols te in  Papers have revealed, much of Ho ls te in 's  advice 
to the K a i s e r  went unheeded.49 H i s t o r i a n s  have t r a d i t i o n a l l y  g iven  
H o l s t e in  c r e d i t  f o r  being the " e v i l  gen ius"  beh ind German f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  
during 1890 to 1906 ."  He, according to h is  most recent biographer, Norman 
R ich ,  was no th ing  more than a hard wo rk ing  c i v i l  se rvan t  who c re a ted  a 
powerfu l  ho ld  over the a d m in i s t r a t i o n  o f  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e . "  F o re ign  
S e c re ta r y  T s ch i r s c h k y ,  who served in  t h a t  c a p a c i t y  from 1906 to 1909,
remarked o f  Ho ls te in  that:
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[He] was unquestionably a marvelous worker. You could bring a p i l e  of 
f i l e s  in the morning, which any other man would require a week to work 
through. H o l s t e in  would have them f i n i s h e d  by n ig h t ,  and, w i th  i t  
a l l ,  h is  work was exce l len t  and minute ly  exact.
In sp i te  of h is  importance in the Foreign O f f ice  Hols te in  refused to accept 
a h ighe r  p o s i t i o n ,  such as S ta te  S e c r e t a r y .^  As the D i r e c t o r  of the 
P o l i t i c a l  Department he lacked d i r e c t  access to the Ka is e r .  The K a i s e r ,  
who d i s l i k e d  H o l s t e in ,  met him on ly  once, in  November 1 9 0 4 . Wi l he l m,  
nonetheless, recognized Holste in  fo r  h is  "great shrewdness, seconded by a 
phenomena l memory and a c e r t a i n  t a l e n t  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  c o m b in a ­
t i o n s  . . . ."55 But, d id  W i lhe lm  take H o l s t e in  s e r i o u s l y ?  S ince  he 
served as an intermediary between the Ka iser and Hols te in ,  what Eulenburg 
s t a t e d  about the in f lu e n c e  o f  H o l s t e in  on German p o l i c y  i s  of v i t a l  
importance:
Neither Capr iv i nor Hohenlohe nor Buelow ever promulgated an ed ic t  
on even the most i n s i g n i f i c a n t  p o l i t i c a l  mat te r  w i th ou t  H o l s t e i n ' s  
putt ing in his oar; in some instances he drew up the document with h is  
own hand. A l l  these e d i c t s ,  however, . . . were m od i f ie d  by reason o f  
the Emperor 's very  f requen t  i n t e r f e r e n c e  in fore ign po l icy .  And th i s  
because of His Majesty's d i r e c t  te leg raph ic  communication in c ipher with 
the Royal col leagues, or the despatch of A.D.C.s with p r iva te  l e t t e r s  to 
a sovereign, or brusque marg ina l ia  and commands on the reports from the 
German Ambassadors and M in i s te r s ,  etc. This caused perpetual changes in 
the p o l i t i c a l  temper of the Foreign O f f ice .
In such circumstances there could be no such thing as independent 
a c t io n  on the pa r t  o f  H o l s t e i n ,  or the Im pe r ia l  C h a n ce l lo r ,  or the 
Secretary of State . . . .  For the Imper ial in tervent ions  would soon be 
made to chime in  w i th  the p o l i c y  o f  the [ F o r e ig n ]  O f f i c e - - t h a t  i s  to 
say, would be re-modelled, brought in to conformity  so fa r  as might be, 
and then receive o f f i c i a l  countenance . . . , 56
With l i t t l e  i n f l u e n c e  over the a c tu a l  conduct o f  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y ,  
Ho ls te in  and the once h igh ly  d i s c ip l i n e d  diplomats in the Foreign O f f ice
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became d i f f i c u l t  to manage. D ip lom a ts ,  i n c l u d i n g  H o l s t e i n ,  would not 
cooperate with Buelow or h is  Foreign Secretary , Oswald Baron von Richthofen 
(1900-6), which resu lted in  the ine f fe c t iveness  o f  the Foreign O f f ice  as an 
organizat ion. The Chancel lor complained: "the p o l i t i c a l  department o f  the 
Foreign O f f ice  became a f f l i c t e d  with petty jea lou s ie s  and disputes. Most 
of them arose from Pr ivy  Counc i l lo r  von Ho ls te in 's  i n a b i l i t y  to work with 
anybody e l s e . " 57 One h i s t o r i a n  o f  the German d ip lomat ic  serv ice,  Edward 
W i l l i s ,  has commented:
I t  was a s t range group, composed o f  men who had l i t t l e  in  common 
except a d r iv ing  ambit ion, unbrid led by the d i s c ip l i n e  of t r a d i t i o n  or 
by the r e s t r a i n t  o f  decency. Everywhere the N ie tzschean  l u s t  f o r  
power was apparent. Nor did Buelow have a s u f f i c i e n t l y  strong hand to 
c o n t r o l  them. H is  was the s u b t l e ,  s c i n t i l l a t i n g  mind, the smooth 
tongue, and the suave persona l i ty ,  but he was no Bismarck. He had the 
a r t i s t r y  w i th ou t  the a r t ,  the form w i th o u t  the substance ,  o f  
greatness.
H o l s t e i n ,  h im s e l f ,  opposed the K a i s e r ' s  agg re s s iv e  a c t i o n s  in  f o r e ig n  
re la t ion s  which increased the tension between Germany and other states. He 
wrote  in  h i s  memoirs,  "the Fo re ign  M i n i s t r y ,  y ea r  in  y ea r  out,  had to 
r e s i s t  the Ka iser 's  sudden in sp i r a t io n s ,  and I was c h ie f l y  responsib le  fo r  
t h i s  c e n s o r s h ip . " 59 Such o p p o s i t i o n  d id  not make H o l s t e i n  popu la r  w i th  
e i th e r  the Ka iser or Chance l lor .5  ̂ A f te r  the death of Richthofen, the new 
Foreign Secretary, Tsch irschky, found i t  e s p e c ia l l y  d i f f i c u l t  to get along 
with h is  unruly subordinate.51 Thus, Ho ls te in  became dispensable, and was 
used as a scapegoat and he ld  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  the K a i s e r ' s  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  
d i s a s t e r  du r ing  the F i r s t  Moroccan C r i s i s  in  1906.5  ̂ S h o r t l y  be fo re  h i s  
death in 1909, Ho ls te in  stated in  h is  memoirs:
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Future  h i s t o r i a n s  w i l l  c om p i le  a long l i s t  o f  the K a i s e r ' s  sudden 
impulses in conversation, in w r i t ing ,  in  telegrams, which c o l l e c t i v e l y  
and s ing ly  have had the e f f e c t  o f  gradual ly  d im in ish ing  the prest ige  
of the Ka iser and the Reich, of wrecking d ip lomat ic  negot ia t ions and 
even o f  provoking immediate danger o f  war.63
Eventual ly  lo s ing  confidence in Buelow, the Ka iser replaced him with 
Theobald von Bethmann-Hol lweg as the new Im pe r ia l  C h a n c e l l o r  in  1909. 
Bethmann, who had prev ious ly  headed both the Imperial and Prussian In te r io r  
M in i s t r i e s ,  "knew nothing of fore ign a f f a i r s . " 64 G.P. Gooch bel ieved that 
W i lhe lm  chose Bethmann as h i s  C h a n c e l l o r  because "the K a i s e r  was l e s s  
anx ious  f o r  another  t r a i n e d  d i p l o m a t i s t  than f o r  a t r u s tw o r t h y  o f f i c i a l  
with who he could work."65
Bethmann s e le c t e d  the expe r ienced  d ip lo m a t ,  A l f r e d  von K i d e r l e n -  
Waechter, as h is  Fo re ign  S e c re ta ry .  The K a i s e r ,  however, on ly  agreed to 
K i d e r l e n ' s  appo in tment  a f t e r  in f o rm in g  Bethmann o f  h i s  o b j e c t i o n . 66 
D ip lom ats  a t  the W i lh e !m s t ra s s e  he ld  a h igh op in io n  o f  K id e r l e n  and 
con s ide red  him "a man o f  s u p e r io r  a b i l i t y  . . . , a second B i sm a rck . "6  ̂
Bethmann considered Kider len as "perhaps the ab le s t  dip lomat that Germany 
had had o f  l a t e . " 63 His e x cep t io n a l  d i p l o m a t i c  e xpe r ien ce  and a b i l i t y ,  
however, made him arrogant and d i f f i c u l t  to get along with. He possessed a 
r u t h l e s s  and dom ina t ing  manner, which he p icked  up from B ismarck  and 
Hols te in ,  th ink ing  that "he could accomplish everything by beating h is  f i s t  
on the t a b l e . " 6  ̂ He q u i c k l y  r e s t o r e d  s t r i c t  d i s c i p l i n e  to the Fo re ign  
O f f i c e  and maintained the support of most d ip lom ats .^  One exception to 
t h i s  support  came from P r in ce  Ka r l  Max von L ichnowsky ,  the German
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Ambassador to B r i t a in ,  who g reat ly  d i s l i k e d  K ider len and described him as 
"a d i s c i p l e  and i n t im a t e  f r i e n d  o f  H o l s t e i n ' s  . . . was underhand, a r t f u l ,  
s l y  and c r a f t y ,  not w i th ou t  common sense and not w i th ou t  humour, but 
unmannerly, untidy, s p i t e fu l ,  malevolent and ma l ic ious ."71
As the d ip lomat ic  expert w i th in  Bethmann's cabinet,  K ider len exerted a 
great deal of in f luence and independence. K ider len  managed the a f f a i r s  of 
the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  w i th  g rea t  s e c r e t i v e n e s s  and re fu sed  to c oo rd in a te  
d ip lomat ic  issues with the Chance l lo r  because he did not t r u s t  Bethmann. 
The Wi lhelmstrasse supported Kider len against  the e f f o r t s  of  Bethmann to 
d iscover what d ip lomat ic  e f f o r t s  were under way in  the fore ign se rv ice .72 
The previous Chancel lor , Buelow, now a diplomat serv ing the Wi lhelmstrasse 
abroad and a c lose f r iend  o f  K ider len 's  bel ieved that the Foreign Secretary 
was given too free a reign because the Chance l lor  was a f ra id  of him. In 
fac t ,  the re la t ion sh ip  between the two men became so d is tan t  that  Gordon 
Cra ig  described the s i tua t ion :
H is  [ K id e r l e n ]  s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e  and ar rogance b l in ded  him to the 
necess ity  of keeping Bethmann f u l l y  informed of  h is  in ten t ions  so that  
the un fo r tuna te  C h a n c e l l o r  was reduced to on one o cca s ion  to the 
e x t r e m i t y  o f  g e t t i n g  h i s  Fo re ign  S e c re ta r y  i n t o x i c a t e d  in  o^der to 
f ind  out what was on h is  mind.7*1
For  obv ious reasons Bethmann r e g r e t t e d  h i s  cho ic e  o f  K i d e r l e n  as S ta te  
S e c re t a r y  because o f  such extreme i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n . 7  ̂ None the le ss ,  the 
Ka iser ,  who remembered h is  object ion to K ider len 's  appointment, refused to 
a s s i s t  Bethmann in the power s t rugg le  against  h is  Foreign S e c r e t a r y / 0 The 
K a i s e r  p laced  l i t t l e  importance  on the a c t i v i t i e s  w i t h i n  the Fo re ign
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O f f i c e , ' 77 d e sp i t e  K id e r l e n  be ing an out-spoken  c r i t i c  o f  T i r p i t z ' s  nava l 
b u i ld up . '7® He dec la red ,  :,I am an opponent o f  T i r p i t z  because I am a f r a i d  
h is  p o l i c i e s  w i l l  bring us to war with E n g l a n d . B u t ,  before h is  sudden 
death in  1912, K id e r l e n  r e a l i z e d  t h a t  T i r p i t z  was too i n f l u e n t i a l  w i th  
Wilhelm to red i re c t  German policy.®®
From the beg inn ing  o f  h i s  r e ig n  the K a i s e r  he ld  a low op in io n  o f  the 
Wi1helmstrasse. Wilhelm d irected h is  own fore ign po l i c y  and put more stock 
in the advice of m i l i t a r y  and naval leaders than he did diplomats. Admiral 
T i r p i t z  possessed a high degree o f  i n f l u e n c e  over W i lhe lm  f o r  over a 
decade. As the leading dip lomat in the Empire, a lb e i t  without experience, 
Bethmann was responsib le  fo r  adv is ing the Ka iser on fore ign re la t io n s .  The 
Imperial Chancel lor,  nonetheless, " lacked the persona l i ty"  to chal lenge the 
naval program supported by W i lhe lm  and T i rp i t z .® *  Bethmann and T i r p i t z  
competed over the conduct of German fore ign  pol icy.®2 The Ka iser ,  h imse l f ,  
was known to have sa id  tha t  "one T i r p i t z  i s  worth ten Bethmanns."®® The 
weakness o f  Bethmann, combined w i th  the in s u b o rd in a t i o n  o f  K i d e r l e n ,  
f u r t h e r  decreased the in f l u e n c e  o f  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  w i th  the K a i s e r .  
Eulenburg complained about the s i t u a t io n  that the m i l i t a r y  "acquired more 
and more in f luence [with the Ka ise r]  as t ime went on. These men, with the 
eve r la s t ing  Be r l in  r ib a ld ry ,  s y s tem a t i c a l l y  derided the Foreign Office."®^ 
Kurt  Z e i z l e r ,  the a s s i s t a n t  to the C h a n c e l l o r ,  noted tha t  Bethmann had 
"abso lu te ly  no ta len t  fo r  gett ing  along with the m i l i t a r y ,  fo r  impress ing 
them and for  gett ing in format ion from them."®5 This s i t u a t io n  e sp e c ia l l y
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became acute when, in  1912, German Army l e a d e r s  a cqu i re d  more in f l u e n c e  
when the K a i s e r  re cogn ized  the f a i l u r e  o f  Wei tpo l  i t i k  and sw i t ched  to a 
M i t t e l e u r o p a  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y ,  which in c re a sed  the importance  o f  land 
warfare, to p rotect  Germany's Great Power status.®® Thus, Bethmann and the 
Foreign O f f ice  held l i t t l e  in f luence  with the German Emperor. One dip lomat 
commented th a t ,  "as Bethmann was f i l l e d  w i th  a bu rn ing  d e s i r e  to s tay  in  
o f f i c e - -no  M in i s te r  clung to o f f i c e  as he did--he f ie ld ed  to the Ka iser  in 
e ve ry th ing  from the beginning."®^ The K a i s e r  kep t  Bethmann as h i s  
Chancel lor fo r  th i s  reason.®®
The sudden death of K ider len l e f t  the Foreign O f f i c e  w ithout a strong 
leader. A f te r  the experience o f  K ider len,  the Ka iser  and Bethmann wanted 
to avoid f i l l i n g  the pos i t ion  o f  State Secretary w ith another s t rong -w i l le d
diplomat. Arthur Zimmermann, the Undersecretary o f  State, who was more of
89  90an a d m in i s t r a t o r  than a d ip lomat.,  d e c l in e d  the o f f e r  o f  p romot ion .
They f i n a l l y  s e t t l e d  on a d ip lom a t  w i th  twenty  y ea rs  o f  e xpe r ien ce ,
Go t t l ieb  von Jagow, the former German Ambassador to I t a l y . 91 He, too, was
u n w i l l i n g ,  but Jagow accepted the p o s i t i o n  a f t e r  be ing persuaded by
no
Bethmann in January 1913. Jagow has been described by Barbara Tuchman as 
"a puny rodent o f  a man whose Cha r l ie  Chaplin mustache and un-Teutonic look 
o f  an anx ious r a b b i t  caused him to be regarded by everybody,  i n c l u d in g  
h im s e l f ,  as inadequate  f o r  h i s  p o s t . " 93 But, F o re ign  S e c r e t a r y  Jagow 
worked c l o s e l y  w i th  Bethmann and the K a i s e r ,  supported  the a rmy,94 and 
became a "most l o y a l  a s s o c i a t e  and u n f l a g g in g  c oun se lo r .  3 As e a r l y  as
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January 1913, however, S i r  Edward Goschen, the B r i t i s h  Ambassador to 
Germany, warned the B r i t i s h  Foreign O f f i c e  tha t  "Jagow fo r  h is  part  was not 
made of re in fo rced concrete: he feared that,  should a sudden c r i s i s  occur, 
Bethmann Hollweg and Jagow would be swept away."9® Commenting on Jagow's 
re la t ion sh ip  with Bethmann, Wilhelm wrote in  h is  memoirs, "the Secretary of 
State fo r  Foreign A f f a i r s  was, under him [Bethmann], a mere helper, so much 
so th a t  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  was a lm os t  a f f i l i a t e d  w i th  the o f f i c e  o f  the 
Chancel l o r  , . .
The in f luence  o f  the m i l i t a r y  was too strong even fo r  a Chancel lor and
F' ~eign S e c re ta r y  who worked toge the r .  Bethmann and Jagow came to the
conclusion that Germany must l i m i t  the expansion o f  i t s  navy or r i s k  war
with B r i t a in .  In vain they attempted to in f luence  the Ka iser  to change h.is
program.9® Both men discovered that  they were not al lowed to p a r t i c ip a te
in  any d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  m i l i t a r y  p l a n n in g , 99 s in c e  the K a i s e r  b e l i e v e d
Bethmann to be a " p a c i f i s t . " 100 Even S i r  Edward Grey, the B r i t i s h  Foreign
Secretary, re a l i z ed  that the Chancel lor and German Foreign O f f ice  had no
in f luence over German po l icy .  He wrote in h is  memoirs:
[N]ow something that had always been an uncomfortable susp ic ion in  the 
background came to  the f r o n t  and took more d e f i n i t e  and ug ly  shape. 
There were forces other than Bethmann-Hollweg in  the seat o f  au tho r i ty  
in Germany. He was not master o f  the s i t u a t io n ;  in negot ia t ing  w ith 
him we were not n e g o t i a t i n g  w i th  a p r i n c i p a l . Yet he was the on ly  
au thor i ty  w ith  who we could negotiate at  a l l . 101
The K a i s e r  under the in f l u e n c e  o f  mi 1 i t a r y  1eaders was the c e n t r a l  
f igu re  concerning German fore ign po l icy .  He had acted as h is  own Foreign 
M i n i s t e r  more o r  l e s s  th roughou t  h i s  r e ig n .  On numerous o c ca s io n s ,
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e s p e c i a l l y  i n v o l v i n g  Morocco and the Ba lkans ,  he had backed down when 
confronted with the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  war.10  ̂ However, by 1913, Wilhelm came 
to the r e a l i z a t i o n  th a t  Germany needed to support  the weakened A u s t r i a n  
monarchy a g a in s t  the Se rb ian  m i l i t a r y  t h r e a t  and South S la v  movement in  
order fo r  Aust r ia  to maintain i t s  Great Power status. He knew that i t  was 
o f  v i t a l  in te re s t  to Germany to support i t s  a l l y  since the Serbian threat,  
backed by the Tsa r ,  cou ld  d r a s t i c a l l y  change the ba lance  o f  power in  
sou theas te rn  Europe.10:1 /\s e a r l y  as 1913, the K a i s e r ,  who b e l i e v e d  the 
o the r  Great Powers would not a c t ,  had t o l d  the A u s t r i a n  C h ie f  o f  S t a f f ,  
Genera l Conrad von Hoe tzendor f ,  t h a t  Germany would support  A u s t r i a  in  a 
lo c a l i z e d  war against Serb ia .104 Wilhelm feared the d is in teg ra t ion  of h is  
one f a i t h fu l  a l l y ,  Aus t r ia ,  and perceived Germany "cornered and desperate" 
f a c in g  the d e c l i n e  o f  the T r i p l e  A l l i a n c e  a g a in s t  the T r i p l e  E n te n te .105 
Any dec is ion fo r  act ion to defend the a l l i a n c e  was up to him.
The i n c i d e n t  t h a t  prompted the K a i s e r  to take a c t i o n  was the 
assass inat ion  of h is  c lose  assoc ia te ,  Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the he i r  to 
the A u s t r i a  th rone ,  on 28 June 1914. He favo red  an immedia te  A u s t r i a n  
ac t ion  aga inst  Serb ia.105 On 5 Ju ly ,  the Ka iser met with Count Lad is laus 
S zogyeny -Ma r ich ,  the Au s t ro -H unga r ian  Ambassador to Germany. W i lhe lm  
in fo rmed  the ambassador t h a t  he "expected some s e r i o u s  step . . . towards 
Serbia" and, without consu l t ing  with  Bethman, to ld  Szogyeny that Aust r ia  
c ou ld  " r e l y  upon Germany's f u l l  s u pp o r t . " 101. The K a i s e r  v/as under the 
assumption that  any Austr ian act ion could be lo c a l i z e d  in the Balkans since
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"Russia at the present t ime was in no way prepared fo r  war, and would think 
tw ice before i t  appealed to arms."10°
La te r  t h a t  same day, on 5 J u l y ,  the K a i s e r  summoned those o f  h is  
highest m i l i t a r y  and p o l i t i c a l  adv isers who were ava i lab le  at a moment's 
not ice to a meeting in Potsdam. The army was represented by General E r i c  
von Fa lkenhayn,  the P ru s s ian  M i n i s t e r  o f  War, and General M o r i t z  von 
Lyncker, the Ch ief  of the Ka iser 's  M i l i t a r y  Cabinet, wh i le  Captain Zenker 
o f  the German Naval S t a f f  rep resen ted  h i s  branch o f  the s e r v i c e . 109 
Bethmann and Zimmermann, both with l i t t l e  knowledge o f  fore ign re la t ion s ,  
represented the dip lomats at the meeting s ince Jagow was on leave away from 
B e r l i n . 110 At the Potsdam Conference ,  the K a i s e r  i n s i s t e d  upon Germany 
s u p p o r t i n g  A u s t r i a  because  i t s  p r e s e r v a t i o n  was v i t a l  to  German 
se cu r i t y .111 He questioned h is  adv isers about Germany's readiness fo r  war,
1 1  O
and discovered that they a l l  bel ieved the Empire to be prepared.1-1*- They, 
however, agreed that any war between Austr ia  and Serbia could be l im i t e d  to 
the Balkan r e g io n . 110 As f o r  any A u s t r i a n  a c t i o n ,  the K a i s e r  t o l d  
Bethmann:
I t  was not our bus ine ss  . . .  to adv ise  our a l l y  what i t  must do in  
respect of the bloody deed at Serajevo. Austria-Hungary must s e t t l e  
that fo r  i t s e l f .  We must abstain from any d i r e c t  act ion or advice, as 
we must labour with every means to prevent the Austro-Serbian dispute 
deve lop ing  i n t o  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n f l i c t .  But the Emperor Franc is  
Joseph must a l s o  be q iven  to know th a t  we would not d e s e r t  A u s t r i a -  
Hungary in i t s  hour of p e r i l .
The next day, 6 J u l y ,  the Im pe r ia l  C h a n c e l l o r  r e la yed  the K a i s e r ' s  
dec is ion to the Austr ian government. He informed Szoegyeny that Germany
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would support Austr ia ,  and that the Ka iser  considered "immediate ac t ion  on 
our [ A u s t r i a ]  p a r t  as the bes t  s o l u t i o n  o f  our d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  the 
Ba lkans . "115
Upon return ing to B e r l in ,  Foreign Secretary Jagow was informed o f  the
Potsdam Conference and subsequent communications with Vienna.115 He a lso
found out t h a t  the K a i s e r  was p e r m i t t i n g  the A u s t r i a n s  to f o rm u la te  an
ult imatum to Serbia without German co l labo ra t ion .  Jagow bel ieved t h i s  to
be f o l l y ,  but by the t ime he was c o n su l t e d  and drawn i n t o  the s i t u a t i o n ,
the Ka iser  "had so committed h imse l f  that  i t  was too la te  fo r  any act ion on
customary d ip lomat ic  l i n e s ,  and there was nothing more to be done."11^
The d ip lom a ts  a t  the B a l l h a u s p l a t z  in  Vienna were r e l u c t a n t  to
c o l l a b o r a t e  w i th  the W i lh e lm s t r a s s e  conce rn ing  any p lans  f o r  A u s t r i a n
m i l i t a r y  a c t i o n  a g a in s t  Se rb ia .  The A u s t r i a n  Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r ,  Count
Leopo ld B e r ch to ld ,  fea red  a leak  o f  A u s t r i a n  i n t e n t i o n s . 115 Meanwhi le ,
both Bethmann and Jagow, under the d i r e c t i o n  o f  the K a i s e r ,  pushed the
Austr ians to take m i l i t a r y  act ion soon in hope o f  l o c a l i z i n g  the c o n f l i c t
and achieving a f a i t  accompl i.11  ̂ The Chancel lor and Foreign Secretary did
not expect  the c o n f l i c t  to break out  i n t o  a European war, however .1 0̂
Jagow communicated to L ichnowsky ,  the German Ambassador to London, the
th ink ing  of the leadership in Be r l in :
Russia was not ready; there would probably be some fuss and noise, but 
the more f i rm ly  we took sides with Aus t r ia  the more would Russia give 
way. As i t  was, Aust r ia  was accusing us o f  weakness, and there fore  we 
dare not leave her in a lurch. Pub l ic  opin ion in  Russia, on the other 
hand, was becoming more and more an t i -Ge rm an ,  so we must j u s t  r i s k  
i t .  1
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On 9 Ju ly ,  Zimmermann to ld  a fe l low  diplomat that he bel ieved “the present
moment very opportune fo r  Aust r ia  to undertake a revenge campaign against
i t s  southern neighbor," and that "war could su cce ss fu l ly  be lo ca l i z ed .1,122
On 18 Ju ly ,  Jagow informed Lichnowsky:
[I]n the in te res t  of l o c a l i z a t io n  we abstained from any inf luence on 
the p re p a ra t io n  o f  the A u s t r i a n  step toward Se rb ia .  We hoped to be 
ab le  to p revent  the Serb ian  c o n f l i c t  from becoming a European 
quest ion. 28
The Foreign Secretary, on 19 July,  placed a statement in a German newspaper 
in which he expressed h is  des ire  to lo c a l i z e  any Austro-Serbian c o n f l i c t .  
He wrote:
In the utterances of the European press in regard to the e x is t ing  
ten s ion  between Au s t r ia -H unga ry  and S e rb ia  i t  i s  i n c r e a s i n g l y  
recogn ised  tha t  Au s t r ia -H unga ry ' s  d e s i r e  to  c l e a r  up her r e l a t i o n s  
w i th  S e rb ia  i s  j u s t i f i e d .  In t h i s  connec t ion  we share the hope 
expressed in  more than one qua r te r  th a t  a s e r i o u s  c r i s i s  w i l l  be 
avo ided by the Serb ian  Government g i v i n g  way in  t ime.  In any event 
the s o l i d a r i t y  of  Europe, which made i t s e l f  f e l t  dur ing  the long 
Balkan c r i s i s  in maintain ing peace among the great Powers, demands and 
requires that the sett lement of d i f fe rences which may ar ise  between 
Austr ia-Hungary and Serbia should remain l o c a l i s e d . 12<1
In his own ana lys is  of the s i tu a t ion ,  Buelow described the Chancel lor  and
Jagow as "a pa ir  of w i l f u l  l i t t l e  urchins p lay ing with what seems an empty
she l l  case, which is  l i a b l e  to explode at any minute."125
On 22 July,  Foreign M in i s te r  Berchtold forwarded a copy of Aust r ia 's
ult imatum to Serbia to the German Foreign O f f ice .  The ult imatum was to be
del ivered to the Serbian government the fo l low ing  day.125 Jagow found the
terms of the document excess ive ly  severe,12  ̂ and to ld  Bethmann so when he
gave the Chancel lor the copy of the ult imatum.128 Bethmann, too, bel ieved
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"the u l t im a tum ,  a f t e r  I saw i t ,  to be too sharp . . . Both gethmann 
and Jagow r e a l i z e d ,  none the le s s ,  th a t  such a sho r t  n o t i c e  be fo re  the 
u l t im a tum  would be served to Be lg rade l e f t  the German d ip lom a ts  no t ime  
express t h e i r  opinions to the B a l l h a u s p l a t z . * 30 Both the C h a n ce l lo r  and 
State Secretary hoped fo r  serious negot ia t ions between Belgrade and Vienna 
to begin a f te r  the sharp ult imatum.*3*
But, two days a f t e r  the d e l i v e r y  of the f o r t y - e i g h t  hour u l t im a tum ,  
the Serbian government began the process of m ob i l i za t ion  that eventua l ly  
engu l fed  the whole o f  Europe in  war. The A u s t r i a n s  began p a r t i a l  
mob i l i za t ion ,  declared war on Serbia, and began sh e l l in g  Serbian t e r r i t o r y  
on 28 Ju ly .  The Russ ian government took note o f  t h i s  t h r e a t  to i t s  a l l y ,  
and prepared to come to i t s  defense. On 29 Ju ly ,  the Russian Ambassador to 
Vienna, N.N. Shebeko, informed S.D. Sazonov, the Russian Foreign M in i s te r ,  
t h a t  a European c o n f l i c t  cou ld  not be avo ided s in c e  the A u s t r i a n s  and 
Germans "had gone too f a r  to r e t r e a t  w i thou t  s e r i o u s  damage to t h e i r  
prest ige and to the s t a b i l i t y  of t h e i r  a l l iance ."*33 The very next day, on 
30 J u l y ,  the Russ ians  began genera l  m o b i l i z a t i o n .  Wh i le  the German 
government warned Moscow about such act ion, the Austr ians i n i t i a t e d  general 
m ob i l i za t ion  on 31 July.
Within Germany, the m i l i t a r y  leadership pressured the Ka iser to act by 
m o b i l i z i n g  and i n i t i a t i n g  the S c h l i e f f e n  P lan .* 33 The K a i s e r  and h i s  
adv isers had misca lcu lated the Russian react ion to a war in the Balkans.*34 
They had bel ieved that Russia would not intervene. Russian m ob i l i za t ion
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made i t  a n e c e s s i t y  f o r  Germany to  m o b i l i z e  and c a r r y  out i t s  p lan s  f o r  
f i g h t i n g  a war on two f r o n t s ,  a g a in s t  Russ ia  and F ran ce .135 General 
Helmuth von Moltke, the German Army Ch ief  o f  S ta f f ,  was anxious and hasty 
to fo r c e  Germany in t o  war a g a in s t  Russ ia  because the S c h l i e f f e n  P lan  
re q u i r e d  a r a p id  German m o b i l i z a t i o n  to  coun te r  any Russ ian and French 
m i l i t a r y  moves.136 The h is to r ian  L.C.F. Turner bel ieved that  "Russian and 
Austr ian general mob i l i za t ion  made a great war in e v i tab le  . . . ,"13  ̂ On 1 
August, the Germans began m ob i l i z ing  and declared war on Russia.
Bethmann and Jagow had had no i n f l u e n c e  on the sequence o f  events  
because of the powerful in f luence that  the m i l i t u a r y  held over the Kaiser.  
A few days l a t e r  Buelow v i s i t e d  Bethmann in  B e r l i n .  He d e s c r ib ed  h i s  
reception:
Bethmann stood in  the c en t re  o f  the room. S ha l l  I ever  f o r g e t  h i s  
face. There i s  a p i c t u r e  by some c e l e b r a te d  E n g l i s h  p a in t e r ,  which 
shows the wretched scapegoat with a look of in e f fab le  anguish in  i t s  
eyes--such pain as I now saw in  Bethmann's. For an in s tan t  we ne i ther  
o f  us spoke. At l a s t  I sa id  to  him: "W e l l ,  t e l l  me, at  l e a s t ,  how i t  
a l l  happened." He r a i s e d  h i s  long ,  t h i n  arms to heaven and answered 
in  a du l l ,  exhausted voice: "Oh— i f  I only knew!"13®
Speaking to the B r i t i s h  Ambassador to B e r l in ,  Jagow blamed the outbreak o f
war on " th is  d----- d system of a l l i a n c e s . "13  ̂ Re f lec t ing  upon the c r i s i s ,
S i r  Edward Grey wrote in h is  memoirs:
I t  i s  o f  no use to look  to the a c t i o n  o f  Bethmann-Hol l  weg and Jagow 
[to d iscover who d irected German fore ign p o l i c y ] - - th e  men who, having 
nominal d i r e c t i o n  o f  German p o l i c y ,  f o ld e d  t h e i r  hands a f t e r  the 
murder o f  the Archduke, and . . . never asked to see the terms o f  
t h e i r  Austr ian A l l y ' s  ult imatum to Serbia before i t  was sent; the men 
who, a f t e r  t h a t  u l t im a tum  was sent  and the Se rb ian  r e p l y  r e c e i v e d ,
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expressed some c r i t i c i s m  o f  the fo rmer and thought t h a t  the l a t t e r  
went f u r t h e r  in  the d i r e c t i o n  o f  c o n c i l i a t i o n  than cou ld  have been 
expected;  and who y e t  l e t  th in g s  d r i f t  or spoke on ly  in  w h isp e rs  at  
Vienna, when a dec is ive  word was wanted. I bel ieve that ne i ther the 
Emperor or Bethmann-Hollweg nor Jagow planned or desired war. But the 
Emperor, in the c r i t i c a l  moment a f te r  the Serbian rep ly ,  apparently 
w i t h h e ld  h i s  i n f l u e n c e ,  when i t  m ight have been d e c i s i v e  f o r  
peace . . . .  Bethmann-Holl weg and Jagow had no inf luence. They were 
powerless, and they were the only Germans with  whom other Governments, 
inc lud ing  our own, could deal. ®
At the outbreak o f  c o n f l i c t ,  the German Fo re ign  O f f i c e  s t r o n g ly  
supported the K a i s e r ' s  war e f f o r t .  The K a i s e r ,  Bethmann, and Jagow l e f t  
B e r l i n  to d i r e c t  t h e i r  a f f a i r s  from the headquar te rs  o f  the Army High 
Command. Meanwhile, Zimmermann, the Undersecretary o f  State, managed the 
a c t i v i t i e s  of the Foreign O f f i c e  in B e r l i n . 141 At the ba t t le  f ront ,  Jagow, 
who was s i c k l y ,  r e t i r i n g ,  and unimpress ive, found i t  imposs ib le  to hold h is  
own in d iscuss ions with the Army High Command, but, along with Bethmann, 
kept  oppos ing the High Command's p roposa l  o f  u n r e s t r i c t e d  submarine 
warfare. The m i l i t a r y  wanted to get r i d  o f  Jagow, and have him replaced 
by Zimmermann, who supported un res t r i c ted  submarine warfare.14"1 Zimmermann 
amb it ious ly  worked behind Jagow's back, urging the Wilhelm II to appoint 
Genera l Paul von Hindenburg and Genera l E r i c h  von Ludendo r f f  as supreme 
commanders.144 In 1916, the K a i s e r  took t h i s  s tep  to support  Hindenburg 
and Ludendorff in an o f fens ive  designed to achieve a dec is ive  v ic to ry .  In 
r e a l i t y ,  the Ka iser permitted the estab l ishment o f  a m i l i t a r y  d ic ta to r sh ip  
t h a t  made a l l  the major p o l i t i c a l  d e c i s i o n s  u n t i l  the end o f  the w a r .14  ̂
The Ka iser had l o s t  control o f  po l icy .  In fa c t ,  at one point ,  "the supreme 
w a r lo rd  went down on h i s  knees be fo re  the gene ra ls  and begged them to
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accept h is  s u g g e s t i o n s . O n  24 November 1916, Zimmermann was appointed 
Foreign Secretary, and shor t ly  the rea f te r ,  in  December, the dec is ion was 
made fo r  Germany to pursue unres t r i c ted  submarine war fa re .^ '7 During the 
course of the F i r s t  World War, the Foreign O f f i c e  had l i t t l e  in f luence over 
events and merely served the m i l i t a r y  in i t s  attempt to achieve a dec is ive  
v ic to ry .  Under the m i l i t a r y  d ic ta to r sh ip  o f  Hindenburg and Ludendorff, the 
Wi lhelmstrasse qu ick ly  d is in tegra ted  in to an in e f f e c t i v e  organizat ion used 
to support the war e f fo r t .
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CHAPTER I I I
THE FOREIGN OFFICE DURING THE WEIMAR ERA
The Wi lhelmstrasse lo s t  what l i t t l e  p rest ige  and in f luence over the
formula t ion of fore ign po l icy  i t  possessed during the course of the F i r s t
World War. In s p i t e  o f  i t s  l i m i t e d  i n f l u e n c e ,  many o f f i c i a l s  used the
dip lomats as scapegoats and held them respons ib le  fo r  the con f l i c t . -1- With
an end to the war, however, Germany e xpe r ien ced  many p o l i t i c a l  changes.
The K a i s e r  abd ica ted  and f l e d  to  the Kingdom o f  the Ne ther lands .  A
revo lu t ion ,  fo l lowed by the estab l ishment of the Weimar Republic, as well
as the A l l i e s  d i c t a t i n g  the V e r s a i l l e s  s e t t l e m e n t  c rea ted  a whole new
p o l i t i c a l  framework in  which the Foreign O f f ice  needed to operate. Before
the war, the Wilhelmstrasse, la rge ly  manned by a r i s t o c ra t s ,  had funct ioned
as a t i g h t - k n i t  organizat ion under the contro l  o f  the Kaiser. As F r ie d r i c h
Payer, the Vice Chancel lor ,  commented in  1918:
Over the AA [Foreign O f f i c e ]  p reva i led  a s p i r i t  of exclus iveness; fo r  
o u t s i d e r s  i t  had the aura o f  a mys te ry ,  im pene t rab le  to laymen. I t  
was an enc losed  organism i n s i d e  the government, i n t o  which on ly  
se lected people were al lowed gl impses, and even these r e lu c ta n t ly  and 
not more than was abso lu te ly  necessary.'*
But, by 1918, the t r a d i t i o n a l  F o re ign  O f f i c e  had s u f f e r e d  an a lm os t
complete co l lapse  because of i t s  complete subord inat ion to the Army High
Command, as well  as the disasterous end to the war. From the ashes o f  what
remained, however, gradually  emerged a r e v i t a l i z e d  fore ign serv ice.
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For seve ra l  yea rs  numerous C h a n c e l l o r s  and Fo re ign  S e c r e t a r i e s  had 
re cogn ized  the need to re fo rm  the Wi1he lm s t r a s se .  They r e a l i z e d  the 
n e c e s s i t y  o f  a p p o in t in g  q u a l i f i e d  p e rsonne l ,  o the r  than a r i s t o c r a t s ,  to 
important d ip lomat ic  pos i t ions ,  as well  as reorgan iz ing the Foreign O f f ice  
f o r  more e f f i c i e n t  op e ra t io n s .  None the less ,  the le a d e r s h ip  f a i l e d  to 
reform the Foreign O f f ice  because o f  t h e i r  re luctance to d ismiss the h ighly 
va lued  t e c h n i c a l  e x p e r t i s e  o f  a r i s t o c r a t i c  d ip lom a ts .  As the K a i s e r  
explained in h is  memoirs:
Every new Chancel lor , e sp e c ia l l y  i f  he h im se l f  did not come from the 
ranks o f  the f o r e ig n  s e r v i c e ,  needed the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  in  o rde r  to 
work h im s e l f  i n t o  f o r e ig n  a f f a i r s ,  and t h i s  took t ime.  But once he 
had worked h imse l f  in he was under ob l iga t ion  to the o f f i c i a l s ,  and he 
was re lu c tan t  to make extensive changes, burdened as he was by other 
matters and lack ing  de ta i led  knowledge rega rd ing  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  
personnel, p a r t i c u l a r l y  as he s t i l l  be l ieved that  he needed the advice 
of those who were "orientated."^
In 1918, during the demise of the Wi lhelmstrasse, Foreign Secretary 
R icha rd  von Kuehlmann began the re fo rm ing  p rocess .  He asked Edmund 
Schueler, the D irec to r  of the Consular Department, to ou t l ine  changes for  
the Foreign Off ice.  Schueler, only three years short o f  ret irement,  worked 
toward the reorganziat ion of the fore ign serv ice ,  which included both i t s  
personne l and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e s .  In the meantime, none the le s s ,  
Germany had become a r e p u b l i c ,  t r a n s f o rm in g  a l l  im p e r i a l  o f f i c e s  i n t o  
c on s t i tu t iona l  m in i s t r ie s  under Reich M in i s te r s  who were respons ib le  to the 
Reichstag. The Foreign O f f i c e  became a m in is t ry ,  but the leading o f f i c i a l s  
at the Wi lhelmstrasse decided to keep the name "Foreign O f f ice "  instead of 
"Foreign M in i s t r y "  because of t h e i r  respect fo r  t r a d i t i o n . 5 Even so, the
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Reichstag gave the former imper ia l pos i t ion  of State Secretary fo r  Foreign 
A f f a i r s  (Foreign Secretary) the status of Foreign M in is te r .  Moreover, the 
previous Undersecretary of State fo r  Foreign A f f a i r s  was now renamed the 
State Secretary (Foreign Secretary).8
On 10 Ap r i l  1919, the Weimar Republic 's f i r s t  Foreign M in i s te r ,  U l r ich  
von Brockdorff-Rantzau, announced the s o - c a l l e d  S chue le r  Reforms. These 
changes regarded four major areas w i th in  the Foreign O f f ice .  They inc luded 
the combin ing  o f  consular and d ip l o m a t i c  c a re e r s  which gave c o n su la r  
personnel d ip lomat ic  status. Moreover, the Foreign O f f ice  would accept men 
of  in f luence who were not o f  noble l ineage to f i l l  key d ip lomat ic  pos i t ions  
a t  the Wi1he lm s t ra s se  and embass ies .  O r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y ,  the re fo rms 
included adding a fore ign trade department to the Foreign O f f ice  besides 
c r e a t i n g  a reg iona l  g roup ing system o f  o r g a n i z a t i o n  w i t h i n  the c e n t r a l  
o f f i c e ,  which rep la ced  the P o l i t i c a l  Department, and c o n s i s t e d  o f  
depar tments to manage a f f a i r s  f o r  West, South, and Sou th -Ea s t  Europe 
(Department I I ) ;  England, Amer ica ,  and the O r ie n t  (Department I I I ) ;  and 
East Europe, Scandinavia, and East As ia (Department IV).7
For  the next th ree  y e a r s ,  in  s p i t e  o f  numerous changes w i t h in  the 
leadersh ip of the Wi lhe lmstrasse, in c lud ing  seven Foreign M in i s te r s ,  these 
re fo rm s  found va ry in g  degrees o f  p o l i t i c a l  back ing  w i t h i n  the Fo re ign  
O f f i c e .8 Meanwhile, the s ize  of the W i lhe l  mstrasse increased. A j a n i t o r  
a t  the Wil  h e lm s t ra s se  made the comment, "I don 't  know what i s  go ing on. 
The German Reich i s  grow ing s m a l l e r  and s m a l l e r  but the Fo re ign  O f f i c e
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bigger and b i g g e r . H e r b e r t  von Dirksen, a dip lomat in the B a l t i c  A f f a i r s
D iv is ion ,  stated about Schueler's program, "he shattered the old h i s t o r i c a l
s t ructure  dat ing from Bismarck and b u i l t  up a new organizat ion big enough
to be the p o l i t i c a l  b ra in  o f  a v i c t o r i o u s  World Power."1® By mid-1920,
however, the o lder career diplomats began to reverse some of the reforms.
Few o u t s i d e r s  were appointed to im po r tan t  d i p l o m a t i c  p o s t s . 11 The few
o u t s id e r s  who had found p o s i t i o n s  in  the f o r e ig n  s e r v i c e  had made no
s ign f ic an t  impact. In fact ,  as Christoph Kimmich has pointed out:
Some had found the atmosphere not to t h e i r  l i k i n g  and had l e f t ;  some 
had been rent abroad to serve in legat ions  and embassies. Those who 
atta ined in f l u e n t i a l  pos i t ions  soon adapted themselves to the re ign ing 
outlook and the t r a d i t io n a l  procedures. By mid-1920 the p ro fess iona ls  
f e l t  secure once aga in ,  and w i t h i n  the next th ree  or fou r  yea rs  the 
m in is t r y  returned to old hands.13
During the twent ies, the Wi lhe lmstrasse, which operated without the 
benef i t  of an autocra t ic  leader in contro l  of Germany, gradual ly  asserted 
i t s  independence under i n f l u e n t i a l  Fore ign M in i s te r s ,  State Secre tar ies ,  
and other p e r sona l i t ie s  with the r e su l t  that i t  gained recognit ion as the 
pr ime f o rm u la t o r  of German f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  in the Weimar government. 
Although fore ign po l i c y  dec is ions were made by tbe parl iamentary cabinet,  
inc lud ing  the Foreign M in is te r ,  the advice of the Wi lhelmstrasse was most 
i n f l u e n t i a l .  Moreover,  the Weimar c o n s t i t u t i o n  backed the d ip lom a t s  by 
des ignating the Foreign O f f ice  as the so le agency fo r  the adm in is t ra t ion  of 
fore ign p o l i c y . 13 With such a u t h o r i t y ,  the d ip lo m a t s  se t  the long - range  
goa ls  of r e e s t a b l i s h i n g  f u l l  s o v e r e ig n t y  and Great Power s t a t u s  f o r  
Germany. "S tand ing  between defea ted  Germany and i t s  r e s t o r a t i o n  to
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sovereign and Great Power status,"  according to Gaines Post, Jr.,  "was the 
T rea ty  of V e r s a i l l e s ,  and the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  in  B e r l i n ' s  W i1he lm s t ra s se  
considered rev is ion  of that t rea ty  an a r t i c l e  of fa i th .
In February  1922, Wa lthe r  Rathenau, a le ad ing  Jew ish  i n d u s t r i a l i s t  
from B e r l i n ,  became Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  under the l e a d e r s h ip  o f  C h an ce l lo r  
Joseph W ir th .  He had p r e v i o u s l y  served Germany as the M i n i s t e r  f o r  
R e con s t ru c t io n ,  a new post  c rea ted  j u s t  f o r  him in 1921, w i th  the 
r e s p o n s i b i 1i t y  o f  a d m in i s t e r in g  compensat ion to the A l l i e s .  W ir th  
appo inted Rathenau, a f i n a n c i a l  e xpe r t ,  to head German f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  
because o f  the importance  o f  the r e p a r a t i o n s  i s sue  dur ing  the e a r l y  
twen t ie s .^  Viscount D'Abernon, the B r i t i s h  Ambassador to Be r l in ,  admired 
the t a l e n t  o f  the Fo re ign  M in i s t e r .  He wrote in  h i s  memoirs: "Rathenau 
enjoyed immense prest ige abroad; . . .  he was eloquent in three languages, 
he was sub t le .  H is  arguments were in gen iou s ,  even when unsound . . .
As head o f  the Wi 1 h e lm s t r a s se ,  Rathenau, who Hajo Holborn has c a l l e d ,  "a 
man of large v is ion  and great d ip lomat ic  a b i l i t y , "  pract iced h is  p o l i c y  of 
f u l f i l lm e n t . ^  This program ca l led  fo r  Germany to accept A l l i e d  demands 
fo r  reduct ions in German m i l i t a r y  arms and reparat ion payments. However, 
the Fore ign  M i n i s t e r ,  at the same t im e ,  n ego t ia ted  w i th  the A l l i e s  f o r  a 
reduction of t h e i r  u n r e a l i s t i c  demands concerning reparat ions so as not to 
bankrupt Germany. Rathenau and W ir th  worked as a team to evade pay ing
1 O
reparat ions as much as poss ib le.
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Whi le  Rathenau worked f o r  b e t t e r  r e l a t i o n s  w i th  B r i t a i n  and France 
some members of the Foreign O f f ice  pre ferred Germany to seek rapproachement 
with the Soviet Union. Baron Ago von Maltzan, the D irector  of the Eastern 
Department in the Foreign O f f ice ,  and prev ious ly  the German Ambassador to 
Moscow, was a s t rong  and i n f l u e n t i a l  advocate o f  c l o s e r  German-Sov iet  
t i e s . * 9 D'Abernon found Ma ltzan  as "perhaps the c l e v e r e s t  man who has 
worked in the Wi lhelmstrasse s ince the war. In diplomacy and p o l i t i c s  a
on
p u p i l  o f  K id e r len -W aech te r ,  who in  tu rn  was a pup i l  o f  B ismarck  . . . . u 
Ma l t zan  and h i s  f o l l o w e r s ,  i n c l u d in g  B ro c kdo r f f -R an t z au  and D i rk sen ,  
bel ieved that:
Rapproachement with the Soviet Union might, at the very leas t ,  provide 
a coun te rw e igh t  to the power o f  the West, and, at bes t ,  m ight open 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  t r e a t y  r e v i s i o n ,  e s p e c i a l l y  a long the eas te rn  
f r o n t i e r s . 2*
Negotiat ions between the German Foreign O f f ice  and Moscow that led to
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the Rapal lo Treaty with the Soviet Union began as ea r ly  as December 1921.
As a strong leader w i th in  the Foreign O f f ice  Maltzan maneuvered to achieve 
an agreement with Moscow.22 During the Genoa Conference, in A p r i l  1922, 
Ma l t zan  met w i th  Sov ie t  d e lega te s  at R ap a l lo  and acqu i red  an agreement, 
which included secret m i l i t a r y  co l labo ra t ion  between the German and Soviet 
armies.2  ̂ Although opposed to such an eastern po l i c y ,  Rathenau and Wirth 
were persuaded to accept  the agreement by the dete rm ined  and f o r c e f u l  
M a l t z a n .22 D irksen ,  at the t im e  C h ie f  o f  the P o l i s h  A f f a i r s  D i v i s i o n  in  
the Foreign O f f ice ,  decribed the s i tu a t ion :
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That the German delegation resolved to conclude the t rea ty  was s o le ly  
due to Maltzan's energy and s k i l l .  He was not only the author of the 
p o l i t i c a l  combination involved in th i s  t rea ty ,  he was also the p i l o t  
who s tee red  t h i s  f r a i l  boat through the s h a l lo w  waters  o f  h i s  own 
delegation. F i r s t ,  he succeeded in winning over Chancel lor  Wirth, who 
was unprejudiced and p o l i t i c a l l y  minded. The main obstac le  was, of 
course, Rathenau. He was a Westerner to the very core of h is  being, a 
re f ined and cu l t iv a ted  man who abhorred the Russian Method of ru l ing  
and t e r r o r i z i n g .  He was at l a s t  persuaded . . .  to g ive  way.2f>
In s p i t e  o f  the f a c t  th a t  many in the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  b e l ie v ed  tha t  an
agreement with the Soviet Union to be a s ig n i f i c a n t  step towards improving
Germany's standing in the in te rna t iona l  system, the actual s igning of the
R apa l lo  T rea ty  was c o n t r o v e r s i a l . B ro c kdo r f f -R a n t z au ,  the German
Ambassador to Moscow (1922-28) t o l d  Gustav H i l g e r ,  an o f f i c i a l  at the
embassy, that:
[T]he Foreign M in i s t r y  had shown unnecessary haste; . . .  he bel ieved 
th a t  they might have ob ta ined  even g re a te r  advantages by s t a l l i n g .  
Even so, he acknowledged the great benef i ts  Germany derived from the 
t rea ty  not only by e l im ina t ing  Russia as a c la imant of reparat ions but 
a l s o  by se cu r ing  m o s t - f a v o r e d -n a t io n  t rea tm en t  f o r  Germany in  her 
r e l a t i o n s  w i th  S o v ie t  Russ ia .  More g e n e r a l l y ,  R ap a l lo  meant t h a t  
Germany had begun her s low road away from her p o s i t i o n  as a mere 
o b je c t  of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l t i c s .  As such, i t  met w i th  f a i r l y  broad 
approval throughout Germany.2*7
With the s ig n in g  o f  R a p a l l o ,  not on ly  were the French and B r i t i s h  
upset at such a turn  in  p o l i c y ,  but the m a jo r i t y  o f  the Wi 1 h e lm s t r a s se  
o f f i c i a l s  were "dumbfounded."2  ̂ Dirksen, h imse l f ,  despite being the ch ie f  
of the Foreign O f f ice 's  Po l ish  D iv is ion ,  professed that the Wi lhelmstrasse 
"was h a rd ly  in formed about what was going on ."29 One h i s t o r i a n ,  Gordon 
C r a ig ,  has c a l l e d  the s ig n in g  o f  R a p a l l o  "an ac t  o f  weakness and a d en ia l  
o f  e v e r y th in g  he [Rathenau] had accom p l ished  so f a r  . . . ."^O The t r e a t y
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r e s u l t e d  in  the f a i l u r e  o f  the Genoa Confe rence ,  and put a stop to the 
progress made toward better  Al l ied-German re la t ion s .
A f ter  the assass inat ion of Rathenau in June 1922, the Wi lhelmstrasse 
f e l  1 under the powerfu l  i n f l u e n c e  o f  M a l t zan ,  who was appo in ted  Fo re ign  
Secretary in December 1922. He kept the Foreign O f f ice  stab le  despite the 
p o l i t i c a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  of Germany under the Cuno and Stresemann governments 
in 1922 and 1923. Becoming C h a n ce l lo r  in  November 1923, W i lhe lm Marx 
appo inted Gustav Stresemann as h i s  Fo re ign  M in i s t e r .  Stresemann was to 
become not on ly  the dominant fo r c e  w i t h i n  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e ,  but in  the 
Weimar government u n t i l  h i s  death in  1929. One o f  h i s  f i r s t  ac ts  was to 
shakeup the Foreign O f f ice  and replace Maltzan with Carl von Schubert as 
Foreign Secretary (1924-30) mainly because Stresemann wanted an " o f f i c i a l  
who would be eas ie r  to handle than the au toc ra t ic  i n i t i a t o r  of the Rapallo- 
p o l i c y . "^  Maltzan w's sent away to become the German Ambassador to the 
United States. 0 Those diplomats who remained in Be r l in  and abroad qu ick ly  
became lo y a l  to the Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r . ^  D i rk sen ,  who served as the 
D i r e c t o r  o f  the  E a s t e r n  Depa r tm en t  (1925-28),  made the f o l l o w in g  
observat ion:
Stresemann, a member o f  the lower  m id d l e - c l a s s  in the eas te rn  
suburbs of Be r l in ,  was, when he took o f f i c e ,  not a l together free  from 
s u sp i c i o n  and a sense o f  i n f e r i o r i t y  towards the n o b i l i t y  and the 
d ip lom a ts .  But soon he became conv inced  of the l o y a l t y  and the 
devo t ion  of the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  s t a f f .  A f e e l i n g  o f  mutual t r u s t ,  
amounting to f r iendsh ip ,  developed between him and h is  co l leagues.55
During the Stresemann era, the Wi lhe lmstrasse emerged as the primary
fo rm u la t o r  o f  German f o r e ig n  p o l i c y .  I t s  new ly  found i n f l u e n c e  was a
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r e s u l t  o f  Stresemann's  i n f l u e n c e  in the R e i ch s tag ,  as w e l l  as the Weimar 
R e p u b l i c ' s  obv ious need f o r  an e f f e c t i v e  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  fo rm u la ted  and 
c a r r i e d  out by an e f f i c i e n t ,  c e n t r a l i z e d  agency w i th  the aim o f  r i d d i n g  
Germany o f  the V e r s a i l l e s  D ik t a t  and r e s t o r i n g  i t s  Great Power s ta tu s .  
Stresemann served as the head of th i s  organ izat ion ,  the Foreign O f f ice ,  and 
d i r e c t e d  i t s  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y .  None the less ,  the Fo re ign  M in i s t e r  was too 
busy with h is  dut ies in the Reichstag to c lo s e ly  manage the adm in is t ra t ive  
a f f a i r s  o f  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e . 33 However, "a mutual t r u s t  and re sp e c t , "  
according to Gaines Post, Jr. , "grew between Stresemann and the o f f i c i a l s  
in  the Wi 1 h e lm s t r a s se  . . . . "37 E rns t  von W e izsaecke r ,  a young d ip lom a t  
in the fore ign serv ice,  noted that the Foreign M in i s te r  only spent mornings 
at the Foreign O ff ice .  In fa c t ,  Weizsaecker claimed that,  " in the Foreign 
O f f i c e  he knew on ly  a few of the o f f i c i a l s ;  he was a s t r a nge r  to the rank 
and f i l e .  He was igno ran t  o f  a g rea t  deal th a t  went on t h e r e . " 33 In 
add it ion to th i s ,  Dirksen added:
The rout ine work of a complicated bureaucrat ic  machine bored him, and 
he would have t r ie d  to evade i t  even i f  he could have spared the t ime 
f o r  i t .  He was tho rough ly  u n b u re a u c r a t<c , and he cou ld  d r i v e  h i s  
subordinates to despair by h is  f a i l u r e  to keep appointments or draw up 
minutes of his conversat ions.33
L e f t  a lone much of the t im e ,  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e ,  under the c a r e f u l
management of Foreign Secretary Schubert, once again became a c lo se -kn i t ,
e l i t e  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  Schubert ,  "a s t range  and ve ry  com p l i c a ted  man" has
been portrayed by a fe l low  diplomat:
[He had] an outspoken g i f t  f o r  f o r e i g n  p o l i t i c s  . . . combined w i th  
very painstak ing and consc ient ious rout ine  work. He was susp ic ious,
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secre t ive ,  and lacked the g i f t  of tak ing things e a s i l y  and conf in ing 
h imse l f  to the r e a l l y  important matters. He made l i f e  a burden to h is  
co l labo ra to rs ,  but s t i l l  more to h imse lf .  He was pass ionate ly  devoted 
to h i s  task  and b e l i e v e d  t h a t  e v e r y th in g  would be on the rocks  i f  he 
were out o f  h i s  o f f i c e .  A Westerner by b i r t h  and c a re e r ,  he was a 
conv inced  advocate o f  the p r o - B r i t i s h  school in  the German f o r e ig n  
serv ice.  But he was s u f f i c i e n t l y  fa r -s igh ted  and p o l i t i c a l l y  minded 
to take in to  cons iderat ion the duty incumbent on the conduct o f  German 
f o r e ig n  p o l i c y :  to c ou n te r -b a la n c e  the Western in f l u e n c e s  by a good 
understanding with Russ ia.40
Schubert reorganized the leadersh ip  of the departments w i th in  the Foreign
Off ice .  He placed career dip lomats,  instead o f  c i v i l  servants, to serve as
d i re c to rs  of key pos i t ions .  These new d i re c to r s  became v i t a l  to Foreign
O f f ice  operations. As Dirksen explained:
The newly  appo in ted  'D i r e c t o r s '  were e n t ru s t e d  w i th  im po r tan t  
p o l i t i c a l  negot ia t ions. They accompanied the [ F o r e ig n ]  M i n i s t e r  to 
con fe rences ,  they d r a f t e d  the notes,  negotiated with the Embassies, 
and had d i r e c t  access  to the S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  and the [ F o r e ig n ]  
M in i s t e r .  They were o f ten  p a r t y  to the most s e c r e t  a f f a i r s  . . . . 
Schubert  se t  up a s o - c a l l e d  'Bureau o f  M i n i s t e r s '  in  which these 
h ighly  con f iden t ia l  matters were concentrated, but he shrank from the 
dec is ive  step of forming a new p o l i t i c a l  department.4*
The leading o f f i c i a l s  w i th in  the Foreign O f f ice  formed an inner c i r c l e  that
worked c lo se ly  together over issues.  Although stay ing away from much of
the Wilhe!mstrasse's bureaucrat ic  a c t i v i t i e s ,  Stresemann was a c lose f r iend
o f  t h i s  in n e r  c i r c l e . 4  ̂ I t  was under h i s  l e a d e r s h ip  t h a t  the Fo re ign
O f f i c e  became a very important asset to the Weimar Republic.
Stresemann and the Foreign O f f i c e  were the prime formula tors  o f  German
fo r e ig n  p o l i c y . 4*̂ At f i r s t ,  however, the Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  expe r ienced
prob lems w i th  General Hans von Seeck t ,  the C h ie f  o f  the Army Command.
Stresemann had inher i ted  the two-faced p o l i c i e s  concerning the West and the
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Sov iet  Union. Stresemann favored the pursu i t  of  both p o l i c i e s  and planned 
to s t e e r  a m idd le  course  between the West and Moscow, p la y in g  one o f f  
a g a in s t  the o the r ,  to g r a d u a l l y  rega in  s o ve re ig n ty  and s e c u r i t y  f o r  
Germany.1*4 He a l s o  i n s i s t e d  upon the Army s u b o rd in a t in g  i t s e l f  to the 
goa ls  o f  German f o r e ig n  p o l i c y . 45 Seeck t ,  on the o the r  hand, d i s l i k e d  
Stresemann's leanings towards the West, e sp e c ia l l y  France, and objected to 
the Locarno T rea ty  (1925) and p lans  f o r  Germany to j o i n  the League o f  
Nat ions .45
In work ing  f o r  good r e l a t i o n s  w i th  the West and the S o v ie t  Union, 
Stresemann sought to r e v i s e  the V e r s a i l l e s  D i k t a t  and g r a d u a l l y  rega in  
G rea t  Power s ta tu s  f o r  Germany. He sought improved r e l a t i o n s  w i th  the 
West, inc lud ing  the A l l i e d  evacuation o f  the Ruhr, Saar, and Rhinelands, as 
well  as the termination o f  A l l i e d  m i l i t a r y  inspect ions in s ide  Germany.47 
To reassu re  the French o f  Germany's peace fu l  i n t e n t i o n s ,  the Fo re ign  
M in i s te r ,  as part of his r e c o n c i l i a t io n  po l i c y  with the West, acquired an 
agreement, the Locarno T rea ty  o f  1925, on Franco-German border  i s sue s .  
This t reaty  included the French promise for  eventual withdrawal o f  m i l i t a r y  
f o r c e s  from the Ruhr and Rh ine lands .  However, Stresemann cou ld  on ly  
ach ieve  t h i s  t r e a t y  by ag ree ing ,  a t  the i n s i s t e n c e  o f  the French 
government,  to Germany j o i n i n g  the League o f  Na t ions  as a permanent 
member.45 In 1926, the Foreign M in i s t e r  acquired Germany's membership in 
the League d e sp i t e  s t rong  p r o t e s t s  from Seeck t ,  M a l t z an ,  and the young 
Buelow, who fea red  t h a t  membership would im p r i s o n  Germany in  the
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in te rna t iona l  system created at V e r s a i l l e s  and block r e v i s i o n i s t  p lans.4® 
But, Stresemann was w i l l i n g  to take a chance in order fo r  Germany to meet 
i t s  long-range goal of t e r r i t o r i a l  rev is ion  in the east. As one h is to r ian  
put i t ,  the Foreign M in i s te r  played fo r  " c o n c i l i a t i o n  and a re laxa t ion  of 
t en s ion  in  the west,  r e s u l t i n g  in  the w i l l i n g n e s s  o f  London and P a r i s  to 
cooperate or acquiesce in rev is ion  in the eas t . "^
Coopera t ion  w i th  Moscow had the two-edged purpose of p ro v id in g  
Stresemann the p o s s i b i l i t y  fo r  d ip lo m a t i c a l l y  maneuvering Germany between 
the in te rna t iona l  pos i t ions  of the West and the Soviet Union in an attempt 
to regain Great Power status, besides serv ing as a way to pressure Poland 
in to returning lo s t  German lands to the Weimar Republic. In sp i te  of the 
loss of t e r r i t o r y  in eastern Europe a f te r  the war, the Weirnar government 
re fused  to accept  the f o r f e i t u r e  o f  Danz ig ,  the P o l i s h  C o r r i d o r ,  Upper 
S i l e s i a ,  and Posen. The Weimar government sought to rega in  these l o s t  
t e r r i t o r i e s .  The German Army v iewed Poland as i t s  avowed enemy and i t s  
main m i l i t a r y  threat  to Germany since the Poles, with French backing, would 
not p e a c e f u l l y  re tu rn  the l o s t  German lands.  Acco rd ing  to Gaines Pos t ,  
Jr., "the Army considered the Corr idor  v i t a l  to German secu r i ty ,  regain ing 
i t ,  leg i t im a te  grounds fo r  war."^ The Army therefore s t rong ly  supported 
c lo s e  German-Sov ie t  c oope ra t ion  in  eas te rn  Europe to  p re ssu re  the Po le s  
in t o  r e t u r n in g  the l o s t  t e r r i t o r i e s .  Stresemann and the Foreign O f f ice  
a l so  re cogn ized  the need f o r  Germany to weaken Po land 's  p o s i t i o n  in  the 
east through c lose  r e la t ion s  with the Soviet Union. ^  The Rapal lo po l i c y ,
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and la te r  the Treaty of Be r l in  (1926), put pressure on the Poles to return 
t e r r i t o r y  to Germany by t h r e a te n in g  the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a German-Sov iet  
a l l i a n c e  aga in s t  Poland. However, in sp i te  of German-Soviet cooperation 
becoming an important part of German fore ign po l i c y  and m i l i t a r y  planning, 
Stresemann cont inued  to pursue r e l a t i o n s  w i th  both Moscow and the West. 
This two-faced diplomacy of Stresemann's d i s t u r b ed  the Sov ie t  le a d e r sh ip  
and resu lted in a de te r io ra t ion  of German re la t ion s  with the Soviet Union. 
Dirksen, who was German Ambassador to Moscow (1928-33), noted th i s  change 
in r e l a t i o n s  and blamed Stresemann's  Locarno p o l i c y  w i th  the West f o r  
ru in ing  the c lose German-Soviet f r iendsh ip  that began at Rapallo.33
Besides p o l i t i c a l  pressure, Stresemann recognized the need fo r  Germany 
to rearm and rega in  a powerfu l  m i l i t a r y  to make i t s  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  more 
e f fe c t iv e .  In the b e l i e f  that the Poles would not peace fu l ly  return German 
t e r r i t o r y ,  Wi lhelmstrasse o f f i c i a l s  rea l i zed  that Germany had to increase 
i t s  m i l i t a r y  power s in ce  "Germany must u l t im a t e l y  use m i l i t a r y  f o r c e  to 
reso lve the Po l ish  q u e s t i o n . T h u s ,  the Foreign O f f ice  and Army shared 
not on ly  the common o b j e c t i v e s  o f  r i d d in g  Germany of the V e r s a i l l e s  
m i l i t a r y  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  but t e r r i t o r i a l  rev is ion  in the east, the evacuation 
of A l l i e d  forces from Germany, and an end to A l l i e d  M i l i t a r y  inspect ions of 
German m i l i t a r y  a c t i v i t i e s .  Therefore, as a matter of po l i c y ,  Stresemann 
and the Wi lhelmstrasse both supported the secret rearmament of the German 
army and m i l i t a r y  co l labo ra t ion  with Soviet Russia. In fa c t ,  Stresemann
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promoted such a c t i v i t y  while  "denying, exp la in ing  away, or screening German 
disarmament v io la t ion s "  to Western leaders.55
In 1926, General Wilhelm Heye replaced Seeckt as Chief of the German 
Army Command. Under new leadership, the Defense M in i s t r y  cooperated with 
Stresemann in the mutual aim of res to r ing  German m i l i t a r y  power and Great 
Power s t a tu s .  The Defense M i n i s t r y  changed i t s  own independent p o l i c y  
a f te r  recogniz ing the need to work c lo se ly  with the diplomats in pursuing a 
rapproachement with France to provide Germany se cu r i ty  against a poss ib le  
F r a n c o - P o l i s h  a t t a c k ,  e s p e c i a l l y  s in c e  the m i l i t a r y  lacked s u f f i c i e n t  
resources to f ig h t  a two-front war.55 In fa c t ,  the Army subordinated and 
integrated i t s  m i l i t a r y  planning with Stresemann's fore ign po l i c y  to avoid 
d i s c re d i t in g  Germany in the European d ip lomat ic  system. This al lowed the 
Foreign M in i s te r  to play the middle between the Soviet Union and the West 
in an a t tempt to ach ieve  h i s  p o l i c y  goa ls  o f  the r e a c q u i s t i o n  o f  f u l l  
German sovere ignty and secu r i ty ,  as well  as the rev is ion  of the V e r s a i l l e s  
Treaty. Close cooperation between the Foreign O f f ice  and Defense M in i s t r y  
was evident in t h e i r  j o i n t  planning, use of m i l i t a r y  attaches in d ip lomat ic  
ro le s ,  use of d iplomats in m i l i t a r y  operations,  and campaign fo r  rev is ion  
of the m i l i t a r y  c lauses in the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . 57
Desp i te  s e rv in g  the Weimar R epub l i c  as the p r im a ry  f o rm u la t o r  o f  
fo re ign  po l i cy ,  Gustav Stresemann had achieved l im i te d  success in fo re ign
a f f a i r s  before h is  unt imely  death in October 1929. The French were slow to
(
accept any rev is ion  of the V e r s a i l l e s  Treaty, and German-Soviet r e la t io n s
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were d e t e r i o r a t i n g .  By 1929, the Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  came under much
c r i t i c i s m  from the impat ient  German leadersh ip ,  inc lud ing  some diplomats in
the Foreign O f f ice ,  for  h is  f a i l e d  po l i c y  with the West.58 However, at the
Hague Conference,  Stresemann, s h o r t l y  be fo re  h i s  death, had ob ta ined ,  in
exchange f o r  Germany's accep tance  o f  the Young P lan ,  French Fore ign
M in i s t e r  A r i s t i d e  Br iand's promise that France would evacuate a l l  of i t s
m i l i t a r y  fo r ce s  from the Rh ine land  by 30 June 193C.59 Summing up the
d ip lomat ic  career of Stresemann, the B r i t i s h  Ambassador to B e r l in  stated:
Stresemann may c l a im  to have r a i s e d  Germany from the p o s i t i o n  o f  a 
s t r icken  and disarmed foe in to  that  of a d ip lomat ic  equal, e n t i t l e d  to 
f u l l  c o n s id e r a t i o n  as a G reat  Power and en jo y ing  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
guarantee for  the protect ion  o f  her f ro n t ie r s .  To have accomplished 
t h i s  in  a few yea rs  o f  power w i t h o u t  the suppor t  o f  armed fo r c e  i s  a 
feat  worthy of those who have w r i t ten  t h e i r  names most memorably on 
the s c ro l l  of fame. Stresemann l e f t  Germany i n f i n i t e l y  stronger than 
when he took the helm in  1923, and Europe incomparably more peaceful. 
This achievement i s  the more remarkable in  that  Stresemann was not, by 
temperament, a p a c i f i s t  . . . .
The death o f  Stresemann l e f t  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  w i t h o u t  a s t rong  
le a d e r  who would con t inue  a p o l i c y  o f  r e c o n c i 1i a t i o n  w i th  the West. 
C on s tan t in  Baron von Neurath, German Ambassador to Rome, turned down 
Pres ident Paul von Hindenburg's o f f e r  to become Foreign M in i s te r  in  1929.6* 
Instead, J u l iu s  Curt ius  assumed the pos i t ion .  The new m in is te r ,  according 
to one Fo re ign  O f f i c e  member, " la cked  the a u t h o r i t y  and v i s i o n  which had 
elevated Stresemann to the rank of a European statesman."62 The fo l low ing  
y ea r ,  in  1930, H e in r i c h  B ruen ing  became C h a n c e l l o r  and teamed up w i th  
Curt ius  to conduct German fore ign po l icy .
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For the next two years, Chance l lor Bruening, with the strong support 
o f  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e ,  d i r e c t e d  German f o r e ig n  p o l i c y .  S t a f f  w i t h i n  the 
Wi lhelmstrasse praised h is  r e v i s i o n i s t  po l i cy .  In h is  memoirs, Weizsaecker 
s ta ted  tha t  B ruen ing was "the one who moved w i th  the g re a te s t  assurance 
along the narrow path between German needs and fore ign res istance. With 
h i s  tough and ye t  cou r teous ,  a s c e t i c  y e t  generous, na tu re ,  he won 
con f id ence  in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c i r c l e s . S o m e  h i s t o r i a n s ,  however, have 
c r i t i c i z e d  the C h a n ce l lo r  because he was a "headstrong and w i l l f u l  
statesman who bel ieved that act ion was always bet te r  than inac t ion ,  even i f  
i t  was taken without r e f l e c t i o n ,  and whose t a c t i c s  in fore ign a f f a i r s  did 
not bring advantage to h is  country."^ Why did Bruening's p o l i c y  receive 
such d i f f e re n t  judgements?
With the av id  support  of the Fo re ign  O f f i c e ,  Bruening con t inued  
Stresemann's r e v i s i o n i s t  po l icy .  But, in s te ad  o f  work ing toward gradua l  
change to the Ve r s a i l l e s  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  Bruening became impat ient and, with 
the advice of Bernhard Wilhelm von Buelow, the new Foreign Secretary (1930- 
36), who was a nephew of the prewar Chancel lor,  h a s t i l y  pursued a quicker 
path to rees tab l i sh ing  Germany as a Great Power.^ The dec is ion fo r  t h i s  
change in  s t r a t e g y  was the outcome o f  Stresemann 's  success  at the Hague 
Conference, which resulted in a new reparat ions sett lement fo r  Germany as 
well  as the promised withdrawal of French troops from the Rhineland in June 
1930. Buelow, who one h i s t o r i a n  has d e s c r ib e d  as a d ip lom a t  w i th  
" e x c e l l e n t  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  . . .  a good grasp o f  the le g a l  d imens ion  o f
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diplomacy, and experience and exper t ise "66 bel ieved the accomplishment of
such fe a t s  s i g n a l l e d  the moment f o r  Germany " to  embark on a g re a te r
a c t i v i t y , "  and push fo r  an end to the V e r s a i l l e s  r e s t r i c t i o n s . 6^
Although Bruening and h is  supporters bel ieved *he t ime was r igh t  fo r
making new "demands," the B r i t i s h  government warned Germany against fo rc ing
France in t o  c o n s id e r in g  more concess ions  too soon. In J u l y  1930, the
B r i t i s h  Ambassador to France commented:
I f  the Germans create the impression here that they do not appreciate 
the s p i r i t  of [the French withdrawal from the Rhineland] and merely 
use i t  as a peg on which to  hang f r e sh  demands, they w i l l  p la y  in t o  
the hands o f  M. B r ia nd 's  c r i t i c s  . . . .  The adv ice ,  t h e r e fo r e ,  to 
Germany i s  tha t  in  her own i n t e r e s t  she had b e t t e r  go s low now and 
rest  content fo r  the present with what Stresemann's enl ightened po l i c y  
has already achieved fo r  her.68
Bruening and the Foreign O f f ice  ignored th i s  advice. Since Bruening, 
h imse l f ,  was too busy with domestic problems, and Foreign M in i s te r  Curt ius  
was too "inexperienced," the Chancel lor r e l i e d  upon the expert ise  of Buelow 
and the Foreign O f f ice  fo r  formula t ing and conducting fore ign a f f a i r s .  The 
Foreign Secretary worked c lose with Chancel lor Bruening on fore ign po l i c y  
i s s u e s . 60 But, as one ob se rve r  has noted about the h ig h l y  i n t e l l i g e n t  
Buelow:
H is wide knowledge o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a f f a i r s  in t h e i r  most v a r ie d  
aspects were somewhat handicapped by a c r i t i c a l  and ana ly t i c a l  mind 
which prevented a p o s i t i v e  and c r e a t i v e  approach to p o l i t i c a l  
p rob lems. His  a n a l y s i s  o f  every  s i t u a t i o n  was so thorough th a t  he 
always found weighty reasons fo r  a p o l i c y  of "wait and see."70
Even so, f o l l o w in g  Buelow's adv ice ,  the C h a n c e l l o r  and Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r
sought more con ce ss ion s  from the French. They wanted the French to
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evacuate  the Saa r land ,  a r e v i s i o n  o f  Germany's eas te rn  bo rde rs ,  the
a b o l i t i o n  o f  d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n  r e s t r i c t i o n s  in  the Rhineland, as well  as the
r i g h t  to b u i l d  naval c r u i s e r s .  B ruen ing  e s p e c i a l l y  wanted the re tu rn  o f
Danzig, the Corr idor ,  western Posen, and Upper S i l e s i a . 7* On 3 Ju ly  1930,
Curt ius informed the B r i t i s h  Ambassador to B e r l in  that "Germany could not
r e s t  con ten t  w i th  her p re sen t  f r o n t i e r  in  the e a s t . " 72 Such "demands"
i r r i t a t e d  the B r i t i s h  and in fu r ia te d  the French governments. Since German
leadersh ip  fo l lowed Foreign O f f ice  advice, the Wilhelmstrasse support fo r
Bruening's fore ign po l i cy  came natura l.  Nonetheless, as already mentioned,
some h is to r ian s  have ca l l e d  the Chancel lo r 's  fore ign po l i cy  as awkward and
se l f -de fea t ing .  Gordon Cra ig  wrote:
H is  condoning o f  menacing speeches about the C o r r i d o r  and the 
Rh ine land ,  h i s  demand f o r  a reopen ing  o f  the Saar q u e s t io n ,  h i s  
s tubborn i n s i s t e n c e  on the r i g h t  to b u i l d  P anzek reuze r , a la rmed 
Germany's neighbors without improving h is  domestic s i tua t ion .  The net 
r e su l t  of a l l  these f r a n t i c  maneuvers was to make the French re lu c tan t
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to grant concessions o f  any kind to Germany.
Meanwhile, as the Bruening government made strong utterances about the 
demand fo r  rev is ions  to the V e r s a i l l e s  D ik tat ,  Foreign M in i s te r  Cu r t iu s  and 
S ta te  S e c re ta ry  Buelow co n sp i r e d  towards t a k in g  the f i r s t  s tep in  the 
gradual annexat ion  o f  A u s t r i a .  R e a l i z i n g  the se r io u sne s s  o f  A u s t r i a ' s  
economic p l i g h t ,  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  made p lans  to n eg o t ia te  an A u s t r o -  
German customs union. In Feb rua ry  1931, the W i lh e lm s t r a s s e  conv inced  
Bruen ing  o f  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  which r e s u l t e d  in  an agreement w i th  the 
A u s t r i a n  government du r ing  the f o l l o w i n g  month.74 The unexpected j o i n t  
announcement by the German and A u s t r i a n  governments le d  to  s t rong
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i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r o t e s t s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  by F rance ,  "a larmed by what i t  
cons ide red  the spe c t re  o f  a reawakening German hegemony in  Cen t ra l  
Europe."7® Andre Francois-Poncet, the French Ambassador to Be r l in ,  wrote 
in h is  memoirs:
The r e s u l t  proved c a t a s t r o p h i c .  Both the g rea t  and s m a l l e r  powers 
rose in  a storm of  unanimous r e p roba t io n .  France reac ted  w i th  
p a r t i c u l a r  fo r c e .  Germany and A u s t r i a  were compe l led  to stand as 
c u l p r i t s  in the dock befo re  the Counc i l  o f  the League o f  Na t ions  at 
Geneva, whence t h e i r  case was r e f e r r e d  f o r  a r b i t r a t i o n  by the
7FiInternat iona l  Court at The Hague.
Germany was forced to back down to in te rna t iona l  pressure. Both Bruening 
and C u r t iu s  s u f f e r e d  a s e r i o u s  d e fea t ,  a l though Buelow anu Lne Fo re ign  
O f f i c e  l o s t  l i t t l e  p r e s t i g e  over the in c i d e n t .  In the a f te rmath  o f  t h i s  
inc ident  Curt ius  was forced to res ign in October 1931,77 leaving Bruening 
to act as h is  own Foreign M in i s t e r .7®
The e a r l y  t h i r t i e s  were p o l i t i c a l l y  ve ry  t u r b u le n t .  B ruen ing 's  
aggressive fore ign po l i c y  made i t  more d i f f i c u l t  fo r  Germany to rev ise  the 
V e r s a i l l e s  Dik tat .  The French were more re lu c tan t  to give concessions to 
Germany a f te r  the customs union c r i s i s .  The depression combined with the 
i n t e r n a l  p o l i t i c a l  s t r u g g l e s  w i t h i n  Germany occup ied much o f  the 
C h a n c e l l o r ' s  t ime.  The p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  became so t ro ub le d  th a t  
Bruen ing had l i t t l e  t ime  to "g ive  more than p e r f u n c to r y  a t t e n t i o n  to 
f o r e ig n  a f f a i r s . " 79 Thus, o p e ra t in g  w i th  l i t t l e  i n t e r f e r e n c e  from the 
C h a n c e l lo r ,  and w i th ou t  a Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r ,  S ta te  S e c re ta r y  Buelow was
ab le  to ach ieve  a more independent r o l e  f o r  the W i1 he 1m st rasse  in  the
80conduct of fo re ign  a f f a i r s .
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Buelow, however, con t inued  to work c lo s e  wi t h  Bruening on f o r e ig n  
a f f a i r s .  F ran co is -P on ce t  d e s c r ib ed  the S ta te  S e c re t a r y  as " f i l l e d  wi t h  
zeal and devotion to duty as he was s i l e n t  and d is c ree t ,  a statesman worthy 
of the t r a d i t i o n s  of a Prussian f a m i ly  which has given Germany numerous and 
honorab le  s e r v a n t s . B u t ,  these were t r o u b le d  t im es  in Germany. The 
in te rna l  p o l i t i c a l  confusion in Germany combined with the renewed French 
s u s p i c i o n  o f  German am b i t ion s  s tagnated  German f o r e ig n  p o l i c y .  In May 
1932, the p o l i t i c a l  c r i s i s  resu lted in Pres ident von Hindenburg d ism iss ing  
Bruening and rep lac ing him with Franz von Papen. Although, according to
OO
Weizsaecker, the Wi lhelmstrasse regretted the departure of Bruening, the 
change meant the appoin tment o f  one o f  t h e i r  own, Cons tan t in  Baron von 
Neurath, as the new Foreign M in is te r .
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NEURATH, THE FOREIGN OFFICE, AND THE RISE OF HITLER
Constantin Baron von Neurath was born in  Wuerttemberg in 1873. As the 
member of an a r i s t o c r a t i c  Swabian fam i ly  with a long h is to ry  o f  serv ice  to 
the k ings  o f  Wuert temberg, he broke w i th  f a m i l y  t r a d i t i o n  and ente red  
Ka iser Wilhelm II 's  consulate serv ice  in B e r l in  in  1901. He served abroad 
in London from 1903 to 1908 in the German Consulate before t ran s fe r r ing  to 
the German d ip l o m a t i c  s e r v i c e  in  1913. In 1919, the Weimar government 
appointed Neurath as M in i s t e r  to Denmark. He l a t e r  served as Ambassador to 
I t a l y  and managed German-Ita l ian r e la t ion s  with the F a s c i s t  government of 
Benito Musso l in i  from 1922 to 1930. Pres ident Paul von Hindenburg, a c lose 
f r iend ,  was instrumental in acqu ir ing Neurath's appointment as Ambassador 
to B r i t a i n  in  1930 to 1932.1 Hindenburg, however, p r e f e r r e d  Neurath to 
become Fo re ign  M in i s t e r .  Both the P r e s id e n t  and C h a n c e l l o r  H e in r i c h  
B ruen ing asked him seve ra l  t im es  dur ing  1931 and 1932 to accep t  such an 
appointment,2 but Neurath, who enjoyed l i v i n g  in London, dec l ined because 
o f  h i s  c o n s e r v a t i v e  based d i s t a s t e  f o r  s e r v in g  in  a p a r l i a m e n ta r y  
government c a b in e t .  Neurath, who was not a f f i l i a t e d  w i th  any p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i e s ,  s t r o n g l y  d i s l i k e d  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  and p a r l i a m e n t s ,  
p r e f e r r i n g  a more a u t o c r a t i c  type o f  government l i k e  t h a t  which e x i s t e d
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under the K a i s e r . 0 As Neurath, h im s e l f ,  t o ld  the Internat ional M i l i t a r y
Tr ibunal in 1946 why he refused an appointment to Foreign M in is te r :
[ I ] n v iew o f  the p a r ty  c o n d i t i o n s  in  the Re ich s tag  in  those days,  I 
saw no p o s s i b i l i t y  fo r  a stab le  fore ign po l icy .  I was not a member o f  
any of the t h i r t y  or so pa r t ie s ,  so that I would not have been able to 
[ f i n d ]  . . . support  in  the R e i ch s tag  o f  those days.4
Neurath in s i s te d  that he would only become Foreign M in i s te r  under a party-
free p re s iden t ia l  cabinet that showed the promise of res tor ing  leadersh ip
and s t a b i l i t y  to Germany.6
In May 1932, w h i l e  s t i l l  in  London, Neurath re ce ived  another  o f f e r  
from Hindenburg to become Foreign M in is te r .  Hindenburg, who saw Neurath as 
a prudent, moderate, and r e l i a b le  d ip lomat ,6 appealed to h is  c lose f r iend  
to t r a v e l  to B e r l i n  and d i s c u s s  the m a t t e r . 7 In B e r l i n ,  Neurath t o l d  the 
P r e s id e n t  t h a t  he would on ly  serve as Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  under a s t rong  
p r e s i d e n t i a l  c a b in e t  th a t  a l low ed  him to fo rm u la te  and conduct  f o r e ig n  
po l i c y  without any in ter ference.0 Hindenburg agreed to these terms and got 
Neurath appointed as Foreign M in i s te r  in the newly formed cabinet,  despite 
Franz von Papen and General Kurt von S ch le iche rs ’ support fo r  the d iplomats 
Rudolf Nadolny or U l r ich  von Hasse l l ,  on 2 June 1932.9
The S ta te  S e c re ta r y ,  Bernhard W i lhe lm  von Buelow, and the le a d in g  
members of the Foreign O f f ice  supported the appointment o f  Neurath over the 
other candidates.*0 They desired a Foreign M in i s t e r  who would continue the 
moderate fore ign po l i cy  o f  Stresemann and Bruening. Neurath, as Ambassador 
to B r i t a i n ,  had represented Bruening's p o l i c y  with the B r i t i s h  and bel ieved 
in  c o n t i n u in g  the fo rmer  C h a n c e l l o r ' s  program.11 Hans D ie c k h o f f ,  the
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D irec to r  o f  the Br i t ish -Amer ican  Department in the Foreign O f f ic e ,  bel ieved 
Neurath to be a "man o f  h igh s tandards  and an expe r ienced  d ip l o m a t . " 12 
Buelow, who many have v iewed as "the most i n f l u e n t i a l  f i g u r e "  in  the 
Foreign O f f i c e  during the e a r l y  t h i r t i e s , 12 b e l i e v e d  Neurath 's  c lo s e n e s s  
and access to Hindenburg would s t rong ly  support the Foreign O f f ice  and i t s  
po l i c y  o f  gradual rev is ion  to the V e r s a i l l e s  Treaty.14 Buelow represented 
the peaceful po l i c y  of res to r ing  Germany as a Great Power in centra l  Europe 
(M i t te leu ropa), inc lud ing t e r r i t o r i a l  r e v i s i o n  in  eas te rn  Europe and the 
annexation o f  Aus t r ia .12
Neurath and Buelow held s i m i l a r  v iews  concerning fore ign re la t ion s .  
Buelow, however, served h is  super ior not only as the adm in is t ra to r  o f  the 
Fo re ign  O f f i c e ,  but as the " i n t e l l e c t u a l  f a th e r "  o f  Neurath 's  f o r e ig n  
p o l i c y .16 Both Buelow and Neurath advocated the cont inuat ion o f  Bruening's 
r e v i s i o n i s t  p o l i c y  aimed a t  a c q u i r i n g  from the V e r s a i l l e s  Powers the 
acknowledgement o f  equal r i g h t s  f o r  Germany, an end o f  r e p a r a t i o n s ,  and 
t e r r i t o r i a l  boundary changes in  e a s te rn  Europe.1'7 Neurath, who had been 
German Ambassador to B r i t a i n  and I t a l y ,  and Buelow toge the r  d e s i r e d  
improved German re la t ion s  with B r i t a i n  and I t a l y  to gain leverage aga inst  
F rance  in  n e g o t i a t i n g  r e v i s i o n s  to the V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a t y . 18 They, a long 
with Dirksen and Nadolny, a lso promoted c lo s e r  German re la t io n s  with Sov iet  
Russ ia  to coun te rba lance  any in f l u e n c e  t h a t  France he ld  in  e a s te rn  
Europe.19 Describ ing Neurath's fore ign po l i c y  to the Nuremberg court ,  Hans
Dieckhof f  stated:
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I t  was the aim o f  Herr Von Neurath to  m a in ta in  good r e l a t i o n s  
with a i l  states and thereby to re -e s tab l i s h  gradual ly  Germany's status 
o f  equal r i g h t s  which we had l o s t  in  1919. Th is  was the same p o l i c y  
th a t  had been pursued by Stresemann and Bruen ing.  Herr  Von Neurath 
was aware of the d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  Germany's pos i t ion .  His tendency was 
to exerc ise moderation.2^
In h is  own words, Neurath to ld  the In ternat iona l  M i l i t a r y  Tr ibunal:
I t  was my v iew th a t  the s o l u t i o n  o f  the v a r io u s  p o l i t i c a l  
prob lems cou ld  be ach ieved  on ly  by peace fu l  means and step  by step. 
Complete e q u a l i t y  f o r  Germany in  a l l  f i e l d s ,  in  the m i l i t a r y  f i e l d  
t h e re fo re  as w e l l ,  and a l s o  the r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  s o ve re ig n ty  in  the 
e n t i r e  t e r r i t o r y  o f  the  Re i c h  and t he  e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  any 
d is c r im ina t ion  were p re requ is i te  condit ions.  But to achieve th i s  was 
p r im ar i ly  the f i r s t  task of German fore ign p o l i c y . 2 -̂
N eve r th e le s s ,  in  the case o f  l o s t  German t e r r i t o r i e s ,  Neurath s t r o n g ly
bel ieved that Germany needed to rearm and threaten to use force in  order to
reacquire these lands i f  diplomacy u l t im a te ly  f a i l e d . 22
S h o r t l y  a f t e r  assuming o f f i c e  as Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r ,  Neurath had h i s
f i r s t  d ip lomat ic  success. On 9 Ju ly  1932, the Western Powers agreed to end
German reparations at the Lausanne Con fe rence .22 Dur ing the Disarmament
Conference in  Geneva, the Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  c a l l e d  f o r  the o the r  Great
Powers to disarm as spec i f ied  in the V e r s a i l l e s  agreement. On 6 September,
Neurath also demanded the recognit ion of equal r igh ts  fo r  Germany. Two
pc
weeks la te r ,  Germany withdrew from the conference. This t a c t i c  resu lted  
in the V e r s a i l l e s  Powers recogniz ing equa l i t y  o f  r ig h t s  on secu r i ty  matters
pc
fo r  Germany on 3 December 1932: a major tr iumph fo r  the Foreign O f f ice .  
Germany was in  the fu tu r e  to be t r e a t e d  on the same l e v e l  as the o the r  
G rea t  Powers s in c e  the d e c l a r a t i o n  im p l i e d  the e l im i n a t i o n  o f  a l l
0  7
d i s c r i m i t o r y  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  the V e r s a i l l e s  T re a ty  a g a in s t  Germany.
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Commenting on th i s  event, Hans D ieckhoff  t o ld  the Nuremberg court  that  the 
Foreign O f f i c e  took the view that  Germany now had "the ind isputab le  r ig h t  
to rearm a f t e r  a l l  d isarmament e f f o r t s  had f a i l e d . " 22 And y e t ,  Neurath 
b e l i e v e d  t h a t  rearmament would have to be slow so as not to d i s t u r b  the 
se cu r i ty  o f  i t s  immediate neighbors.29
Hindenburg appo in ted  A d o l f  H i t l e r  as C h a n c e l lo r  on 30 January  1933. 
Neurath admitted that  t h i s  act ion took him by su rp r ise .20 The Pres ident 
made H i t l e r ' s  appo in tment on the c o n d i t i o n s  th a t  Neurath was kep t  as 
Foreign M in i s t e r  and there would be no changes in the Foreign O f f ic e ,  or in  
the course  o f  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y . 22 A l though Neurath a t  f i r s t  re fu sed  to 
remain in  o f f i c e , 22 Hindenburg convinced the Foreign M in i s te r  to continue 
h i s  work in  g u id in g  f o r e ig n  a f f a i r s ,  and a c t  as a coun te rba lance  a g a in s t  
any po l i cy  i n i t i a t e d  by H i t l e r . 22 Hindenburg to ld  h is  c lose f r iend  tha t  he 
wanted him to "secure the cont inuat ion o f  a peaceful fore ign po l i c y ,  and to 
prevent H i t l e r  from tak ing the rash steps which were so poss ib le  in  view of 
h i s  im p u l s i v e  na tu re ,  in  one word, to a c t  as a b rake ."2  ̂ Neurath became 
convinced tha t  he could, with Hindenburg's support, control fore ign po l i c y  
under the National S o c i a l i s t s  and thus accepted the cha l lenge.25 Hermann 
Rauschning, a c lose f r iend  and admirer o f  H i t l e r ' s  p o l i t i c a l  s k i l l ,  wrote 
about Neurath's in ten t ions:
I am p e r f e c t l y  sure t h a t  he [Neura th ]  ac ted  from the h ig h e s t  o f  
mot ives :  he was t r y i n g  to t r a i n  the Naz is  and tu rn  them i n t o  r e a l l y  
se rv iceab le  partners in  a moderate n a t i o n a l i s t  regime . . . .  He f e l t  
that i t  was h is  duty to make the best of the Nazis, and t h i s  could not 
mean gett ing  r i d  of them qu ick ly  as poss ib le. He regarded h im se l f  as
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the p r o t e c t o r  o f  a young and u n d i s c i p l i n e d  e lement of which he 
f l a t t e r e d  h imse lf  that he could form a p o l i t i c a l l y  serv iceab le  one.38
The r i s e  of H i t l e r ,  however, meant the in t roduct ion  of new ideas in to
German f o r e ig n  p o l i c y .  H i t l e r  had w r i t t e n  m anusc r ip t s ,  i n c l u d in g
Mein Kampf, about h i s  ou t look  on i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  as w e l l  as
professed h is  ideas in numerous speeches. L ike the Foreign O f f ice ,  H i t l e r
wanted to be r i d  of the Ve rsa i l l e s  Treaty and regain Great Power status fo r
Germany. H i t l e r ' s  ideas on the r e a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  l o s t  German t e r r i t o r y ,
however, went beyond the p o s i t i o n  o f  the W i1he lm s t r a s se  and advocated
o 7
German expans ion in t o  eas te rn  Europe, i n c l u d in g  the Sov ie t  Union. 
Moreover, he held strong an t i -Bo lshev ik  and an t i -S em it i c  sentiments. In 
the mid-twent ies,  H i t l e r  had w r i t ten  in Mein Kampf:
Never f o r g e t  th a t  the r u l e r s  o f  p re sen t -da y  Russ i a  are common 
b lo o d - s t a in e d  c r im i n a l s ;  th a t  they are the scum o f  humanity wh ich,  
favo red  by c i r c um s tan ce s ,  ove rran  a g rea t  s t a t e  in a t r a g i c  hour, 
slaughtered and wiped out thousands of her leading i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  in 
w i l d  b lood l u s t ,  and now f o r  a lmost  ten yea rs  have been c a r r y i n g  on 
the most cruel and ty rann ica l  regime of a l l  time. Furthermore, do not 
forget that these ru le rs  belong to a race [Jewish] which combines, in 
a rare mixture, bes t ia l  c rue l ty  and an inconceivable g i f t  fo r  ly ing ,  
and which today more than ever i s  conscious of a mission to impose i t s  
b loody  opp re ss ion  on the whole wor ld .  Do not f o r g e t  th a t  the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  Jew who c o m p le t e ly  dom inates  Russ i a  today regards  
Germany, not as an a l l y ,  but as a s tate destined to the same fa te .38
R e a l i z i n g  tha t  France would oppose any r e v i s i o n  of  the s t a t u s  quo,
H i t l e r ,  who saw France as a "menace", wanted a German a l l i a n ce  with B r i t a i n
and I t a l y  to counter any French obstruct ion to a German attempt to regain
Great Power s t a t u s ,  as we l l  as to mi n i mi z e  the r i s k  o f  war du r ing  t h i s
process.3  ̂ He stated in Mein Kampf:
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England des ires no Germany as a world power, but France wishes no 
power at a l l  ca l led  Germany: quite  an essen t ia l  d i f fe rence ,  a f te r  a l l !  
Today we are not f i g h t i n g  f o r  a p o s i t i o n  as a wor l d  power: today we 
must s t r u g g le  f o r  the e x i s t e n c e  o f  our f a t h e r l a n d  . . . .  I f  we look 
about us fo r  European a l l i e s  from th i s  standpoint, there remain only 
two states: England and I ta ly .
In h is  second book, which was wr i t ten  in 1928, but was never published in 
h is  l i f e t im e ,  H i t l e r  made fu r the r  comments in h is  ideas concerning fore ign 
po l i cy :
Germany dec ides  to go over to [her f u t u r e  a im] a c l e a r ,  f a r ­
s igh ted  t e r r i t o r i a l  p o l i c y .  Thereb) she abandons a l l  a t tempts  at 
w o r1d - i n d u s t r y  and w o r ld - t r a d e  and in s tead  c on cen t ra te s  a l l  her 
s t reng th  in o rde r ,  through the a l l o tm e n t  o f  s u f f i c i e n t  l i v i n g  space 
fo r  the next hundred years to our people, a lso to prescr ibe a path of 
l i f e .  Since th i s  t e r r i t o r y  can be only  in the East, the ob l iga t ion  to 
be a naval power also recedes in to the background. Germany t r i e s  anew 
to champion her in te re s ts  through the formula t ion of a dec is ive  power 
on land.
This aim is  equa l ly  in keeping with the highest nat ional as well 
as f o l k i s h  requirements. I t  l i k ew ise  presupposes great m i l i t a r y  power 
means fo r  i t s  execution, but does not necessa r i ly  bring Germany into 
c o n f l i c t  wi t h a l l  European g rea t  powers. As s u r e l y  as France here 
w i l l  remain Germany's enemy, ju s t  as l i t t l e  does the nature of such a 
p o l i t i c a l  aim contain a reason fo r  England, and e sp e c ia l l y  fo r  I ta ly ,  
to maintain the enmity of the World War.4-*-
Ju s t  as Neurath he s i t a t e d  to serve under a H i t l e r ,  the d ip lo m a t s  o f  
the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  ques t ioned  the course  o f  t h e i r  c a re e rs  and f o r e ig n  
po l i c y  in ea r ly  1933. Former Chancel lor Bruening, nonetheless, in f luenced 
the members of the Wi lhelmstrasse to stay at t h e i r  posts. In h is  own words 
Bruening admitted:
I adv i sed Herr von Buel ow s t r o n g l y  to remain in  o f f i c e ,  and to urge 
these  o the rs  to do l i k e w i s e ,  f o r  they  . . . t o g e th e r  wi t h  moderate 
leaders in the Reichswehr, alone would be in a pos i t ion  to f ru s t ra te  
any aggressive fore ign of m i l i t a r y  p o l i c i e s  of H i t l e r . 42
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Thus, Neurath and Buelow both stayed to manage the Fore ign  O f f i c e  under 
H i t l e r ' s  chance l lo rsh ip  and continue the moderate p o l i c y  a s so c ia ted  w i th  
Stresemann and Bruening. Writ ing in h is  memoirs, Herbert von Dirksen, the 
German Ambassador to Moscow, summed up the p o s i t i o n  o f  the d ip lom a ts  
s ta t ing:
[W]e f e l t  i t  to  be ou r  d u t y  to  a s s i s t  in  t h i s  p r o c e s s  o f  
n o rm a l i z a t i o n .  We had been s u c c e s s fu l  so f a r  in  our endeavors to 
t r a i n  the newcomers in  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s h ip  and to keep the sh ip  o f  
s t a t e  on a s t r a i g h t  course  in  s p i t e  o f  the storms which i t  had 
encountered. Thus, a lmost  a l l  the c a re e r  d 'p lom a ts  as w e l l  as the 
o t h e r  pe rmanen t  o f f i c i a l s  r e m a in e d  in  o f f i c e .  As to  the  
c on s t i tu t iona l  and j u r i s d i c a l  im p l i c a t io n s  of the new s i tu a t ion ,  the 
permanent o f f i c i a l s  were p e r fe c t ly  j u s t i f i e d  in p lac ing t h e i r  serv ices 
at the d isposal of the party which had gained power by con s t i tu t iona l  
and democratic e le c t io n s .^
Besides, Neurath and Buelow were convinced that H i t l e r  and the Nazi Party 
would not la s t  long.^
D ip lomats  in  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  q u i c k l y  came to b e l i e v e  t h a t  H i t l e r  
had in ten t ions  to peacefu l ly  pursue rev is ion s  to the Ve rsa i l l e s  Treaty.*^ 
In r e p l y  to the Sov ie t  government's concern over the r i s e  o f  the a n t i -  
B o ls h e v ik  H i t l e r ,  Fo re ign  S e c re ta r y  Buelow t o l d  Ambassador D i rksen  on 6 
February 1933:
I b e l i e v e  tha t  they o v e re s t im a te  the re  [Moscow] the importance  in 
terms of fore ign po l i c y  of the change of government. When they have 
the r e s p o n s ib i  1 i t y  the N a t io na l  S o c i a l i s t s  are n a t u r a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  
people and pursue a d i f f e re n t  p o l i c y  than they proclaimed before. It 
was a lways l i k e  t h i s ,  and i t  i s  the same w i th  a l l  p a r t i e s .  The 
persons o f  Neurath and a l s o  o f  B lomberg [ the  German War M i n i s t e r ]  
guarantee the con t inu i t y  of the previous p o l i t i c a l  re la t ion s .  6
Wh i le  d ip lo m a t s  b e l ie v ed  tha t  H i t l e r  would f o l l o w  t h e i r  lead in
f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s ,  H i t l e r  con t inued  to q u i e t l y  p ro fe s s  h is  own p o l i c y
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i n t e n t i o n s  to c lo s e  f r i e n d s  such as Joachim von R ibben t rop ,  a f a i r l y  new 
member of the Nazi Party who had impressed him with h is  knowledge of world 
a f f a i r s . 47 Ribbentrop was a champagne salesman who had l ived  in B r i t a in ,  
France, Canada, and the United States.4® He was a strong advocate of c lose 
r e l a t i o n s  w i th  B r i t a i n  and France w h i l e  being a n t i - B o l s h e v i k . 40 In 
February  1933, H i t l e r  r e l a t e d  to R ibben t rop  over d inne r  h i s  inne r  most 
thoughts on po l icy:
At t h i s  f i r s t  d iscuss ion [on fore ign a f f a i r s ]  Adolf  H i t l e r  to ld  
me tha t  he wanted peace at a l l  c o s t s .  One wor ld  war had been enough 
fo r  Germany; i t  must not happen again. But he must achieve Germany's 
e q u a l i t y .  The German na t ion  was too s t rong  to t o l e r a t e  permanent 
d i s c r im in a t i o n .  A r e v i s i o n  o f  c e r t a i n  V e r s a i l l e s  terms had to be 
brought about. Nor was i t  poss ib le  fo r  Germany, surrounded as she was 
by S ta te s  armed to the te e th ,  to remain undefended. Yet the re  was 
t ime fo r  him to do a l l  t h i s  gradual ly.
What he wanted beyond a l l  e lse ,  said H i t l e r ,  was a permanent and 
c lea r  sett lement with B r i t a in .  He also wanted f r iendsh ip  with I ta ly ,  
and thought tha t  the k i n s h i p  o f  the N a t io na l  S o c i a l i s t  and f a s c i s t  
phi losophies would provide the basis fo r  th is .
H i t l e r ' s  a t t i t u d e  to  S o v i e t  R u s s i a  was s h a r p l y  a n t a g o n ­
i s t i c  . . . .  When d i s c u s s in g  t h i s  s u b je c t  h i s  fa ce  became s te rn  and 
h is  expression inexorable. It  was c le a r  to me even then that H i t l e r  
was f a n a t i c a l l y  resolved to destroy communism fo r  good.50
On 7 Ap r i l  1933, with the b e l i e f  that the Wi lhel instrasse had complete
control over the formula t ion and conduct of German fore ign  po l i c y ,  Neurath
br ie fed H i t l e r  at the Reich Chancel le ry concerning Germany's s i t u a t io n  in
the in te rna t iona l  system.51 The Foreign M in i s te r  stressed that the "demand
f o r  r e v i s i o n  [o f  the V e r s a i l l e s  T re a ty ]  r e q u i r e s  the employment o f  a l l
p o s s i b l e  ene rg ie s . "  Neurath o u t l i n e d  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e ' s  main goal of
reacqu ir ing  lo s t  German t e r r i t o r i e s  in eastern Europe, and declared that
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"border  r e v i s i o n s  can be broached o n ly  when Germany has become s t rong  
m i l i t a r i l y ,  p o l i t i c a l l y ,  and f i n a n c i a l l y . "  He emphasized tha t  c l o s e r  
r e l a t i o n s  w i th  B r i t a i n ,  I t a l y ,  and the S o v ie t  Union were e s s e n t i a l  to 
r e v i s e  t e r r i t o r i a l  borders in face  o f  s t rong  o p p o s i t i o n  from Poland and 
France. The Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  d ec la red  th a t  "an unders tand ing  between 
Germany and France i s  as good as im p o s s i b l e , "  and "an unders tand ing  w i tn  
Po land i s  n e i t h e r  p o s s i b l e  nor des i rab le . "  A dd i t io na l l y ,  Neurath or ie fed  
the C h a n ce l lo r  tha t  "the Ansch lu ss  [a nnexa t io n ]  o f  A u s t r i a  can not be 
a c t i v e ly  promoted fo r  the t ime being owing to I ta ly ' s  oppos i t ion ."^
The f o l l o w in g  month, on 17 May 1933, the C h a n ce l lo r  spoke to the 
R e i ch s tag  and addressed f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  i s s u e s . ^  Erns t  Woermann, Head 
Counselor fo r  Internat ional Law at the WiIhelmstrasse, and h is  col leagues 
were "deeply impressed" by H i t l e r ' s  speech, and came to the conclusion that 
the Chancel lor would fo l low  the po l i c y  formulated by the Foreign O f f i c e .^  
In t h i s  speech H i t l e r  stated:
Germany does not want war. She has demonstrated her good w i l l  by 
d i s a rm in g ;  l e t  the o the r  powers now demonstra te  t h e i r s  by do ing 
l i k e w i s e  . . . .  France invokes her a n x ie t y  as to her s e c u r i t y ,  ye t  
France i t  i s  who remains armed whereas Germany has d isarmed . . . . 
I t  has been dec la red  d e s i r a b l e  tha t  Germany's m i l i t a r y  s t a t u s  be 
m od i f ie d ;  Germany i s  w i l l i n g .  She has concurred  in  the proposed 
MacDona ld  P l a n ,  but  on c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  i t  e s t a b l i s h  a s t r i c t  
p a r a l l e l i s m  and t ru e  e q u a l i t y  among the powers in vo lv ed  . . . .  I f  a 
d e c i s i o n  were to be imposed on Germany under p re te x t  t h a t  i t  was a 
m a j o r i t y  d e c i s i o n ,  then Germany would r e fu se  to  y i e l d ,  p r e f e r r i n g  
ra ther  to resign from both the Disarmament Conference and the League 
o f  Na t ions  . . .
Despite agreeing to Hindenburg's terms in January 1933, Adolf  H i t l e r  
g r e a t l y  d i s l i k e d  ca ree r  d ip lom a t s  and the thought o f  a l l o w in g  the
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Wilhelmstrasse to formulate and conduct fo re ign  po l i cy .  Paul Otto Schmidt, 
who became H i t l e r ' s  ch ie f  in te rp re te r ,  stressed in h is  memoirs that "H i t l e r  
d i s l i k e d  the German Foreign O f f ice  and everyone connected with i t . " 66 But, 
the Chance l lor rea l i zed  that he needed to use the Wi lhelmstrasse to pursue 
a " p o l i c y  of concea lment"  in o rde r  to conv ince  f o r e ig n  governments tha t  
Germany's f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  would remain peace fu l  and not undergo any 
fundamenta l changes.6  ̂ Bes ides ,  H i t l e r  f u l l y  agreed w i th  the Fore ign  
O f f ice 's  r e v i s i o n i s t  p o l i c y .6® Unt i l  he consol idated h is  power base in the 
government, the Chancel lor was therefore forced by circumstances to accept 
the inf luence of Neurath and the Wi lhelmstrasse in fore ign re la t i o n s .6  ̂ In 
his ana lys is  of the s i t u a t io n ,  Gordon Craig has stated:
He [ H i t l e r ]  re cogn ized  h i s  vu 1 nerab i  1 i t y  and h i s  need f o r  t im e  
[ to  c o n s o l i d a t e  h i s  power base] and t h e r e f o r e  encouraged the 
democratic governments in t h e i r  i l l u s i o n s  le s t  they undertake to baulk 
h i s  p lans  be fo re  he cou ld  do any th ing  to p revent  tha t .  Indeed, he 
s t rengthened the im p re s s io n  tha t  no fundamenta l  change in  German 
p o l i c y  need be expected by r e t a i n i n g  the Fo re ign  M i n i s t r y  s t a f f  and 
d ip lomat ic  personnel that had served h is  predecessors, keeping Baron 
von Neurath and Bernhard von Buelow in the posts of Foreign M in i s te r  
and S e c re ta r y  o f  S ta te  r e s p e c t i v e l y  and le a v in g  the ambassador ia l  
pos ts  untouched . . . .66)
In f a c t ,  the W i lh e lm s t r a s s e  expe r ienced  no major changes in  l e a d e r sh ip  
u n t i l  a major r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  in  1935 and 1936. H i t l e r  kept the s e n io r  
members of the Foreign O f f ic e ,  inc lud ing  the seven department d i re c to rs ,  
u n t i l  he had taken f u l l  c o n t r o l  o f  Germany.61 In e a r l y  1936, when he 
ar r ived in Ber l in  on leave from h is  mission as Ambassador to Tokyo, Herbert
von Dirksen discovered:
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In the Fore ign  O f f i c e  . . . the re  were no s ign s  o f  any r a d i c a l  
changes. It  was sta f fed by the same o f f i c i a l s  who had been in o f f i c e  
be fo re  1933, w i th  Neurath as M i n i s t e r  and Buelow as S e c re ta r y  o f  
S ta te .  The t h i n l y  v e i l e d  a n t i - N a z i  sen t im en ts  o f  the l a t t e r  were 
common knowledge. There was not a s i n g l e  p a r t y  "b igw ig "  among the 
h ighe r  ranks o f  o f f i c i a l s .  Membership in  the p a r t y  was a minor 
i s s u e .6^
Even so, the C h a n ce l lo r  had h i s  d ip lo m a t s  c l o s e l y  watched by h i s  p a r t y
members. 63 The Nazi l e a d e r s h i p  d i s t r u s t e d  the  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the
Wi lhelmstrasse to the point of bugging t h e i r  headquarters.6^
H i t l e r ' s  con t inued  use o f  the W i lh e lm s t r a s s e  r e f l e c t e d  h i s  need f o r  
putt ing  forward a respectable image toward the other Great Powers. Hitler, 
h imse l f ,  had never t rave l led  outs ide of Germany or h is  nat ive Austr ia ,  and 
had no knowledge of fore ign languages.65 Moreover, the National S o c ia l i s t s  
lacked  p a r t y  members w i th  d ip l o m a t i c  e xpe r ien ce  and language s k i l l s  to 
s e r i o u s l y  cha l le n ge  the a u t h o r i t y  o f  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e . 66 Joachim von 
Ribbentrop, with the support of H i t l e r ,  wanted to become Foreign Secretary, 
but V ice  C h a n ce l lo r  Franz von Papen re fused  to e n t e r t a i n  any such no t ion  
s in c e  the champagne salesman lacked  d i p l o m a t i c  c r e d e n t i a l s .  A l f r e d  
Rosenberg, the Head o f  the Fo re ign  P o l i c y  O f f i c e  o f  the Nazi P a r ty ,  
in tended to re p la c e  Neurath as Fo re ign  M in i s t e r .  However, Rosenberg 
embarassed H i t l e r ,  who never forgave him, with his inappropr iate act ions 
w h i l e  r e p re s e n t in g  Germany in  London in  1933.6® But, in s p i t e  o f  such a
handicap, H i t l e r  refused to become dependent upon the Foreign O f f i c e ,  and 
g r a d u a l l y  began us ing  not on ly  R ibben t rop ,  but Hermann Goer ing ,  Rudo l f  
Hess ,  and o t h e r  am a teu r  d i p l o m a t s  to  b ypas s  the  c o n t r o l  o f  the
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Wilhelmstrasse in conducting fore ign re la t i o n s .69 Such p rac t ices ,  however, 
as Gordon Craig pointed out, were not uncommon among the leadership of the 
o the r  Great Powers,  i n c l u d in g  B r i t a i n  and F rance,  in  the conduct of 
in te rna t iona l  a f f a i r s . ' 79 The Weimar government, nonetheless, had re fra ined 
from such methods and l e f t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s  in  the hands o f  the 
p r o f e s s io n a l  d ip lom a ts .  In h i s  a n a ly z a t i o n  o f  H i t l e r ' s  e x te n s iv e  use o f  
amateur diplomacy a f te r  1933, Ernst von Weizsaecker, who became D irec to r  of 
the newly r e e s t a b l i s h e d  P o l i t i c a l  Department in  1936, and l a t e r  Fo re ign  
Secretary in 1938, commented:
Amateurish and i r r e gu la r  reports were often preferred to the o f f i c i a l  
ones. D ec i s io n s  were taken w i thou t  the Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  or the 
Foreign O f f ice  having had a say in the framing o f  them. The carry ing  
ou t  o f  the  d e c i s i o n s  was e n t r u s t e d  to  the  most v a r i o u s  
q ua r t e r s  . . . .  The f o r e ig n  s e r v i c e  had been de lega ted  to  the l e v e l  
of a mere technica l apparatus. ^
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CHAPTER V
HITLER, RIBBENTROP, AND THE DECLINE OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE
Becoming Chancel lor in January 1933, Adolf  H i t l e r  agreed to leave the 
f o rm u la t i o n  and conduct o f  f o r e i g n  a f f a i r s  in  the hands o f  the Fo re ign  
O f f i c e .  He dec la red  tha t  Germany would con t inue  the peace fu l  p o l i c y  
pursued by Stresemann and Bruening. However, H i t l e r  on ly  acquiesced to the 
des ires of Pres ident Hindenburg in order to buy h imse l f  t ime to conso l idate 
h i s  own power base in  Germany. The C h a n c e l l o r ' s  b ehav io r ,  a c co rd ing  to 
W i l l i a m  Ca r r ,  was c a l c u l a t e d  to l u l l  both h i s  own d ip lom a ts  as w e l l  as 
Germany's fore ign neighbors into a fa l s e  sense of security.-*- Gordon Cra ig 
has wr i t ten  that H i t l e r  thought that fore ign re la t io n s  "was too important 
to be l e f t  in the hands o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l  d ip lomats ."^  Agree ing  w i th  t h i s  
judgement, Klaus Hildebrand has professed that H i t l e r  q u ie t ly  took control 
of fore ign po l i c y  in 1933.  ̂ In h is  study on German po l i cy ,  Hi ldebrand has 
wr i t ten:
Already in the f i r s t  few days a f te r  the "se izure of power", i t  
became c l e a r  th a t  H i t l e r  was adher ing  to the aims drawn up in  h i s  
Programme. In an address to the most s e n io r  o f f i c e r s  of the 
Reichswehr, he expounded views thoroughly in l i n e  with h is  Programme 
set down in Mein Kampf.^
During the f i r s t  few months o f  the new government, the s t r u g g le  f o r  
contro l of fore ign a f f a i r s  between H i t l e r  and Foreign M in i s te r  Constantin 
von Neurath g r a d u a l l y  became e v id en t .  E rn s t  von W e izsaecke r ,  who was
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tempora r i ly  in Ber l in  during ea r ly  1933, witnessed the d i f f i c u l t  t ime that 
Neurath had with H i t l e r ' s  use of amateur d iplomats as well  as the t rans fe r  
of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  propaganda intended fo r  fo re ign  d i s t r ib u t io n  from 
the WiIhelmstrasse to the newly es tab l ished Propaganda M in i s t ry ,  d irected 
by the Nazi Joseph Goebbels.^ During t h i s  p e r iod  the Fore ign  M i n i s t e r  
th rea tened  to r e s ig n  th ree  times.® H i t l e r  appeased Neurath f o r  a sho r t  
t ime  because he knew tha t  he had to t r e a t  Neurath, as Gerhard Koepke 
t e s t i f i e d  at Nuremberg, " c a re fu l l y  and p o l i t e l y "  while  he consol idated h is  
power b a s e .  ̂ I t  was o f  the  u tm o s t  im p o r t a n c e  t h a t  d u r i n g  t h i s  
conso l ida t ion  of power that H i t l e r ,  while  h is  own p o l i t i c a l  strength was 
s t i l l  weak, kept the support  o f  Hindenburg as w e l l  as presented a non-
O
t h r e a te n in g ,  f a v o ra b le  image o f  the Nazi reg ime to the ou t s id e  wor ld .  
Nonetheless, as Weizsaecker to ld  the Nuremberg court ,  when H i t l e r  came to 
power " f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  was very  soon s p l i t  i n t o  the p o l i c y  o f  the Fo re ign  
O f f ice  and the po l i c y  of the [Nazi]  Party."0
A lthough A d o l f  H i t l e r  g r a d u a l l y  began to dominate German f o r e ig n  
po l i c y  t h i s  was not re ad i l y  apparent since the ob ject ives  of H i t l e r  and the 
Wi lhelmstrasse were very s im i l a r .  The success of H i t l e r ' s  strugg le  with 
Neurath over p o l i c y  was made much eas ie r  because of the Foreign M in i s te r 's  
"weak leadership" c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . 10 Neurath, a conservat ive c i v i l  servant 
who was "fasc inated by author i ty" and pre ferred Germany to be in the hands 
of a strong leader without par l iamentary in ter ference  in fore ign a f f a i r s ,  
found  i t  e a s y  to  f a l l  unde r  th e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  H i t l e r ' s  s t y l e  o f
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lovernment.11 The French Ambassador to Germany, Andre F ran co is - P o n ce t ,  
round the Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  to be t im id .  In h i s  o v e r a l l  im p re ss ion  of 
Jeurath, Francois-Poncet stated:
He . . . was a lm os t  a lways good humored and s im p le ,  but w i th  
d i g n i t y .  . . . [H]e was e x t r em e ly  p o l i t e ,  which made a l l  r e l a t i o n s  
w i th  him easy and ag reeab le .  His i n t e l l i g e n c e  was in  no way 
a r r e s t i n g ,  but he p o s s e s s e d  i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  common sense  and 
composure.
5ir E r i c  Phipps, the B r i t i s h  Ambassador to B e r l in ,  saw Neurath as lazy in 
nanaging fore ign a f f a i r s ,  leaving the adm in is t ra t ion  of the Wilhelmstrasse 
in the hands o f  Bernhard W i lhe lm  von Buelow, the Fo re ign  S e c r e t a r y . 14 
Jnfortunate ly ,  Buelow, who was s t rong ly  a n t i -N a z i , 1  ̂ had become so i l l  that 
'Jeurath had to c on s id e r  r e p l a c i n g  him w i th  We izsaecke r  in  A p r i l  1933.^  
Neurath's personal c h a ra c te r i s t i c s  of t im idness and la z iness ,  combined with 
nis f a i l u r e  to bu i ld  a personal r e la t ion sh ip  and jo in  the inner c i r c l e  of 
the Chance l lor 's adv iso rs ,^  doomed the in f luence of the Foreign O f f ice  in 
any of H i t l e r ' s  c ab in e t  meet ings.  H i t l e r  dominated the d i s c u s s io n  of 
fore ign po l i c y  issues. The diplomats at the Wi lhelmstrasse rea l i zed  that 
these t r a i t s ,  combined with Neurath's well-known lack of speaking s k i l l s ,  
made the task  o f  c o n t r o l l i n g  the d i r e c t i o n  o f  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  d i f f i c u l t .  
Weizsaecker wrote in h is  memoirs:
His [Neurath's] ch ie f  f a i l i n g  was h is  i n a b i l i t y  to express h imse l f  in 
a c o n ve r s a t io n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in a la rge  c i r c l e  o f  people. We in  the 
Fo re ign  O f f i c e  found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  imag ine  how he cou ld  p o s s i b l y  
manage to  get  a word in  edgeways  when s u b j e c t  t o  H i t l e r ' s  
outpour ings. ™
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Franz von Papen agreed with t h i s  judgement of Neurath. He commented:
What he [Neurath] lacked was the a b i l i t y  to break into H i t l e r ' s  long 
monologues and . . . get a word in. Neurath's standards of d ip lomat ic  
p o l i t e n e s s  made him t h i n k  i t  r a t h e r  i l l - m a n n e r e d  . . . [ t o  
in te r rup t ] ,  9
N eve r th e le s s ,  Neurath stayed in o f f i c e  and f a i t h f u l l y  served Germany as 
H i t l e r ' s  Fo re ign  M in i s t e r  in s p i t e  o f  h i s  o b je c t i o n s  to the N a t iona l  
S o c ia l i s t s  and th e i r  methods in p o l i t i c s .  Neurath f i r m l y  bel ieved that  he 
could contro l H i t l e r ' s  involvement in fore ign a f f a i r s  with strong support 
from President Hindenbnrg.2^
The question of disarmament was the f i r s t  major d ip lomat ic  issue that 
arose a f t e r  H i t l e r  took power. Neurath had broke o f f  t a l k s  at  the 
D is a rm am en t  C o n fe r e n c e  in  Geneva in  1932. The V e r s a i l l e s  Powers 
r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  German e q u a l i t y  prompted Germany, under the adv ice  o f  
Fo re ign  S e c re ta r y  Buelow, to re tu rn  to the d isarmament t a l k s  in  January  
1 9 3 3 . The Foreign O f f ice  negotiated with B r i t a in ,  France, and I t a l y  fo r  
the  adhe rence  to  the  V e r s a i l l e s  T r e a t y  t h a t  c a l l e d  f o r  g e n e r a l  
disarmament,22 A f te r  several months of t a lk s ,  France would not agree to 
disarmament, fear ing  future German aggression, e sp e c ia l l y  a f te r  H i t l e r  took 
o f f i c e . 23 In a d d i t i o n  to genera l  d isa rmament ,  the n e g o t i a t o r s  a l s o  
d i s cu ssed  arms l i m i t a t i o n s  w i th  an in c r e a s e  o f  German arms to a l e v e l  
approximately equivalent to the other Great Powers, but they could not come 
to a mutual agreement, thus r e su l t in g  in a deadlock in the t a l k s . 2  ̂ During 
the Disarmament Conference ,  H i t l e r  a l low ed  Neurath to manage the 
n e g o t i a t i o n s  s in c e  both men had the l i k e  goa ls  o f  German e q u a l i t y  in
p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s  and m i l i t a r y  i s s u e s . 2  ̂ A f t e r  r e t u r n in g  from Geneva in
September 1933, Neurath to ld  H i t l e r  of the deadlock. During in te r roga t ion
by A l l i e d  a u t h o r i t i e s  a t  Nuremberg in  1945, Neurath recounted t h i s
d iscuss ion with the Chancel lor s ta t ing  that:
I pointed out to him [ H i t l e r ]  how things were going [ in  Geneva], 
and th a t  no agreement cou ld  be reached the re .  Then he dec ided 
to leave  the con fe rence .  He sa id  i t  was o f  no use in  Geneva 
anymore.
H i t l e r  made the d e c i s i o n  to abandon the Disarmament Conference. 
F r u s t r a t e d  w i th  the whole p rocess ,  and c o n s id e r in g  t h a t  he v iewed the 
o r g a n i z a t i o n  as " w o r t h l e s s " , 27 H i t l e r  a l s o  made the d e c i s i o n  f o r  German
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withdrawal from the League of Nations. He wanted no part  of an agreement 
w i th  a League th a t  would not re cogn ize  Germany's e q u a l i t y  on m i l i t a r y  
matters. The Chancel lo r 's  dec is ions,  however, were st rong ly  in f luenced by 
General Blomberg, the War M i n i s t e r ,  and Neurath, w i th  the support  o f  
Pres ident Hindenburg, who strong ly  wanted German rearmament and the return 
of Germany to Great Power s tatus.2  ̂ On 13 October 1933, H i t l e r  b r ie fed  a 
g a the r ing  o f  the Reich m in i s t e r s  t h a t  he had dec ided  t h a t  Germany would 
"leave both the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, since the 
c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  we be re cogn ized  as a na t ion  w i th  equal r i g h t s  i s  not 
f u l f i l l e d . " 30 i t  was l e f t  to the Foreign M in i s t e r  to communicate H i t l e r ' s  
dec is ions to the world sho r t ly  the rea f te r .31 During the fo l low ing  months 
Germany began to  r e a rm ,  a c c o r d i n g  to  N e u r a t h ,  to  meet d e f e n s i v e  
requirements.32 In ana lyz ing th i s  cooperat ion between H i t l e r  and Neurath,
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Gordon Cra ig has stated:
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L I ] n t h i s  f i r s t  marked s a l l y  o f  Nazi f o r e ig n  p o l i c y ,  the Fo re ign  
O f f ice  and the Fuehrer were at one. The dip lomats had, indeed, every 
reason fo r  sa t i s fa c t ion .  They had, fo r  the most part,  been l e f t  f ree 
to fo l low  to i t s  lo g ica l  end the l i n e  they had l a id  down in  1932; the 
c o o p e r a t i o n  between th e  R e i c h s k a n z l e i  [ C h a n c e l l e r y ]  and the 
Wi lhelmstrasse had at a l l  t imes been amicable and e f fe c t iv e ;  . . . and 
the r e s u l t  o f  the j o i n t  e f f o r t  had been a d i p l o m a t i c  success ,  o r  a t  
le a s t  a d ip lomatic  sensat ion .33
Wh i le  in vo lv ed  in  d isarmament t a l k s  w i t h  the West, the German 
government engaged in secret communications with Poland regarding Danzig 
and the C o r r id o r .  As e a r l y  as A p r i l  1933, Marsha l Joseph P i l s u d s k i ,  the 
head o f  the P o l i s h  government, sought t a l k s  w i th  H i t l e r  to a c q u i r e  a 
r e l a x a t i o n  o f  ten s ion  between the two s t a t e s  over the l o s t  German 
t e r r i t o r i e s . 3  ̂ He feared H i t l e r ' s  in ten t ions  and that "growing uneasiness" 
between Po land and Germany over  the s t a t u s  o f  Danz ig  m ight e rup t  i n t o  a 
c o n f l i c t .
P i l sudsk i  sent a request to H i t l e r  fo r  the German Chancel lor to meet
p e r s o n a l l y  w i th  the P o l i s h  Ambassador to  B e r l i n ,  A l f r e d  Wysock i.  The
Marshal of Poland rea l i zed  that  the German Foreign O f f ice ,  whose fore ign
p o l i c y  was h o s t i l e  to Po land,  would o b je c t  to any a t tempts  by h i s
government to improve re la t io n s  with Germany.33 H i t l e r  was in te res ted  in
such t a l k s  because fo rmer C h a n c e l l o r  B ruen ing  as w e l l  as d ip lom a t s  in
Prague and Warsaw warned him, in  Ap r i l  1933, of  the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  France,
37Poland, and Czechoslovakia launching a p re v e n t i v e  war a g a in s t  Germany. 
The German Chancel lor was in te res ted  in  b lock ing any fore ign in te rvent ion  
i n t o  German a f f a i r s ,  b reach ing  F rance 's  system o f  a l l i a n c e s  in  e a s te rn  
Europe, as w e l l  as seek ing  improved r e l a t i o n s  w i th  F ran ce .33 Moreover,
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i t l e r  wanted to n ego t ia te  the re tu rn  o f  l o s t  German t e r r i t o r y  and seek 
o l i s h  adherence to a l a t e r  a n t i - B o l s h e v i k  a l l i a n c e  aga in s t  the Sov ie t  
mon. The Chancel lor therefore met with Ambassador Wysocki in Be r l in  on 
May 1933. At t h i s  meeting, in the presence of Neurath, Wysocki presented 
i l s u d s k i ' s  request  f o r  c l o s e r  Ge rman-Po l ish  r e la t io n s .  He also pressed 
l i t l e r  and acqu i red  an unders tand ing  over the s t a t u s  o f  Danzig and a 
i rom ise  tha t  Germany would not take any agg re s s iv e  measures aga in s t  
Joland.40 Wysocki, however, discovered la te r  that Neurath, who had kept 
lu ie t  during the meeting, had "ser ious misg iv ings" about the agreement.4-̂ 
ie u ra th ,  under the in f l u e n c e  of Fo re ign  S e c r e t a r y  Buelow and o the r  
d ip lom a ts ,  s t i l l  supported a p o l i c y ,  cen tered  on c lo s e  German-Soviet  
r e l a t i o n s ,  aimed aga in s t  Po land .42 H i t l e r ' s  agreement w i th  W ysock i , 
n e v e r th e le s s ,  r e s u l t e d  in much improved r e l a t i o n s  between Germany and 
Pol and.4^
In l a t e  September 1933, w h i l e  at the Disarmament Conference, the 
Po l ish  Foreign M in i s te r ,  Joesph Beck, approached Neurath in Geneva about 
Ge rman-Po l ish  r e l a t i o n s .  Beck t o ld  h i s  c o u n te rp a r t  th a t  P i l s u d s k i  was 
w i l l i n g  to d iscuss with H i t l e r  a sett lement of outstanding issues between 
t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  c o u n t r i e s . 44 S h o r t l y  t h e r e a f t e r ,  Marshal P i l s u d s k i  
replaced Wysocki in B e r l in  with Joesph L ipsk i  as the new Po l ish  Ambassador 
in order to negotiate a more substant ia l  agreement.45 Adding incent ive  fo r  
obta in ing Detter r e la t io n s  with Germany was the Po l ish  government's fear of
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German in tent ions  a f te r  i t  withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and the 
League of Nations.
Desp i te  H i t l e r ' s  i n t e r e s t  in c l o s e r  r e l a t i o n s  w i th  Poland and 
oppos it ion to improved German-Soviet t i e s ,  Foreign M in i s te r  Neurath and the 
Wilhelmstrasse continued to support the l a t t e r  po l icy .  The Foreign O f f ice  
rep la ced  Herber t  von D irk sen ,  who was re a s s ig ned  to Tokyo, w i th  Rudo l f  
Nadolny, who had p r e v i o u s l y  headed the German d e l e g a t io n  at the Geneva 
disarmament ta lk s ,  as the new Ambassador to Moscow. On 13 November 1933, 
Neurath p rov ided  the f o l l o w in g  d ip l o m a t i c  i n s t r u c t i o n s  to Nadolny 
concerning h is  new assignment:
Good German-Sov ie t  r e l a t i o n s  are o f  e s s e n t i a l  importance  to 
Germany. In Germany's r e l a t i o n s  w i th  Po land they  are o f  extreme 
im p o r t a n c e .  What must n a t u r a l l y  be p r e v e n t e d  . . .  i s  the  
i n c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  the S o v ie t  Union in  any p o l i t i c a l  f r o n t  d i r e c t e d  
against Germany.46
H i t l e r  se c re t ly  met with L ipsk i  in d i re c t  oppos it ion to the advice of 
the W i lh e lm s t r a s s e  on 15 November 1933. Both the C h a n ce l lo r  and P o l i s h  
Ambassador wished to avoid the in ter ference and h o s t i l i t y  of the Foreign 
O f f i c e . 47 Both men d is cu ssed  the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a nonaggress ion  pact.  
H i t l e r  was w i l l i n g  to declare that Germany had no in ten t ion  of aggression 
against the Poles to s e t t l e  t h e i r  t e r r i t o r i a l  d i f fe rences ,  but he decl ined 
the o p p o r t u n i t y  to d i s c u s s  a boundary se t t lement .  ° Faced with H i t l e r ' s  
dec is ion  to sign a nonaggression pact, which would se r iou s ly  a f fe c t  German- 
S o v ie t  r e l a t i o n s ,  the f o r e ig n  s e r v i c e  d iv ided  in to  the t r a d i t i o n a l  east-  
west f a c t i o n s .  Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  Neurath, who found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to
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c o n t r a d i c t  the op in ion  o f  H i t l e r ,  Gerhard Koepke, the D i r e c t o r  o f  
Department II (West, South, and Sou th -Eas t  Europe), and Hans A d o l f  von 
Moltke, the German Ambassador to Warsaw, accepted the Po l ish  card as a way 
to improve not on ly  Ge rm an -Po l ish ,  but Franco-German r e l a t i o n s .  S ta te  
Secretary Buelow and Ambassador Nadolny, on the other hand, argued against 
a rapproachement w i th  Po land, p r e f e r r i n g  the R apa l lo  p o l i c y  o f  c l o s e r  
German-Soviet t i e s . 49
Because of the s p l i t  in opinion at the WiIhelmstrasse, the subsequent 
n e g o t i a t i o n s  between Germany and Po land were he ld  in  s t r i c t  se c re cy  and 
bypassed many of the dip lomats who would have normally  been involved in  the 
conduct of fore ign r e la t io n s .5  ̂ For two months German and Po l ish  d iplomats 
passed each o ther  d r a f t  nonaggress ion  agreements u n t i l  both s id e s  were 
f i n a l l y  agreeable to the wording of the t re a ty .5-'- In the process Neurath 
had managed to in f luence the Chancel lor to accept a weaker version of the 
d ra f t  t rea ty  to appease those diplomats in the Foreign O f f ice  who objected 
to  c l o s e  G e r m a n - P o l i s h  r e l a t i o n s . 5  ̂ Even so, Ambassador Nadolny 
cont inuous ly  warned Neurath that the Soviet leadership was leaning toward a 
rapproachement with France i f  Germany f a i l e d  to pursue c lo se r  German-Soviet 
r e l a t i o n s . 5  ̂ The n e g o t i a t i o n s  came to an end when Neurath and L i p s k i  
s igned a nonaggress ion  pact in B e r l i n  on 26 January  1934, which was 
r a t i f i e d  in Warsaw a month l a t e r . 54 The agreement s u rp r i s e d  the S o v ie t  
le a d e r ,  Joseph S t a l i n ,  and brought a complete  change in  German-Sov ie t  
r e l a t i o n s .  George Kennan, a d ip lo m a t  and h i s t o r i a n ,  wrote t h a t  the pact
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"suddenly brought home to him [S t a l i n ]  how complete ly  the Germans had cut 
loose  from the o ld  R ap a l lo  concep t .1,55 The t r e a t y  a l s o  had the e f f e c t  o f  
g r e a t l y  weakening the in f l u e n c e  o f  Neurath and the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  w i th  
H i t l e r .  The C h a n ce l lo r  found tha t  the p r o f e s s i o n a l  d ip lom a ts  had 
represented an obstac le  in h is  conduct of fo re ign  re la t ion s .  He had gained 
the upper advantage over the Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  and the now fa c t i o n o u s  
d i p l o m a t i c  corps .  In the f u tu r e  he would avo id  the use o f  the f o r e ig n  
serv ice  as much as poss ib le  by employing the se rv ices  of amateur diplomats. 
Gordon Craig viewed the German-Polish agreement as the turning point in who
C £
con tro l led  the formulat ion and conduct of German f o r e ig n  p o l i c y .  Such
contro l was noted by the fore ign dip lomats in Ber l in .  On 27 December 1933,
Andre Francois-Poncent,  the French Ambassador, reported to Paris:
Adolf H i t l e r ,  today, i s  t r u l y  in contro l of h is  people. He exerc ises 
a complete  ho ld  over them . . . .  He m a in ta in s  the ba lance between 
competing r i v a l s ;  he judges over t h e i r  quarre ls ;  h is  au thor i ty  i s  not 
in ques t ion .5^
A f te r  the in te r rogat ion  of those involved in d ip lomat ic  a f f a i r s ,  inc lud ing
Neurath, R ibben t rop ,  Papen, and Goer ing ,  be fo re  the Nuremberg t r i a l s ,
DeWitt C. Poole, the Chie f  Interrogator and Special Representative of the
U.S. Secretary of State, came to the conclus ion that:
H i t l e r  dominated every s i tua t ion .  Every dec is ion  se t t ing  the course 
of German e x te rn a l  r e l a t i o n s  from 1933 on was made by H i t l e r  
persona l ly ,  and i t  was he who set the exact t im ing  of every important 
a c t i o n . 58
In c o n t r o l  o f  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  H i t l e r  now turned  h i s  e f f o r t s  towards 
the issues of c lo se r  German-Ital ian r e l a t i o n s  and the A u s t r i a n  Quest ion.
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H i t l e r  sought I t a l i a n  support  o f  German rearmament as w e l l  as an 
a l l i a n c e . H o w e v e r ,  the Chan ce l lo r  r e a l i z e d  th a t  the a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  an 
a l l i a n c e  w i th  Ben i to  M u s s o l i n i  would have to w a i t  u n t i l  the two le ade rs  
agreed upon the s t a tu s  o f  A u s t r i a . 60 H i t l e r ,  o f  cou rse ,  sought the 
u l t im a t e  annexat ion  o f  h i s  homel and.6 -*- M u s s o l i n i ,  on the o the r  hand, 
fea red  German in t e n t i o n s  towards the South T y ro l ,  l a r g e l y  popu la ted  by 
Germans. The Fasc is t  leader preferred fo r  Aus t r ia  to remain independent 
and serve as a buffer state between Germany and I ta ly .
Consc ious o f  the va lue  o f  c l o s e r  G e rm an - I ta l ia n  r e l a t i o n s ,  Fo re ign  
M in i s te r  Neurath and the WiIhelmstrasse advised the Chancel lor  not to take 
any agg re s s iv e  a c t io n  a g a in s t  A u s t r i a  aimed at annexat ion .  Fo re ign  
S e c re ta r y  Buelow cau t ioned  a g a in s t  pursu ing  a p o l i c y  o f  p r e s su r in g  
Au s t r ia ,66 and Gerhard Koepke, the D irector  of Department II bel ieved the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c l im a t e  was not r i g h t  f o r  a German a t tempt to annex 
Aus t r ia .6'* Neurath, h imse lf ,  preferred c lo se r  Austro-German economic t i e s ,  
not p o l i t i c a l  union. Remembering the c r i s i s  over the Austro-German Customs 
Union in 1931, Neurath, nonetheless, was "resolved [not to] touch t h i s  hot 
i ron aga in . "66
H i t l e r  l a r g e l y  ignored the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  conce rn ing  the A u s t r i a n  
Question. He viewed Austro-German re la t io n s  as an in te rna l  German problem, 
not as an in te rna t iona l  issue.66 He therefore bypassed the Wi lhe lmstrasse 
to a la rg e  e x ten t ,  r e l y i n g  upon Hermann Goer ing and F ranz von Papen to 
conduct much o f  h i s  p o l i c y  aimed towards the ove r th row  o f  the A u s t r i a n
I l l
government,^7 headed by C h a n ce l lo r  Enge lbe r t  Do l l fuss .  H i t l e r  pressured V .
the A u s t r i a n  government, d e s p i t e  the p r o t e s t s  o f  Neurath, w i th  German
economic sanctions as well as support fo r  the Austr ian National S o c i a l i s t
Party's i l l e g a l  a c t i v i t i e s  against the Do l l fuss  regime.*^ With the aid of
the Austr ian Nazis, H i t l e r  hoped to gain in f luence over Austr ia ,  and thus
force  a sett lement in Germany's f a v o r .^
Although he supported the Nazi Party's act ions in Austr ia ,  H i t l e r  was 
c a u t io u s  in h i s  d i p l o m a t i c  maneuvering so as not to o f fend ,  but to woo 
M u s s o l i n i .  At a meet ing w i th  the I t a l i a n  le ade r  in  Ven ice ,  which was 
arranged by Papen, not the Fo re ign  O f f i c e ,  H i t l e r  avo ided any ment ion of 
h i s  d e s i r e  to  annex A u s t r i a . ' 7’-1 Ins tead ,  the C h a n c e l lo r  sought improved 
German-Ita l ian r e la t ion s  as we l l  as an understanding over Au s t r ia .7*
In sp i te  of such caut ion with Musso l in i ,  H i t l e r  conspired to take f u l l  
charge o f  the German government. S h o r t l y  a f t e r  r e t u r n in g  from Venice 
H i t l e r  gave the orders to e l im ina te  h is  p o l i t i c a l  opposi t ion. On the night 
o f  30 June, H i t l e r  had E rn s t  Roehm and o the r  S tu rm ab te i lu ng  leade rs  
murdered.73 The purge made a deep impression upon Neurath, and placed him 
in f e a r  o f  H i t l e r .  On 11 J u l y ,  dur ing  a meet ing w i th  H i t l e r ,  Hermann 
Rauschning not iced that the Foreign M in i s t e r  was "anx ious ly  s e rv i le "  in h is  
"manner towards the Reich Chancel lor . This was something very d i f f e re n t  
from the once much-contumned fawn ing  o f  the fo rm er  monarch. Th is  was 
abject fear of the hangman."73 On 19 Ju ly ,  fear ing  fo r  h is  own l i f e  and the 
sa fe ty  of his fam i ly ,  Neurath asked Pres ident Hindenburg fo r  permission to
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r e s ig n  as Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r . ' 7'* Hindenburg, however, convinced Neurath to 
remain at h is  post.7  ̂ As long as Hindenburg was a l i v e  Neurath would have 
the Pres ident's strong support.7^
Such v io lence that ex is ted in Germany was also evident in Austr ia .  On 
25 Ju ly  1934, the Austr ian National S o c i a l i s t s  attempted a putsch against 
the Do l l fuss  government. Although i t  f a i l e d ,  Do l l fu ss  was murdered in the 
attempt. The in te rna t iona l  community bel ieved that H i t l e r  was respons ib le  
f o r  the in c i d e n t .  H i t l e r  had supported the A u s t r i a n  Naz is  d e s p i t e  the 
advice of the Wi1helmstrasse. German diplomats were n a tu ra l l y  upset at the 
tu rn  of events .  Paul Otto Schmidt  t o l d  the Nuremberg Court  th a t  "the 
attempted Putsch in  A u s t r i a  and the murder o f  D o l l f u s s  on 25 J u l y  1934 
s e r i o u s l y  d i s t u r b e d  the c a tee r  personne l o f  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  because 
these events d isc red i ted  Germany in the eyes of the world."77 On 26 Ju ly ,  
H i t l e r  complete ly bypassed Neurath's contro l  of  r e la t io n s  with Aus t r ia  by 
appo in t in g  Papen as German Ambassador to  Vienna. Papen was to  r e p o r t  
d i r e c t l y  to the Chance l lor instead of Neurath on Austr ian issues.7  ̂ Within 
weeks, H i t l e r  decided to back o f f  from in te r fe rence  in Austr ia 's  in te rna l  
a f f a i r s  because of in te rna t iona l  pressure.79 The in te rna t iona l  community 
saw Germany as an aggressive force about to upset the status quo. German 
d ip lom a t s  re cogn ized  tha t  Germany's aggress iveness  during the summer of 
1934 and quest to rearm had resu lted in increased suspic iousness towards 
German i n t e n t i o n s ,  and served as the c a t a l y s t  t h a t  encouraged France to
Of)
seek a rapproachement with both I t a l y  and the Sov ie t  Union.
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The death of Pres ident Hindenburg, on 2 August 1934, had a tremendous 
iact on the in terna l  p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t io n  of Germany. H i t l e r  assumed sole 
.dersh ip  of Germany as Fuehrer  and C h a n ce l lo r .  The r e s u l t  was tha t  
le r ,  according to Norman Rich, held the "u l t imate  control of power and 
hor i ty "  in Germany.®* The death of Hindenburg meant that Neurath had no 
port in the ba t t le  with H i t l e r  fo r  in f luence over the formulat ion and 
duct of f o r e ig n  p o l i c y .  Neurath and the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  d ip lom a ts ,  
r i n g  the consequences o f  oppos ing H i t l e r  as w e l l  as s t i l l  hoping to 
luerice in te rna t iona l  re la t io n s ,  thus agreed to the Chance l lor 's demand 
t  they swear a l leg iance  to him.®® The American Ambassador to Be r l in ,  
l iam Dodd, immediately noticed the change in the Foreign M in is te r .  He 
>te in h i s  d i a r y ,  "Neurath h e i l e d  H i t l e r  . . . when supreme powers were 
en on. I have never seen evidence that . . . [Neurath] ever r e s i s t s  the 
i t r a r y  conduct o f  the Fuehrer."®® With f i r m  c o n t r o l  over the German 
ernment, H i t l e r  became his  own Foreign M in i s te r .  Ernst Woermann, who 
i Head C o u n se l lo r  f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law in  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  in 1934, 
ted at his t r i a l  at Nuremberg:
In 1°34, a f te r  Reich Pres ident von Hindenburg had died, H i t l e r  decided 
fore ign p o l i c y  e x c lu s i v e ly  by h imse l f ,  although i t ' s  a fa c t  that there 
were many, and f a r  too many, who d id  bother  about f o r e ig n  p o l i c y ,  
too.®^
fa c t ,  H i t l e r  wanted to r i d  h im s e l f  o f  Neurath and the W i1 he !ms t ra sse .  
Fuehrer became impat ient with h is  p rofess iona l  d iplomats.  He commented
Hermann Rauschning:
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I to ld  these Father Christmases at the Foreign M in i s t r y  that  what 
they were up to was good enough fo r  quiet  t imes, when they can a l l  go 
t h e i r  sleepy way; but not good enough fo r  c reat ing  a new Reich. They 
must take the t r o u b le  to le a rn  more modern methods. Neurath i s  
unimaginative. Shrewd as a peasant, but with no id eas .85
H i t l e r ,  nevertheless,  retained Neurath and the p r o f e s s i o n a l  d ip lo m a t s  o f
the  F o r e i g n  O f f i c e .  Even so ,  the  F u e h r e r  l a r g e l y  i g n o r e d  the
Wilhelmstrasse. He " p r a c t i c a l l y  stopped" c ab in e t  meet ings tha t  in c luded
Neurath.85 Instead, he preferred to employ h is  own amateur dip lomats in
the conduct of  p o l i c y  f o rm u la ted  by h im s e l f . 8 '7 The r i s e  o f  H i t l e r ' s
persona l  d ip lo m a t s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  Joachim von R ibben t rc j j ,  e c l i p s e d  any
in f luence that the Wilhelmstrasse had concerning the formula t ion of fore ign
p o l i c y . 88
R ibbentrop  was born in the Rh ine land  c i t y  o f  Wesel in  1893. His 
f a m i ly  had a long t r a d i t i o n  of serv ing in the m i l i t a r y .  Growing up the son 
of a German Army o f f i c e r ,  the young Ribbentrop l i ved  in A lsace-Lorra ine ,  
and l a t e r ,  S w i t z e r la n d .  He s tud ie d  and became f l u e n t  in  the French and 
English languages. As a young man Ribbentrop t ra ve l le d  to England, Canada, 
and the United States. He returned to Germany to j o in  the German Army in 
1914, and served in  B e r l i n ,  and l a t e r ,  Turkey. A f t e r  the war, R ibben t rop  
married in to the wealthy Henkel l fam i ly ,  which spec ia l i zed  in the wine and 
s p i r i t s  t rade ,  in 1920. He prospered  in  t h i s  t rade  h im s e l f ,  making h igh 
soc ie ty  contacts not only in Germany, but throughout B r i t a i n  and France. A
va in  and am b i t iou s  man, R ibben t rop  turned to p o l i t i c s  in the e a r l y  
89t h i r t i e s .
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R ibben t rop  f i r s t  met H i t l e r  at Berchtesgaden in  August 1932. Count
He l ldo r f ,  a Sturmabtei1unq leader in Be r l in ,  introduced Ribbentrop to the
r i s i n g  Nazi le ade r  because H i t l e r  needed someone who cou ld  read f o r e ig n
newspapers to him.^O H i t l e r  q u i c k l y  took a l i k i n g  to R ibben t rop ,  who
happened to hold  s i m i l a r  v iews w i th  the Nazi le ade r  on wor ld  a f f a i r s .
Besides being a well-known ant i -Bo lshev ik ,  Ribbentrop bel ieved that Germany
should seek c l o s e r  t i e s  w i th  B r i t a i n  and France. R ibben t rop 's  t i e s  w i th
the higher c i r c l e s  of Be r l in  soc ie ty ,  as well  as ins  accumulated knowledge
of f o r e ig n  a f f a i r s  by way of h i s  bus ine ss  t r i p s  a l s o  impressed H i t l e r . ^
Thus, H i t l e r  began to  use R ibben t rop  as an a d v i s o r  on i n t e r n a t i o n a l
r e l a t i o n s .  At the  same t im e ,  the  a m b i t i o u s  R ib b e n t r o p  made the
c o n s c i e n t i o u s  d e c i s i o n  to a t tach  h im s e l f  to  the r i s i n g  Nazi le ade r ,  and
played a key ro le  in H i t l e r ' s  r i s e  to power in January 1933.^
Once H i t l e r  became C h a n ce l lo r ,  R ibben t rop  b e l ie v ed  the Nazi le ade r
owed him an appointment to an o f f i c i a l  d i p l o m a t i c  p o s i t i o n .  V i c e -
C h a n c e l lo r  Papen ob jec ted  to R ibben t rop  r e p l a c i n g  Buelow as Fo re ign
S e c re ta r y ,  howeve r .^  R ibbentrop  b ided h i s  t im e  w a i t i n g  f o r  H i t l e r  to
u t i l i z e  him. It was during th i s  in te r im  period that Ribbentrop discovered
a t a c t i c  th a t  he would s u c c e s s f u l l y  employ w i th  H i t l e r  th roughout  h is
serv ice  to the Third Reich. As Gordon Craig has wr i t ten:
He [Ribbentrop] became the most constant attendant in the Chancel lor 's  
anteroom, where, by the s im p le  exped ien t  o f  making a f i n e  a r t  of 
hanging around, he managed to have frequent t a lk s  with Germany's new 
ru le r .  In the conversations . . . , he stumbled on the technique that 
was to be the founda t ion  stone o f  h i s  c a re e r .  Th is  was the g i f t  o f  
s t o r i n g  away in  h i s  memory pet ideas  o f  the Fuehrer  and then
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in t roduc ing them on l a t e r  occasions as ideas o f  h is  own--a procedure 
which could not help but persuade H i t l e r  that  Ribbentrop was a man of 
discernment and judgment. 4
As a l r e ad y  d i s cu s s ed ,  H i t l e r  d i s l i k e d  p r o f e s s i o n a l  d ip lom a ts  and 
sought to bypass the W i lh e !m s t r a s s e  in  the f o rm u la t i o n  and conduct  o f  
f o r e ig n  p o l i c y .  H i t l e r  and Goer ing ,  n one th e le s s ,  were h ig h l y  impressed 
w i th  R ibben t rop 's  c r e d e n t i a l s  t h a t  in c lu d ed  h i s  knowledge o f  fo r e ig n  
languages and world a f f a i r s ,  personal connections abroad, party membership, 
and the f a c t  t h a t  he was not a p r o f e s s io n a l  d ip lom a t .  Goer ing dec la red  
that  Ribbentrop "seemed made to order."^ in 1933, the Chancel lor provided 
R ib b e n t r o p  money f rom the  N az i  P a r t y ' s  t r e a s u r y  to  e s t a b l i s h  an 
o r g a n i z a t i o n - - t h e  Bureau R ib b e n t r o p - - t h a t  would cha l le n ge  the German 
Fo re ign  O f f i c e  f o r  c o n t r o l  over  the conduct  o f  f o r e ig n  r e l a t i o n s . 9*’ The 
Bureau Ribbentrop served as the personal fore ign serv ice  o f  H i t l e r ,  f a l l i n g  
under the d i r e c t i o n  o f  H i t l e r  and R udo l f  Hess.9  ̂ R ibbent rop  se t  up the 
Bureau ac ro ss  the s t r e e t  from the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  a t  Number 64 on the 
Wi lhe lmstrasse.9® I n i t i a l l y  i t  began with a small s t a f f , 99 but the Bureau 
gradual ly  increased to over 300 personnel ,100 a f igu re  much la rge r  than the 
number o f  s t a f f  a t  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e . 101 I t  was s t a f f e d  by men w i th ou t  
d i p l o m a t i c  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  who sought a sh o r t  c u t  to a c a re e r  in  f o r e ig n  
r e l a t i o n s . 102 None the le ss ,  a c co rd ing  to E r i c  Ko rd t ,  a p r o f e s s io n a l  
d ip lomat at the Wi lhe lmstrasse, the Bureau became an "exact r e p l i c a  o f  the 
Foreign O f f ice"  in organ iza t iona l  s t ru c tu re .103
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H i t l e r  began using Ribbentrop as a personal d iplomat by sending him on 
u n o f f i c i a l  v i s i t s  to France  in  l a t e  1933. Both men sought a b e t t e r  
unde rs tand ing  between Germany and France concerning armament issues .104 
Ribbentrop had impressed upon H i t l e r  that  Germany needed c lo se r  r e la t io n s  
w i th  F rance,  B r i t a i n ,  and I t a l y  to a c q u i r e  t h e i r  acceptance o f  equal 
r i g h t s ,  rearmament, and a re tu rn  to G rea t  Power s t a tu s  f o r  Germany.109 
With increas ing control  over fore ign po l i c y ,  H i t l e r  made a d i r e c t  chal lenge 
a g a in s t  the a u t h o r i t y  o f  the F o re ign  O f f i c e  by appo in t in g  R ibben t rop  as 
s p e c ia l  Commiss ioner  f o r  D isarmament Ques t ions  on 27 A p r i l  1934.106 
Despite Neurath's p ro te s ts ,107 H i t l e r  sent Ribbentrop on several t r i p s  to 
London, Pa r is ,  and Rome during A p r i l  to November 1934,108 hoping tha t  h is  
envoy cou ld  make use o f  h i s  s p e c ia l  c o n ta c t s  and make some headway 
rega rd ing  the acceptance o f  German m i l i t a r y  e q u a l i t y . 109 A l though h i s  
t a l k s  w i th  B r i t i s h  Fo re ign  S e c re t a r y  S i r  John Simon and French Fo re ign  
M in i s t e r  Louis Barthou f a i l e d  to achieve any pos i t iv e  r e s u l t s , 110 t h i s  f a c t  
d id  not a f f e c t  R ibben t rop 's  s tand ing  w i th  H i t l e r . 111 Th is  a f f a i r ,  
nevertheless, was of utmost importance concerning Neurath and the Foreign 
O f f i c e  since i t  se r ious ly  c u r t a i l e d  t h e i r  in f luence over the major fore ign 
po l i c y  issue o f  rearmament.11^
German rearmament and aggressiveness created i n s t a b i l i t y  in  Europe in 
1934. Fearing German in ten t ion s ,  the French government reacted by seeking 
rapproachement with I t a l y  and the Sov ie t  Union. Talks culminated in the 
Lava l-Musso l in i  Accord on 7 January 1935. The French and I t a l i a n s  agreed
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to oppose any un i la te ra l  rearmament by Germany, as well as to support the 
cont inuat ion o f  Austr ian independence.113 H i t l e r  had no immediate react ion  
to t h i s  chal lenge since the Saar P l e b i s c i t e  was scheduled for  13 January. 
He wanted the re tu rn  o f  the Saa r land  from French c o n t r o l . 114 A f t e r  a 
su c ce s s fu l  r e a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  t h i s  t e r r i t o r y ,  H i t l e r  p lanned f o r  h i s  next 
move. Meanwhile, the Fuehrer appointed Ribbentrop as the Commissioner fo r  
Fo re ign  P o l i c y  Ques t ions ,  and a t tached  him to Rudo l f  Hess' s t a f f  on 25 
F eb rua ry .115 Such an appo in tment  as the top Nazi d ip lo m a t  i l l u s t r a t e d  
Ribbentrop's favor with H i t l e r . 116 Having made no advancement in gain ing 
acceptance o f  German m i l i t a r y  e q u a l i t y ,  H i t l e r  was becoming f r u s t r a t e d .  
When, du r ing  the f i r s t  week o f  March, the B r i t i s h  government c r i t i c i z e d  
German rearmament e f f o r t s  and urged f o r  B r i t i s h  rearmament ,11 ̂  H i t l e r  
qu ick ly  reacted by tak ing steps in the u n i la t e ra l  rearmament of Germany. 
On 8 March 1935, the Fuehrer made the estab l ishment o f  the German A i r  Force 
pub lic  knowledge.11® One week la t e r ,  on 15 March, the Fuehrer declared the 
re in t roduct ion  o f  universa l m i l i t a r y  consc r ip t ion  as well as dec la r ing  that 
Germany would not respect the V e r s a i l l e s  m i l i t a r y  clauses l im i t i n g  i t  to 
100,000 troops in the future .119 Both o f  these March announcements were 
p la nned  by H i t l e r  w i t h o u t  th e  a d v i c e  o f  th e  F o r e i g n  O f f i c e . 120 
Internat ional tension heightened and representat ives  from B r i t a i n ,  France, 
and I t a l y  met at Stresa, Switzer land,  and agreed to create a common f ron t  
against  German u n i la te ra l  rearmament on 11 A p r i l . 121 Several weeks l a t e r ,  
in  May, French Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  P i e r r e  Lava l  ga ined a mutual d e fe n s iv e
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arrangement w i th  the S o v ie t  Union in  case o f  German agg re s s io n .* 22 The 
G rea t  Powers o f  Europe were u n i t i n g  in  a common f r o n t  a g a in s t  German 
designs to destroy the V e r s a i l l e s  agreement. H i t l e r ,  however, broke th i s  
f r o n t  by n e g o t i a t i n g  and c on c lu d in g  a naval arms pact  w i th  B r i t a s r .  in  
1935.123
From h i s  e a r l i e r  w r i t i n g s  on f o r e ig n  r e l a t i o n s ,  H i t l e r  had a lways 
bel ieved that  Germany should seek an arrangement with B r i t a in  over spheres 
of in f luence. He st rong ly  des ired c lose  t i e s  with B r i t a i n . - ^  During the 
m i d - t h i r t i e s  H i t l e r  came to  r e a l i z e  t h a t  he c o u ld  o n l y  re a ch  an 
accommodation with B r i t a i n  i f  Germany recognized B r i t i s h  supremacy on the 
h igh seas .*23 Thus, the Fuehre r  was w i l l i n g  to o f f e r  an arms l i m i t a t i o n  
agreement to B r i t a in  that would place the German Navy in a much i n f e r i o r  
status than the Royal Navy.*23 He thought that such an arrangement would 
encourage the B r i t i s h  to support German m i l i t a r y  rearmament.*2  ̂ In Ap r i l  
1935, s h o r t l y  a f t e r  Germany's d e c l a r a t i o n  to rearm, H i t l e r  r e c e i v e d  
ind ica t ion s  from S i r  John Simon tha t  the B r i t i s h  government was w i l l i n g  to 
negotiate a naval arms l im i t a t i o n  agreement in order to avoid a naval arms 
ra ce .*28 The f o l l o w in g  month, S i r  E r i c  Ph ipps ,  the B r i t i s h  Ambassador to 
B e r l in ,  pressed H i t l e r  fo r  the i n i t i a t i o n  o f  naval arms ta lk s  in London.-1  ̂
H i t l e r  decided to pa r t i c ip a te ,  and therefore appointed Ribbentrop as German 
Ambassador a t  Large to t r a v e l  to  London and n eg o t ia te  an agreement. 
Beginning the ta lk s  on 4 June, Ribbentrop submitted H i t l e r ' s  proposal that 
Germany would b u i l d  a f l e e t  on ly  35 pe r cen t  the s i z e  o f  the Royal Navy's.
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According to Paul Otto Schmidt, the German Foreign O f f ice  in te rp re te r  who 
iccompanied him to London, Ribbentrop declared to Simon, " i f  the B r i t i s h  
Government does not immediately accept t h i s  cond it ion ,  there i s  no po int  at 
i l l  in  c o n t i n u in g  these n e g o t i a t i o n s .  We must i n s i s t  upon an immedia te  
answer."131 Such a t a c t i c  was shocking to the B r i t i s h  Foreign O f f ic e ,  and 
aven to the h ighly  experienced Schmidt, but w i th in  a few days the B r i t i s h  
agreed to H i t l e r ' s  demand, and Ribbentrop acquired h is  Anglo-German Naval 
Agreement on 18 June 1935.132 Such success  conv inced  H i t l e r  th a t  
Ribbentrop was the obvious person to employ fo r  implementing h is  ideas o f  a 
"genera l  accommodat ion" w i th  B r i t a i n . 133 H i t l e r  h a i l e d  R ibbent rop  as 
" g r e a t e r  than B ismarck"  f o r  h i s  success  in  a c q u i r i n g  an agreement w i th  
Britain. 134
In sp i te  o f  d ip lomat ic  success in B r i t a i n ,  H i t l e r  discovered that  the 
rearmament o f  Germany continued to br ing together states that viewed the 
T h i r d  Re ich  as a t h r e a t  to European p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y .  France and the 
S o v i e t  Union worked to c re a te  a l l i a n c e s  a g a in s t  Germany and p r o t e c t  the 
status quo. As for  Germany's return to Great Power status, there was only 
one more V e r s a i l l e s  m i l i t a r y  r e s t r i c t i o n  s t i l l  in  en fo rcement ,  the 
d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n  of the Rhineland, which was re in forced by the Treaty of 
Lo ca rno .135 H i t l e r ,  as w e l l  as the Wi 1 he! m s t ra s se ,  r e a l i z e d  they would 
have to n e g o t ia t e  a g a in s t  French o p p o s i t i o n  to r i d  themse lves  o f  the 
V e r s a i l l e s  and Locarno agreements in  o rde r  to r e a cq u i r e  f u l l  s o v e re ig n ty  
over the Rh ine land ,  and thus r e ga in  Great  Power s t a tu s .  F rance,
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n e v e r t h e le s s ,  was moving c l o s e r  to r a t i f y i n g  the F r a n c o -S o v ie t  Mutual 
A s s i s t a n c e  Pact .  Th is  pac t ,  a long w i th  these  two s t a t e s '  a l l i a n c e s  w i th  
o t h e r  Eu ropean  s t a t e s ,  such as C z e c h o s l o v a k i a ,  th rea tened  German 
s e c u r i t y . 136 H i t l e r ' s  a t tem pt  to d is suade  France from r a t i f y i n g  the 
Franco-Soviet agreement by reassuring the French government about Germany's 
peaceful in ten t ions  f a i l e d ,  however.13'7 In February 1936, H i t l e r  confided 
to U l r i c h  von Hasse l l ,  the German Ambassador to I t a l y ,  h is  thoughts about 
using the poss ib le  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  the Franco-Sov iet  Pact as grounds fo r  
denouncing the Locarno T rea ty  and reoccupy ing  the Rh ine land  zone w i th  
German f o r c e s . 130 He b e l i e v e d  t h a t  the t ime  was r i g h t  f o r  such a c t i o n  
since the in te rna t iona l  community >;.as busy p rotest ing  the I t a l i a n  invasion 
o f  A b y s s in i a .  H i t l e r  had de te rm ined ,  and R ibben t rop  encouraged such 
thought,  th a t  n e i t h e r  B r i t a i n  or France would a c t  m i l i t a r i l y  to oppose 
German reoccupation o f  the Rhineland. 0:7
The French Chamber o f  Deputies r a t i f i e d  the Franco-Soviet agreement on 
27 February 1936. H i t l e r  qu ick ly  made the dec is ion  to send German troops 
in to the Rhineland.140 On 2 March, General Blomberg ordered a d iv i s io n  of 
German fo r c e s  to move i n t o  the Rh ine land  on 7 March 1936.141 H i t l e r  
informed Neurath o f  h is  dec is ion on 5 March, s ta t ing  that  he took the view 
that  the Franco-Sov ie t  Pact was incompatib le  with the Locarno Treaty and 
made i t  obso le te.142 The threa t  of the French and Sov ie t  a l l i a n c e  systems 
to Germany made i t  im p e r a t i v e  t h a t  H i t l e r  reoccupy the Rh ine land  w i th  
troops for  defensive reasons.143 Understanding H i t l e r ' s  reasoning and the
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d e s i r a b i l i t y  for  the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the Foreign M in i s te r  
ad v ised  H i t l e r  a g a in s t  t a k in g  such a move because o f  the p o s s i b l e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e a c t io n .  Even so, Neurath had a l s o  adv ised  H i t l e r  th a t  
B r i t a i n  and France would not intervene m i l i t a r i l y . 144 He, however, f a i l e d  
to contest  H i t l e r ’s dec is ion because of h is  fear o f  the Fuehrer.145 On the 
o th e r  hand, Goer ing,  R ibben t rop ,  and Goebbels  encouraged H i t l e r  to 
r e m i l i t a r i z e  the Rhineland, and there fore ,  when German troops success fu l ly  
reoccupied the west bank o f  the Rhine without any m i l i t a r y  react ion from 
the V e r s a i l l e s  Powers on 7 March, t h e i r  stock with the Fuehrer d ram a t ica l ly  
increased while  the Wi lhelmstrasse only received h is  conten.pt.145 In fac t ,  
H i t l e r  sent Ribbentrop, instead o f  a d iplomat from the Foreign O f f ic e ,  to 
defend the German act ion to the League o f  Nations Counci l in  London on 10 
March 1936.147
In regards to the dec is ion to reoccupy the Rhineland, both Nazi Party
members and profess ional d ip lomats o f  the Foreign O f f ice  agreed tha t  H i t l e r
made the d e c i s i o n  h im s e l f  on the spur o f  the moment. A cco rd ing  to
witnesses, t h i s  pattern of decis ion-making continued throughout the Third
Reich. In 1945, Hermann Goering to ld  h is  Nuremberg in te r rogators :
H i t l e r ' s  a rb i t r a r y  dec is ions . . . were as unquestionable as a turn in  
the weather.  We would t a l k  one day about someth ing . . . and H i t l e r  
would agree w i th  us; then sudden ly  a day or so l a t e r  H i t l e r  would 
announce that he had decided something a l together  d i f f e r e n t . 148
Ernst von Weizsaecker, the German Ambassador to Sweden (1933-36), and l a t e r
D i re c to r  of  the P o l i t i c a l  Department (1936-38) and Foreign Secretary (1938-
43),149 declared that "H i t l e r  was not lo g i c a l .  He would pul l  h is  ideas out
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o f  the a i r ,  j u s t  l i k e  t h a t ,  j u s t  as the moment i n s p i r e d  h im."*50 As f o r  
Neurath's in f luence  with H i t l e r ,  We izsaecker  s t a t e d  du r ing  h i s  Nuremberg 
t r i a l ,  "Neurath saw l i t t l e  o f  H i t l e r — much too l i t t l e ,  in view o f  H i t l e r ' s  
tendency to act  on the spur o f  the moment. With H i t l e r ,  anyone who was not 
on the  s p o t  d id  n o t  c o u n t . " * 5* " D e c i s i o n s  were  made,"  so s t a t e d  
W e izsaecke r ,  "w i t h o u t  the Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  . . . .  Sometimes they d i d n ' t  
even l i s t e n  to him . . . ."*52 Goer ing even adm it ted  th a t  the Fo re ign  
O f f i c e  had no in f l u e n c e  over  the f o rm u la t i o n  o f  p o l i c y .  He t o l d  the 
Nuremberg judges:
As fa r  as fore ign po l i c y  was concerned, H i t l e r  only consulted h is  
co T ie  ague s more on the . . . p u r e l y  t e c h n i c a l  s ide .  The most 
important and fa r- reach ing p o l i t i c a l  dec is ions  were taken by h imse l f ,  
and he then announced them to h i s  c o l l  a bora to  > and c o l l e a g u e s  as 
ready-made conceptions. Only very few people were a l l  owed to d iscuss 
them, m y s e l f  f o r  in s t an ce ;  and the t e c h n i c a l  e xecu t ion  o f  h i s  
dec is ions  in  the f i e l d  of fore ign po l i c y ,  when i t  came to the framing 
the d i p l o m a t i c  notes ,  was done by the F o re ig n  O f f i c e  and i t s  
m in i s te r .* 52
A f te r  the h igh ly  successfu l reoccupation o f  the Rhineland, the Fuehrer 
sought to complete h is  plans fo r  reforming the Wilhelmstrasse. He st rong ly  
d i s l i k e d  profess iona l  dip lomats and wanted to replace the Foreign O f f i c e  
leadersh ip  with Nazi Party members. H i t l e r  planned to take control o f  the 
fore ign serv ice  by i n t e g r a t i n g  R ibben t rop  and members o f  the Bureau 
Ribbentrop in to  the Wi lhelmstrasse. According to one observer:
The Fuehrer saw in the Foreign O f f i c e  a body of o s s i f i e d  red-tape 
c i v i l  s e r v an t s ,  more or  l e s s  untouched by N a t io n a l  S o c i a l i s m .  [H]e 
often made fun o f  the Foreign O f f ice .  He considered i t  to be the home 
o f  react ion  and defeatism.*54
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Many fore ign diplomats,  inc lud ing  Ambassador Dodd, bel ieved that  Ribbentrop 
would soon become e i t h e r  the new Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  or  S ta te  S e c re t a r y  in  
1935.155 In October 1935, the Fuehre r  had proposed to Neurath t h a t  
Ribbentrop should replace Buelow as Fo re ign  S e c re ta ry .  But, the F o re ign  
M i n i s t e r  s t r o n g l y  ob je c ted  to the appo in tment  o f  an u n q u a l i f i e d  person,  
such as R ibben t rop ,  and th rea tened  to r e s i g n . 156 A f t e r  t h i s  r e f u s a l  to 
bend to h i s  w ishes ,  H i t l e r  demanded the re fo rm o f  the Wi 1 h e lm s t r a s s e ,  
c a l l i n g  fo r  the d ism issa l  of  such "scoundrels and t r a i t o r s "  as Buelow.157 
On 4 November 1935, H i t l e r  t o ld  the Neurath that,  "the [Foreign O f f i c e ]  has 
refused to cooperate. I t  stands outs ide the party, refuses to understand 
the  p o l i c i e s  o f  the  F u e h r e r ,  and c o n t i n u e d  to  make d i f f i c u l t i e s  
everywhere."15®
Fea r ing  H i t l e r ' s  w ra th ,  Neurath and Buelow made e x te n s iv e  p lan s  to 
reorganize the Wilhelmstrasse. They had already star ted t h i s  process by 
d isband ing  Department IV (Eas t  Europe, S cand in av ia ,  and Eas t  A s ia )  and 
t r a n s f e r r i n g  i t s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  to Departments II (West, South, and 
South-East Europe) and III  (B r i t a in ,  American, and the Orient) in  September 
1935.159 Such act ion was dr iven by H i t l e r ' s  threa t  to the Jewish D i re c to r  
o f  Department IV, R icha rd  Meyer, who was granted a le ave  o f  absence by 
Neurath in response to the Nuremberg Laws of September 1935 tha t  deprived 
Jews o f  t h e i r  German c i t i z e n s h ip . 160 When Gerhard Koepke, the D i re c to r  of 
Department I I ,  became s e r i o u s l y  i l l ,  Neurath t e m p o r a r i l y  combined t h i s  
depar tment w i th  Department I I I ,  headed by Hans D ie c k h o f f ,  in  December
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1 fi 11935. 1 Thus, with the funct ions of the three main departments 1 a i l i n g
under the d i re c t io n  of Dieckhoff,  the Foreign M in i s t e r  and Buelow planned
to r e o rg a n iz e  the f o r e ig n  s e r v i c e  by r e e s t a b l i s h i n g  the P o l i t i c a l
Department, under the leadersh ip  o f  D ieckhoff ,  to replace Departmen ".s II
and I I I . 162 This reorgan izat ion became e f f e c t i v e  on 15 May 1936.163
Dur ing  t h i s  p e r iod  o f  r e o r g a n i z a t i o n  Neurath and the Fo re ign  O f f i c e
suffered considerable losses in d ip lomat ic  expert ise .  Not only did Ri ;hard
Meyer r e t i r e ,  but Roland Koester, the German Ambassador to France died in
December 1935.164 Gerhard Koepke resigned because of h is  i l l n e s s  in ea r ly
January 1936.165 Three months l a te r ,  in  A p r i l ,  the D i rec to r  o f  Personnel,
Werner von Gruenau, a l so  became i l l  and re s igned  w h i l e  the German
Ambassador to B r i t a i n ,  Leopold von Hoesch, unexpectedly died in  London.-1®6
W i th in  seve ra l  months Neurath had l o s t  h i s  top two a d v i s e r s  (Meyer and
Koepke), h is  personnel d i re c to r ,  and the two most in f l u e n t i a l  ambassadors
in  the f o r e ig n  s e r v i c e .  As i f  such lo s s e s  were not enough, Fo re ign
1 fi7Secretary Bernhard Wilhelm von Buelow died o f  pneumonia on 21 June 1936.
The blows of fa te had destroyed what l i t t l e  res is tance  to H i t l e r ' s  p o l i c i e s
t h a t  was l e f t  in  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e .  Hans D ie c k h o f f  was made temporary
Fo re ign  S e c r e t a r y  and E rn s t  von W e iz saecke r  assumed c o n t r o l  o f  the
P o l i t i c a l  Department.168 A r r i v in g  in  B e r l i n  from h i s  post  in  S tockho lm ,
Weizsaecker noted the changes at the Wilhelmstrasse:
On t h i s  o c ca s ion  I found t h a t  in  the F o re ig n  O f f i c e  the r e i n s  o f  
government had s l ipped. H i t l e r  had no great opinion of t h i s  o f f i c e .  
Even then . . .  he a l r e ad y  c a l l e d  us a c lu b  o f  d e f e a t i s t s .  He 
pre ferred in format ion from laymen to tha t  obtained from us. Decis ions
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were taken w i th o u t  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  o r  even the Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  
be ing heard on the sub je c t .  Unoer normal c o n d i t i o n s ,  an op in io n  i s  
formed by the expert and i s  passed on to the top le ve ls  fo r  dec is ion. 
Instead  o f  t h i s ,  o rde rs  came to us out o f  a c l e a r  sky, from top to 
bottom, as an accomplished fact .  Our Foreign Service had sunk to the 
l e v e l  o f  a t e c h n i c a l  appara tus .  I t  was r e a l l y  on ly  a facade ,  the 
f a c a d e  o f  a f i r m  w h ic h  had unde rgone  c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n t e r n a l  
arrangements.16^
Whi le  the W i lh e lm s t r a s s e  was undergoing d r a s t i c  personne l and 
organ izat iona l  changes, the Fuehrer continued to employ Nazi dip lomats in 
the conduct of h is  fore ign po l icy .  H i t l e r ' s  primary focus was upon c lo se r  
r e l a t i o n s  w i th  B r i t a i n ,  I t a l y ,  and Japan. He sought to not on ly  ga in  a 
free hand fo r  German expansion in to  eastern Europe, but a bloc against  the 
Sov ie t  Union. He recognized the value o f  an understanding with B r i t a i n  and 
I t a l y  to protect  any t e r r i t o r i a l  a cqu i s i t io n s ,  while  noting the bene f i t  of 
c l o s e r  German-Japanese r e l a t i o n s  aimed a g a in s t  the common enemy o f  the 
Sov ie t  Union. Thus, the Fuehrer's diplomacy was aimed at securing c lo se r  
r e la t io n s  with a l l  three countr ies  during 1935 to 1937.17  ̂ He used Joachim 
von Ribbentrop and h is  Bureau to negotiate in  B e r l in  and Tokyo, w ithout the 
knowledge o f  the W i lh e lm s t r a s s e ,  c l o s e r  t i e s  w i th  Japan as e a r l y  as the 
spr ing o f  1935.171 He a lso  employed Franz von Papen, the German Ambassador 
to Austr ia ,  to se c re t ly  negotiate the "Gentlemen's Agreement" with Kurt  von 
Schuschn igg ,  the A u s t r i a n  C h a n c e l l o r ,  du r ing  May to J u l y  1936, which 
re cogn ized  A u s t r i a n  in depend tnce, in  o rde r  to improve G e rm a n - I t a l i a n  
r e la t io n s ,  e spe c ia l l y  cons ider ing Musso l in i ' s  fears o f  German in ten t ion s  to 
expand sou thwards .173 Moreover ,  on 25 J u l y  1936, H i t l e r ,  d e s p i t e  the 
advice o f  the Foreign O f f i c e , 173 began to openly back the I t a l i a n  e f f o r t  in
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support of the forces led by General Franc isco Franco against the Popular 
Front government during the Spanish C i v i l  War.-*-'74
With the death o f  Buelow in  June 1936, Joach im von R ibben t rop  made 
another  b id  to become Fo re ign  S e c re ta ry .  A l though H i t l e r  favo red  t h i s  
a p p o in tm e n t ,  N e u r a t h , in  a r a r e  moment o f  d e f i a n c e ,  o b j e c t e d  to 
R ibben t rop 's  appo in tment  by t h r e a te n in g  to r e s i g n . 176 R e a l i z i n g  t h a t  
H i t l e r  cou ld  not be c o n t r o l l e d ,  Neurath as w e l l  as Franz von Papen, who 
both had much to ga in  w i th  the champagne sa lesman out o f  B e r l i n ,  q u i c k l y  
suggested t h a t  the Fuehrer  appo in t  R ibben t rop  as the new Ambassador to 
B r i t a i n . 176 They reminded H i t l e r  of Ribbentrop's connections with B r i t a i n  
and h is  success with the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, as well as pointed 
out tha t  Ribbentrop was the best poss ib le  choice as ar. Ambassador who could 
acquire H i t l e r ' s  long sought a f te r  Anglo-German understanding,176 Agreeing 
with such lo g i c ,  H i t l e r  appointed Ribbentrop as Ambassador to B r i t a i n  on 24 
J u l y  1936.177 Neurath and Papen, however, r e a l l y  b e l i e v e d  th a t  t h i s  
d i p l o m a t i c  ass ignment  would d e s t ro y  R ibben t rop 's  c r e d i t a b i l i t y .  Papen 
remarked that  Ribbentrop would "make a fool of h imse lf"  in  London,17® wh i le  
Neurath to ld  Galeazzo Ciano that  "Ribbentrop w i l l  soon d iscover in  London 
i t  i s  eas ie r  to have compliments paid to one as a representat ive  o f  a brand 
o f  champagne than as a representat ive o f  the Government o f  the Reich."179 
H i t l e r ,  however, g rea t ly  upset Neurath by making Ribbentrop as Ambassador 
to B r i t a i n  r e s p o n s ib le  d i r e c t l y  to him in  Anglo-German a f f a i r s ,  thus 
bypassing the control o f  the W i lhe lmstrasse .1®®
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H i t l e r  simultaneously  worked fo r  c lo se r  r e la t io n s  with B r i t a in ,  I t a ly ,
and Japan du r ing  1936 and 1937. H is  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  cen te red  on u n i t i n g
Germany with these Great Powers in an anti-communist  bloc that  would help
secure eastern expansion fo r  the Third Reich.181 To carry  out such po l i cy ,
the Fuehre r  p r im a r i l y  r e l i e d  upon the s e r v i c e s  o f  R ibben t rop  and h is
Bureau. But,  H i t l e r  a l s o  employed the t r a d i t i o n a l  o f f i c e s  o f  the
Wilhelmstrasse, without informing Neurath o f  the f u l l  extent of h is  plans
or tak ing the Foreign O f f i c e ' s  d ip lomat ic  advice, in  seeking arrangements
with B r i t a in  and I t a l y . 18  ̂ At the Nuremberg t r i a l ,  Hans D ieckhoff  to ld  the
court  that  Neurath and the Wi lhelmstrasse, despite t h e i r  lack of in f luence
on the f o rm u la t i o n  o f  p o l i c y ,  con t inued  to c a r r y  out the Fueh re r ' s
183in s t ru c t ion s  be l iev ing  tha t  Germany would peace fu l ly  pursue i t s  goal s /
H i t l e r  kep t  R ibbent rop  in  B e r l i n  f o l l o w in g  h i s  persona l  d ip lo m a t ' s  
appo in tment  to the ambassadorsh ip  to B r i t a i n .  The Fuehre r  needed 
Ribbentrop to conclude ta lk s  fo r  c lo se r  re la t io n s  with Japan. Ribbentrop 
and h i s  Bureau had been s e c r e t l y  n e g o t i a t i n g  f o r  an unde rs tand ing  w i th  
Japan  w i t h o u t  N e u r a t h ' s  i n v o l v e m e n t  s i n c e  1935 .184 These t a l k s ,  
nonetheless, had turned from the prospect o f  a m i l i t a r y  a l l i a n c e  toward an 
ideo log ica l  agreement at the in s is ten ce  o f  General Blomberg, the German War 
M in i s t e r . 185 The idea of a German-Japanese pact aga inst  the common threat  
o f  the Communist  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  was in t rodu ced  by Hans von Raumer, a key 
s t a f f  member o f  the Bureau Ribbentrop.186 With the f u l l  support o f  H i t l e r ,  
R ibben t rop  sought an A n t i - C o m in te rn  Pac t  w i th  Japan, a imed, o f  cou rse ,
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against the Sov ie t  Union.-*-®'7 H i t l e r  sought c lo se r  re la t ion s  with Japan to 
coun te r  the F r a n c o -S o v ie t  t h r e a t  to  Germany.10® R ibbent rop  and Kintomo 
Mushakoji, the Japanese Ambassador to Germany, agreed to the i n i t i a l  terms 
of such a pact at the Bureau Ribbentrop on 23 October 1936.109
Whi le  us ing R ibbent rop  f o r  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i th  Japan, the Fuehre r  
employed h is  Foreign M in i s te r  and Hermann Goering in seeking a rapproache- 
ment w i th  Italy.**90 In pursu ing  c l o s e r  t i e s  w i th  M u s s o l i n i ,  H i t l e r  had 
already recognized Austr ian independence, provided m i l i t a r y  ass is tance to 
F ranco 's  s t r u g g le  in  Spa in ,  and had re cogn ized  I t a l y ' s  annexat ion  o f  
Abyss in ia .191 In September 1936, the German leader sent h is  personal lega l  
adv isor,  Hans Frank, as an u n o f f i c i a l  envoy to Rome with an in v i t a t i o n  fo r  
C iano ,  the I t a l i a n  Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  and s o n - i n - l a w  o f  the Duce, to v i s i t  
Germany to  fo rm  an ag reem en t  f o r  c l o s e r  r e l a t i o n s . - * 9*7 C i a n o ,  a 
G e rm anoph i le ,19® t r a v e l l e d  to Germany under M u s s o l i n i ' s  d i r e c t i o n s  in  
October 1936.19/1 A f te r  a meeting with  the Fuehrer, where H i t l e r  professed 
h is  strong des ire  fo r  c lo se r  German-Ita l ian re la t io n s  and a common f ron t  
a g a in s t  the communist  t h r e a t ,  C iano and Neurath s igned a p ro to co l  a t  the 
Wi 1 he !m s t ra s se ,  drawn up by the Fo re ign  O f f i c e ,  t h a t  c rea ted  the Rome- 
B e r l i n  A x i s  on 23 October 1936, the same day t h a t  ac ro ss  the s t r e e t  
Ribbentrop and Mushakoji were agreeing to the Anti-Comintern Pact.
Having secured i n i t i a l  agreements with Japan and I t a l y ,  H i t l e r  sent 
R ibben t rop  to London. Upon h i s  ambassador 's  depa r tu re ,  H i t l e r  t o l d  
Ribbentrop to "bring me back the B r i t i s h  a l l i a n c e . " 196 Ribbentrop a r r ived
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in  London w i th  seve ra l  members o f  h i s  Bureau to p re sen t  h i s  d i p l o m a t i c  
c r e d e n t i a l s  on 30 October 1936.19  ̂ The German ambassador im m ed ia te ly  
sensed h o s t i l i t y  from the B r i t i s h  Foreign O f f ice  towards any suggestion of 
c lo se r  re la t io n s  between the two coun t r ie s .198 S i r  Robert Vans i t t a r t ,  the 
Permanent Unde r se c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  a t  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e ,  who was a 
Germanophobe, was a t  the c e n t e r  o f  B r i t i s h  abhorence o f  R ibben t rop 's  
d ip lomat ic  miss ion.199 From the s t a r t ,  the German ambassador knew i t  would 
be "very  d i f f i c u l t "  to conc lude  a pact  w i th  B r i t a i n . 200 The B r i t i s h  
Foreign O f f ice  was committed to Austr ian independence and the status quo in 
centra l and eastern Europe.201 Nevertheless,  Ribbentrop spoke to B r i t i s h  
p o l i t i c i a n s  o f  H i t l e r ' s  d e s i r e  f o r  c l o s e r  r e l a t i o n s  w i th  B r i t a i n  and the 
need to j o in  together in the common strugg le  against  communism. c Despite 
B r i t i s h  d ip l o m a t i c  ad v ic e ,  K ing  Edward V I I I ,  P r ime M i n i s t e r  S tan le y  
Ba ldw in ,  Lord Londonderry ,  and Lord H a l i f a x  t o l d  R ibben t rop  o f  t h e i r  
sympathy f o r  German con ce rn s .202 S h o r t l y  a f t e r  h i s  a r r i v a l  in  London, 
H i t l e r  re ca l led  Ribbentrop to B e r l in  to o f f i c i a l l y  sign the Anti-Comintern 
Pact with Japan on 25 November 1936-204 Ribbentrop spent the next th i r teen  
months t r a v e l l i n g  back and for th  between B r i t a i n  and Germany to attend to 
H i t l e r ' s  d i p l o m a t i c  needs. H is  u n p ro fe s s io n a l  d i p l o m a t i c  b ehav io r  in  
London as w e l l  as h i s  f r e quen t  absences o f fended  many o f  the le a d in g  
B r i t i s h  p o l i t i c i a n s . 205 Wi lhe lmstrasse d ip lomats, however, recognized that 
Ribbentrop's motive fo r  these frequent t r i p s  was to maintain h is  in f luence  
w i th  H i t l e r . 206 E rn s t  Woermann, who Neurath had appo in ted  the German
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Embassy Counsel lor in London, not only spied upon, but handled Ribbentrop's 
d ip lomat ic  a f f a i r s  during these absences.202
Fea r ing  t h a t  the p o l i t i c a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  o f  Europe might lead  to war, 
the Baldwin government, despite the advice o f  the B r i t i s h  Foreign O f f ice ,  
sought c l o s e r  r e l a t i o n s  w i th  Germany in  o rde r  to ob ta in  a s e c u r i t y  
arrangement in  western Europe to replace the Locarno Treaty.208 Ribbentrop 
found Lord Ha l i fax ,  who was serving as the Act ing Foreign Secretary during 
S i r  Anthony Eden's i l l n e s s ,  and Lord Derby, a leading B r i t i s h  Conservative 
p o l i t i c i a n ,  des i r ing  a " f r ie nd ly  understanding" between B r i t a in  and Germany 
to avoid any p o s s i b i l i t y  of war.200 In Ap r i l  1937, the Baldwin government 
rep la ced  the p e s s im i s t i c  S i r  E r i c  Ph ipps w i th  S i r  N e v i l e  Henderson, a 
Germanophile, as the B r i t i s h  Ambassador to B e r l in ,  with hopes o f  achieving 
an understanding with H i t l e r . 210 Now, beginning in May 1937, the ac t ions 
o f  c e r t a i n  B r i t i s h  statesmen began to g ive  H i t l e r  the im p re s s io n  t h a t  
B r i t a in ' s  des ire to avoid war would inc lude a l low ing  Germany a free hand in 
centra l  and eastern Europe. The B r i t i s h  government bypassed i t s  Fo re ign  
O f f i c e  and sent  an u n o f f i c i a l  envoy to B e r l i n  to sound out H i t l e r ' s  
in ten t ions .  On 4 May, Lord Lothian to ld  H i t l e r  during th e i r  conversat ion 
that  "B r i t a in  had no primary in te re s t s  in Eastern Europe."‘: i i  At the same 
t im e ,  Henderson, a f t e r  c o n v e r s a t io n s  w i th  the Fueh re r ,  began u rg ing  the 
B r i t i s h  government to acquiesce to peaceful German expansion in  centra l  and 
ea s te rn  Europe.212 S h o r t l y  be fo re  becoming Pr ime M i n i s t e r ,  S i r  N e v i l l e  
Cham ber la in ,  as w e l l  as Ba ldw in  and Eden pressed t h e i r  d e s i r e s  f o r  an
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Anglo-German rapproachement to General Blomberg during h is  London v i s i t  on 
13 and 14 May 1937.212 Ribbentrop noted, however, that these p o l i t i c i a n s  
would not d iscuss as to how an understanding could be achieved.214
From B e r l i n ,  Henderson con t inued  to appeal to the B r i t i s h  Fo re ign  
O f f ice  for  a rapproachement with Germany. Reporting H i t l e r ' s  pos i t ion  on 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a f f a i r s ,  the B r i t i s h  Am bassado r  s u gg e s te d  t h a t  the  
Chamberlain government support the German annexation of Aust r ia  and other 
Germanic peop les ,  eastward  expans ion ,  and the re tu rn  o f  Germany's l o s t  
overseas c o l o n i e s . 21  ̂ He argued tha t  "Germany i s  now too powerfu l  to  be 
persuaded or compelled to enter in to an Eastern Pact, that a cer ta in  German 
predominance eastward i s  i n e v i t a b l e  . . . ."216 The B r i t i s h  government 
c a r e f u l l y  cons ide red  such arguments, but p laced  i t s  major d i p l o m a t i c  
e f f o r t s  towards acquir ing a Western Eur.p-an s e cu r i t y  pact to replace the 
Locarno agreement.21  ̂ By November 1937, however, Fo re ign  S e c re ta r y  Eden 
began to r e g re t  h is  appo intment o f  Henderson to  B e r l i n ,  and d i r e c t e d  him 
not to encourage H i t l e r  in to be l iev ing  that B r i t a i n  "would contemplate any 
sett lement at the expense of the p o l i t i c a l  independence of the nations of 
Eastern and Central Europe."21^
By th i s  t ime H i t l e r  had made up h is  mind that i t  was h igh ly  u n l i k e ly  
tha t  B r i t a i n  would m i l i t a r i l y  in te r vene  in  any German a t tempts  to 
in c o rp o r a t e  German popu la ted  areas in c e n t r a l  or eas te rn  Europe. He 
p e rce ived  B r i t a i n ' s  f a i l u r e  to p re s su re  Germany i n t o  a Western European 
s e cu r i t y  pact as proof of the Chamberlain government's lack of in te re s t  in
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European a f f a i r s . 219 But, in  an e f f o r t  to ga in  an unders tand ing  between 
the two countr ies  that favored Germany, H i t l e r  had Ribbentrop inform the 
B r i t i s h  Fo re ign  S e c re ta ry  o f  Ge rm an-I ta l ian  negot ia t ions fo r  the I t a l i a n  
admission in to  the Anti-Comintern Pact as a way to pressure B r i t a i n  in to  
making a dec is ion to j o in  the pact in October 1937. The Fuehrer bel ieved 
that B r i t a i n ' s  admission in to  the pact would guarantee Germany a f ree hand 
in eastern Europe.220
The Nazi h ierarchy was well  aware of H i t l e r ' s  fore ign po l i cy  plans fo r  
the annexation o f  Austr ia  and the re a cqu is i t ion  o f  German t e r r i t o r y  l o s t  in 
the V e r s a i l l e s  agreement. Eastward expansion to provide l i v i n g  space fo r  
the German race  was a theme o f  H i t l e r ' s  f o r  over  a decade. Goer ing  had 
informed Ambassador Henderson on numerous occasions during the summer and 
f a l l  o f  1937 that  Germany had designs on regain ing Danzig, Memel, and the 
P o l i s h  C o r r i d o r . 221 Thus, on 5 November 1937, when H i t l e r  assembled h i s  
key s t a f f  in  the Reich C h a n c e l l e r y  to d i s c u s s  h i s  p o l i c y  p lans  a t  the so -  
c a l led  Hossbach meeting, party members, such as Goering, were not surpr ised  
to hear the Fueh re r ' s  p lans  f o r  a gg re s s iv e  a c t i o n  to conquer A u s t r i a  and 
C z e c h o s lo v a k ia . 222 N eve r th e le s s ,  Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  Neurath, as w e l l  as 
General Blomberg, were surpr ised by the unfo ld ing of such plans. Neurath 
had been out o f  contact  with H i t l e r  fo r  many months since the German leader 
had f a v o r e d  the  c o u n s e l  o f  R i b b e n t r o p  and h i s  Bureau  o v e r  th e  
Wilhe lmstrasse .223 Durlng the meeting H i t l e r ,  who was obv ious ly  conf ident  
o f  h i s  own s t r e ng th  and the m i l i t a r y  weakness o f  the o th e r  G rea t  Powers,
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i n s i s te d  that B r i t a i n  and France would not intervene during a German move 
against ^Austria and Czechoslovakia because o f  the German-Ita l ian b loc .224
H av ing  o b t a i n e d  the  A x i s  ag re em en t  in  1936, the  F u e h r e r  had 
immediately star ted d ip lomat ic  t a lk s  towards acqu i r ing  a stronger bond with 
I t a l y  in  o rde r  to s t reng then  h i s  c o n t r o l  over  a f f a i r s  in  c e n t r a l  Europe. 
H i t l e r  understood t h a t  a G e rm a n - I ta l i a n  agreement would s u f f i c e  as the 
necessary d ip lomat ic  tool to use in  pursu i t  of h is  ambit ions in centra l and 
eas te rn  Europe in  case R ibben t rop  cou ld  not ach ieve  an Anglo-German 
understanding.225 For h is  own reasons, Musso l in i  a lso sought c lo se r  I t a lo -  
German r e l a t i o n s ,  to in c l u d e  the c o o r d in a t i o n  o f  defense m at te rs  in  the 
event o f  war against  B r i t a i n  and France.225 H i t l e r  therefore employed the 
d ip l o m a t i c  s e r v i c e s  o f  Goer ing ,  R ibben t rop ,  Raumer, as w e l l  as the 
Wi1helmstrasse to negotiate the I t a l i a n  admission to the German-Japanese 
Anti-Comintern Pact.22'7 In September 1937, M u s s o l i n i  v i s i t e d  B e r l i n  and 
displayed v i s i b l e  signs to the d ip lomat ic  community of I t a l i a n  submission 
to H i t l e r ' s  des i re s .22® Short ly  the rea f te r ,  in  October, the German leader 
sent Ribbentrop to Rome to conclude the Anti-Comintern Pact with I t a l y . 229 
The agreement was f o r m a l l y  s igned ,  w i th ou t  any German Fo re ign  O f f i c e  
involvement, by Ribbentrop and Ciano in Be r l in  on 6 November 1937, the day 
a f t e r  the Hossbach m ee t ing .230 On the s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h i s  agreement, 
Andre F r a n c o i s - P o n c e t ,  the French Ambassador to B e r l in ,  stated, "B r i t a in  
and F rance,  separa ted  from C en t r a l  Europe by a s o l i d  b a r r i e r ,  were now 
pow e r le s s  d i r e c t l y  to succo r  A u s t r i a  or Czechos lovak ia ."231 The I t a l i a n
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Foreign M in i s te r ,  Ciano, viewed the pact with Germany as "os tens ib ly  a n t i ­
communist but in r e a l i t y  a n t i - B r i t i s h .
Even so, A d o l f  H i t l e r  s t i l l  had hopes o f  an Anglo-German under­
standing. He continued to meet with important B r i t i s h  statesmen, inc lud ing  
the Duke o f  W indsor,  the fo rmer  K ing Edward V I I I ,  to d i s c u s s  the 
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  an arrangement in  e a s te rn  E u r o p e . T h e  Chamber la in  
government, in s p i t e  o f  the B r i t i s h  Fo re ign  O f f i c e ,  wanted a s e t t l e m e n t .  
The Pr ime M i n i s t e r  thus sent Lord H a l i f a x ,  the Lord P r e s id e n t  o f  the 
Counci l , who had a keen in te re s t  in fo re ign  po l i c y ,  to Germany in an e f f o r t  
to gain an Anglo-German understanding so as to avoid the p o s s i b i l i t y  of a 
European war.^ 4  Fore ign  S e c r e t a r y  Eden and Permanent U nde r se c re ta ry
pOE
Vans i t ta r t  were h igh ly  against the v i s i t ,  but Chamberlain ins is ted .
The Ha l i fax  d ip lomat ic  miss ion had the e f fe c t  of conf irming H i t l e r ' s  
n o t ion s  tha t  Germany cou ld  e v e n tu a l l y  expand eastwards w i th ou t  B r i t i s h  
in tervent ion.  At Berchtesgaden, on 19 November 1937, he Fuehrer to ld  Lord 
H a l i f a x  o f  h i s  aims f o r  "a c lo s e  union between A u s t r i a  and the Re ich"  as 
w e l l  as s e c u r i t y  f o r  the Sudeten Germans.^36 Paul Otto Schm idt ,  the 
Wi lhelmstrasse in te rp re te r ,  recorded the c o n ve r s a t io n  between H i t l e r  and 
Ha l i fax .  According to Schmidt:
H a l i f a x  adm it ted  o f  h is  own accord tha t  c e r t a i n  changes in the 
European system cou ld  p robab ly  not be avo ided in  the long run. The 
B r i t i s h  did not be l ieve that the status quo had to be maintained under 
a l l  c i r c um s tan ce s .  Among the q ue s t io n s  in  which changes would 
p r o b a b l y  be made so on e r  o r  l a t e r  were D a n z ig ,  A u s t r i a ,  and 
C ze cho s lo vak ia .  England was o n ly  i n t e r e s t e d  in  see ing  t h a t  such 
changes were brought about by peaceful development.^?
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Lord H a l i f a x  made such comments, as he l a t e r  e xp la in ed  to the B r i t i s h  
government, with the view that H i t l e r  had no immediate plans to expand into 
centra l  or eastern Europe.^ 8
Whi le  the B r i t i s h  government was warming up, a l b e i t  s l o w ly ,  to an 
Anglo-German understanding, Joachim von Ribbentrop was becoming f rus t ra ted  
in h is  seemingly lack of success in qu ick ly  achieving H i t l e r ' s  much wanted 
a l l i a n c e .  He had s u f f e r e d  the co ldness  o f  S i r  Anthony Eden, S i r  Robert 
Vans i t ta r t ,  and the diplomats of the B r i t i s h  Foreign O f f i c e .^9  He had no 
breakthrough in convincing S i r  Winston Church i l l  of the mutual benef i ts  of 
an Anglo-German agreement.240 The German Ambassador thus came to the 
c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  h i s  d i p l o m a t i c  m is s ion  was a f a i l u r e .  He blamed h is  
dismal performance on H i t l e r ' s  t ie s  with Musso l in i  and Franco as well  as 
the German demand f o r  the re tu rn  o f  l o s t  overseas c o lo n i e s .  Most 
important ly ,  Ribbentrop bel ieved that "there was a very strong tendency of 
very  im po r tan t  Eng l ishmen who . . .  in t h e i r  i n t e r n a l  p o l i c y ,  i f  not 
ou tw a rd ly ,  [ t oo k ]  a very  f i r m  stand a g a in s t  Germany, t h i n k in g  th a t  one 
day . . . Germany would get too s t rong ."
Towards the end of 1937, Joachim von Ribbentrop prepared a report  that 
included h is  es t imat ion  of Anglo-German re la t ion s .  The Ambassador admitted 
h i s  f a i l e d  d ip l o m a t i c  m is s io n .  He in fo rmed H i t l e r  th a t  s in ce  Germany 
planned to expand in t o  c e n t r a l  and ea s te rn  Europe the hope o f  an 
understanding with B r i t a i n  was at an end. The fu ture ,  and the l i k e l ih ood  
of war between them, depended upon whether B r i t a i n  would fo l low  France in
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defense of her Eastern a l l i e s .  B r i t a i n ,  according to Ribbentrop, would not 
consent  to be dragged in t o  a c o n f l i c t  i f  c o n d i t i o n s  were un favo rab le  f o r  
the Empire. He t o ld  the Fuehrer  th a t  "over a l o c a l  problem in  c e n t r a l  
Europe, even i f  i t  were to add cons iderab ly  to Germany's strength, England 
would, in  my o p in io n ,  not r i s k  a s t r u g g le  f o r  the s u r v i v a l  o f  her 
Empire."^44 R ibbentrop  s t r o n g l y  suggested tha t  Germany s o l i d i f y  i t s  
a l l i a n c e  w i th  I t a l y  and Japan so as to de te r  any B r i t i s h  p rospec t  o f  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  aga in s t  German des igns  in  c e n t r a l  and eas te rn  Europe. He 
summed up h is  analyzation by s ta t ing  that:
The s p e c ia l  problem as to whether France and the reby  England
would in te r vene  i f  Germany shou ld  become in vo lved  in  a c o n f l i c t  in
Cen t ra l  Europe depends upon c i r c um s tan ce s  and the t ime  when such a
c o n f l i c t  were to break ou t  and end upon m i l i t a r y  c o n s i d e r a -  
245t i o n s  . . .
Many con tempora r ie s  blamed R ibbentrop  fo r  H i t l e r ' s  f i rm  b e l i e f  that 
B r i t a i n  would not in te r vene  in a l o c a l  European c o n f l i c t  because o f  h i s  
adv ice .  A f t e r  a l l ,  R ibbent rop  was cons ide red  by H i t l e r  the expe r t  on
O Af.
B r i t a i n ,  and, t h e r e fo r e ,  h i s  o p in io n s  were o f  utmost s i g n i f i c a n c e .  
Franz von Papen wrote in h i s  memoirs ,  "R ibben t rop 's  op in io n  th a t  the 
B r i t i s h  Empire had passed i t s  peak, and would no longer take m i l i t a r y  steps 
to r e s t o r e  the ba lance o f  power in  Europe, formed the b a s i s  f o r  H i t l e r ' s  
agg re s s iv e  p lans  aga in s t  C ze ch o s lo v a k ia  and Poland. But, Papen and
o th e r s ,  such as Hermann Goer ing ,  E rn s t  von W e izsaecke r ,  E r i c  Ko rd t ,  and 
E rn s t  Woermann, who have s t a t e d  s i m i l a r  arguments, were u n f a i r  to 
Ribbentrop, whom they despised.248 H i t l e r  had formed h is  own eva luat ion
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based upon c o n ta c t s  w i th  B r i t i s h  statesmen t h a t  B r i t a i n  was u n l i k e l y  to 
intervene in German expansion towards the east. Ribbentrop knew H i t l e r ' s  
b e l i e f s ,  s in c e  the two had had numerous cha ts  on i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a f f a i r s  
since the e a r ly  t h i r t i e s ,  and in h is  own typ ic a l  way of endearing h imse l f  
to the Fuehrer, had adopted and repeated H i t l e r ' s  viewpoint. Ribbentrop's 
only in f luence during the la te  t h i r t i e s  concerning the question of whether 
the B r i t i s h  would in te r vene  in the event o f  German expans ion was to 
re in fo rce  the Fuehrer's already formed opinion. The re la t ion sh ip  between 
H i t l e r  and Ribbentrop was best stated by Paul Otto Schmidt, who spent long 
hours with both men:
His [Ribbentrop] re la t ion sh ip  to H i t l e r  was one of extreme dependency. 
I f  H i t l e r  was d i s p le a s e d  w i th  him, R ibben t rop  went s i c k  and took to 
h i s  bed l i k e  a h y s t e r i c a l  woman. He was indeed noth ing  but h i s  
master's voice . . . ."249
H i t l e r ,  h imse l f ,  found Ribbentrop a "sturdy and obst inate man", despite h is  
companion's d isagreeable personal ity .^® Andre Francois-Poncet, the French 
Ambassador to B e r l in  during 1931 to 1938, nonetheless, best described the 
H i t le r -R ibbentrop  re la t ion sh ip  in h is  memoirs:
T yp ic a l  of the p e r f e c t  c o u r t i e r ,  he [R ibben t rop ]  would hur l  
thunderbolts of f l a t t e r y  at H i t l e r  without turn ing a hair .  His method 
o f  keeping in fa vo r  was very s im p le .  I t  c o n s i s t e d  in l i s t e n i n g  
r e l i g i o u s l y  to h is  master's endless monologues and in committ ing to 
memory the ideas developed by H i t l e r .  A l s o ,  more im p o r t a n t l y ,  
R ibben t rop  noted the i n t e n t i o n s  to be d i v i n e d  behind these ideas.  
Then, a f te r  H i t l e r  had forgotten ever d iscuss ing  them with Ribbentrop, 
the c o u r t i e r  passed them o f f  as h i s  own, u n fo ld in g  them w i th  g rea t  
warmth. S truck  by t h i s  concordance, H i t l e r  a t t r i b u t e d  to h i s  
c o l l a b o r a t o r  a sureness o f  judgment and a t renchan t  f o r e s i g h t  
s in g u la r l y  in agreement with h is  own deepest thought. He [Ribbentrop] 
not on ly  never c o n t r a d i c t e d  h i s  master or o f f e r e d  the s l i g h t e s t  
o b j e c t i o n ,  he a l s o  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  p i l e d  argument upon argument in
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agreement. He was more H i t l e r i a n  than H i t l e r .  By c l e a r i n g  up the 
Fueh re r ' s  doubts and by d i s s i p a t i n g  the  F u e h r e r ' s  o c c a s i o n a l  
h e s i t a n c i e s  R ibbent rop  e x c i t e d  the Fueh re r ' s  supreme audac i t y ;  he 
pushed and p u l le d  him in t o  ways toward which H i t l e r  was a l l  too 
dangerously  in c l in ed .25^
Even We izsaecker  adm it ted  to the Nuremberg cou r t  th a t  "R ibbentrop  had a 
spec ia l  g i f t  fo r  approaching H i t l e r  in an i n t u i t i v e  manner, l i s t e n in g  fo r  
h is  opinion and then exceeding, and outdoing him in h is  own opinions."252 
Ribbentrop, however, was the fa vo r i t e  target among the Nazi Party e l i t e  as 
well  as the Foreign O f f ice  fo r  blame to a l l  German fore ign po l i c y  f a i l u r e s .  
R ibben t rop  was cons ide red  an o u t s i d e r  by the Pa r ty  e l i t e  because o f  h i s  
l a t e  invo lvement  w i th  H i t l e r ,  and the Wi 1 h e lm s t r a s se  v iewed him as an
p r o
usurper of i t s  t r ad i t io na l  re spons ib i1i t e s  fo r  in te rna t iona l  a f f a i r s .  30
The r i s e  of Ribbentrop had complete ly  ec l ipsed the l i t t l e  contro l over 
fore ign a f f a i r s  held by Constantin von Neurath. For some time Neurath had 
l i ved  in fear of H i t l e r ' s  wrath towards the WiIhelmstrasse.25  ̂ He had lo s t  
in the s t r u g g le  f o r  in f l u e n c e  w i th  R ibbent rop  and h i s  Bureau.255 H i t l e r  
had sent Hans D ie c kho f f ,  the Fo re ign  S e c re ta ry ,  away from B e r l i n  to an 
un impor tan t  post in  the Un ited  S t a t e s . 255 With the lo s s  o f  many key 
d ip lom a t s  at the top p o s i t i o n s  w i t h i n  the W i1he lm s t r a s se  in  l e s s  than a 
yea r ,  the Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r ,  d e s p i t e  the appoin tment o f  h i s  s o n - i n - l a w ,  
Hans-Georg von Mackensen, a Nazi P a r t y  member, to the post o f  Fo re ign  
Coc r e t a r y ,  adm it ted  de fea t  to  H i t l e r ' s  ab so lu te  c o n t r o l  over f o r e ig n  
p o l i c y . 257 A f t e r  the Hossbach con fe rence ,  Neurath "was so deep ly  shaken 
tha t  he dec ided once and f o r  a l l , "  a c co rd ing  to Haro ld  Deutsch, " th a t  he
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would have no t ru ck  w i th  such a p o l i c y . " 25° Commenting on the Hossbach 
meeting, Neurath to ld  the Nuremberg court:
Although the plans set fo r th  by H i t l e r  in that long speech had no 
concrete form, and various p o s s i b i l i t i e s  were envisaged, i t  was quite 
obv ious to me th a t  the whole tendency o f  h i s  p lans  was o f  an 
aggressive nature. I was extremely upset at H i t l e r ' s  speech, because 
i t  knocked the bottom out o f  the whole f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  which I had 
c on s is ten t ly  pursued--the po l i c y  of employing only peaceful means.259
He thus sought an aud ience w i th  the Fuehrer  to hand in  h i s  r e s i g n a t io n .
But, H i t l e r ,  who l e f t  f o r  Berchtesgaden,  re fu sed  to see h i s  Fo re ign
M i n i s t e r . 260 Neurath, m e n ta l l y  and p h y s i c a l l y  upset about the Hossbach
meet ing, and ordered to remain s i l e n t  about H i t l e r ' s  p lan s ,  s u f f e r e d  a
heart attack while  wa it ing fo r  the Fuehrer to return to B e r l in .26* H i t l e r ,
f i n a l l y ,  a f te r  over two months, agreed to see Neurath in order to a l low him
p c n
the o p p o r t u n i t y  to submit  h i s  r e t i r e m e n t  papers on 14 January 1938. 
But, the Fuehrer  re fu sed  to a l lo w  Neurath to r e t i r e  on h i s  s i x t y - f i f t h  
b ir thday at the end of January 1938.262
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CHAPTER ,,T
HITLER, RIBBENTROP, AND THE ROAD TO WAR
S ince  1933 A d o l f  H i t l e r  had ac ted  as the pr ime fo rm u la t o r  o f  German 
f o r e ig n  p o l i c y .  He had pursued c l o s e r  r e l a t i o n s  w i th  B r i t a i n ,  France,  
Aus t r ia ,  I ta ly ,  Japan, and Poland with  the aim of rees tab l i sh ing  Germany as 
a G reat  Power in  c e n t r a l  Europe as w e l l  as c r e a t i n g  an a n t i - S o v i e t  b loc .  
He accomplished a rapproachement with Poland and Austr ia ,  a pact with I t a ly  
and Japan, and con t inued  t a l k s  w i th  B r i t a i n  conce rn ing  a genera l 
understanding. His main goals were a c lose  union between Germany and h is  
homeland o f  A u s t r i a ,  the r e a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  l o s t  German t e r r i t o r y ,  an 
unders tand ing  w i th  B r i t a i n  conce rn ing  spheres o f  in f luence,  and eastward 
expans ion  f o r  the German race. In deve lop ing  a b lo c  th a t  c ha l le n ged  the 
status quo, H i t l e r  employed h is  anti-communist  sentiments to unite  Germany 
w i th  I t a l y  and Japan. Such d ip lom acy  s u c c e s s f u l l y  p laced  Germany in  a 
dominant p o s i t i o n  in  c e n t r a l  and ea s te rn  Europe. The Be r l in -Rom e  A x i s ,  
a long  w i th  H i t l e r ' s  p e r ce p t io n  o f  B r i t i s h  and French u n w i l l i n g n e s s  to 
in t e r v e n e  m i l i t a r i l y  a g a in s t  German a c t i o n s ,  on ly  encouraged H i t l e r  to 
pursue h i s  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  goa ls .  To c a r r y  out n i s  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  the 
Fuehre r  had r e l i e d  m a in ly  upon amateur d ip lo m a t s ,  such as Joach im  von 
R ibben t rop ,  w h i l e  bypass ing  the German Fo re ign  O f f i c e .  Having rega ined
Great  Power s t a tu s  and a s t rong  d ip l o m a t i c  p o s i t i o n  f o r  Germany, H i t l e r
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decided to take control  o f  the Wi lhelmstrasse. He would be his own Foreign 
M in is te r .  The Fuehrer, however, decided not to o f f i c i a l l y  appoint h im se l f  
to the o f f i c e ,  but to appoint the loya l and subservient Ribbentrop to t h i s  
top pos i t ion .  Ribbentrop, f u l l y  r e l i a n t  upon the Fuehrer's wishes, would 
serve h i s  master  not as a Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r ,  but as H i t l e r ' s  top d ip lom a t .  
H i t l e r ,  h im s e l f ,  would remain the p r im a ry  f o rm u la t o r  o f  German f o r e ig n  
p o l i c y .*
In ea r ly  1938 H i t l e r  decided to take d i r e c t  control over the Foreign 
O f f ice  and the German Army. He dismissed General Werner von Blomberg, the 
War M in i s te r ,  and General Werner von F r i t s c h ,  the Commander-in-Chief o f  the
p
German Army, because o f  scandals, and took command of  the German m i l i t a r y .  
At the same t im e ,  on 4 February  1938, H i t l e r  in fo rmed Cons tan t in  von 
Neurath o f  h is  d ism issa l  as Foreign M in i s t e r .8 Ribbentrop would take h is  
place.4 The news surpr ised both Neurath and Ribbentrop, who happened to be 
in B e r l in ,  absent from his  d ip lomat ic  post in  London.5 Simultaneous with 
these a c t i o n s ,  H i t l e r  shook up the f o r e ig n  s e r v i c e  by announcing the 
terminat ion o f  the d ip lomat ic  assignments o f  Franz von Papen, U l r i c h  von 
H a s s e l l ,  and H e rbe r t  von D i r k sen  to t h e i r  ambassador ia l  pos ts  in  V ienna, 
Rome, and Tokyo.6 Neurath was to ld  o f  h is  appointment to the newly created 
S e c re t  C ab in e t  C o u n c i l . 7 D i rksen  was to be t r a n s f e r r e d  to London as a 
rep lacem en t  f o r  R ib b e n t ro p ,8 w h i l e  Papen was to f i n d  f u r t h e r  use as an 
expert on Austro-German a f f a i r s , 9 and Hassel l was r e t i r e d  because o f  h is  
oppos i t ion to the ant i-Comintern p a c t s . 10 Hans-Georg von Mackensen, the
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Foreign Secretary, was re l ieved  of h is  post and t ransferred to the embassy 
in Rome.11 The dec is ion to appoint Ribbentrop as Foreign M in i s te r  was not 
easy for  H i t l e r ,  since Hermann Goering, h is  c lose  personal f r iend ,  showed 
i n t e r e s t  in  the post.  But,  the Fuehre r  o b v io u s l y  wanted no one o f  
i n t e l l e c t  and in f luence to be in a centra l pos i t ion  to in te r fe re  with h is  
f o r e ig n  p o l i c y . 12 G oe r ing ,  a c c o r d i n g  to  L e o n id a s  H i l l ,  was more 
i n f l u e n t i a l  w i th  H i t l e r  over m a t te r s  o f  f o r e ig n  a f f a i r s  than R ibbent rop  
during t h i s  per iod.1-1
The sudden appo in tment  o f  R ibbent rop  as Foreign M in i s te r  astonished 
the W i lh e lm s t r a s s e  and f o r e ig n  d ip lo m a t s  in  B e r l i n .  The p r o f e s s io n a l  
d ip lom a ts  v iewed the champagne sa lesman as u n q u a l i f i e d  to ho ld  such a 
h ighly  esteemed pos i t ion .  Ribbentrop lacked adequate d ip lomat ic  t r a in in g  
and had very l i t t l e  experience in the fore ign serv ice.  As Andre Franco is -  
Poncet,  the French Ambassador to B e r l i n ,  summed up R ibbentrop:  "The new 
M i n i s t e r  f o r  Fo re ign  A f f a i r s  was n e i t h e r  p repared nor f i t t e d  f o r  h i s  
o f f i c e .  C u l t u r a l l y  and i n t e l l e c t u a l l y  he was mediocre. His ignorance of 
h i s t o r i c a l  and d i p l o m a t i c  q u e s t i o n s  was p r o d ig io u s . " 14 One major 
d ip lomat ic  shortcoming was Ribbentrop's lack o f  communicative s k i l l s .  He, 
a c co rd ing  to E r n s t  von W e izsaecke r ,  the D i r e c t o r  o f  the P o l i t i c a l  
Department, "had no fe e l in g  fo r  the most important means of diplomacy; that 
i s ,  f o r  d i p l o m a t i c  c o n v e r s a t i o n . " 15 Most important ly ,  Weizsaecker noted 
th a t  the new Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  "d id  not possess  the a r t  o f  l i s t e n i n g ,  
c e r t a in l y  not with  regard to German profess ional  d ip lomats anyway, nor with
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regard to fore ign diplomats e i the r . "*6 Confirming t h i s  view of  Ribbentrop, 
Francois -Poncet declared:
I t  was d i f f i c u l t  to conduct  a genuine c on ve rsa t ion  w i th  him 
[R ibben t rop ] .  L i k e  the Fuehre r  he cop ied ,  he indu lged  in  leng thy  
monologues; he never caught, l e t  alone re ta ined, the arguments o f  h is  
in te r lo c a to r ;  he l i s tened  only to h imse l f ,  repeat ing the lesson he had 
lea rned .17
Despite d i s l i k i n g  the new Foreign M in i s te r ,  there were members o f  the
Wi1helmstrasse who viewed the appointment o f  Ribbentrop as an opportunity
fo r  the Foreign O f f ice  to regain in f luence  over the formulat ion and conduct
of po l i cy .*6 Weizsaecker to ld  the American M i l i t a r y  Tribunal that "some of
my col leagues thought i t  was a good th ing [the appointment of Ribbentrop]
because in t h i s  way the actual adv isor o f  H i t l e r  in fore ign a f f a i r s  would
now a l s o  have the o f f i c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . " * 9 They b e l i e v e d  t h a t
on
R ibben t rop  cou ld  be man ipu la ted  i n t o  f o l l o w in g  t h e i r  adv ice .  These 
dip lomats, however, misjudged Ribbentrop's in f luence over H i t l e r ' s  fore ign 
po l icy .  The new m in inster had no c lou t  with H i t l e r ,  at le a s t  compared to 
the s ign i f i c an ce  of Hermann Goering, Rudolf Hess, and Heinr ich Himmler.2* 
In February 1938, Goering to ld  Nevi le  Henderson, the B r i t i s h  Ambassador to 
B e r l i n ,  th a t  R ibbent rop  had no i n f l u e n c e  in  the f o rm u la t i o n  o f  German 
f o r e ig n  p o l i c y ,  adding t h a t  " the re  i s  on ly  one person d i c t a t i n g  f o r e ig n  
po l i c y  in Germany, and that  i s  H i t l e r  h imse l f . "22 Herbert von Dirksen saw 
R ibben t rop  as "noth ing  but the D i c t a t o r ' s  message boy . . . . " 26 Even 
Ribbentrop, h imse l f ,  re a l i z ed  h is  own personal shortcomings and to ld  the
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French Ambassador, "the p o l i c y  I f o l l o w  i s  not mine but the Fueh re r s . "2  ̂
During h is  t r i a l  at Nuremberg, Ribbentrop to ld  the court:
I t  was c le a r  to me from the very beginning, a f te r  I took over the 
m i n i s t r y ,  t h a t  I would be work ing ,  so to  speak, in  the shadow o f  a 
t i t a n  and that I would have to impose on myself  ce r ta in  l im i t a t i o n s ,  
t h a t  i s  to say, t h a t  I would not be in  a p o s i t i o n ,  one might a lm os t  
say, to conduct  the f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  as i t  i s  done by o the r  f o r e ig n  
m in i s t e r s ,  who are r e s p o n s ib le  to a pa r i  iamenta ry  system or a 
p a r l i a m e n t .  The commanding p e r s o n a l i t y  o f  the Fuehrer n a t u r a l l y  
dominated the f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  . . . .  He [ H i t l e r ]  occup ied h im s e l f  
w i th  a l l  d e t a i l s .  I t  went l i k e  t h i s  more or  l e s s :  I repor ted  to him 
and fo rwarded  to him im po r tan t  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  re po r t s  through a 
l i a i s o n  man, and H i t l e r  in turn gave me d e f i n i t i v e  orders as to what 
v iews I shou ld  take in  regard to prob lems o f  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  . . . . 25
Having appointed h is  top Nazi dip lomat as Foreign M in ins te r  during the
f i r s t  week o f  February 1938, H i t l e r  qu ick ly  u t i l i z e d  Ribbentrop to a s s i s t
him in  the conduct  o f  German p o l i c y  towards A u s t r i a .  The A u s t r i a n
C h a n c e l l o r ,  Ku r t  von Schuschnigg,  had in fo rmed  the Wi 1 h e lm s t ra s se  about
fears that H i t l e r ' s  purge of h is  top generals and diplomats might represent
a change in  German po l i c y  towards Aus t r ia .2  ̂ Wilhelm Keppler, a Nazi who
H i t l e r  used as an envoy to A u s t r i a  a f t e r  Papen's d i s m i s s a l , 2  ̂ fo rwarded
Schuschn igg 's  reques t  f o r  a meet ing w i th  H i t l e r  to  d i s c u s s  the fu tu re  o f
Austro-German r e l a t i o n s . 2® Thus the two le a de r s  w i th  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e
f o r e ig n  m in i s t e r s  met at  Berchtesgaden on 12 February  1938. F ranz von
Papen, who was temporar i ly  re ins ta ted  as Ambassador to Austr ia ,  accompanied
H i t l e r  and Ribbentrop to provide them d ip lomat ic  advice, e spec ia l ly  since
the Foreign M in i s t e r  was uninformed about Austro-German re la t ion s  as well
as being unsure o f  h im se l f .29 At t h i s  meeting H i t l e r  browbeat Schuschnigg
to accep t  h i s  demands f o r  a c l o s e r  union between the two s t a t e s .  The
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Fueh re r  had R ibbent rop  hand over  h i s  l i s t  o f  demands to the A u s t r i a n  
Foreign M in i s te r ,  Guido Schmidt.30 R ibben t rop ,  in  h i s  a r rogan t  s t y l e  o f  
d ip lom acy ,  t o l d  Schmidt  t h a t  " these demands t h a t  I now o f f e r  you are the 
f i n a l  demands o f  the Fuehre r  and t h a t  he, H i t l e r ,  i s  not prepared to 
f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s  them."^ R ibben t rop  s t r o n g ly  adv ised  the A u s t r i a n s  to 
accep t  H i t l e r ' s  demands. Meanwhi le ,  H i t l e r  p ressu red  Schuschnigg by 
dec lar ing: "You w i l l  sign i t  [the p rotoco l]  and f u l f i l l  my demands in  three 
days, or I w i l l  march in to  Aus t r ia . "32 These demands, a c tua l ly  drafted by 
H i t l e r  and R ibbent rop  e a r l i e r  t h a t  day, on the b a s i s  o f  Kepp le r ' s  ad v ice ,  
c a l l e d  f o r  Schuschnigg to appo in t  Naz is  to  key A u s t r i a n  pos t s ,  i n c l u d i n g  
Arthur Seyss-Inquart to the post of Austr ian M in i s te r  o f  Secur i ty  and the 
I n t e r i o r ;  meet ings between the genera l  s t a f f s ;  an exchange o f  m i l i t a r y  
o f f i c e r s ;  and the a s s im i la t io n  of the Austro-German economic system w i th in  
a matter of days.33 The pressure by both H i t l e r  and Ribbentrop resu lted  in 
Schuschnigg and Schmidt agreeing to the demands.3^
Throughout the f o l l o w in g  weeks H i t l e r  p ressu red  the A u s t r i a n  
government to meet the prov is ions  o f  the Berchtesgaden Protocol . Although 
they found R ibbent rop  u se fu l  a t  Berchtesgaden,  H i t l e r  and Goer ing kept  
Austro-German re la t ion s  to themselves and l im i t e d  the involvement o f  the 
Wi lhe lmstrasse .35 Meanwhile, the B r i t i s h  government, which was troubled by 
the Berchtesgaden Protoco l,  sought an understanding with  H i t l e r . 36 Prime 
M i n i s t e r  N e v i l l e  Chamber la in  d i sm is s e d  S i r  Anthony Eden and S i r  Rober t  
V an s i t t a r t ,  and replaced the leadersh ip  o f  the B r i t i s h  Foreign O f f ice  with
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men, such as Lord Ha l i fax  and S i r  Alexander Cadogan, who were advocates o f  
an Anglo-German unde rs tand ing .37 With no immed ia te  p lans  f o r  a c t i o n , 38 
H i t l e r ,  as w e l l  as h i s  Fo re ign  O f f i c e ,  began to pe r ce iv e  th a t  B r i t a i n  
understood the Fueh re r ' s  d e s i r e  to expand i n t o  c e n t r a l  and eas te rn  
Europe.39 On 4 March 1938, in a conversat ion with the B r i t i s h  Ambassador, 
H it* »r a cqu i red  the p e r cep t io n  t h a t  S i r  N e v i l e  Henderson supported the 
German annexation o f  Aust r ia .40
On 8 March 1938, Ribbentrop t ra ve l le d  to London to f i n i s h  h is  business 
the re  as ambassador. The f o l l o w in g  day, on 9 March, the A u s t r i a n  
Chancel lor announced a p le b i s c i t e  to be held on the th i r teen th  in order to 
gain support fo r  continued Austr ian independence. This compelled H i t l e r  to 
take action. He immediately sent Keppler to Vienna to delay or prevent the 
p le b i s c i t e . 41 For the next tw en ty - fou r  hours the Fuehrer  was i n d e c i s i v e  
about what act ion to take.42 Goering urged H i t l e r  to mob i l ize  the German 
Army and invade Aus t r ia .43 The Fuehrer weighed the d ip lomat ic  and m i l i t a r y  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  and made the sudden dec is ion,  about midnight on the ninth, in 
fa vo r  o f  m i l i t a r y  a c t i o n ,  w i th  the f i r m  b e l i e f  t h a t  n e i t h e r  B r i t a i n  or 
France would m i l i t a r i l y  intervene.44
The f o l l o w in g  day, on 10 March, H i t l e r  gave Goer ing a u t h o r i t y  to 
conduct German operations during the Austr ian c r i s i s . 48 Goering, who held 
a high opinion of the former Foreign M in i s t e r , 48 re ca l led  Neurath, who had 
happened to s tay  in  B e r l i n ,  to the C h a n c e l l e r y . 47 A c t in g  independent o f  
the Fo re ign  O f f i c e ,  Neurath, adv ised  the German l e a d e r s h ip  to oppose the
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p l e b i s c i t e  wh ich m ight  r e s u l t  in  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  guarantee o f  A u s t r i a n
independence. He favored m ob i l i za t ion  to threaten Austr ia ,  but opposed an
actual invas ion.4  ̂ H i t l e r  and Goering, nonetheless,  informed Neurath that
they had already decided on the m i l i t a r y  opt ion.49 Meanwhile, the German
leadersh ip  had drafted orders fo r  Austr ian Nazis to take to the s t ree ts  and
demonstrate against  the Schuschnigg government, as well as an ult imatum to
Schuschnigg to c a l l  o f f  the p l e b i s c i t e  and r e s ig n  in  favo r  o f  Seyss -
I n q u a r t . 50 At the same t im e ,  they requested  the op in io n s  o f  the German
Ambassadors in London and Par is  as to the expected react ion from B r i t a i n
and F ran ce .51 Goer ing ,  who d id  not want the new Fore ign  M i n i s t e r  to
i n t e r f e r e  w i th  the A u s t r i a n  Ques t ion ,  demanded th a t  R ibbentrop  s tay  in
London du r ing  the c r i s i s  to handle the r e a c t i o n  o f  the Chamber la in
government.52 Ribbentrop, a f te r  meeting with the Prime M in is te r ,  reported
back to H i t l e r  that B r i t a i n  s t rong ly  desired to avoid war. He stated:
What now w i l l  England do i f  the A u s t r i a n  que s t io n  cannot be s e t t l e d  
p e a c e f u l l y ?  B a s i c a l l y ,  I am conv inced  t h a t  England . . . w i l l  do 
no th ing  in  regard  to i t  a t  p re sen t ,  but  th a t  she would e x e r t  a 
moderating in f luence upon the other powers. I be l ieve that the French 
would not qo to war now over  a German s o l u t i o n  o f  the A u s t r i a nj  r ̂
quest ion, and ne i ther  would the a l l i e s  o f  France . . . .
Cu r t  B raeuer ,  the Counse lo r  a t  the German Embassy in  P a r i s ,  in fo rmed  h i s  
government that,  in h is  opin ion, France would not intervene in  Aus t r ia .54 
Thus, the in te rna t iona l  s i t u a t io n  looked favorab le  fo r  H i t l e r ' s  invasion of 
Aust r ia .
R e ce iv in g  the u l t im a tum  from H i t l e r ,  Schuschn igg  bowed to German 
pressure and c a l l e d  o f f  the p le b i s c i t e  before res ign ing  on 11 March 1938.
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H i t l e r  had completely bypassed the Foreign O f f i c e  during the en t i re  a f f a i r .  
Ribbentrop had been kept in London unaware o f  H i t l e r ' s  in ten t ion s ,55 while 
Weizsaecker, who was asked by the new Foreign M in i s t e r  to become h is  State 
Secretary on 5 March,56 was not informed of the impending m i l i t a r y  act ion 
un t i l  the e leventh.5'7 During the afternoon of 11 March, while  Ribbentrop 
was meeting with Chamberlain and H a l i fa x  at Downing Street ,  telegrams from 
the B r i t i s h  Embassy in  Vienna a r r i v e d  in fo rm in g  the B r i t i s h  Cab ine t  o f  
H i t l e r ' s  ult imatum. News o f  H i t l e r ' s  act ions came as a complete surpr ise  
to the German Foreign M in i s t e r . 53 Ribbentrop had received no in s t ru c t ion s  
and was therefore in the embarrassing pos i t ion  of not being able to give a 
prepared statement.59
Despite Schuschnigg's adherence to h is  demands, H i t l e r  gave the f in a l  
o rde r  to invade A u s t r i a  on the even ing  o f  11 March.6® W ithou t  p r i o r  
coord inat ion with Musso l in i ,  the Fuehrer presented the Fa s c is t  leader with 
a f a i t  accompli concerning the status of Aust r ia ,  which, according to Paul 
Otto Schm id t ,  was accepted in  "good g race " .6 * As German fo r c e s  e a s i l y  
moved i n t o  A u s t r i a  on the t w e l f t h ,  both Goer ing and Neurath handled 
d ip l o m a t i c  m at te rs  w i th  the f o r e ig n  d ip lom a t s  in  B e r l i n ,  r e a s s u r in g  the 
B r i t i s h  and French governments t h a t  H i t l e r  had no i n t e n t i o n s  towards 
C z e c h o s lo v a k ia . 62 I t  was not u n t i l  the next  day t h a t  Goer ing  c a l l e d  
Ribbentrop in London and informed him of  the week's events.63 The Foreign 
M in i s t e r ,  with a wounded ego, since he rea l i z ed  that  H i t l e r  had not counted 
on him during the c r i s i s ,  at once l e f t  London fo r  Aus t r ia .64 He a r r ived  in
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Vienna, a f te r  H i t l e r  and Goering had already departed,65 to sign the formal
law making Aus t r ia  a province of Germany.66 Meanwhile, the only act ions
taken by B r i t a i n  and France were Henderson and Francois-Poncet submitt ing
t h e i r  respect ive  governments' formal protests  to the takeover o f  Aus t r ia .6^
A f te r  the Austr ian c r i s i s ,  Ribbentrop returned to Ber l in  to take the
re ig n s  o f  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e .  Desp i te  h i s  d i s l i k e  o f  p r o f e s s io n a l
diplomats,  the new Foreign M in i s te r  avoided a mass reorganizat ion of the
Wilhelmstrasse and t r i e d  to gain the ass is tance o f  the foreign serv ice  in
the conduct  o f  H i t l e r ' s  d ip lomacy  by r e t a i n i n g  most o f  the d ip l o m a t i c
s t a f f . 6® R ibben t rop  r e a l i z e d  tha t  he needed to m a in ta in  and t r u s t  the
p r o f e s s io n a l  d i p l o m a t i c  corps  to f i l l  in  f o r  h i s  own la ck  o f  d i p l o m a t i c
t ra in ing  and experience.6® In the small r e shu f f le  o f  personnel, Ribbentrop
appointed E r i c  Kordt, who had acted as a Foreign O f f ice  l i a i s o n  between the
Bureau Ribbentrop and the Wilhelmstrasse (1933-36) and Ribbentrop's F i r s t
S e c re ta ry  a t  the German Embassy in  London (1936-38), as the Head o f  the
Foreign O f f ice  Secretariat.^® At Kord t 's  sugge s t ion ,  R ibbentrop  s e le c t e d
E rn s t  von W e izsaecke r ,  the fo rmer D i r e c t o r  o f  the P o l i t i c a l  Department
(1936-38), to become h is  Fo re ign  S e c r e t a r y .^  The Fore ign  M i n i s t e r
replaced Weizsaecker with Ernst Woermann, Ribbentrop's former Counsel lor a t
7?the London Embassy (1936-38), as D i r e c t o r  o f  the P o l i t i c a l  Depa r tm en t . "1 
Moreover,  R ibben t rop  appo in ted  the Nazi W i lh e lm  Kepp le r  as a S ta te  
Secretary fo r  Special Duties while  mainta in ing the Nazi Ernst Wilhelm Bohle 
as State Secretary fo r  the Aus landorganisat ion.73 The new Foreign M in i s t e r
169
brought  on ly  a s e l e c t  few members o f  the Bureau R ibbent rop  ac ro ss  the 
s t r e e t  to work a t  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e :  the Bureau was not d isbanded u n t i l  
1940.7  ̂ To rep la c e  h im s e l f  in  London, R ibben t rop  appo in ted  Herbe r t  von 
Dirksen as German Ambassador to B r i t a i n . 76
T ru s t in g  them to conduct  the a f f a i r s  o f  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  in  
accordance to H i t l e r ' s  po l i c y ,  Ribbentrop was slow to d iscover that Kordt, 
Weizsaecker, and Woermann worked against  the Nazi program. These men t r ie d  
to keep Ribbentrop out of the management o f  the Foreign O f f i c e .76 In fac t ,  
according to Kordt, Ribbentrop "had l i t t l e  help or u nw i l l in g  help from the 
normal departments of the Foreign O f f ice"  in  managing the m in is t r y .77 As 
fo r  admin is ter ing the Wi lhe lmstrasse, Weizsaecker stated at h is  t r i a l  that 
"a t  f i r s t  R ibbent rop  was in  B e r l i n  a g rea t  deal and came to the O f f i c e  
f a i r l y  often. But h is  o f f i c e  hours were i r regu la r .  Like H i t l e r ,  he got up
70
l a t e  in the morning and did not adapt h imse l f  read i l y  to o f f i c e  routine." 
John W e i t z ,  the au thor  o f  the f i r s t  f u l l - l e n g t h  b iog raphy  on R ibben t rop ,  
noted, however, that the Foreign M in i s te r  spent most of h is  t ime attending 
H i t l e r ' s  cab inet meetings, thus miss ing the d a i l y  d ip lomat ic  meetings at 
the W i lh e lm s t r a s s e ,  in  o rde r  to guard h i s  p o s i t i o n  w i t h i n  the Fueh re r ' s  
ret inue as well as the Foreign O f f ic e 's  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  the conduct of 
fore ign po l i c y  versus the in te r fe rence  o f  Goering, Goebbels, Rosenberg, and 
Hess.7  ̂ S lowly r e a l i z i n g  the lack of ass is tance from Weizsaecker and the 
Wi lhe lmstrasse, Ribbentrop opted to r e ly  upon h is  Bureau to a s s i s t  him with 
f o r e ig n  a f f a i r s . 6® Because o f  the d i f f i c u l t y  w i th  the F o re ign  O f f i c e ,
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Ribbentrop engaged in heated arguments with h is  subordinates and began to
t r e a t  the profess ional  dip lomats with to ta l  d i s t r u s t . 81 Commenting on the
Foreign M in i s te r ,  Keppler to ld  the Nuremberg court:
R ibben t rop 's  c h a r a c t e r  changed c o m p le t e ly  when he became Fo re ign  
M in i s t e r .  W i th in  a very s h o r t  t ime  he got  bossy; he showed a g rea t  
need to demonstra te  h i s  p r e s t i g e .  He got i n t o  competency q u a r r e l s  
with almost a l l  h is  col leagues, and i t s  was c h a ra c te r i s t i c  o f  him that  
he treated h is  assoc iates in a pre t ty  in cons is ten t  manner.8^
Andre Francoi s-Por.cet, the French Ambassador to B e r l i n ,  added:
In the Wilhelmstrasse adm in is t ra t ion ,  which he [Ribbentrop] claimed to 
domineer as a s u ba l t e rn  dominates h i s  p la too n ,  he was c o r d i a l l y  
de tes ted .  He r e t o r t e d  by b u l l y i n g  h i s  subo rd ina te s  and i n f l i c t i n g  
upon h i s  department a l l  s o r t s  o f  p r e t e n t i o u s  and w o r th le s s  f e l l o w  
Nazis. In h is  contacts with ch ie fs  o f  d ip lomat ic  missions he behaved 
in arrogant, b ru ta l ,  and peremptory fashion, fancying that language o f  
t h i s  na ture  was bes t  c a l c u l a t e d  to i n s p i r e  f o r e ig n e r s  w i th  a l o f t y  
idea o f  the new Germany.88
For h is  pos i t ion  as Foreign M in i s te r ,  Ribbentrop t o t a l l y  r e l i e d  upon 
the patronage o f  H i t l e r .  To keep t h i s  standing, Ribbentrop, who more than 
any th ing  wanted high s t a t u s  in  the Th i r d  Re ich ,  understood th a t  i t  was 
necessa ry  to c a t e r  to the Fueh re r ' s  every whim in  o rde r  to m a in ta in  h i s  
m i n i s t e r i a l  p o s i t i o n .  He had no le ve rage  w i th  the o the r  top Naz is  l i k e  
Goer ing.  He was v iewed by h i s  Nazi a s s o c ia t e s  as an i n t e r l o p e r ,  by the
C M
Army as " H i t l e r ' s  puppet", and by p r o f e s s i o n a l  d ip lo m a t s  as a parvenu. 
W i thou t  f r i e n d s  in  the Nazi P a r ty  or a t  the W i lh e lm s t r a s s e ,  R ibben t rop  
would have to re ly  upon the q u a l i t i e s  o f  complete l o y a l t y  and subservience 
to H i t l e r  to not only maintain h is  status as Foreign M in i s te r ,  but to a id  
him in  the b a t t l e  f o r  i n f l u e n c e  w i th  the Fuehrer .  A l though H i t l e r  
c o n t r o l l e d  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y ,  R ibben t rop  sought to be h i s  mas te r 's  main
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f o r e ig n  r e l a t i o n s  a d v is o r .  He would use any t a c t i c  a v a i l a b l e  to ach ieve  
t h i s  goal a g a in s t  h i s  r i v a l s .  The method R ibben t rop  p r a c t i c e d  was to 
c o m p le t e ly  agree w i th  H i t l e r ' s  p o l i c y  id ea s  and support  these des igns  
against  any opposing arguments from the Nazi e l i t e  or the Wi lhelmstrasse. 
Such a t a c t i c  not only demonstrated Ribbentrop's complete lo ya l t y  to h is  
master, but disp layed to ta l  f a i t h  in H i t l e r ' s  fore ign po l i cy  program which 
could only gain H i t l e r ' s  confidence in h is  Foreign M in is te r .  Commenting on 
Ribbentrop's to ta l  compliance towards the Fuehrer's management of fore ign 
a f f a i r s ,  E r n s t  Woermann t o l d  the Amer ican M i l i t a r y  T r ibuna l  t h a t  H i t l e r
o r
formulated fore ign po l i cy  wh i le  R ibben t rop  " f o l l o w e d  in  h i s  wake." In
f a c t ,  Woermann went as f a r  to  s t a t e ,  "R ibben t rop  knew, or a t  l e a s t  he had
an idea o f  H i t l e r ' s  in ten t ions  and p o l i c i e s ,  and very often, though he may
have had a bet ter  po int  o f  view, he y ie lded  h is  own point  of view in favor
o f  H i t l e r ' s  . . . ."®® Dur ing the t r i a l s  o f  h i s  fo rmer c o l l e a gu e s  in  1948,
E r ic  Kordt to ld  the Nuremberg court:
H i t l e r  was in  a b so lu te  c o n t r o l  o f  the whole s t a t e  mach inery .  
Ribbentrop fo l lowed in the most s la v ish  way H i t l e r ' s  in s t ru c t ion s .  He 
[Ribbentrop] submitted the d ra f t s  of telegrams and in s t ru c t ion s  to him 
[ H i t l e r ]  to have them corrected, even t h e i r  wording. Any in s t ru c t ion  
or te leg ram  which he expected to be put aga in  be fo re  the eyes o f  
H i t l e r  he wanted more or le ss  to have h is  b le ss ing  fo r  it.®7
Such dependency upon H i t l e r  prompted Joachim Fest to c a l l  Ribbentrop "the
despised shadow o f  Hitler."®®
W ith in  weeks o f  the annexat ion  o f  A u s t r i a ,  H i t l e r  was ap p ly in g  
p re ssu re  on C ze ch o s lo v a k ia  to r e s o lv e  the Sudeten land  Quest ion.  The 
Sudeten Germans were press ing fo r  e i th e r  autonomy from Czechoslovakia or
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r e un i f i c a t io n  with Germany.89 H i t l e r ' s  annexation o f  Austr ia  resu lted in 
in c rea sed  ten s io n  between the Sudeten Germans and the Czech government. 
Konrad Henlein, the leader o f  the Sudeten German Party, had met with H i t l e r  
and R ibben t rop  in  March 1938, and r e c e iv ed  the prom ise  o f  the Fueh re r ' s  
support  f o r  a l l  Sudeten German p o l i t i c a l  demands a g a in s t  the Czech 
government.9  ̂ On 28 March, H i t l e r  to ld  Henlein that  he was determined "to 
solve the Czechoslovak question in the near future."91
H i t l e r ,  however, began to deve lop p lans  f o r  t a k in g  over a l l  o f  
C ze cho s lo vak ia .  In o rde r  to sa feguard  such an a c t i o n  from B r i t i s h  and 
French i n t e r f e r e n c e ,  the Fuehre r  saw the n e c e s s i t y  o f  c l o s e r  m i l i t a r y  
r e l a t i o n s  w i th  I t a l y .  Thus, on 19 A p r i l  1938, H i t l e r  had R ibbent rop  
propose to Galeazzo Ciano, the I t a l i a n  Foreign M in i s te r ,  the c reat ion of a 
dual al 1 i a nee a g a in s t  B r i  t a i  n.92 A1 though the I t a l i a n s  d id  not jump on 
the suggestion, H i t l e r  informed h is  key m i l i t a r y  leaders to begin planning 
Operation Green, the invasion o f  Czechoslovakia, on 21 A p r i l . 93
Meanwhi le ,  the t e n s io n  between the Sudeten Germans and Czech 
government was q u i c k l y  amount ing to a c r i s i s  s i t u a t i o n .  Mutual a c t s  o f  
v io l e n c e  between Czechs and German Sudetens f a i l e d  to overshadow the 
obvious threat  o f  German m i l i t a r y  act ion aga inst  Czechoslovakia. As the 
c r i s i s  con t inued  i n t o  May, H i t l e r  sen t  R ibben t rop  to Rome to a c q u i r e  the 
much d e s i r e d  m i l i t a r y  a l l i a n c e . 94 The German F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r ,  
n one the le s s ,  con t inued  to encoun te r  C iano 's  o p p o s i t i o n  to such an 
arrangement.95 Within days i t  became known that  Prime M in i s t e r  Chamberlain
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had declared that B r i t a in  would not m i l i t a r i l y  support Czechoslovakia in a 
c r i s i s  s i t u a t i o n . F e a r i n g  a p o s s i b l e  German m i l i t a r y  a c t i o n ,  Eduard 
Benes, the Czech P r e s id e n t ,  i n i t i a t e d  a p a r t i a l  m o b i l i z a t i o n  o f  Czech 
f o r c e s  on 20 May.97 Whi le  s e c r e t l y  t a k in g  t h i s  a c t i o n ,  the Czech 
government spread rumors o f  German troop movements near the Czech-German
no
border.^0 These rumors g reat ly  upset H i t l e r  since they were untrue. The 
World Press spread the fa lse  story as well  as B r i t a in ' s  demand for  H i t l e r  
to stop such t roop  movements on 21 and 22 May. S ince  no t roop  movements 
were discovered by B r i t i s h  and French m i l i t a r y  attaches sent to d iscover 
the t ru th ,  the World Press reported that  H i t l e r  had ordered the terminat ion 
of troop movements due to Chamberlain's warning.99 I t  was then, humi l ia ted 
by untrue s to r ie s  spread by the World Press, that H i t l e r  made the dec is ion 
to s e t t l e  the Czech Quest ion  w i th  the use o f  f o r c e d 00 Acco rd ing  to  the 
Foreign O f f i c e  in te rp re te r ,  Paul Otto Schmidt, who served as H i t l e r ' s  c h ie f  
in te rp re te r :
On account of the al leged German troop concentrat ions the Czechs had 
c a r r i e d  out p a r t i a l  m o b i l i s a t i o n  on May 20th, and when Germany d id  
nothing the World Press announced j u b i l a n t l y  that the German d ic t a to r  
had y ie lded .  One had only to stand up to him, as the Czechs had done, 
they s a id ,  to make him see reason. Anyone d e l i b e r a t e l y  p lann ing  to 
madden H i t l e r  cou ld  have thought  o f  no b e t t e r  method. Openly to 
accuse a d i c t a t o r  o f  weakness i s  the t h in g  l e a s t  l i k e l y  to make him 
see r e a s o n - - a l l  the more so when, as in  t h i s  case ,  the whole m a t te r  
was pure invent ion.101
In Weizsaecker's analyzat ion o f  the s i t u a t io n :
The W o r ld  P r e s s  had c o m m i t t e d  an unpa rdonab le  p s y c h o lo g i c a l  
e r r o r  . . .  by sp read ing  the s t o r y  t h a t  H i t l e r  had y i e l d e d  to f o r e ig n  
pressure in the Czech question. Such an a l lega t ion  H i t l e r  could not 
e n d u r e - - p a r t i c u l a r l y  as i t  was untrue .  H i t l e r  had embarked on no
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m i l i t a r y  ente rp r ise ,  and could not therefore withdraw from one. But 
t h i s  un fo r tun a te  p ro vo ca t io n  by the F o re ig n  Press  now r e a l l y  se t  
H i t l e r  going. From then on he was emphat ica l ly  in favour o f  s e t t l i n g  
the Czech ques t ion  by fo r c e  o f  arms . . . . 10^
Set on d e s t r o y in g  C ze ch o s lo v a k ia ,  the German le ade r  im m ed ia te ly  
sounded out the I t a l i a n  pos i t ion .  He acquired Musso l in i ' s  word that I t a l y  
was not i n t e r e s t e d  in  the f a t e  o f  C ze cho s lo v ak ia  on 25 May.108 The 
fo l low ing  day H i t l e r  informed Goering of h is  dec is ion  to launch an invasion 
in  the f a l l . * 04 Two days l a t e r ,  on 28 May, the Fuehre r  dec la red  to h i s  
cab inet members, inc lud ing  Ribbentrop, at a Chancel lery  meeting that i t  was 
h i s  "unshakab le  w i l l  t h a t  C ze cho s lo vak ia  s h a l l  be wiped o f f  the map."105 
H i t l e r  was conf ident that a war against  Czechoslovakia could be lo ca l i z e d  
without B r i t i s h  and French in te rven t ion .105
Knowing H i t l e r ' s  thoughts about the Czech Question, the German Foreign 
M i n i s t e r  f u l l y  supported h i s  m as te r 's  dream o f  conquest.  R ibbentrop  
pressed fo r  war against Czechoslovakia, assuring the Fuehrer that the West 
would not intervene.10  ̂ In the meantime, in ea r ly  Ju ly  1938, the B r i t i s h  
and French governments declared th e i r  w i l l in gne s s  to defend the sovereignty 
o f  C z e ch o s lo v a k ia .108 H i t l e r  and R ibben t rop  t h e r e fo r e  renewed t h e i r  
e f f o r t s  toward a c q u i r i n g  a m i l i t a r y  a l l i a n c e  w i th  I t a l y . 109 Becoming 
c o n f id e n t  o f  M u s s o l i n i ' s  suppo r t ,  H i t l e r ,  a ided by the con s tan t  verba l  
back ing  o f  R ibben t rop ,  was conv inced  t h a t  he cou ld  r e s o lv e  the Czech 
Question with the use o f  arms without in te rvent ion  by the West because of 
the Ber l  in-Rome A x is .  R ibben t rop  in fo rmed  W e izsaecke r  o f  H i t l e r ' s  
i n t e n t i o n s  on 21 J u l y . 110 Two weeks l a t e r ,  on 3 August,  the Fo re ign
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M in i s t e r  sent a telegram to h is  ambassadors abroad s ta t ing  that the West 
would not in t e r v ene  in  a Czech-German c o n f l i c t ,  and "C zecho s lo vak ia  
presents no m i l i t a r y  problem fo r  the German Army and German Lu f twa f fe , fo r  
Czechoslovakia would be overthrown at  one blow."*^
In m id-August  We izsaecke r  began to r e a l i z e  the se r iou sne s s  o f  the 
s i t u a t i o n .  For the second t im e  R ibben t rop  had in fo rmed him o f  H i t l e r ' s  
in tent ions .  According to the Foreign Secretary , on 19 August, H i t l e r  to ld  
Ribbentrop that he:
was f i rm ly  resolved to s e t t l e  the Czech a f f a i r  by force o f  arms. He 
d e s c r ib ed  the m idd le  o f  October as the l a t e s t  p o s s i b l e  date . . . . 
The other powers would c e r t a in l y  not make any move and, even i f  they 
did, we should accept t h e i r  chal lenge and defeat them . . . .1J-2
When Weizsaecker disagreed with  t h i s  view, s ta t ing  that B r i t a in  and France
would intervene in eastern Europe, Ribbentrop became emotional and demanded
the  F o r e i g n  S e c r e t a r y ' s  c o m p le t e  t r u s t  in  the Fueh re r 's  judgment.
Weizsaecker recounted the d iscuss ion in h is  memoirs:
R ibbent rop  e xp la in ed  to me t h a t  H i t l e r  had never made a m i s ­
take . . . .  I ought to have f a i t h  in  h i s  gen ius ,  j u s t  as he, 
R ibben t rop ,  had as a r e s u l t  o f  many y e a r ' s  e xpe r ience .  I f  I had not 
ye t  won through to t h i s  "b l ind  f a i t h " — he used these actual words— he 
cou ld  on ly  w ish most u r g e n t l y ,  through in  a l l  f r i e n d l i n e s s ,  t h a t  I 
might soon do s o . ^
For the next few weeks the Fo re ign  S e c re ta ry  con temp la ted  h i s  
p red icament .  H i t l e r  and R ibben t rop  were not i n t e r e s t e d  in  any o p in io n s  
that were contrary to t h e i r  own.-^ He was convinced that war would break 
out over  the Czech Quest ion.  Thus, W e izsaecke r ,  as w e l l  as E r i c  Ko rd t ,  
used th e i r  d ip lomat ic  contacts to warn B r i t a i n  and France of the Fuehrer's
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in tent ions .  They employed Theo Kordt, a counse l lo r  at the German Embassy 
in  London and t r u s t e d  b ro the r  o f  E r i c  to in fo rm  W h i t e h a l l , 116 bes ides  
informing the B r i t i s h ,  French, and I t a l i a n  ambassadors in B e r l i n . 116 The 
Foreign Secretary and the Wi lhelmstrasse were f u l l y  convinced that H i t l e r ' s  
i n t e n t i o n s  to  r e s o lv e  the Czech Quest ion  by use o f  fo r c e  would r e s u l t  in  
war s in c e  they f i r m l y  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  B r i t a i n  and France would m i l i t a r i l y  
support the Czechs,11^
In ea r ly  September 1938, Czech Pres ident Benes, fac ing the p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  German m i l i t a r y  a c t i o n ,  conceded to the demand f o r  the p o l i t i c a l  
autonomy of the Sudetenland. Having acquired t h i s  concession, Henlein, the 
Sudeten German leader, backed by H i t l e r ' s  promise, immediately broke o f f  
t a lk s  with the Czech government. Both H i t l e r  and Henlein had hoped fo r  the 
u l t im a t e  goa l:  the German annexa t ion  o f  the Sudeten land. Because o f  the 
deadlock in  the Sudeten land t a l k s  r i o t i n g  broke out in  the reg ion .  The 
ongoing c r i s i s  seemed headed fo r  fu r the r  h o s t i l i t i e s  with a German invasion 
looming in the background.116 As the Sudetenland s i tu a t ion  deter io rated, 
the B r i t i s h  government, informed by the German Foreign O f f ice  o f  H i t l e r ' s  
in ten t ions ,  sought to d ip lo m a t i c a l l y  reso lve the Czech Question. In ea r ly  
September 1938, the B r i t i s h  Prime M in i s te r ,  N e v i l l e  Chamberlain, proposed a 
meeting w ith H i t l e r .  Both Goering, who held great in f luence with H i t l e r  
at the time, and Weizsaecker urged the Fuehrer to accept.119 Therefore, on 
15 September, Chamberlain discussed the Czech Question with H i t l e r ,  without 
the presence o f  R ibben t rop ,  at  Be rch te sgaden .1 6̂ At f i r s t ,  a c co rd ing  to
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Schm id t  who in t e r p r e t e d  the c o n v e r s a t i o n ,  the Fuehre r  came on s t rong  to 
Chamberlain: "I sha l l  not put up with th i s  [the Czech a f f a i r ]  any longer. 
I s h a l l  s e t t l e  t h i s  ques t ion  in  one way or another.  I s h a l l  take m at te rs  
i n t o  my own hands.1,121 Ca lm ing  down a f t e r  a few minutes,  H i t l e r  took 
another approach with Chamberlain. He suggested that a p le b i s c i t e  be held 
in  the Sudetenland to determine the future of the region.122 Acknowledging 
h is  preference fo r  th i s  method of reso lv ing  the Czech Question instead of 
German m i l i t a r y  act ion, Chamberlain to ld  H i t l e r  he would seek the B r i t i s h ,  
French, and Czech governments approval of such a p lan.122 Perce iv ing that 
Chamber la in  had bowed to h i s  "demand," H i t l e r  v iewed the B r i t i s h  Pr ime 
M in i s te r  as weak and w i l l i n g  to abandon the Czechs.124
One week la te r ,  on 22 September, Chamberlain returned to Germany with 
a r e p l y  to H i t l e r ' s  p roposa l .  Meet ing  a t  Godesberg, the B r i t i s h  Pr ime 
M in i s t e r  informed the Fuehrer o f  B r i t i s h  support fo r  a p le b i s c i t e  in the 
Sude ten land .122 H i t l e r ,  n e v e r t h e le s s ,  had changed h is  mind. He now 
demanded German occupation of the Sudetenland by no l a t e r  than 1 October 
1938.128 The next day H i t l e r  again gave Chamberlain an ult imatum.122 The 
l i k e l ih o o d  of war was apparent to a l l  present at the meeting. During a key 
moment at the conference both leaders were informed o f  the Czech i n i t i a t i o n  
of general mob i l i za t ion .  Both leaders rea l i zed  the c r i s i s  had taken a turn 
towards war.128 Having missed an opportunity  to d ip lo m a t i c a l l y  reso lve the 
a f f a i r ,  Chamberlain returned to London reconsider the B r i t i s h  response.
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On 26 September, th ree  days a f t e r  t h e i r  meet ing at  Godesberg,
Chamberlain sent an envoy, S i r  Horace Wilson, to inform the Fuehrer o f  the
B r i t i s h  p o s i t i o n  rega rd ing  the Czech Quest ion .  The B r i t i s h  envoy t o l d
H i t l e r  that the Czech government would not give in  to H i t l e r ' s  demand fo r
the Sudeten land and B r i t a i n ,  as w e l l  as F rance,  would defend the
so ve re ig n ty  o f  C z e ch o s lo v a k ia .120 In response H i t l e r  demanded the
immediate German annexation of the Sudetenland. Schmidt, who served as the
in te rp re te r ,  re la ted  in h is  memoirs that  H i t l e r  t o ld  Wilson:
And i f  they [the  Czech government] choose to re fu se  I s h a l l  smash 
Czechoslovakia! I f  the Czechs have not accepted my demands by 2 p.m. 
on Wednesday September 28th I sha l l  march in to  the Sudeten t e r r i t o r y  
on October 1st with the German army.1-*0
Although h is  declared in ten t ions  were to annex the Sudetenland, H i t l e r  
desired to annex much more of Czechoslovakia to s a t i s f y  h is  appet i te  fo r  
eastwards expansion. Advice from the Wi lhelmstrasse did not support e i t h e r  
p lan.101 His c lose  conf ident,  Goering, and Weurath, who remained in  B e r l in  
as an a d v i s o r ,  both urged H i t l e r  to not to a t t a c k  C ze cho s lo v ak ia ,  but to 
negotiate a set t lement.102 H i t l e r ,  nevertheless , was w i l l i n g  to r i s k  war 
to ach ieve  h i s  g oa ls ,  in  the f i r m  b e l i e f  t h a t  the West would not come to 
the aid o f  Czechos lovakia .100 Only Ribbentrop supported H i t l e r ' s  view of 
the  s i t u a t i o n . 10 '1 W e i z s a e c k e r  warned h i s  s u p e r io r  o f  t h i s  f a l s e  
in te rp re ta t ion  o f  the d ip lomat ic  s i tu a t ion ,  but to no a v a i l . 105 Ribbentrop 
had " b l i n d  f a i t h "  in  H i t l e r ' s  judgement.  A cco rd ing  to W e iz saecke r ,  
Ribbentrop "moved around in  dreams of war and v i c to r y  . . . . Ja
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With t ime  running s h o r t ,  Weizsaecker ,  represent ing the profess ional 
d iplomats of the Wi lhelmstrasse, met with Goering ana Neurath to d iscuss 
the c r i s i s .  The Foreign Secretary en l i s ted  both men in a movement aimed 
towards fo rc ing  H i t l e r  in to  mediation.*3  ̂ In fac t ,  Weizsaecker suggested 
t h a t  the th ree  o f  them d r a f t  a compromise agreement and p rov ide  i t  to 
Mussol in i fo r  him to propose the sett lement to H i t l e r .* 38 Thus, without 
the knowledge o f  R ibben t rop ,  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e ,  Goer ing ,  and Neurath 
drafted the compromise and forwarded i t  to Musso l in i .*3  ̂ Meanwnile Goering 
t r i e d  to destroy Ribbentrop's in f luence  with H i t l e r  by accusing the Foreign 
M i n i s t e r  o f  " i n c i t i n g  war" and c a l l i n g  him a " c r im in a l  f o o l "  in  f r o n t  o f  
the Fuehrer.140
With t ime running out on H i t l e r ' s  ult imatum, the B r i t i s h ,  French, and 
I t a l i a n  governments worked to avo id  a war. On 28 September 1938, the 
French Ambassador, Francois-Poncet,  met with H i t l e r  and Ribbentrop at  the 
C h a n ce l l e r y .  He warned the Fuehre r  th a t  war would r e s u l t  in  any German 
m i l i t a r y  move in to Czechoslovakia. Schmidt, who witnessed the d iscuss ion 
conducted in the German language, recorded the event in  h is  memoirs:
From my corner of the room I c lo s e ly  watched the actors in  th i s  
tense b a t t l e  f o r  peace. I observed H i t l e r ' s  r e a c t i o n s  how, very 
gradually ,  the balance t i l t e d  in  favour of peace. He no longer f la red  
up, and i t  was on ly  w i th  the g r e a t e s t  d i f f i c u l t y  t h a t  he c ou ld  f i n d  
anything to say to the arguments which Francois-Poncet advanced with 
devastating rrench log ic .  He became very pensive. Ribbentrop t r i e d  
to intervene orice or tw ic e— and not on the side of peace. Franco is -  
Poncet, who f u l l y  rea l i sed  the danger of even one fa lse  word in  such a 
s i tu a t ion ,  c a l l e d  him sharply  to order, with suppressed i r r i t a t i o n . 141
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S h o r t l y  a f t e r  t h i s  meet ing ,  the I t a l i a n  Ambassador, Bernardo A t t o l i c o ,  
de l ivered the proposal of an immediate Great Powers meeting in Munich to 
mediate a peace fu l  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  the Czech Q ue s t io n .142 The compromise 
sugges t ion  came as a complete  s u r p r i s e  to R ibben t rop ,  who s t r o n g ly  
advocated the invas ion of Czechoslovakia.148 Fearing the loss of I t a l i a n  
support  f o r  h i s  dreams o f  conquest  in  e a s te rn  Europe H i t l e r  took the 
proposa l  s e r i o u s l y . 144 Faced a t  the same t ime by p re ssu re  from h is  
m i l i t a r y  leaders, inc lud ing  Goering, that Germany was not ready to f i g h t  a 
European war,  H i t l e r  accepted Neurath 's  adv ice  to im m ed ia te ly  meet w i th  
B r i t i s h ,  I t a l i a n ,  and French leaders in  Munich.
H i t l e r  met with Musso l in i ,  Chamberlain, and Dada lier at Munich on 29 
September 1938. In the negot ia t ions,  H i t l e r  agreed to a compromise that  
gave Germany the Sudetenland, but promised no fu r the r  aggression against 
Czechoslovakia.146 H i t l e r  had al lowed h im se l f  to be s ide-tracked from h is  
dream o f  eastwards expans ion i n t o  C ze cho s lo v ak ia  due to adv ice  from 
Goering, Neurath, and the Wi lhelmstrasse. He immediately regretted th i s  
dec is ion .14'7 H i t l e r  perceived the B r i t i s h  and French acquiesce to German 
annexation o f  the Sudetenland as a sure sign o f  weakness, be l iev ing  tha t  i f  
he would have fo l lowed h is  own gut fee l ing ,  and Ribbentrop's advice, that 
a l l  o f  C ze cho s lo v ak ia  would be h i s . 148 Upon r e t u r n in g  to B e r l i n ,  H i t l e r  
was heard say ing ,  " t h a t  f e l l o w  Chamber la in  has s p o i l e d  my en t ry  i n t o  
Prague ."149 R ibben t rop ,  who was unable to i n f l u e n c e  H i t l e r  towards an 
in v a s io n  o f  C ze ch o s lo v a k ia ,  c r i t i c i z e d  the Munich agreement. Re inhard
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S p i t z y ,  R ibben t rop 's  persona l  sec re ta ry ,  overheard H i t l e r  q u ie t ly  t e l l i n g  
h is  Foreign M in is te r :  "Well, you don't have to take i t  so ser ious ly .  This 
paper [the Munich Agreement] i s  r e a l l y  o f  no great importance."15® Even in 
the Fo re ign  O f f i c e ,  a c co rd ing  to Ambassador D i r k sen ,  " i t  was w h i s ­
pered . . . that the sign ing o f  the protocol meant no change in p o l i c y . "151 
In f a c t ,  on 21 October 1938, H i t l e r  gave o rde rs  f o r  the German Army to 
prepare  f o r  a s u r p r i s e  a t t a c k  on C ze cho s lo vak ia  sometime in  the near 
f u tu r e . 15^
The Fuehrer's disappointment at Munich changed h is  view of Ribbentrop 
overnight. Ribbentrop had been the only adv isor who urged H i t l e r  to take 
a c t io n  a g a in s t  C ze chos lo vak ia .  Goer ing ,  Neurath, and the others opposed 
such an adventure. Now, a f t e r  the fac t ,  H i t l e r  viewed h is  Foreign M in i s t e r  
as the on ly  person who had p rov ided  him sound adv ice .  R ibben t rop  would 
replace Goering and Neurath as h is  key d ip lomat ic  adv isor.153
Ribbentrop, r e a l i z in g  h is  newly acquired importance, understood that 
the Wil he! mst rasse  had be t rayed  him du r ing  the Sudeten land c r i s i s .  The 
Foreign M in i s te r  had lo s t  a l l  t r u s t  of  h is  profess ional d ip lomats.154 He 
thus decided to separate h im se l f  from d is lo ya l  profess ional d ip lomats by 
concentrat ing h is  d ip lomat ic  a c t i v i t y  to a small specia l s t a f f  that  would 
bypass Weizsaecker and the t r a d i t i o n a l  funct ions o f  the Foreign O f f ice .  
Bes ides  e s t a b l i s h i n g  h i s  s p e c i a l  s t a f f ,  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  fo rmer Bureau 
R ibben t rop  members and f a i t h f u l  Fo re ign  O f f i c e  d ip lo m a t s ,  R ibben t rop  
t r a n s f e r r e d  l a r g e  numbers  o f  Bureau  R ib b e n t r o p  members to  the
182
Wilhelmstrasse without enforc ing entry requirements.156 At the same time
R ibben t rop  moved h i s  o f f i c e  from the m i n i s t r y  to the newly renovated
P r e s i d e n t i a l  Pa la ce ,  which became the o f f i c i a l  r e s id en ce  o f  the Fo re ign
M in is te r ,  and the rea f te r  ra re ly  v i s i t e d  the Foreign O f f i c e .15^
Ribbentrop was determined not to re ly  upon the profess ional d ip lomat ic
corps  to conduct  H i t l e r ' s  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y .  The Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  would
in s te ad  employ h i s  hand-p icked s p e c ia l  s t a f f  and t r u s t e d  members o f  the
Bureau Ribbentrop for  d ip lomat ic  advice.15® Commenting on the e f f e c t  that
R ibben t rop 's  d e c i s i o n  had on the W i lh e l  m s t ra s se ,  E rn s t  Woermann. the
D irec to r  o f  the P o l i t i c a l  Department, to ld  the Nuremberg court:
[T]he normal d u t ie s  o f  a P o l i t i c a l  D i v i s i o n  were m is s in g  . . .  to use 
the in format ion received fo r  the purpose o f  submitt ing suggestion- an- 
g ive  adv ice  to the Fo re ign  M in i s t e r ;  but ,  . . .  in  the F a l l  . . .  o f  
1938 . . . R ibben t rop  had s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o l d  me t h a t  he d id  not d e s i r e  
to receive any un so l i c i t e d  advice. [Ribbentrop] . . . in s t i t u t e d  h is  
own persona l  work ing  s t a f f  w i th  which he d is cu s sed  a l l  im p o r t a n t  
q ue s t io n s  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  such ques t ions ,  which, before t h i s  t ime, 
had belonged to the sphere of dut ies o f  the p o l i t i c a l  d i v i s io n .1
In November 1938, Ribbentrop, according to Woermann, declared that the Po­
l i t i c a l  Department "was to be re s t r i c t e d  to the handling o f  rout ine mat­
t e r s . " 16® In f a c t ,  the Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  c o n su l t e d  Woermann on o f f i c i a l  
business only f i v e  t imes from the f a l l  of 1938 to 1943, and then on matters 
of minor importance.161 The consequence was that Ribbentrop came to r e ly  
upon the amateur a b i l i t i e s  of current  and former members o f  h is  Bureau fo r  
d i p l o m a t i c  adv ice .  Commenting upon Bureau Ribbentrop methods, Woermann 
s ta ted  t h a t  R ib b en t ro p ' s  c o n f id e n t s  prepared t h e i r  d i p l o m a t i c  a d v i s o r y  
notes in a very unprofess ional manner. They worked on "p r in c ip le s  o f  speed
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and not o f  accuracy"  when p re pa r in g  r e p o r t s . 162 And, from what he ob­
se rved ,  these re p o r t s  "p layed  a p r e t t y  im p o r t an t  p a r t  [ in  d i p l o m a t i c  
a f f a i r s ]  because such notes as a r u l e  con ta ined  whatever the au tho rs  be­
l ieved  Ribbentrop wanted to hear."163 Summing up the s i tu a t ion  w i th in  the 
Wi lhe lmstrasse, U l r i ch  von Hassel l wrote in  h is  d iary  on 20 December 1938:
He [Ribbentrop] i s  no more in c l in ed  to l i s t e n  to d ivergent views than 
h i s  l o r d  and master,  The pace in  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e ,  i t  seems, 
bo rde rs  on the unbearab le;  i t  i s  a f r a n t i c  merry -go-round  in  which 
everybody 's  nerves are g e t t i n g  f rayed. Even the highest  o f f i c i a l s — 
w i th  the p o s s i b l e  e x ceo t io n  o f  W e izsaecke r ,  and he to a l i m i t e d  
ex tent— know nothing about the p o l i t i c a l  ob ject ives  and general l i n e s  
of p o l i c y . 16^
A f t e r  Munich, H i t l e r ' s  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  aimed a t  a c q u i r i n g  a m i l i t a r y  
a l l i a n c e  w i th  I t a l y  t h a t  would a l l o w  Germany the o p p o r t u n i t y  to r e s o lv e  
both the Czech and P o l i s h  Ques t ions .  H i t l e r ,  supported by R ibben t rop ,  
dec ided  to t a c k l e  the Czech s i t u a t i o n  f i r s t . 165 The F u tn re r  t h e r e f o r e  
pursued c l o s e r  r e l a t i o n s  w i th  I t a l y  as Germany prepared to conquer 
C z e c h o s lo v a k ia .166 On 21 October 1938, the German le a de r  d i r e c t e d  h i s  
armed forces to make preparations fo r  the "l iqu idat ion o f  the remainder of 
the Czech state at any time . . . . 1,167
Meanwhi le ,  H i t l e r  sen t  R ibben t rop  to meet w i th  Joseph L i p s k i ,  the 
Po l i sh  Ambassador to Germany, at Berchtesgaden on 24 October. In a wide- 
ranging set of proposals, the German Foreign M in i s t e r  ind ica ted to L ip sk i  
t h a t  H i t l e r  was in t e r e s t e d  in  o b t a in in g  a genera l s e t t l e m e n t  o f  German- 
Po l i sh  d i f fe rences.  A f te r  po int ing out Poland's i s o la t i o n  from the West, 
l a rg e ly  achieved by the Berl in-Rome Ax is ,  Ribbentrop suggested an extension
1 8 4
of the German-Polish Nonaggression Pact of  1934 as well as Poland jo in ing
the Anti-Comintern Pact. A dd i t io na l ly ,  Ribbentrop proposed the return of
the Free C i t y  o f  Danzig to Germany, an e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l  autobahn and
ra i lway  through the Po l ish  Corr idor  connecting Germany with Danzig and East
P r u s s ia ,  as w e l l  as a t r e a t y  c o n f i rm in g  the German-Po l ish  b o rd e r s .16®
A f t e r  these t a l k s ,  in  which L i p s k i  gave no formal response, the German
Foreign M in i s te r  t ra ve l le d  to Rome where he proposed a m i l i t a r y  a l l i a n c e  to
Mussol in i and Ciano on 28 October.169
Several weeks la te r ,  on 19 November, L ip sk i  provided h is  government's
r e p l y  to R ibben t rop  conce rn ing  H i t l e r ' s  p ropo sa ls  in  B e r l i n .  The P o l i s h
government f l a t l y  re fu sed  the German o f f e r s . 170 Upset t h a t  the Po le s
f a i l e d  to accep t  H i t l e r ' s  l i m i t e d  demands, R ibbent rop  i s sued  L i p s k i  a
ve i led  threat.  According to the Po l ish  Ambassador:
R ibbent rop  was d i s c u r s i v e ,  r e v e r t i n g  to the h i s t o r y  o f  the l a s t  
c r i s i s ,  and re p ea t in g  a s ta tement  a l r e a d y  known to me t h a t  in  the 
p o l i t i c a l  c on s te l l a t io n  of that t ime France was a c tua l ly  i so la ted  and 
t h a t  he was conv inced  t h a t  n e i t h e r  France nor England would move to 
the defense of Czechoslovakia. Ribbentrop quoted . . . t h i s  d e ta i l  to 
me in order to s t ress  that the Reich could abso lute ly  count on I ta ly ' s  
m i l i t a r y  a id .  R ibbent rop  emphasized in  h i s  f u r t h e r  d e l i b e r a t i o n s  
Germany's m i l i t a r y  s u p e r i o r i t y  a t  t h a t  t im e ,  remark ing  t h a t  a t  the 
present the s i t u a t io n  has become even more favorable for  the Reich.171
S h o r t l y  t h e r e a f t e r ,  on 24 November, H i t l e r  d i r e c t e d  h i s  m i l i t a r y  to
prepare  f o r  an occupa t ion  o f  Danz ig .17® Meanwhi le ,  the German Army
continued to plan fo r  the invasion o f  Bohemia and Moravia. J
H i t l e r ' s  d ip lomacy  was u n fo ld in g  in  a manner t h a t  would p rov ide
Germany a m i l i t a r y  a l l i a n c e  with I t a l y  wh i le  fo rc ing  the Czech state and
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Poland to come to terms with the Third Reich. At the beginning o f  the new 
year, Hans-Georg von Mackensen, the German Ambassador to I ta ly ,  reported 
M u s s o l i n i ' s  g rea t  i n t e r e s t  in  fo rm ing  a m i l i t a r y  a l l i a n c e . 174 In the 
meantime, H i t l e r  met with Slovak p o l i t i c a n s  who sought independence from
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Prague. J The Fuehrer  and R ibbent rop  a l s o  met w i th  the P o l i s h  Fo re ign
M in i s t e r ,  Joseph Beck, and L i p s k i  a t  Berchtesgaden on 5 January  1939.
H i t l e r  p e r s o n a l l y  r e s u b m i t t e d  h i s  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  a German-Pol i s h
sett lement.178 The fo l low ing  day, in Munich, Ribbentrop in s is ted  that Beck
accept  H i t l e r ' s  p ropo sa ls ,  e s p e c i a l l y  the reunion o f  Danzig with Germany
1 77and the c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  an e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l  road and r a i lw a y  system.
In la te  January, Ribbentrop t ra ve l le d  to Warsaw to seek Po l ish  acceptance 
o f  H i t l e r ' s  p r o p o s a l s ,  bu t  f a i l e d  to  a c q u i r e  the  much d e s i r e d  
se t t lement .178
H i t l e r  increased the pressure on the Czech state. Although m i l i t a r y  
p lans  were drawn up, the Fuehre r  con t inued  to  keep t h i s  f a c t  from 
R ibbent rop  and the W i lh e !m s t r a s s e . 179 Ribbentrop, h is  specia l s t a f f ,  as 
well  as the Foreign O f f ice  were under the assumption that  H i t l e r  was t r y ing  
to force a c r i s i s  s i t u a t io n  in order peace fu l ly  reso lve the Czech Question 
by d ip lomat ic  means, s im i l a r  to Munich.188 H i t l e r  employed Ribbentrop to 
d iscuss a f f a i r s  with F rant isek  Chvalkovsky, the Czech Foreign M in i s te r ,  in 
B e r l i n  on 21 January  1939. F o l l o w in g  H i t l e r ' s  d i r e c t i v e ,  R ibben t rop  
t h r e a t e n e d  the  Czech  t h a t  " u n l e s s  t h e r e  w ou ld  be a change in  
Czechoslovakia, the s i t u a t io n  might become ca ta s t roph ic a l . "181
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Although unaware o f  a c tua l  m i l i t a r y  p lans  f o r  the in v a s io n  o f  the 
Czech s t a t e ,  We izsaecker  and the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  re ce ived  i n d i c a t i o n s  
through t h e i r  many contacts that H i t l e r  was planning a c r i s i s  s i tua t ion .  
On 13 F e b r u a r y ,  the  F o r e i g n  S e c r e t a r y  j o t t e d  down on pape r  t h a t  
"C ze cho s lo vak ia  w i l l  r e c e i v e  i t s  death blow in  a pp rox im a te ly  fou r  
weeks."182 In fact ,  H i t l e r ,  who continued to d i s t r u s t  diplomats, did not 
inform even Ribbentrop o f  the impending invasion un t i l  11 March.183 About
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the same time, Weizsaecker discovered the t ru th  from Slovakian sources. ° 
H i t l e r ' s  in ten t ions ,  however, became obvious. Robert Coulondre, the French 
Ambassador to Be r l in ,  reported to Pa r is  that  German troops were on the move 
toward Czechoslovakia.185
As German fo r ce s  made f i n a l  p r e p a r a t io n s  to pounce on Bohemia and
Morav ia ,  H i t l e r  c a l l e d  Joseph T i s o ,  the S lovak  n a t i o n a l i s t  l e a d e r ,  and a
d e le g a t io n  o f  p ro -Naz i  S lovak s  to B e r l i n  on 13 March. H i t l e r  and
Ribbentrop d irected  Tiso to proc la im S lovakia as an independent state ,  or
Germany would be fo rced  to invade S lo v a k ia  as w e l l  as the r e s t  o f
C z e ch o s lo v a k ia .185 R ibben t rop  added t h a t  Germany would annex a p a r t  o f
S lo v a k ia  w i th  the r e s t  be ing  d i v i d e d  among Hungary and P o l a n d . T h e
German Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  even p r o v i d e d  T i s o  a d r a f t  o f  S l o v a k i a ' s
dec la ra t ion  of independence.188 The very next day, on 14 March, Tiso had
the S lovak  D ie t  d e c la re  S lovak  independence from c o n t r o l  o f  the Prague
government.188 At the same time Ribbentrop informed the I t a l i a n  government
. 190of' H i t l e r ' s  dec is ion to occupy Bohemia and Moravia.
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Fea r in g  the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  h i s  s t a t e ,  Czech P r e s id e n t  Hacha
requested through the German Embassy in  Prague a meeting with H i t l e r . 191
Hacha and Chvalkovsky, the Czech Foreign M in i s te r ,  a r r ived  in Be r l in  la te
in  the even ing  o f  14 March. A f t e r  m idn igh t  they met w i th  H i t l e r ,
Ribbentrop, Goering, Weizsaecker, and others .19  ̂ During the meeting H i t l e r
browbeat Hacha to accept an ult imatum requ i r ing  h is  acceptance of peaceful
German o c cupa t ion  o f  Bohemia and Morav ia  o th e rw is e  the German A i r  Force
would bomb Prague.19  ̂ Schmidt, the in te rp re te r ,  described the s i tu a t ion  in
h is  memoirs: "Here was no in t imate  d iscuss ion between man and man. There
were a number o f  people present, but Hacha, Chvalkovsky, and the res t ,  even
Goering and Ribbentrop, were the audience, H i t l e r  the speaker."19  ̂ A f te r  a
few d ram a t ic  moments, i n c l u d in g  Hacha pass ing  ou t ,  the Czech P r e s id e n t
agreed to H i t l e r ' s  terms and p laced  the f a t e  o f  C zechos lo vak ia  in  the
Fueh re r ' s  hands.195 W i th in  days the fo rmer C ze cho s lo vak ia  became the
P r o t e c t o r a t e  o f  Bohemia and Morav ia  as w e l l  as the s t a t e  o f  S lo v a k ia ,  a
1 Qfis a t e l l i t e  o f  Germany.
With such a sudden change in the balance o f  power in centra l Europe, 
the world viewed H i t l e r  as a very dangerous menace. Fear struck the hearts 
o f  many c o u n t r i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  e a s t e r n  Europe. The L i th u a n ia n  
government,  r e a l i z i n g  th a t  H i t l e r  m ight  have des igns  on Memeland, a 
t e r r i t o r y  l a rg e ly  populated by Germans annexed by L i thuan ia  in 1923, sought 
support from B r i t a i n  and France.197 "The occupation o f  Prague," according 
to A.J.P. T a y lo r ,  " f lu ng  the people o f  Memel i n t o  ungovernab le  e x c i t e -
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ment . . . ."198 y^g west,  however, d e c l in e d  to come to the a id  o f
L i t h u a n i a . 100 Thus, on 20 March 1939, the L i t h u a n ia n  Fo re ign  M in i s t e r ,
Juosaz Urbsys, t ra ve l le d  to B e r l in  to meet with Ribbentrop regarding the
Memeland Question. Ribbentrop, under the guidance of H i t l e r ,  browbeat his
L i thuanian counterpart by t e l l i n g  him that:
There were only two ways of so lv ing  the Memel problem. The one i s  the 
f r i e n d ly  cession of th i s  t e r r i t o r y  to Germany. Otherwise revo l t s  and 
shootings would occur and H i t l e r  would then ac t  with l igh ten ing  speed. 
Future developments would be governed by the m i l i t a r y  and not by the 
p o l i t i c i a n s .  00
Having re c e iv e d  such a t h r e a t ,  the L i th u an ia n  government agreed to cede 
Memeland to Germany on 22 March. German troops occupied the t e r r i t o r y  two 
weeks l a t e r . 201
In s p i t e  o f  not t a k in g  any a c t i o n  to support  L i t h u a n ia ,  the B r i t i s h
government objected to German aggression in eastern Europe. The invasion
of Czechoslovakia, in the eyes of B r i t i s h  statesmen, upset the balance of
power in  Europe in  a way t h a t  was unacceptab le  to European s e c u r i t y .
The B r i t i s h  had understood the German d e s i r e  to r e u n i t e  l o s t  German
t e r r i t o r i e s  to the Third Reich, but the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia
went beyond the concept o f  se l f -de te rm ina t ion .202 As the German Ambassador
to London, Herbert von Dirksen, wrote in h is  memoirs:
The average Englishman had understood the l i n k in g  of the Sudetenland 
as a union o f  Germans w i th  Germans. The i n c o r p o r a t i o n ,  however,  o f  
seven m i l l i o n s  of [a] fo re ign  race was considered i r r e c o n c i l a b l e  with 
the declared p r in c ip le s  o f  National Soc ia l ism  i t s e l f .  I t  was regarded 
as unadulterated im pe r ia l i sm .202
189
A f te r  the annexation of the Czech state ,  the Chamberlain government found 
i t  extremely d i f f i c u l t  to t r u s t  H i t l e r ' s  stated in ten t ions  concerning the 
res t  of eastern Europe.20  ̂ a s B r i t i s h  Ambassador, Henderson, expla ined 
to  U l r i c h  von H a s s e l l ,  " H i t l e r  had b roken  e v e r y  p ro m is e  made by 
Berchtesgaden, Godesberg, and Munich. A l l  f a i t h  in him i s  destroyed. He 
[Henderson] be l ieves that the se izure  of Czechoslovakia was a great mistake 
from the German point o f  view."208 j n response to H i t l e r ' s  aggression the 
B r i t i s h  and French governments considered defensive a l l i a n ce s  with Poland, 
Romania, Greece, and the Sov ie t  Union to e n c i r c le  Germany and maintain the 
e x i s t in g  balance of power in  Europe.208 Leaving London, Dirksen t r a v e l le d  
to B e r l i n  to warn H i t l e r  and R ibben t rop  o f  the change in  B r i t i s h  p o l i c y  
towards Germany. He warned the Foreign M in i s te r  o f  B r i t i s h  in ten t ions  to 
defend eas te rn  Europe a t  the c o s t  o f  war, but h i s  s u p e r io r  was not 
i n t e r e s t e d  in  such v iews.  A cco rd ing  to D i r k sen ,  "I came to the obv ious  
c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  he [R ib ben t rop ]  was im i t a t i n g  H i t l e r ' s  methods in  not 
wan t ing  to l i s t e n  to any th ing  not in  accordance w i th  h i s  v iews o f  wo r ld  
a f f a i r s . " 207
L i v i n g  on the emot iona l  h igh o f  s u c c e s s fu l  annexa t ions  o f  Bohemia, 
Moravia, and Memeland, H i t l e r  and Ribbentrop set upon the path to reso lve 
the Po l ish  Question by means o f  in t im id a t ion  and diplomacy.208 On 21 March 
1939, the Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  met w i th  the P o l i s h  Ambassador in  B e r l i n .  
Ribbentrop in s i s te d  that Poland accept H i t l e r ' s  proposals .20  ̂ Fearing the 
German threat,  on 21 March, the Poles began p a r t ia l  m ob i l i z a t ion  of t h e i r
1 9 0
armed f o r c e s  to defend t h e i r  homeland a g a in s t  German a g g re s s io n .2*̂  
Several days l a te r ,  on 26 March, L ipsk i  warned Ribbentrop that any German 
move toward Danzig  would r e s u l t  in  a Ge rm an -Po l ish  war.2** The Po le s ,  
nevertheless , would guarantee the Free C i ty  o f  Danzig as well  as o f f e r  fa r -  
reaching t r a f f i c  concessions between Germany and East Pruss ia wh i le  s t i l l  
mainta in ing Po l ish  sovereignty in the Co r r ido r .2*2 Ribbentrop, r e v e l l i n g  
in  re cen t  d i p l o m a t i c  successes ,  made known t h a t  t h i s  r e p l y  was t o t a l l y  
unaccep tab le ,  and i n d i r e c t l y  th rea tened  L i p s k i  by compar ing the P o l i s h  
a t t i tude  to that of the Czechs during the previous year.2*̂  The fo l low ing  
day, on 26 March, Ribbentrop stressed to L ipsk i  tha t  " re la t ion s  between the 
two c o u n t r i e s  were . . . d e t e r i o r a t i n g  s h a r p l y . " 2*4 By the tw e n t y -n in th ,  
the Foreign M in i s t e r  bel ieved that the c l imax of the German-Polish c r i s i s  
had been reach, and the Po les  would soon be fo r ced  to accep t  H i t l e r ' s  
demands.2*̂  However, on 31 March, the B r i t i s h  government announced i t s  
guarantee to defend the so ve re ig n ty  o f  P o l i s h  t e r r i t o r y  in  the event  o f  
unprovoked aggression by Germany.2*® This re leva t ion  suddenly changed the 
d ip l o m a t i c  s i t u a t i o n .  W i th in  days the B r i t i s h  and P o l i s h  governments 
concluded a defensive arrangement, which was qu ick ly  fo l lowed by B r i t i s h  
guarantees to Romania and Greece.2*7
H i t l e r  took offense to th i s  d ip lomat ic  a c t i v i t y .  He looked fo r  ways 
to i s o la te  Poland so as to pressure Warsaw to concede to h is  demands. In 
the meantime, on 3 A p r i l ,  the Fuehrer d irected  the German Army to draw up 
p lans  f o r  a s u r p r i s e  in v a s io n  o f  the P o l i s h  C o r r i d o r  and Danzig no l a t e r
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than 1 September 1939.2*® H i t l e r  meant to retake lo s t  German t e r r i t o r y  one 
way o r  another .  On 4 A p r i l ,  H i t l e r ,  upset  a t  R ibbent rop  about B r i t a i n ' s  
unexpected react ion to the invasion o f  Prague, ordered Ribbentrop to avoid 
t a l k s  w i th  the P o l i s h  government.2*  ̂ The f o l l o w in g  day, however, the 
Foreign M in i s te r ,  in an attempt to avoid a European war, had Weizsaecker 
in fo rm  the P o l i s h  government t h a t  H i t l e r  would not repea t  h i s  demands, 
s t re ss ing  that "the Po l ish  Government had apparently not f u l l y  understood 
the s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  the o f f e r . " 22  ̂ Upset a t  the Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r ' s  d i s ­
obedience, on 6 A p r i l ,  H i t l e r  ordered Ribbentrop to mind h is  own business 
demanding "the Po l ish  question was to be reserved e n t i r e l y  to h imse l f . "22* 
In fac t ,  Weizsaecker stated at h is  Nuremberg t r i a l  that  the Ribbentrop and 
the Wilhelmstrasse had l i t t l e  to do with Poland between Ap r i l  and August 
1939 because H i t l e r  monopolized German-Polish r e la t i o n s .222
H i t l e r  served not ice on B r i t a i n  and Poland regarding t h e i r  pact. On 
27 and 28 Ap r i l  1938, H i t l e r  denounced the German-Polish Nonaggression Pact 
o f  1934 and Anglo-German Naval Agreement o f  1935.223 He pe r ce ived  
Cham ber la in 's  agreements w i th  ea s te rn  European c o u n t r i e s  as a B r i t i s h  
a t tem p t  to e n c i r c l e  Germany.224 He t h e r e fo r e  wanted to loosen  the 
d ip lomat ic  bonds that hindered German defense e f fo r t s .  To counter B r i t i s h  
d ip l o m a t i c  e f f o r t s ,  H i t l e r  looked to M u s s o l i n i  f o r  the c o n c lu s i o n  o f  a 
m i l i t a r y  a l l ia n ce .  He sent Ribbentrop to M ilan to arrange the conclus ion 
o f  a German-Ita l ian a l l i a n c e  in ea r ly  May.225 Musso l in i  was anxious fo r
such an a l l i a n c e  h im s e l f  because o f  the I t a l i a n  in v a s io n  o f  A lb an ia  on 7
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A p r i l . 2d6 Two weeks l a te r ,  on 22 May 1939, Ribbentrop and Ciano signed the 
Pact  o f  S t e e l ,  a m i l i t a r y  a l l i a n c e  t r e a t y  drawn up by the Bureau 
R ibben t rop ,  in  B e r l i n . 227 H i t l e r  b e l i e v e d  t h i s  pac t  to be the answer to 
Ang lo -F rench  p o l i c y  in  eas te rn  Europe.22® The f o l l o w in g  day, on 23 May, 
H i t l e r  h e l d  a m i l i t a r y  c o n f e r e n c e ,  w i t h o u t  any F o r e i g n  O f f i c e  
representat ion, to d iscuss the Po l i sh  Question. The Fuehrer to ld  h is  top 
m i l i t a r y  s t a f f ,  i n c l u d in g  Goer ing ,  th a t  "the Po le  i s  not a f r e sh  enemy. 
Poland w i l l  always be on the side o f  our adversar ies.  In sp i te  of t r e a t ie s  
of f r iendsh ip  Poland has always been bent on e xp lo i t in g  every opportunity  
a g a in s t  us ."229 The Fuehre r  anno- ncod h i s  d e c i s i o n  "to a t t a c k  Po land a t  
the f i r s t  su i tab le  opportunity ."2®0 Moreover, H i t l e r  to ld  the top m i l i t a r y  
le a d e r s ,  "we cannot expec t  a r e p e t i t i o n  o f  Czech ia .  There w i l l  be war. 
Our task  i s  to i s o l a t e  Po land. Success in  i s o l a t i n g  her w i l l  be 
d e c i s i v e . " 2®®
Having secured an a l l i a n c e  w i th  I t a l y ,  H i t l e r  became i n t e r e s t e d  in  
o b t a in in g  an agreement w i th  the S o v ie t  Union conce rn ing  the s t a t u s  o f  
eastern Europe. Despite h is  an t i -Sov ie t  sentiments, the Fuehrer understood 
t h a t  such an unde rs tand ing  would t o t a l l y  i s o l a t e  Po land from the West, 
making i t  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  B r i t a i n  and France would m i l i t a r i l y  suppor t  the 
Poles during a German-Polish c o n f l i c t . 232 H i t l e r  saw the B r i t i s h  guarantee 
to Poland as a b lu f f ,  but the added bene f i t  o f  a German-Soviet pact would 
guarantee a lo c a l i z e d  c o n f l i c t  instead o f  a European war.22® The idea o f  a 
German-Sov ie t  agreement came from R ibben t rop ,  who was s t i l l  in  H i t l e r ' s
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d i s f a v o r  over  the B r i t i s h  r e a c t i o n  to Prague and seek ing  a way to endear 
h im se l f  to the Fuehrer, in A p r i l . 234 The Foreign M in i s te r  viewed a German- 
Sov iet  understanding as a guaranteed way to d ip lom a t i c a l l y  force the Poles 
i n t o  ag ree ing  to H i t l e r ' s  demands.235 He jumped at  the o p p o r t u n i t y  as a 
way to r e t a i n  h i s  p o s i t i o n  as the Fueh re r ' s  top d ip l o m a t .235 Those 
d ip lo m a t s  in  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e ,  such as We izsaecke r  and D i r k sen ,  who 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y  had argued for c lo se r  German-Soviet re la t ion s ,  supported such 
an i n i t i a t i v e . 23" The German l e a d e r s h ip  p e r ce iv ed  S t a l i n ' s  d i s m i s s a l  o f  
Maxim L i t v in ov  and appointment of Vyacheslav Molotov as Foreign Commissar 
as a s ign  o f  S o v ie t  i n t e r e s t  in  a German-Sov ie t  rapproachement on 4 May 
1939.233 Thus, the Wi lhelmstrasse, under H i t l e r ' s  d i re c t ion ,  inves t iga ted  
the p o s s i b i l i t y  of c lo se r  re la t io n s  by r e c a l l i n g  Gustav H i lge r ,  the Ch ief  
o f  Economic A f f a i r s  a t  the German Embassy in  Moscow, to B e r l i n  f o r  
consu l ta t ion  with H i t l e r  and Ribbentrop.239 On 10 May, H i lge r  answered the 
F u e h r e r ' s  q u e s t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  the  l i k e l i h o o d  o f  a German-Sov ie t  
rapproachement a t  Berchtesgaden. H i l g e r  gave the German le a de r  the 
impress ion that S t a l in  was w i l l i n g  to come to terms.240
H i t l e r ,  however, h e s i t a t e d  in  making a d ip l o m a t i c  move towards the 
S o v i e t  Union. He wa i ted  to f i n d  out  the r e s u l t s  o f  B r i t i s h  and French 
d ip l o m a t i c  e f f o r t s  to n eg o t ia te  an agreement w i th  the S o v ie t  gove rn ­
ment.24* We izsaecke r ,  im p a t i e n t  over  the w a i t ,  suggested to R ibben t rop  
that  H i lg e r  approach the Sov iet  Foreign Commissar iat to h in t  at  H i t l e r ' s  
d e s i r e  f o r  c l o s e r  German-Sov ie t  r e l a t i o n s . 242 In the meantime, the
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Wilhe!mstrasse received s igna ls  that, the Sov iet  Union was in terested in a 
rapproachement.243 Therefore, on 29 May 1939, H i t l e r  made the dec is ion to 
employ the fore ign serv ice  to pursue c lo se r  t i e s  with the Sov ie t  Union.244 
The Sov iet  government, nonetheless, showed no immediate in te re s t  to begin 
negot ia t ions.  Thus, on 29 Ju ly ,  Ribbentrop d irected  Count F r ied r ich  Werner 
von der Schu lenburg ,  the German Ambassador to Moscow, to in fo rm  Mo lo tov  
that  Germany was ready to take account of " a l l  Sov iet  in te res ts "  in  Poland 
and the B a l t i c  s ta tes .245
While l i t t l e  d ip lomat ic  a c t i v i t y  took place between Germany and the 
S o v ie t  Union, the r e l a t i o n s  between Germany and Poland were q u i c k l y  
reach ing  the c r i s i s  p o in t .  The German armed f o r c e s ,  under H i t l e r ' s  
d i r e c t i o n ,  p repared f o r  the in v a s io n  o f  Poland. Tens ion between the two 
states increased d a i l y  because of Naz i -Po l i sh  antagonism in Danzig.246 On 
8 August 1939, H i t l e r  had R ibben t rop  p r o t e s t  to  L i p s k i  about the P o l i s h  
stand on Danzig. The Po l ish  Ambassador, however, warned Ribbentrop that 
any f u r t h e r  German i n t e r f e r e n c e  in  P o l i s h -D a n z ig  r e l a t i o n s  would be 
considered an act o f  aggression aga inst  h is  government.247 Such opposit ion 
to h is  d ip lomat ic  e f f o r t s  upset the Foreign M in i s te r .  He set h is  mind on 
the destruct ion of Poland.
To d iscover Musso l in i 's  v iewpoint,  the Fuehrer requested the I t a l i a n  
Foreign M in i s t e r  to v i s i t  Germany to d iscuss the German-Polish c r i s i s  in  
e a r l y  August. C iano met w i th  R ibben t rop  a t  S a lzbu rg  on 11 August. The 
German Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  warned h i s  c o u n te rp a r t  t h a t  the Ge rm an -Po l ish
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s i tu a t io n  was "extremely grave, and that,  in h is  opin ion, the c lash between
Germany and Poland i s  in e v i tab le . "2^  Ribbentrop informed Ciano that both
H i t l e r  and h imse l f  bel ieved that B r i t a i n  and France were not prepared to
f i g h t  and therefore would not m i l i t a r i l y  support Poland, thus the c o n f l i c t
would be kept l o c a l i z e d . 2^9 The f o l l o w i n g  day, on 12 August,  H i t l e r  met
with Ciano at Berchtesgaden and reemphasized these statements, adding that
Germany would achieve a quick v i c t o r y  against  Poland. H i t l e r  stated:
When the moment fo r  the attack on Poland comes--and that  moment w i l l  
come as the r e s u l t  o f  the outbreak o f  a s e r i o u s  i n c i d e n t  or e l s e  
because Germany w i l l  force Poland to define her pos i t ion - - the  German 
f o r c e s  w i l l  s t r i k e  s im u l t a n e o u s l y  a t  the h ea r t  o f  Po land from a l l  
points along the f r o n t i e r  where attacks are launched and fo l low  routes 
well  l a id  down in advance.2^
Concerning the react ion o f  the West, H i t l e r  bel ieved:
France and England w i l l  c e r t a i n l y  make e x t rem e ly  t h e a t r i c a l  a n t i -  
German ges tu res  but w i l l  not go to war, because t h e i r  m i l i t a r y  and 
moral p r e p a ra t io n s  are not such as to a l l o w  vhem to beg in  the 
c o n f l i c t . 2 j l
The next day, on 13 August, H i t l e r  again to ld  Ciano that: "I am unshakably 
conv inced  th a t  n e i t h e r  England nor France w i l l  embark upon a genera l
war. ..252
Wh i le  these G e rm a n - I ta l i a n  t a l k s  proceeded in  southern Germany. 
B r i t i s h  and French diplomats a r r ived  in Moscow to seek an agreement with 
the S o v ie t  Union. Th is  s i t u a t i o n  a t  once w o r r i e d  H i t l e r  because the 
outcome of  such ta lk s  could create a s i g n i f i c a n t  obstac le  to German plans 
f o r  the in v a s io n  o f  Po land .25  ̂ I t  looked l i k e  the West m ight  be ab le  to 
block h is  plans by c rea t ing  a m i l i t a r y  bloc e n c i r c l i n g  Germany. Dirksen
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had been report ing from London that B r i t a i n  would standby i t s  promise to
Po land s in c e  J u l y . 254 Worr ied  about the outcome o f  o f  the Moscow t a l k s ,
H i t l e r  im m ed ia t e l y  ordered R ibben t rop  to seek a rapproachement with the
S o v ie t  Union. On 14 August,  the Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  sent a te leg ram  to
Mo lo tov ,  seek ing  a meet ing between the c h i e f  d ip lo m a t s ,  and c a l l i n g  f o r
f r i e n d ly  cooperat ion between the two states.  He stressed that there were
no rea l  c o n f l i c t s  between Germany and the S o v ie t  Union, and o f f e r e d  to
s e t t l e  spheres o f  i n f l u e n c e  in  e a s te rn  Europe.255 Such p leas  from the
German government were sent as the Wi lhelmstrasse received warnings from
the B r i t i s h  government.256 These wa rn ings ,  n e v e r t h e le s s ,  were h ig h l y
encouraged by We izsaecke r  and the p r o f e s s i o n a l  d ip lom a ts  in  the Fo re ign
O f f i c e  as a way to d e te r  H i t l e r  from any w a r l i k e  a c t i o n . 257 The
W i lh e lm s t r a s s e  a l s o  in fo rmed  W h i t e h a l l  o f  Ribbentrop's move towards the
S o v ie t  Union, f e a r i n g  t h a t  a German-Sov ie t  agreement would in c r e a s e  the
l i k e l i h o o d  o f  war.256 But, on 16 August,  w h i l e  s t i l l  t a l k i n g  to the
B r i t i s h  and French delegates, S t a l i n  had Molotov no t i f y  Count Schulenburg
of h is  des ire  to improve German-Soviet re la t ion s .  He suggested that the
two s t a t e s  s ign  a nonaggress ion  p a c t . 25  ̂ R ibben t rop  q u i c k l y  in fo rm ed
Molo tov o f  H i t l e r ' s  i n t e r e s t  in  t h i s  p r o p o s a l . 260 Fea r ing  a S o v ie t
agreement w i th  the West in  the meantime, on 18 August,  H i t l e r  had
Ribbentrop seek an immediate meeting with Molotov to conclude such a pact.
H i t l e r  considered i t  essen t ia l  to c l a r i f y  Ge rm an-Sov ie t  r e l a t i o n s  be fo re
261Germany invaded Poland.
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S t a l i n  accepted the idea o f  a qu ick  meet ing on 20 August. He sent 
H i t l e r  a d ra f t  o f  a nonaggression pact,262 and approved Ribbentrop's t r i p  
to Moscow.262 The Fuehrer consented to the d ra f t  that afternoon.26  ̂ On 22 
August, H i t l e r  gave h is  Foreign M in i s t e r  f u l l  powers to negotiate and sign 
the nonaggress ion  pact  w i th  the S o v ie t  Union: an agreement th a t  he had 
already f u l l y  approved.266 Ribbentrop qu ick ly  t ra ve l le d  to Moscow. Once 
th e re ,  he re ce ived  a te leg ram  from H i t l e r  d i r e c t i n g  him to ask S t a l i n  to 
agree to d i v i d i n g  eas te rn  Europe i n t o  German and S o v ie t  spheres o f  
in te re s ts .  Thus, on 23 August, Ribbentrop and Molotov, in the presence 
o f  S t a l i n ,  s igned the N a z i - S o v i e t  Nonaggress ion Pac t ,  i n c l u d in g  an 
a d d i t i o n a l  s e c r e t  p ro to co l  d i v i d i n g  eas te rn  Europe i n t o  two spheres o f  
in t e r e s t .26  ̂ The B r i t i s h  and French d e le g a t io n  l e f t  Moscow empty-handed 
two days l a t e r . 268
While Ribbentrop was sign ing the pact with Molotov, H i t l e r  permitted 
B r i t i s h  Ambassador Henderson and the German Foreign Secretary to v i s i t  him 
at Berchtesgaden on 23 August. Henderson handed H i t l e r  a l e t t e r  from the 
B r i t i s h  P r im e  M i n i s t e r  d e c l a r i n g  t h a t  "we a re  s t a n d in g  by ou r  
commitments ."26  ̂ Both Henderson and Weizsaecker warned the Fuehrer that  
B r i t a i n  would a s s i s t  the Poles and that Mussol in i would not come to the a id  
o f  Germany.2 '78 Commenting on t h i s  meet ing, We izsaecke r  wrote  in  h i s  
memoirs: "My words were spoken in to  the a i r .  I t  was c le a r  that  H i t l e r  was 
work ing  f o r  war,  and was on ly  u n c e r t a in  as to whether i t  c ou ld  be
lo c a l i s e d . 2 7 1
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Upon h i s  re tu rn  the next day, R ibben t rop  was greeted by an e x c i t e d  
H i t l e r  at  Berchtesgaden. The Foreign M in i s t e r  had provided h is  master the 
pac t  t h a t  would assure  the i s o l a t i o n  o f  Po land ,  and an easy conquest  f o r  
Germany. H i t l e r ,  a c co rd ing  to W i l l i a m  C a r r ,  "assumed th a t  the western 
powers would be so stunned [by the announcement o f  the N a z i - S o v i e t  
Nonaggression Pact] that they would lose a l l  heart fo r  war."272 Paul Otto 
Schmidt, who had accompanied Ribbentrop to Moscow, wrote in h is  memoirs: 
"By t h e i r  supr ise move in  th i s  round o f  the d ip lomat ic  contest, H i t l e r  and 
S ta l in  had checkmated England and France."272 In the midst of the German- 
Po l i sh  c r i s i s  the conclusion o f  the pact provided Ribbentrop great p rest ige  
with H i t l e r ,  and placed the Foreign M in i s te r ' s  in f luence  with h is  master at 
i t s  zen i th .27  ̂ Now having achieved Sov ie t  n eu t r a l i t y  H i t l e r  was ready to 
crush the Poles. The German Army was ready to march.279
D esp i t e  success in  a ch ie v in g  an agreement wi t .  the S o v ie t  Union, 
H i t l e r  discovered that the West had not abandoned the Poles. The B r i t i s h  
P a r l i a m e n t  r a t i f i e d  the A n g lo - P o l i s h  a l l i a n c e  on 25 August  1939.276 
Moments a f te r  t h i s  announcement, the French Ambassador warned H i t l e r  that 
France would f i g h t  fo r  the Po les.277 I f  t h i s  was not enough, the I t a l i a n  
Ambassador d e l i v e r e d  a message to H i t l e r  from M u s s o l i n i  d e c l a r i n g  t h a t  
I t a ly  was not ready to f ig h t  a war.272 According to Schmidt, "the l e t t e r  
was a b o m b s h e l l .  He [ H i t l e r ]  was b i t t e r l y  d i s a p p o i n t e d  a t  t h i s  
sudden . . . d e f e c t i o n  o f  h i s  a l l y . " 279 Now "deep ly  shaken," the Fueh re r  
reacted by postponing the invasion o f  Poland. u
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At t h i s  po int  the counsel o f  Ribbentrop, Weizsaecker, Goering, and the 
General S t a f f  advised H i t l e r  to avoid war because B r i t a i n  and France would 
stand by t h e i r  commitment to Po land .281 H i t l e r ,  none the le s s ,  q u i c k l y  
regained confidence in h is  opin ion that the West would not intervene, and 
sudden ly  dec ided  to r i s k  the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a European war to conquer 
Poland.282 Rea l iz ing  the th rea t  to h is  in f luence  with H i t l e r ,  Ribbentrop 
q u i c k l y  changed h i s  o p in io n  to match h i s  m a s te r ' s . 283 We izsaecker  
complained in h is  memoirs that Ribbentrop "did not want to take advice from 
anyone, or to change h i s  v iews on account  o f  what anyone s a i d . " 284 The 
Foreign M in i s te r ,  according to Weizsaecker, "did not and would not be l ieve 
t h a t  the A l l i e s  would make common cause w i th  Po land ."285 Upset a t  the 
Wi lhelmstrasse, the Foreign M in i s t e r  to ld  Weizsaecker and h is  s t a f f  that  i f  
they f a i l e d  to f o l l o w  H i t l e r ' s  o rde rs  f o r  an a g g re s s iv e  p o l i c y  than "he 
would shoot [them] persona l ly  in h is  own o f f i c e . " 285
Although th r e a te n in g  war,  H i t l e r  was s t i l l  w i l l i n g  to ach ieve  h is  
demands by d ip lomat ic  means. On 28 August 1939, the Fuehrer gathered h is  
Genera l S t a f f  t oge the r  a t  the Re ich  C h a n ce l l e r y .  A cco rd ing  to General 
F ranz  Ha ide r ,  the C h ie f  o f  the Genera l S t a f f ,  H i t l e r  s a id  he was 
"determ ined to have [ th e ]  e a s te rn  ques t ion  s e t t l e d  one way or another.  
Minimum demands: Return o f  Danz ig ,  s e t t l i n g  o f  C o r r i d o r  que s t ion .  I f  
minimum demands not s a t i s f i e d ,  then war . . . ."287 pueh re r  d ec la red  
t h a t  Germany would a t t a c k  Po land on 1 September,  b a r r i n g  any f u r t h e r  
postponements.288 That same day H i t l e r  met with the B r i t i s h  Ambassador in
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the presence o f  Ribbentrop at the Chancel le ry. The Fuehrer to ld  S i r  Nevi le  
Henderson that  he had made up h is  mind on s e t t l i n g  the Po l ish  Question once 
and f o r  a 11.289 nenc|erson in fo rmed  H i t l e r  t h a t  the B r i t i s h  government 
d e s i r e d  the Po le s  to n ego t ia te  w i th  H i t l e r  d i r e c t l y ,  in s te ad  o f  through 
London. Henderson bel ieved that the Poles would fo l low  London's advice in 
t h i s  matter.29^
The f o l l o w in g  morning H i t l e r  was aga in  somewhat indec is ive  on what 
avenue to pursue, d ip l o m a t i c  or m i l i t a r y  a c t i o n . 291 In f r o n t  o f  the 
Foreign Secretary,  Goering advised the German leader: "Let's drop the ' a l l -  
or-noth ing' game." To which H i t l e r  rep l ied :  "A l l  my l i f e  I have played for  
' a l l - o r - n o t h i n g ' . " 292 La te r  t h a t  day H i t l e r  met w i th  Henderson and 
ind ica ted  h is  w i l l in gne ss  to ta lk  d i r e c t l y  to the Poles i f  a p len ipo ten iary  
a r r ived  in B e r l in  no la te r  than 30 August.293
Having been issued an ult imatum, the Po l i sh  government re jected the 
idea of d i r e c t  German-Polish ta lks .  They began general mob i l i za t ion  on the 
morning o f  30 August.29  ̂ H i t l e r  had h a l f  expected the B r i t i s h  to pressure 
th e  P o l e s  i n t o  hand ing  D anz ig  o v e r  t o  Germany and a g r e e i n g  to  
e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l  road and r a i lw a y s  through the P o l i s h  C o r r id o r .  
A r r i v in g  at Ribbentrop's o f f i c e  a f t e r  midnight, Ambassador Henderson to ld  
the Foreign M in i s t e r  that there would be no Po l i sh  p len ipotent ia ry .  Up to 
t h i s  p o in t  R ibben t rop  had expected to beg in  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  A cco rd ing  to 
Schmidt, the in te rp re te r ,  Ribbentrop demanded the immediate a r r i v a l  o f  a 
Po l i sh  d ip lomat with f u l l  powers to negot ia te a treaty.  Becoming extremely
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upset, the Foreign M in i s te r  to ld  Henderson that  the s i tu a t ion  was "damned 
s e r i o u s ! " 296 He then read out loud H i t l e r ' s  demands, d ra f t e d  by the 
Wil  hel m s t ra sse  in  the hope o f  ano the r  Munich type o f  agreement, r a th e r  
s l o w ly  to the B r i t i s h  Ambassador, c a l l i n g  f o r  a re tu rn  o f  Danzig  to 
Germany, an e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l  road and ra i lway  through the Po l ish  Corr idor ,  
as well  as a p le b i s c i t e  in  the Corr idor .29  ̂ Under H i t l e r ' s  in s t ru c t ion s ,  
Ribbentrop refused to provide a copy of the demands to Henderson since they
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were intended fo r  a Po l ish  envoy and the deadl ine had already expired. 
H i t l e r  had i s sued  an u l t im a tum  and would c a r r y  through w i th  h i s  t h r e a t .  
Commenting about t h i s  meeting, Schmidt to ld  the Nuremberg court:
The atmosphere du r ing  t h a t  con fe rence  was . . . charged w i th  
e l e c t r i c i t y .  Both pa r t ic ipan ts  were extremely nervous. Henderson was 
very uneasy; and never before, and perhaps only once afterwards,  have 
I seen the Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  so nervous as he was dur ing  t h a t  
conference.299
Having heard H i t l e r ' s  demands, the B r i t i s h  Ambassador, c o n s id e r in g  
them "not unreasonable," immediately t r a v e l le d  to v i s i t  L ipsk i  at  h is  home 
in  B e r l i n . 300 Now, a f t e r  Germany's u l t im a tum  to Po land had e xp i re d ,  
Henderson found, awoke, and in fo rmed  L i p s k i  o f  H i t l e r ' s  demands a t  two 
o ' c lo c k  in  the morning on 31 August .301 Not a u th o r i z e d  w i th  powers to 
accept these demands, L ipsk i  forwarded them to the Po l ish  Foreign M in i s te r  
in Warsaw l a t e r  that morning, but received a negative rep ly  from Beck.JUC 
H i t l e r  v iewed the f a i l u r e  o f  a P o l i s h  envoy to show up in  B e r l i n  as a 
re jec t ion  of h is  demands.303 H i t l e r ' s  l a s t  minute diplomacy had fa i le d .
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The German plan to attack Poland was w i th in  hours of being launched.
Goering argued against  the attack,  be l ie v ing  tha t  B r i t a i n  and France would
declare war on Germany.304 Goering pleaded w ith  H i t l e r  to t ry  once again
to d ip lo m a t i c a l l y  resolve the Po l i sh  Question.305 But, on the afternoon of
the t h i r t y - f i r s t ,  H i t l e r  made the f i n a l  d e c i s i o n  f o r  the a t t a c k  to
proceed.306 He instructed Ribbentrop o f  the impending in v a s io n  p la n s . 307
Rea l iz ing  tha t  the B r i t i s h  would never disavow th e i r  guarantee to Poland,
the Foreign M in i s te r  f i n a l l y  got up enough courage to t e l l  H i t l e r  that  he
bel ieved the B r i t i s h  would f u l f i l l  t h e i r  ob l iga t ion s  to Poland.306 But, i t
was too la te !  H i t l e r  was already convinced tha t  B r i t a i n  and France lacked
the reso lve to f ig h t  in aid o f  Poland.
German forces attacked Poland on 1 September 1939. Within hours the
B r i t i s h  and French ambassadors a r r i v e d  a t  the C han ce l le r y  to hand
R ib b e n t r o p  u l t im a t u m s  c o n c e r n in g  the unprovoked a t tack  on Poland.
Henderson and Coulondre found the Foreign M in i s t e r  extremely upset over the
s i tu a t io n .309 The fo l low ing  day B r i t a i n  and France began to mob i l i ze .3*0
On 3 September, Henderson ar r ived  at the Chancel lery. With in s t ru c t ion s  to
receive the ambassador, Schmidt accepted the B r i t i s h  dec la rat ion o f  war.
Schm idt  en te red  H i t l e r ’ s o f f i c e  and read the d e c l a r a t i o n  to both the
Fuehre r  and h i s  Fo re ign  M in i s t e r .  Both H i t l e r  and R ibbent rop  were
surpr ised at the West dec lar ing war.31* According to Schmidt:
[B]oth gentlemen were abso lu te ly  s i l e n t  fo r  about a minute. I could 
c l e a r l y  see t h a t  t h i s  deve lopment d id  not s u i t  them at  a l l .  Fo r  a 
w h i l e  H i t l e r  sa t  in  h i s  c h a i r  deep in  though t  and s ta red  somewhat
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worr ied ly  in to  space. Then he broke the s i lence  with  a rather abrupt 
question to the Foreign M in i s te r ,  saying, "what sha l l  we do now?"312
Summing up the c r i s i s ,  U l r i c h  von H a s se l l  wrote in  h i s  d ia r y  on 1
September 1939:
H i t l e r  and Ribbentrop wanted war with Poland and knowingly took 
the r i s k  o f  war w i th  the Western Powers, d e lud ing  themse lves  to 
va ry ing  degrees up to the very l a s t  w i th  the b e l i e f  th a t  the West 
would remain n eu t ra l  a f t e r  a l l .  The P o le s ,  f o r  t h e i r  p a r t  . . . 
conf ident of English and French support, had missed every remaining 
chance fo r  avoiding war. The Government in  London, whose ambassador 
d id  e ve ry th ing  to keep the peace, gave up the race in  the very l a s t  
days and adopted a k ind  o f  d e v i l -m a y - c a r e  a t t i t u d e .  France went 
through the same stages, only with much more hes i ta t ion .  Mussol in i 
did a l l  in h is  power to avoid war.313
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI
1. Wolfgang Michalka, "Con f l i c t s  w i th in  the German Leadership on the 
O b je c t i v e s  and T a c t i c s  o f  German Fo re ign  P o l i c y ,  1933-9," chap, in  The 
Fasc is t  Chal lenge and the Po l i c y  of Appeasement, ed. Wolfgang Mommsen and 
Lo tha r  Ke t tenacke r  (London: George A l l e n  and Unwin, 1983), 48; D i r k sen ,  
186; Fest, Face of the Third Reich, 179; Ernst Woermann testimony, 2 Ju ly  
1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 140, Fo lder  6, 11036, 11052; Gustav 
Ado lf  Steengracht von Moyland, 23 June 1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, 
Box 140, F o ld e r  1, 9878; E r i c  Ko rd t  t e s t im o ny ,  4 June 1948, AMT 
t r a n s c r i p t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 136, F o ld e r  8, 7400-1; W e i t z ,  143.
2. Papen, 407; Francois-Poncet, 226; H i l l ,  "The Wi lhelmstrasse in 
the Nazi Era ,"  46; Order o f  the Fuehrer  and Re ich  C h a n ce l lo r  on the 
Command o f  the Wehrmacht, 4 February  1938, H i t l e r ' s  Th i rd  Reich: A 
Documentary H is tory  ed. Louis S. Snyder (Chicago: Ne lson-Hall ,  1981), 275.
3. Constantin von Neurath testimony, 24 June 1946, TMWC, 16:641; 
Fest, H i t l e r , 543; Seabury, The W i lhe lmstrasse , 45.
4. Francois-Poncet,  227; Joachim von Ribbentrop testimony, 28 March 
1946, TMWC, 10:241; H i t l e r ' s  Decree, 4 February 1938, 1337-PS, NCA, 3:913.
5. Ribbentrop, 78; Weizsaecker, 119; Galeazzo Ciano, Ciano's Hidden 
D ia ry  1937-1938, t ran s .  Andreas Major ,  i n t r o d .  Malco lm Muggeridge (New 
York: E.P. Dutton, 1953), d iary  entry for  7 February 1938, 71; Weitz, 151.
6. Dirksen, 181; Papen, 406.
7. Heineman, H i t l e r ' s  F i r s t  Foreign M in i s t e r , 169.
8. Dirksen, 186.
9. Papen, 408-39. Papen served as the German Ambassador to Turkey 
from Apr i l  1939 to August 1944 (Louis L. Snyder, Encyclopedia o f  the Third 
Reich [New York: Paragon House, 1976], 266-67).
10. U l r i ch  von Hasse l l ,  The Von Hassel l D ia r ie s  1938-1944, in trod. by 




12. G i lb e r t ,  Nuremberg D ia ry , 138; I rv ing,  Goering, 203,
13. H i l l ,  "The Wilhelmstrasse in  the Nazi Era," 557.
14. F ranco is -Poncet ,  233.
15. Ernst von Weizsaecker testimony, 10 June 1948, AMT t r a n s c r ip t ,  
UNO... OGL 17, Box 137, F o ld e r  2, 8098.
16. Weizsaecker testimony, 8 June 1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, 
Box 136, F o ld e r  13, 7701.
17. Francois-Poncet,  233.
18. Ibid.
19. Weizsaecker testimony, 8 June 1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, 
Box 136, F o ld e r  13, 7692.
20. H i l l ,  "The Wilhelmstrasse in  the Nazi Era," 564,
21. Seabury, "Ribbentrop and the German Foreign O f f i c e , "  539.
22. As quoted in I rv ing,  Goering, 203.
23. Dirksen, 186.
24. As quoted in Michalka, "Con f l i c t s  w i th in  the German Leadership on 
the Objectives and Tact ics  of German Foreign Po l i c y ,  1933-9," 48.
25. Ribbentrop testimony, 29 March 1946, TMWC, 10:243.
26. Mackensen memorandum, 8 February 1938, DGFP(D), 1:503-4.
27. TWC, 12:14; Weinberg, The Foreign Po l ic y  o f  H i t l e r ' s  Germany, 
2:278-79. Keppler was H i t l e r ' s  expert on Austr ian p o l i t i c a l  and economic 
matters (Weitz, 149).
28. Keppler to Ribbentrop, 7 February 1938, DGFP(D), 1:500-2.
29. Papen, 414; Weitz, 152.
30. Excerpt from General Jod i 's  d ia ry ,  1780-PS, NCA, 4:361; Alan 
B u l l o c k ,  H i t l e r  and S t a l i n :  P a r a l l e l  L i v e s  (New York: A l f r e d  A. Knopf,  
1992), 564; Papen, 414; Weitz, 153.
2 0 6
31. Kurt von Schuschnigg a f f i d a v i t ,  19 November 1945, 2995-PS, NCA, 
5:711.
32. As quoted in Bu l lock,  H i t l e r  and S t a l i n , 565.
33. Gehl, 173.
34. H it ler-Schuschnigg meeting minutes, 12 February 1938, TWC, 12: 
714-16; Berchtesgaden Protocol,  12 February 1938, DGFP(D), 1:515-17.
35. Kordt testimony, 4 June 1948, AMT t r a n s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 
136, F o ld e r  7, 7364; H i l l ,  "The Wil hel m s t ra s se  in  the Nazi Era,"  566; 
Ribbentrop test imony, 29 March 1946, TMWC, 10:244-49.
36. Woermann to Ribbentrop, 17 February 1938, DGFP(D), 1:525; Weiz- 
saecker memorandum, 28 February 1938, DGFP(D), 1:227.
37. Woermann to Ribbentrop, 21 February 1938, DGFP(D), 1:208-9; 
Harvey, 64, 66; Cockett, 48, Ha l i fax ,  198; G i lb e r t  and Gott, 68-69.
38. Keppler memorandum, 28 February 1938, DGFP(D), 1:548-49.
39. Weizsaecker to Hasse l l ,  10 January 1938, DGFP(D), 1:171-72.
40. Ribbentrop to Henderson, 4 March 1938, DGFP(D), 1:248. Henderson 
den ied t h i s  s ta tement  to R ibbent rop  the f o l l o w in g  day, but H i t l e r  had 
a l r e ad y  pe r ce ived  h i s  own v e r s io n  o f  the c o n ve r s a t io n  (Henderson to 
Ribbentrop, 5 March 1938, DGFP(D), 1:249-50).
41. Weizsaecker to Ribbentrop, 9 March 1938, DGFP(D), 1:562.
42. David Irv ing, The War Path: H i t l e r ' s  Germany 1933-1939 (New York: 
V ik ing ,  1978), 81.
43. Fest,  H i t l e r , 545; Irv ing, Goering, 206.
44. Andreas H i l lg ruber ,  Germany and the Two World Wars, trans. 
W i l l i a m  C. K i r b y  (London and Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y  P res s ,  
1981). 64; Irv ing, The War Path, 81; Fest, H i t l e r , 546.
45. I rv ing ,  Goering, 210.
46. G i lb e r t ,  Nuremberg D ia ry , 304.
47. Neurath testimony, 24 June 1946, TMWC, 16:642; Irv ing, The War 
Path, 81.
2 0 7
48. Weizsaecker test imony, 7 June 1948, AMT t r an s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17} 
Box 136, F o ld e r  13, 7700; Neurath t e s t im o ny ,  24 June 1946, TMWC, 16:643; 
Heineman, H i t l e r ' s  F i r s t  Foreign M in i s t e r , 171.
49. I rv ing,  The War Path, 82; Heineman, H i t l e r ' s  F i r s t  Foreign Min- 
i s t e r , 172.
50. Bu l lock,  H i t l e r  and S t a l i n , 566; I rv ing,  Goering, 206; Heine- 
man, H i t l e r ' s  F i r s t  Foreign M in i s te r ,  172.
51. I rv ing ,  The War Path, 81.
52. Woermann testimony, 2 Ju ly  1948, AMT t r a n s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 
140, Folder 2, 10872.
53. Ribbentrop to H i t l e r ,  10 March 1938, DGFP(D), 1:263.
54. Braeuer memorandum, 11 March 1938, DGFP(D), 1:570.
55. Ribbentrop, 86.
56. I rv ing ,  The War Path, 78.
57. Weizsaecker test imony, 8 June 1948, AMT t r a n s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, 
Box 136, F o ld e r  13, 7712.
58. Woermann test imony, 2 Ju ly  1948, AMT t r a n s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 
140, Folder 2, 10872.
59. Ribbentrop memorandum, 11 March 1938, DGFP(D), 1:273-75; Esmonde 
M. Robertson, H i t l e r ' s  Pre-War P o l i c y  and M i l i t a r y  P lans  1933-1939 (New 
York: C itadel Press, 1963), 118.
60. Hi ldebrand, The Foreign Po l ic y  of the Th ird Reich, 63; Robert­
son, 115; C h r i s t o p h e r  Thorne, The Approach o f  War 1938-1939 (London: 
Macmil lan, 1967), 46-47.
61. Schmidt, 80. See also Ciano, Ciano's Hidden D ia ry , 87; H i t l e r  
to Musso l in i ,  11 March 1938, DGFP(D), 1:573.
62. Francois -Poncet to Del bos, 12 March 1938, The French Yel low Book: 
D ip lomatic Documents (1938-1939), ed. M in i s t e r e  des A f f a i r e s  E t ranqe res  
TNew York: Reyna! and Hitchcock, 1940), 2-3; Francois -Poncet to Del bos, 12 
March 1938, The French Yel low Book, 3.
2 0 8
63. T ransc r ip ts  o f  telephone c a l l s  from the German A i r  M in is t ry ,  11- 
14 March 1938, 2949-PS, NCA, 5:642-54.
64. Weitz, 157-58
65. Ib id .
66. Law concerning the union o f  Aus t r ia  with Germany, 13 March 1938, 
2307-PS, NCA, 4:997-98.
67. Henderson to Neurath, 11 March 1938, DGFP(D), 1:578; Franco is -  
Poncet to Neurath, 11 March 1938, DGFP(D), 1:578.
68. Weizsaecker testimony, 10 June 1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, 
Box 137, Folder 2, 8090.
69. Weitz, 155.
70. Seabury, The Wi lhe lmstrasse , 61; Lewis Namier, "Ernst von Weiz­
saecker," chap, iny In the Nazi Era (London: Macmil lan, 1952).
71. Weizsaecker, 122; Seabury, The W i lhe lmstrasse , 61. E r ic  Kordt 
and the p r o f e s s io n a l  d i p l o m a t i c  co rps  had f a i t h  chat We izsaecker  would 
regain control of fore ign po l i cy  fo r  the Wi lhelmstrasse (Kordt testimony, 3 
June 1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 136, Folder 6, 7335-36).
72. Woermann testimony, 2 Ju ly  1948, AMT t r a n s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 
140, Folder 2, 10848, 10873.
73. Appendix II,  DGFP(D), 2:1031; Appendix IV, DGFP(D), 2:1044,
1052.
74. Kordt, Nicht aus den Akten, 183-89; Woermann testimony, 6 Ju ly  
1948, AMT t r a n s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 140, Fo lder 7, 11127.
75. Dirksen, 194, 196.
76. Kordt testimony, 3-4 June 1948, AMT t r a n s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 
136, Folder 7, 7335-36, 7343.
77. I b id . ,  4 June 1948, Box 136, Folder 7, 7345.
78. Weizsaecker, 126.
79. Weitz, 163. See also Weizsaecker, 128; Ribbentrop, 80-81.
2 0 9
80. Weizsaecker testimony, 10 June 1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UNO, OGL 17, 
Box 137, F o ld e r  2, 8090; Kord t  t e s t im o n y ,  4 June 1948, AMT t r a n s c r i p t ,  
UNO, OGL 17, Box 136, Folder 7, 7345; Woermann testimony, 6 Ju ly  1948, AMT 
t r a n s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 140, Fo lder 7, 11128.
81. Woermann testimony, 6 Ju ly  1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 
140, Fo lder 6, 11052-54,
82. Wilhelm Keppler, 16 Ju ly  1948, AMT t r an s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 
142, Fo lder 2, 12931-932.
83. Francois-Poncet,  233.
84. Weitz, 162.
85. Woermann testimony, 6 Ju ly  1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 
140, Fo lder 6, 11052.
86. Ib id . ,  2 Ju ly ,  Box 140, Folder 6, 11036.
87. Kordt testimony, 4 June 1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 
136, Folder 8, 7400-1.
88. Fest,  The Face o f  the Third Re ich , 179.
89. See Ronald M. Smelser, The Sudeten Problem, 1933-1939: Volkstum- 
p o l i t i k  and the F o rm u la t ion  o f  Nazi F o re ign  P o l i c y  (Middletown, Conn.: 
Wesleyan Un ive rs i ty  Press, 1975).
90. Weitz, 165; Ribbentrop memorandum, 29 March 1938, 2788-PS, NCA, 
5:422-24.
91. As quoted in Weitz, 165.
92. Leonidas E. H i l l ,  ed., Die Weizsaecker-Papiere (Frankfurt  am 
Main, B e r l in ,  Vienna: Propylaeen, 1977), 126; Mario Toscano, The Or ig ins  
o f  the Pact o f  Steel (Balt imore: The John Hopkin's Un ive rs i ty  Press, 1964), 
5.
93. Schmundt memorandum, 22 Ap r i l  1938, DGFP(D), 2:239-40; Irv ing, 
Goering, 219.
94. Ciano, Hidden Diary , 112.
95. Ib id .
2 1 0
96. E isen lohr to Ribbentrop, 12 May 1938, DGFP(D), 2:275.
97. Weizsaecker, 134.
98. Ibid.; Dirksen, 197; Schmidt, 85-86; Weizsaecker to Ribben- 
t r o p ,  20 May 1938, DGFP(D), 2:296.
99. H i l l ,  Die Weizsaecker-Papiere, 144-45; I rv ing ,  Goering, 219.
100. Operation Green d i r e c t i v e ,  20 May 1938, 388-PS, NCA, 3:311.
101. Schmidt, 88. See a lso Henderson, 178.
102. Weizsaecker, 135-36.
103. Ciano, Hidden D ia ry , 121.
104. I rv ing,  Goering, 220.
105. F r i t z  Wiedemann a f f i d a v i t ,  21 November 1945, 3037-PS, 5:743.
See a l s o  Schmundt Papers ,  A p r i l - O c t o b e r  1938, NCA, 3:305, 311; H i t l e r ' s  
speech, 30 January 1939, NCA, 4:1101.
106. Weizsaecker test imony, 8 June 1948, AMT t r an s c r ip t ,  UND, 0GL 17, 
Box 136, F o ld e r  13, 7717; Ko rd t  te s t im o ny ,  4 June 1948, AMT t r a n s c r i p t ,  
UND, 0GL 17, Box 136, Folder 7, 7376.
107. Weizsaecker testimony, 8 June 1948, AMT t r an s c r ip t ,  UND, 0GL. 17, 
Box 136, Folder 13, 7717; Weizsaecker memorandum, 21 Ju ly  1938, DGFP(D), 
2:504; We izsaecker  memorandum, ca. 19 August  1938, DGFP(D), 2:593-94; 
We izsaecke r  memorandum, 30 August 1938, DGFP(D), 2:662-63; E r i c h  Ko rd t  
a f f i d a v i t ,  25 September 1947, Amer ican M i l i t a r y  T r ibuna l  documents, 
Nuremberg, Germany, Documents in  Chester F r i t z  L ib ra ry ,  Un ive rs i ty  of North 
Dakota, 0GL 17 [ h e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  as AMT documents, UND, OGL 17],  NG-3605, 
Box 235, F o ld e r  4, 2. See a l s o  W i l l i a m so n  Murray, The Cha l lenge  in  the 
European Ba lance o f  Power, 1938-1939 (P r in ce ton :  P r in c e to n  U n i v e r s i t y  
P re s s ,  1984), 182.
108. Francois-Poncet,  258-59.
109. Ciano, Hidden D ia ry , 135.
110. Weizsaecker memorandum, 21 Ju ly  1938, NG-3716, TWC, 12:797-98.
111. Ribbentrop to Embassies Abroad, 3 August 1938, DGFP(D), 2:529- 
31.
2 1 1
112. Weizsaecker memorandum, 19 Augusut 1938, DGFP(D), 2:593. See 
a lso Weizsaecker, 137.
113. Weizsaecker, 137.
114. H i t l e r  and Ribbentrop refused to see Dirksen in August and 
September 1938 a l though they knew th a t  the German Ambassador to B r i t a i n  
ca r r ied  warnings from Prime M in i s te r  Chamberlain (Dirksen, 207).
115. Kordt testimony, 4 June 1948, AMT t r a n s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 
136, F o ld e r  7, 7386.
116. Weizsaecker, 146, 148.
117. Weizsaecker testimony, 8 June 1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, 
Box 136, F o ld e r  13, 7717; Kord t  a f f i d a v i t ,  25 September 1947, AMT 




120. Ib id .
121. I b id . ,  92.
122. Weizsaecker note, 16 September 1938, DGFP(D), 2:810.
123. Schmidt memorandum, 15 September 1938, DGFP(D), 2:786-98.
124. Weizsaecker, 150-51.
125. Schmidt, 96-97.
126. Francois-Poncet,  263; Weizsaecker, 151.
127. Schmidt, 100; H i t l e r  to Chamberlain, 23 September 1938, DGFP(D), 
2:889-91; H i t l e r  to Chamberlain, ca. 23 September 1938, DGFP(D), 2:908-10.
128. Hencke to Ribbentrop, 24 September 1938, DGFP(D), 2:920; 
Schmidt, 101.
2 1 2
129. Schmidt, 103, 105; Weitz, 182.
130. As quoted in  Schmidt, 104.
131. Weizsaecker testimony, 8 June 1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UNO, OGL 17, 
Box 136, F o ld e r  13, 7717; Ko rd t  t e s t im o ny ,  4 June 1948, AMT t r a n s c r i p t ,  
UND, OGL 17, Box 136, F o ld e r  7, 73888; H a s s e l l ,  38; We izsaecker ,  148-49; 
H i l l ,  "The Wilhelmstrasse in the Nazi Era," 567.
132. Paul Otto Schm idt  t e s t im o ny ,  24 August  1948, AMT t r a n s c r i p t ,
UND, OGL 17, Box 146, F o ld e r  19, 178-31-835; Neurath te s t im ony ,  24 June 
1946, 16:646-47; I r v in g ,  Goeri  ng, 229; Heineman, Hi t l  e r ' s
F i r s t  Foreign M in i s t e r , 175-76, 181; Manvell and Fraenkel , Goering, 200; 
Kordt testimony, 4 June 1948, AMT t r a n s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 136, Folder 
7, 7388.
133. Weizsaecker, 8 June 1948, AMT t r a n s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 136, 
Folder 13, 7717; Ciano, Hidden D ia ry , 161; Kordt testimony, 4 June 1948, 
AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 136, Folder 7, 7376.
134. Kordt testimony, 4 June 1948, AMT t r an s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 
136, F o ld e r  7, 7376; We izsaecker ,  152; Robertson,  145; H a s s e l l ,  10; 
C iano,  Hidden D i a r y , 161; We izsaecke r  t e s t im o ny ,  8 June 1948, AMT 
t r a n s c r i p t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 136, F o ld e r  13, 7712, 7717; Manve l l  and 
Fraenkel , Goering, 201.
135. Weizsaecker testimony, 8 June 1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, 
Box 136, Folder 13, 7717.
136. Ib id . ,  Box 136, Folder 13, 7718.
137. Kordt testimony, 4 June 1948, AMT t r a n s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 
136, F o ld e r  7, 7388.
138. Ib id .
139. Weizsaecker, 154; Schmidt testimony, 24 August 1948, AMT t ran ­
s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 146, Folder 19, 17831-835; Schmidt, 111; Manvell 
and F raen ke l ,  Goer ing ,  201; H i l l ,  "The W i lh e lm s t r a s s e  in  the Nazi Era ,"  
567.
140. Manvell and Fraenkel , Goering, 200.
141. Schmidt, 106-7. See a lso Franco is -Poncet,  266.
142. Francois -Poncet,  267; Ciano, Hidden Diary, 165.
2 1 3
143. Weizsaecker test imony, 7 June 1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, 
Box 136, Folder 13, 7719, 7723.
144. Schwerin-Krosigk a f f i d a v i t ,  18 May 1946, TMWC, 40:476; Weitz,
154.
145. Manvel 1 and Fraenkel , Goering, 199, 201; Middlemas, 400;
Schmidt, 107; Ribbentrop to M iss ions Abroad, 28 September 1939, DGFP(D), 
2:994.
146. Munich Protoco l ,  29 September 1938, TWC, 12:818-20.
147. Weizsaecker test imony, 8 June 1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, 
Box 136, Folder 13, 7729; Carr ,  Arms, Autarky, and Aggress ion, 102.
148. Carr,  Arms, Autarky, and Aggress ion, 102; Francois-Poncet,  261.
149. Hjalmar Schacht testimony, 2 May 1946, TMWC, 12:531.
150. Reinhard Sp itzy ,  So Haben w i r  das Reich Ve rsp ie l t ,  Bekenntisse 
eines I l l ega len  (Munich: Langen-Muller, 1988), 320. See also Poole, 141.
151. Dirksen, 211.
152. Carr,  Arms, Autarky, and Aggress ion, 102.
153. Weizsaecker, 157.
154. Ibid., 159; Weizsaecker testimony, 10 June 1948, AMT t rans­
c r i p t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 137, F o ld e r  2, 8090, 8093.
155. Weizsaecker test imony, 10 June 1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UND, OGL 
17, Box 137, F o ld e r  2, 8090-1; Ko rd t  t e s t im o ny ,  4 June 1948, AMT 
t r a n s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 136, Fo lder 7, 7347.
156. Kordt testimony, 4 June 1948, AMT t r a n s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 
136, F o ld e r  7, 7341, 7346.
157. Ibid., Box 136, Folder 7, 7553; Schmidt, 175; A lbe r t  Speer, 
Spandau: The Secret D ia r i e s , t ran s .  R icha rd  and C la r a  Winston (New York: 
M iacm i l lan ,  1976), 142; Hans-Georg von S t u d n i t z ,  Wh i le  B e r l i n  Burns: 
The D ia ry  o f  Hans-Georg von S t u d n i t z  1943-1945, t r a n s .  R.H. S te v en s  
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), 259; Weitz, 238.
2 1 4
158. Weizsaecker testimony, 10 June 1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UNO, OGL 
17, Box 137, F o ld e r  2, 8092; Woermann t e s t im o ny ,  6 J u l y  1948, AMT t r a n s ­
c r i p t ,  UNO, OGL 17, Box 140, F o ld e r  6, 11050.
159. Woermann testimony, 6 Ju ly  1948, AMT t r a n s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, 
Box 140, F o ld e r  6, 11039-40. Ko rd t  s ta ted  a t  the t r i a l  o f  h i s  c o l l e a gu e s  
in Nuremberg in  1948: "Ribbentrop had . . . given an order that  the fore ign 
miss ion [embassy] should only report  facts  and abstain from commenting on 
them" (Kordt testimony, 4 June 1948, AMT t r a n s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 136, 
F o ld e r  7, 7375).
160. Ib id . ,  Box 140, Folder 6, 11055.
161. Ib id . ,  Box 140, Folder 6, 11056.
162. Ib id . ,  Box 140, Folder 7, 11128.
163. Ibid.
164. H a s s e l1, 26.
165. Ib id . ,  54.
166. Ib id . ,  16; Robertson, 150.
167. H i t l e r  d i r e c t iv e ,  21 October 1938, DGFP(D), 4:99-100. See also 
R ich ,  H i t l e r ' s  War A im s , 1:111; Thorne, 93; Ca r r ,  Arms, Au ta rky ,  and 
Aggression, 102.
168. L ipsk i  memorandum, 24 October 1938, Diplomat in Be r l in ,  1933- 
1939, 453-54; Hewel memorandum, 24 October 1938, DGFP(D), 5:104-7.
169. Ciano, Ciano's D ip lomat ic  Papers, 242-46; Ciano, Hidden D ia ry , 
185; Schmidt memorandum, 28 October 1938, DGFP(D), 4:515-20.
1,70. Ribbentrop memorandum, 19 November 1938, DGFP(D), 5:127-28.
171. L ipsk i  to Beck, 19 November 1938, Diplomat in Be r l in ,  1933-1939, 
466-67.
172. Ke i te l  d i r e c t i v e ,  24 November 1938, 137-C, NCA, 6:949-50.
173. Ke i te l  d i r e c t i v e ,  17 December 1938, DGFP(D), 4:185-86.
174. Mackensen memorandum, 3 January 1939, DGFP(D), 4:545-46; Rib­
bentrop to Ciano, 9 January 1939, DGFP(D), 4:550.
2 1 5
175. Simon Newman, March 1939: The B r i t i s h  Guarantee to Poland (Ox­
ford: Oxford Un ive rs i t y  Press, 1976), 90.
176. L ip s k i ,  482; Schmidt memorandum, 5 January 1939, DGFP(D), 5:152- 
58.
177. Ribbentrop memorandum, 10 January 1939, DGFP(D), 5:159-61; 
L ip s k i ,  482.
178. L ip s k i ,  485; Ribbentrop memorandum, 1 February 1939, DGFP(D), 
5:167-68.
179. Woermann testimony, 6 Ju ly  1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, 
Box 140, F o ld e r  2, 11084; W e izsaecke r  t e s t im o ny ,  8 June 1948, AMT 
t r a n s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 136, Folder 13, 7715, 7731.
180. Weizsaecker testimony, 8 June 1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, 
Box 136, Folder 13, 7731.
181. Schmidt memorandum, 21 January 1939, s t a f f  summary ana lys is ,  In­
ternat iona l  M i l i t a r y  Tribunal documents, Nuremberg, Germany, Documents in 
Chester F r i t z  L ib ra ry ,  Un ive rs i ty  o f  North Dakota, OGL 17 [hereafter  c i ted  
as IMT documents, UND, OGL 17], Box 195, Fo lder  6, 2795-PS, 55.
182. Leonidas E. H i l l ,  "Three C r i se s ,  1938-39," Journal of Contem­
pora ry  H i s t o r y , 3 (January 1969), 124. See a l s o  H i l l ,  Die We izsaecke r  
Papi e re , 150-52.
183. Ke i te l  to Ribbentrop, 11 March 1939, DGFP(D), 4:234-35; Ribben­
trop, 94.
184. Weizsaecker testimony, 8 June 1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, 
Box 136, Fo lder 13, 7732; Weizsaecker, 175.
185. Coulondre to Bonnet, 13 March 1939, The French Yel low Book, 67-
6 8 .
186. Crimes Against  Czechoslovakia Report, 3061-PS, NCA, 5:867; 
Hewel memorandum, 13 March 1939, 2802-PS, NCA, 5:443-47.
187. Weinberg, The Foreign Po l i c y  o f  H i t l e r ' s  Germany, 2:471, n.21.
188. Ib id .
216
189. Newman, 91; Ribbentrop, 94; Altenburg memorandum, 14 March 
1939’ DGFp(Dh 4:252-53.
190. Weizsaecker memorandum, 14 March 1939, DGFP(D), 4:261.
191. Henke to Ribbentrop, 13 March 1939, DGFP(D), 4:249; Newman, 91.
192. Hewel memorandum, 15 March 1939, DGFP(D), 4:263-69.
193. Ibid., 266-69; Lacro ix  to Bonnet, 15 March 1939, The French 
Ye l low  Book, 86; German Cr imes a g a in s t  C ze cho s lo vak ia  Report,  Czech 
Government, 3061-PS, NCA, 5:857; Weizsaecker, 176; Schmidt, 123-24.
194. Schmidt, 123.
195. Czech-German Dec larat ion, 15 March 1939, DGFP(D), 4:270; 
Schmidt, 124-25.
196. German-Slovak P r o t o c o l ,  23 March 1939, IMT documents, UND, OGL 
17, Box 195, F o ld e r  6, 2793-PS.
197. A l f r e d  E. Senn, The Great Powers, L i thuan ia ,  and the V i lna Ques- 
t ion ,  1920-1928 (Leiden, The Netherlands: E.J. B r i l l ,  1966), 107-21.
198. A.J.P. Taylor,  The Or ig ins  o f  the Second World War (London: 
Hamish Hamilton, 1961), 209.
199. J u l i u s  P. Slavenas, "L ithuania ,  Klaipeda-Memel, and H i t l e r , "  
B a l t i c  H is to ry , 3 (1974), 266.
200. Hewel memorandum, 20 March 1939, s t a f f  evidence ana lys is ,  IMT 
documents, UND, OGL 17, Box 196, Folder 3, 2956-PS.
201. Slavenas, 266; Reich decree, 23 March 1939, TC-53-A, NCA,
8:408.
202. Henderson to Ha l i fax ,  28 May 1939, B r i t i s h  Foreign O f f ice ,  The 
B r i t i s h  War Blue Book: Documents Concerning German-Polish Relat ions and the 
Outbreak of H o s t i l i t i e s  between Great B r i t a i n  and Germany on September 3, 




205. Hasse l l ,  45.
206. Theo Kordt to Ribbentrop, 22 March 1939, Auswaertiges Amt, Docu­
ments on the Events Preceding the Outbreak o f  the War [ h e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  as 
DEPOW-] (Ber l in  and Hew York: German Foreign O f f ice ,  1939), 295; Theo Kordt 
to Ribbentrop, 23 March 1939, DEPOW, 295-96.
207. Dirksen, 216, 218.
208. H i t l e r  d i r e c t i v e ,  25 March 1939, DGFP(D), 6:117-19.
209. L ip s k i ,  502; Ribbentrop memorandum, 21 March 1939, DGFP(D), 
6:70-72.
210. Chamber la in  speech, 31 March 1939, TMWC, 41:109-10; L i p s k i ,
508.
211. Ribbentrop memorandum, 26 March 1939, TMWC, 41:110-14.
212. Ribbentrop memorandum, 26 March 1939, DGFP(D), 6:121-24.
213. Weizsaecker to Moltke, 27 March 1939, DGFP(D), 6:127.
214. Ribbentrop, 102; Schmidt memorandum, 27 March 1939, DGFP(D), 
6:135-36.
215. Sch l iep to Moltke, 29 March 1939, DGFP(D), 6:155-56.
216. Chamberlain speech, 31 March 1939, TMWC, 41:109-10; Chamberlain 
speech, 31 March 1939, The B r i t i s h  War Blue Book, 48.
217. Ciano, Ciano's D ip lomat ic  Papers, 282; Theo Kordt to Ribben­
t ro p ,  13 A p r i l  1939, DEPOW, 309; Ang lo -Po l  i s h  Communique, 6 A p r i l  1939, 
The B r i t i s h  War Blue Book, 49.
218. Ke ite l  d i r e c t iv e ,  3 Ap r i l  1939, DGFP(D), 6:186-87; H i t l e r  
d i r e c t iv e ,  11 Ap r i l  1939, DGFP(D), 6:223-28.
219. Hasse l l ,  54; Weinberg, The Foreign Po l ic y  of H i t l e r ' s  Germany, 
2:561.
220. Weizsaecker to Moltke, 5 Ap r i l  1939, DGFP(D), 6:195.
218
221. As quoted in Weinberg, The Foreign P o l i c y  o f  H i t l e r ' s  Germany, 
2:561, n.89.
222. Weizsaecker testimony, 8 June 1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, 
Box 136, Fo lder 13, 7736.
223. Ribbentrop memorandum, 27 Ap r i l  1939, The B r i t i s h  War Blue Book, 
68-70; Ribbentrop memoraundum, 28 Ap r i l  1939, The B r i t i s h  War Blue Book, 
32-36; Weizsaecker, 181.
224. Ribbentrop memorandum, 12 Ap r i l  1939, DGFP(0 ) , 6:228.
225. Ribbentrop memorandum, 18 May 1939, DGFP(D), 6:450-52; Schmidt,
130.
226. Macgregor Knox, Mussol in i Unleashed 1939-1941: P o l i t i c s  and 
S t ra teg y  in  F a s c i s t  I t a l y ' s  La s t  War (Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y  
P re s s ,  1982), 41.
227. Ciano, Ciano's Dip lomatic  Papers, 287; German-Ital ian Pact of 
Fr iendship  and A l l i a n ce ,  22 May 1939, DGFP(D), 6:561-64; Kordt testimony, 
4 June 1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 136, Folder 8, 7417.
228. Ribbentrop testimony, 29 March 1946, TMWC, 10:266.
229. Conference minutes, 23 May 1939, DGFP(D), 6:575.
230. I b id . ,  6:576.
231. Ib id . ,  6:575.
232. H i l lg rube r ,  66; Weitz, 208; Anthony Read and David F isher ,  The 
Deadly Embrace: H i t l e r ,  S t a l in ,  and the Naz i-Sov ie t  Pact 1939-1941 (New 
York: W.W. Norton,  1988), 75-77.
233. Weizsaecker, 192.
234. Wolfgang Michalka, "From the Anti -Comintern to the Eu ro -As ia t ic  
Bloc: Ribbentrop's A l te rnate  Concept o f  H i t l e r ' s  Foreign Po l i c y  Programme," 
chap, in Aspects o f  the Third Reich, ed. H.W. Koch (New York: St. Mart in 's  
Press, 1985), 276; Ribbentrop, 105-10; Weitz,  206; Ribbentrop in te r roga ­




237. Weizsaecker, 186-87; H i l l ,  "The Wil hel mstrasse in the Nazi 
E ra , "  568.
238. H i lge r  and Meyer, 293; T ippe lsk i r ch  to Ribbentrop, 4 May 1939, 
Auswaertiges Amt, N a z i - S o v ie t  R e l a t i o n s ,  1939-1941: Documents from the 
Archives o f  the German Foreign O f f i c e , eds. Raymond J. Sontag and James S. 
Beddie (Washington, D.C.: Department o f  State, 1948), 2-3.
239. H i lge r  and Meyer, 293.
240. Ib id .
241. Weizsaecker to Schulenburg, 27 May 1939, Naz i-Sov ie t  Relat ions,  
1939-1941, 9.
242. Weizsaecker memorandum, 25 May 1939, DGFP(D), 6:586-87.
243. Ribbentrop to H i t l e r ,  29 May 1939, Naz i-Sov iet  Relat ions,  1939- 
1941, 10-11.
244. Ribbentrop memorandum, 29 May 1939, Naz i-Sov iet  Relat ions,  1939- 
1941, 11; We izsaecker  memorandum, 30 May 1939, N a z i - S o v i e t  R e l a t i o n s ,  
1939-1941, 12; Weizsaecker to Schulenburg, 30 May 1939, Naz i-Sov ie t  Rela- 
t i o n s ,  1939-1941,15 ;  We izsaecke r  to  Schu lenburg ,  30 May 1939, DGFP(D), 
6:610.
245. Weizsaecker to Schulenburg, 29 Ju ly  1939, DGFP(D), 6:1006-9.
246. Hasse l l ,  53. See also Herbert S. Levine, H i t l e r ' s  Free C i ty :  The 
H i s t o r y  o f  the Nazi Pa r ty  in  Danz ig ,  1925-39 (Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y  o f  
Chicago Press, 1973).
247. Ribbentrop to L i p s k i ,  9 August 1939, TMWC, 41:118-19.
248. Ciano, Ciano's D ip lomat ic  Papers, 297. See also Galeazzo Ciano, 
The Ciano D ia r ie s  1939-1943: The Complete, Unabridged D ia r ies  of Count Gal- 
eazzo Ciano, I t a l i a n  M i n i s t e r  f o r  Fo re ign  A f f a i r s ,  1936-1943, ed. Hugh 
Gibson, in trod. Sumner Welles (New York: Doubleday. 1946), 119.
249. Ciano, Ciano's D ip lomat ic  Papers, 297-98. See a lso Schmidt,
132.
250. Ciano, Ciano's Diplomat ic Papers, 300.
2 2 0
251. Ibid., 301. See also Ciano, The Ciano D ia r ies  1939-1943, 119;
Schmidt, 132.
252. Schmidt, 132.
253. Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, 11 August 1939, DGFP(D), 7:28.
254. Dirksen, 222. On 13 August 1939, Dirksen ar r ived  in B e r l in  to 
varn o f  the B r i t i s h  i n t e n t i o n  to go to war in  support  o f  Poland. H i t l e r  
ind R ibben t rop  would not meet w i th  t h e i r  ambassador to  accep t  such a 
earn ing ,  however. Acco rd ing  to D i r k s en ,  they d id  not want to hear 
in fo rm a t ion  c o n t r a r y  to t h e i r  b e l i e f  t h a t  B r i t a i n  and France would not 
:igh t  fo r  the Poles (Dirksen, 228, 231).
255. Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, 14 August 1939, Naz i-Sov iet  Relat ions 
.939-1941, 50-52; Schulenburg to  R ibben t rop ,  11 August  1939, DGFP(D), 
?:28.
256. Henderson to Ha l i fax ,  16 August 1939, The B r i t i s h  War Blue Book, 
.15-119.
257. I b i d . ; Weizsaecker, 192.
258. Kordt, Nicht aus den Akten, 311-19; Henderson to Ha l i fax ,  16
august 1939, The B r i t i s h  War Blue Book, 115-119; H i l l ,  "The Wilhelmstrasse 
n the Nazi E ra , "  568.
259. Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, 16 August 1939, DGFP(D), 7:76-77. 
ee a lso Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, 16 August 1939, DGFP(D), 87-90.
260. Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, 16 August 1939, DGFP(D), 7:84-85.
261. Ribbontrop to Schulenburg, 18 August 1939, DGFP(D), 7:121-23.
262. Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, 20 August 1939, DGFP(D), 7:150-51.
263. Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, 20 August 1939, DGFP(D), 7:149-50.
264. Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, 20 August 1939, DGFP(D), 7:156-57.
265. H i t l e r  dec la ra t ion  of f u l l  d ip lomat ic  powers fo r  Ribbentrop, 22 
ugust 1939, DGFP(D), 7:200.
266. Weizsaecker to Schulenburg, 23 August 1939, DGFP(D), 7:221.
2 2 1
267. Schmidt, 138; Ribbentrop, 111; H i lge r  and Meyer, 300-4; 
Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union o f  Soviet S o c i a l i s t  
R ep u b l i c s ,  DGFP(D), 7:245-46.
268. Schulenburg to Ribbentrop, 25 August 1939, DGFP(D), 7:295.
269. Chamberlain to H i t l e r ,  22 August 1939, The B r i t i s h  War Blue 
Book, 125-27; Franz Ha lde r ,  The Ha ide r  War D ia ry  1939-1942 ed. Cha r ie s  
Burdick and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Novato, C a l i f . :  Pres ido Press, 1988), 38.
270. Weizsaecker testimony, 8 June 1948, AMT t r an s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, 
Box 135, Fo lder 14, 7754-755.
271. Weizsaecker, 204.
272. Carr,  Arms, Autarky, and Aggress ion, 123.
273. Schmidt, 138-39.
274. Carr ,  Arms, Autarky, and Aggress ion, 116.
275. Weizsaecker testimony, 8 June 1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, 
Box 136, Folder 14, 7755.
276. Ang lo-Po l ish  Mutual Ass istance Pact, 25 August 1939, The B r i t i s h  
War Blue Book, 49-52.
277. Schmidt, 145.
278. Ib id . ,  146; Weizsaecker, 207.
279. Schmidt, 146.
280. Haider, 34-35, 39; Weizsaecker, 205; Ribbentrop, 117; Weiz­
saecker  t e s t im ony ,  8 June 1948, AMT t r a n s c r i p t ,  UND, OGL 17, Box 136, 
Fo lder 14, 7755.
281. Woermann testimony, 6 Ju ly  1948, AMT t r a n s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, 
Box 140, F o ld e r  7, 1128-129; D i r k s en ,  226; R ibben t rop ,  116-17; Ha ide r ,  
35.
282. Ribbentrop in te r roga t ion  test imony, 10 October 1945, NCA, Sup. 
8, 1252; Ciano, The Ciano D ia r ies  1939-1943, 129.
283. Weizsaecker test imony, 8 June 1948, AMT t r an s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, 
Box 136, Folder 14, 7747; Ribbentrop, 117.
2 2 2
284. Weizsaecker, 192.
285. I b id . ,  193.
286. Weizsaecker testimony, 8 June 1948, AMT t r an s c r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, 
Box 136, Fo lder 14, 7747. See also Dirksen 231.
287. Haider, 37.
288. Ib id . ,  40.
289. Schmidt memorandum, 29 August 1939, DGFP(D), 7:381-84.
290. Ribbentrop, 118; Haider, 42.
291. Weizsaecker, 208.
292. As quoted in Weizsaecker, 208.
293. Taylor,  The Or ig ins  of the Second World War, 272; Ribbentrop, 
119; Schmidt, 249.
294. Haider, 42; Ribbentrop, 121; Sch l iep  memorandum, 30 August 
1939, DGFP(D), 7:442; Beck to L i p s k i ,  31 August 1939, D ip lomat  in  
B e r l in  1933-1939, 572.
295. Haider, 40.
296. Schmidt, 150-51.
297. Hasse l l ,  68-72;- Kordt, Micht aus den Akten, 234-35; Schmidt,
150, 152; Schm idt  memorandum, 31 August 1939, DGFP(D), 7:451-54.
Ribbentrop to ld  the Internat ional M i l i t a r y  Tr ibunal that  H i t l e r  h imse l f  had 
drawn up the document (Ribbentrop testimony, 1 A p r i l  1946, TMWC, 10:367).
298. Ribbentrop, 123; Schmidt, 153; Ribbentrop testimony, 29 March 
1946> ™ w c > 1 0 : 2 7 5 .
299. Schmidt testimony, 28 March 1946, TMWC, 10:197. For the B r i t i s h  
viewpoint of t h i s  meeting, see Henderson, 283-87.
300. Tay lor ,  The Or ig ins  of the Second World War, 274.
301. L i p s k i  to  Beck, 31 August 1939, D ip lom a t  in  B e r l i n  1933-1939,
571.
223
302. Beck to l i p s k i ,  31 August 1939, Diplomat in Be r l in  1933-1939, 
572; Ribbentrop, 118.
303. German Communique to B r i t a i n ,  31 March 1939, TMWC, 41:121-22.
304. Weizsaecker, 209.
305. Hasse l l ,  69.
306. Ribbentrop testimony, 29 March 1946, TMWC, 10:276; D i re c t ive  
No. 1 f o r  the Conduct o f  War "Case White" ,  31 August 1939, A d o l f  H i t l e r ,  
B l i t z k r i e g  to Defeat: H i t l e r ' s  War D i re c t iv e s  1939-1945 trans. and ed. Hugh 
Trevor-Roper (New York: Holt,  R inehart,  and Winston, 1964), 3-5.
307. Ribbentrop testimony, 29 March 1946, TMWC, 10:276.
308. Ib id . ,  10:275.
309. Schmidt, 155.
310. I b id . ,  156.
311. Weizsaecker testimony, 8 June 1948, AMT t ran sc r ip t ,  UND, OGL 17, 
Box 136, Folder 14, 7755.
312. Schmidt testimony, 10 March 1946, TMWC, 10:200.
313. H a s se l l , 71.
CHAPTER VII
RIBBENTROP AND THE WILHELMSTRASSE 
DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR
The outbreak of war in September 1939 resu lted in the demise o f  Nazi 
diplomacy and the increased importance of m i l i t a r y  matters. D irec t ing  the 
Po l ish  Campaign, Adolf  H i t l e r  had no t ime fo r  h is  Foreign M in i s te r  and the 
Wi1 he !m s t ra sse .  The Fuehre r  would now r e l y  upon h i s  General S t a f f  f o r  
m i l i t a r y  and d ip lomat ic  advice in ca r ry ing  out the war against  Poland and 
i t s  a l l ie s .^  As Ernst von Weizsaecker to ld  the American M i l i t a r y  Tr ibunal ,  
"H i t l e r  preferred to ta lk  to a so ld ie r  about fore ign po l i cy  rather than to 
experts.
H i t l e r ' s  un favo rab le  d i s p o s i t i o n  towards profess ional d ip lomats,  of  
course, was nothing new. He had always despised, and, according to Joachim 
von Ribbentrop, "hated" the d ip lomat ic  corps.3 But, now, the Fuehrer was 
upset  a t  h i s  own Fore ign  M i n i s t e r ,  the Naz i R ibben t rop ,  because o f  the 
B r i t i s h  and French dec la rat ions  o f  war against Germany on 3 September 1939. 
Although f i rm ly  be l iev ing  that the West would not intervene in a German- 
Po l i sh  c o n f l i c t ,  H i t l e r ,  h imse l f ,  could not but help blame Ribbentrop for  
the unexpected outcome s ince, a f te r  a l l ,  the Foreign M in i s te r  was the so- 
c a l l e d  e xpe r t  on r e l a t i o n s  w i th  B r i t a i n  and France. Key members o f  the
224
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Nazi inner c i r c l e ,  o f  which Ribbentrop never belonged, loud ly  declared the 
Foreign M in i s t e r  to blame fo r  the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a European war.^ However, 
H i t l e r ,  f i n a l l y  r e a l i z i n g  the shortcomings o f  h is  top diplomat, was forced 
to keep Ribbentrop on as Foreign M in i s te r  since to d ism iss the champagne 
salesman would mean admit t ing h is  own m isca lcu la t ions  in  diplomacy.6
In o rde r  to m a in ta in  h i s  p o s i t i o n  in  the Th i r d  Re ich ,  R ibbent rop  
needed to take d ra s t i c  act ions to demonstrate h is  l o y a l t y  and usefulness to 
the Fuehrer. At the onset o f  the invasion o f  Poland, the Foreign M in i s te r  
distanced h imse l f  from the profess ional dip lomats at the Foreign O f f ice ,  
whom he also hated fo r  t h e i r  d is lo ya l  se rv ice  to H i t l e r  and h imse l f .6 He 
r e l i e d  upon the advice and serv ices o f  h is  own Sec re ta r ia t ,  also known as 
the Bureau R e i c h s a u s s en m in i s t e r  (RAM).'7 Th is  group c o n s i s t e d  o f  such 
trusted dip lomats as Er ich  Kordt and Paul Otto Schmidt, as well as former 
members o f  the Bureau R ibben t rop ,  i n c l u d i n g  Wa lthe r  Hewel, Gustav A d o l f  
Steengracht von Moyland, Franz Sonnle ithner, and Rudolf L ikus.6 With th i s  
assortment o f  o f f i c i a l s ,  Ribbentrop procured cars aboard Heinr ich Himmler's 
s p e c ia l  t r a i n  and t r a v e l l e d  to the war f r o n t  to be c lo s e  to the Fueh re r .0 
Steengracht von Moyland, who had prev ious ly  worked fo r  Ribbentrop in  London 
(1936-38) and B e r l i n  (1938-39) managed the Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r ' s  sa loon 
c a r s . 10 Throughout the P o l i s h  Campaign, and f o r  most o f  the f o l l o w in g  
m i l i t a r y  campaigns during the Second World War, Ribbentrop and the Bureau 
RAM u t i l i z e d  t h i s  t r a in  to keep in  c lose  contact with H i t l e r  and h is  f i e l d
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headquarters.11 According to Gustav H i lge r ,  who jo ined th is  se lec t  group 
of adv isors in  1941:
[R ih ben t rop ]  f o l l o w e d  H i t l e r  everywhere  [ i n  h i s  s p e c ia l  t r a i n ]  in  
o rde r  to be c lo s e  to him a t  a l l  t im es .  The s p e c ia l  t r a i n  in c lu d ed  a 
pa r lo r  car fo r  the m in is te r  h imse l f ,  two d in ing cars, and no le ss  than 
e ig h t  s le e p in g  ca rs  housing a crew o f  a id e s ,  male and female  
s e c r e t a r i e s ,  c ounse le r s  and e xp e r t  c o n s u l t a n t s ,  and a numerous 
bodyguard responsib le  fo r  von Ribbentrop's personal safety. The whole 
thing was very much l i k e  a c i r c u s  which put up i t s  tents here or there 
j u s t  as required, or j u s t  as the fore ign m in is te r 's  whims des ired.1^
From t h i s  t r a i n  R ibbent rop  d i r e c t e d  the o p e ra t io n s  o f  the German
Fo re ign  O f f i c e .  Throughout World War I I ,  the Fo re ign  M in i s t e r  l o y a l l y
c a r r i e d  out the o rders  o f  the Fuehre r  as the s u r e s t  way to remain in
H i t l e r ' s  fa vo r .  S teeng rach t  von Moyland t o l d  the Nuremberg c o u r t  t h a t
"Ribbentrop h imse l f  never l a id  down any po l i cy .  He merely executed what
H i t l e r  ordered him to do and towards H i t l e r  he was in a sort  of trance and
he fo l l o w e d  a l l  o f  h i s  o rde rs  b l i n d l y . T o  c a r r y  out H i t l e r ' s  o rd e r s ,
Ribbentrop u t i l i z e d  the telephone in h is  sa loon-car to d i r e c t  the Foreign
O f f i c e  in  B e r l i n  on a c t i o n s  to t a k e . 14 Dur ing  h i s  t r i a l  a t  Nuremberg,
We izsaecke r  compla ined  o f  t h i s  management techn ique ,  s t a t i n g  t h a t
Ribbentrop "always wanted to hold a l l  p o l i t i c a l  dec is ions  in  h is  own hands,
i r re spe c t iv e  o f  where he happened to be."16 Moreover, Ribbentrop would not
a l low Schmidt to provide the Foreign Secretary copies of reports and notes
on H i t l e r ' s  c on fe rences .16
The Foreign M in i s te r  lacked t ru s t  fo r  the profess ional d iplomats at 
the Wi 1 h e !m s t ra s se .  He appo in ted  Naz is  from the Bureau R ibben t rop  to 
control the a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the career diplomats. He made Theodor Habicht
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the Deputy D i rec to r  of  the P o l i t i c a l  Department, under Ernst Woermann.^ 
But, more im p o r t a n t l y ,  R ibben t rop  r a p i d l y  promoted M a r t in  Lu the r  to the 
p o s i t i o n  o f  U nde rsec re ta ry  o f  S ta te  f o r  Fo re ign  A f f a i r s . ^  From t h i s  
p o s i t i o n ,  Lu the r  c o n t r o l l e d  i n t e r n a l  m a t te rs  at  the W i lh e lm s t r a s s e ,  and 
acqu i red  c o n s id e r a b le  power over the c a re e r  d ip lom a t s  by bugging t h e i r  
o f f i c e s  and te lephone c a l l s ,  and r e p o r t in g  t r e a so nab le  m at te rs  to the 
Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r . ^  We izsaecke r ,  the S ta te  S e c re t a r y ,  compla ined t h a t  
Lu the r  "made a note o f  my v i s i t o r s ,  tapped my te lephone w i r e s ,  and 
i n s t a l l e d  a m on i to r  system in  my own s tudy ."2® With a id  from Lu the r ,  
Ribbentrop was preparing to d ism iss 150 to 200 of the top o f f i c i a l s  at the 
W i lh e lm s t r a s s e ,  i n c l u d in g  We izsaecke r  and Ko rd t ,  in  e a r l y  1940.21 He 
planned to r e p la c e  them w i th  members o f  the Bureau R ibben t rop ,  which he 
d isbanded on 1 February  1940.22 H i t l e r ,  neverthe less ,  denied Ribbentrop 
h is  quest to shakeup the Wi lhelmstrasse in June 1940. He rea l i zed  that the 
expert ise  of the d ip lomat ic  corps might s t i l l  be needed, while  Ribbentrop 
was u se le s s  f o r  most d i p l o m a t i c  requ i rem en ts  o th e r  than c a r r y i n g  out 
i n s t r u c t i o n s . 22
In the f a l l  o f  1939, A d o l f  H i t l e r  and h i s  General S t a f f  fo rm u la ted  
plans to attack the West.2  ̂ Having no d i r e c t  knowledge of such planning, 
in October, Foreign Secretary Weizsaecker, nonetheless, t r ie d  to dissuade 
the Fuehrer from launching an o f fens ive  against  the West. 3 For numerous 
reasons H i t l e r  postponed an o f fens ive  through the Low Countries against  the 
B r i t i s h  and French forces deploying in France. Even so, the war at sea was
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a c t i v e . i n  t h i s  l i g h t ,  H i t l e r  r e a l i z e d  the B r i t i s h  t h r e a t  to h is  
northern f lank in Scandinavia, and the poss ib le  loss o f  important i ron-ore  
supp l ies  coming from Sweden and shipped v ia  Norwegian ports to Germany.2^
H i t l e r  was g r e a t l y  i n t e r e s t e d  in  the n e u t r a l i t y  o f  Norway. In 
December 1939, A l f red  Rosenberg arranged fo r  Vidkun Qu is l ing ,  the leader of 
the Norwegian Nasjonal Sam l ing  P a r t y ,  to s e c r e t l y  meet w i th  the Fuehre r  
w ithout the knowledge o f  the Foreign O f f i c e . Q u i s l i n g ,  who sought power 
in  Norway, warned H i t l e r  that the West was planning to occupy Norway, and 
stressed the need for German act ion to prevent such a move.29
Instead o f  s t r i k in g  d i r e c t l y  a t  Germany, B r i t a in  and France made plans 
to c u t  o f f  German s u p p l i e s  o f  i r o n - o r e  from S cand inav ia .  As e a r l y  as 
October 1939, the A l l i e s  schemed to p lant mines in  Norwegian coasta l waters 
with the p o s s i b i l i t y  of deploying an expedit ion force to occupy the i ron -  
ore mines in  Sweden.20 N e ve r th e le s s ,  on 30 November, the S o v ie t  Union 
a t ta c ked  F in la n d ,  and t h e r e f o r e ,  t em po ra r i l y  red irected the a t ten t ion  o f  
the A l l i e s  from Norway and Sweden f u r t h e r  e a s t . 31 By February  1940, 
however, B r i t a i n  and France were planning to occupy key ports in Norway.32
German m i l i t a r y  i n t e l l i g e n c e  was w e l l  aware o f  A l l i e d  p lans  f o r  
occupy ing  Norway.33 To p reven t  the A l l i e s  from o u t f l a n k in g  Germany and 
acqu i r ing  forward a i r  force and naval bases, H i t l e r  and h is  m i l i t a r y  s t a f f  
s e c re t ly  planned to invade and occupy both Norway and Denmark. Such plans, 
a c co rd ing  to H i t l e r ,  were "des igned to p r o t e c t  by fo r c e  o f  arms the 
n e u t r a l i t y  o f  the Northern countr ies ."3*1 Admiral Wilhelm Canaris,  the Head
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of the German M i l i t a r y  In te l l igence  Serv ice ,  se c re t ly  informed E r ic  Kordt 
o f  such plans,  who to ld  h is  c lose confederate, Weizsaecker.35
Meanwhi le ,  the German General S t a f f  kep t  p lann ing  f o r  an o f f e n s i v e  
against the bui ldup o f  B r i t i s h  and French forces along the eastern border 
of France. Plans c a l led  fo r  German forces to attack the A l l i e s  through the 
Low Countr ies.36 Ribbentrop became aware o f  the invasion plans, but H i t l e r  
shared no in format ion with h is  Foreign M in i s t e r  regarding m i l i t a r y  de ta i l s .  
The Fueh re r ,  however, t o l d  R ibbent rop  t h a t  Germany needed to conduct  a 
p reempt ive  s t r i k e  through the Low C o u n t r i e s ,  which were r i s k i n g  t h e i r  
neutral s tatus by coordinat ing m i l i t a r y  e f f o r t s  with the West, in order to 
safeguard the Ruhrland from an A l l i e d  invas ion.37
H i t l e r  sent h is  Foreign M in i s te r  to meet Musso l in i  and Ciano in  Rome 
on 10 March 1940. Ribbentrop informed the Duce o f  H i t l e r ' s  plans to attack 
the West, and defeat France by the f a l l  o f  1940.38
Whi le  p re pa r in g  f o r  the in v a s io n  o f  the West, German m i l i t a r y  
o f f i c i a l s  began noting the B r i t i s h  Royal Navy's incurs ions  in to Norwegian 
waters on 28 March 1940.39 Ribbentrop was made aware of th i s  fa c t  by the 
German Ambassador to Norway the fo l low ing  morning.40 Wasting l i t t l e  t ime, 
on 2 A p r i l ,  H i t l e r  i s sued  an o rde r  f o r  German f o r c e s  to invade and occupy 
Norway and Denmark on the ninth.4*
Having received such in s t ru c t ion s ,  General Wilhelm Ke i t e l ,  the Ch ie f  
o f  S t a f f  o f  the High Command, drafted a l e t t e r  to Ribbentrop informing him 
o f  the upcoming m i l i t a r y  a c t i o n ,  and r e q u e s t in g  the Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  to
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c o o rd in a te  the d ip l o m a t i c  aspec t  w i th  the m i l i t a r y  o p e ra t io n s  p lanned 
against  Norway and Denmark.42 The fo l low ing  morning, on 3 A p r i l ,  Ke i te l  
aga in  wrote to R ibbentrop.  D i s t r u s t i n g  the l o y a l t y  o f  h i s  d ip lo m a t s ,  
H i t l e r  feared that the Wi lhelmstrasse would leak out word of the upcoming 
in v a s io n  to the f o r e ig n  d ip l o m a t i c  co rp s  in  B e r l i n .  K e i t e l  t o l d  
Ribbentrop: "In accordance with the Fuehrer's s p e c i f i c  in s t ru c t ion s ,  . . . 
reques t  t h a t  the number o f  persons p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in  the p r e p a ra t io n s  be 
re s t r i c t e d  to the fewest poss ib le."43 To minimize the amount of t ime that  
m i l i t a r y  in format ion would be in the hands o f  untrustworthy dip lomats,  both 
o f  K e i t e l ' s  l e t t e r s  were not handed to Ribbentrop un t i l  7 A p r i l . 44
Ribbentrop fo l lowed orders and informed only a few key dip lomats of 
H i t l e r ' s  p lans .  W e izsaecker ,  keen ly  aware o f  the impending in v a s io n  
through Kordt and m i l i t a r y  f r iends ,  took leave from Be r l in .45 Ribbentrop 
had Schmidt and several members o f  the Languages D iv is ion  in the Foreign 
O f f ice  prepare and t rans la te  notes fo r  the Danish and Norwegian governments 
in  sec recy  a t  the Hotel Ad lon on 8 A p r i l . 46 That same day the Royal Navy 
began lay ing  mines in Norwegian t e r r i t o r i a l  waters.47
As planned, German forces invaded Denmark and Norway on 9 A p r i l .  The 
ac t ion  surpr ised many of the top diplomats at the Wilhelmstrasse. Ernst  
Woermann, the D i rec to r  of the P o l i t i c a l  Department, knew nothing about the 
impending i n v a s i o n . 48 Even the Denmark and Norway s p e c i a l i s t s  a t  the 
Foreign O f f ice  were not aware o f  H i t l e r ' s  p lans.4  ̂ Ribbentrop's task was 
to d e l i v e r  d ip lomat ic  notes to the Danish and Norwegian ambassadors that
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explained H i t l e r ’ s reasons fo r  the invasion and to request t h e i r  respect ive 
governments to not r e s i s t . 50
On 9 May 1940, as German fo r c e s  made the l a s t  p r e p a ra t io n s  f o r  the 
attack against  the West, H i t l e r  informed Ribbentrop o f  m i l i t a r y  matters and 
requested him to prepare d ip lomat ic  notes fo r  the ambassadors o f  Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and The Netherlands. The Foreign M in i s t e r  immediately ca l led  
Schmidt and language experts from the Foreign O f f ice  to the Pres ident ia l  
Palace to d ra f t  and t rans la te  the d ip lomat ic  notes in  complete secrecy from 
the o f f i c i a l s  at the Wil he! mstrasse.51 He to ld  Schmidt that " i f  news of 
t h i s  o f f en se  le a k s  out,  the Fuehre r  w i l l  have you shot.  I s h a l l  not be 
ab le  to save you ."52 I t  was not u n t i l  one o ' c l o c k  in  the morning on the 
ten th  t h a t  We izsaecke r  was in fo rmed  o f  H i t l e r ' s  m i l i t a r y  p lan s  and 
Ribbentrop's d ip lomat ic  a c t i v i t i e s  olanned fo r  l a t e r  that  morning.55 The 
e n t i r e  Fo re ign  O f f i c e ,  w i th  the e x cep t ion  o f  the S e c r e t a r i a t  and the 
languages d iv i s io n ,  had been kept in the dark about m i l i t a r y  matters un t i l  
the l a s t  moment.54
German forces i n i t i a t e d  H i t l e r ' s  preemptive o f fens ive  s t r i k e  against  
the A l l i e s  through the Low Countries on 10 May 1940. H i t l e r  had Ribbentrop 
p e r s o n a l l y  meet w i th  the B e lg ia n ,  Dutch, and Luxembourg ambassadors .55 
Ribbentrop informed the Belgian and Dutch d ip lomats that t h e i r  countr ies  
had not f u l f i l l e d  t h e i r  o b l i g a t i o n s  as n eu t ra l  c o u n t r i e s ,  and t h a t  "they 
have attempted . . .  to maintain the outward appearance o f  n eu t ra l i t y ,  but 
in p rac t ice  both countr ies  have shown a one-sided p a r t i a l i t y  fo r  Germany's
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opponents and have f u r t h e r e d  t h e i r  d e s ig n s . "56 He made i t  p l a i n  tha t
H i t l e r  bel ieved a B r i t i s h  and French attack through the Low Countries in to
the Ruhrland to be imminent. Moreover, the Foreign M in i s te r  declared:
[ I ] n t h i s  s t r u g g le  f o r  e x i s t e n c e  fo r ced  upon the German people by 
England and France, the Reich Government i s  not disposed to await  i d l y  
the attack by England and France and to a l low  them to carry the war by 
way o f  Be lg ium and the Ne the r lands  i n t o  German t e r r i t o r y .  I t  has 
t h e re fo re  now is sued  the command to German t roops  to ensure the 
n e u t r a l i t y  o f  these c o u n t r i e s  by a l l  the m i l i t a r y  means at  the 
disposal of the Reich.57
Ribbentrop warned that the Germans would f i g h t  i f  they met any res istance. 
To the d ip lomat ic  representat ive from Luxembourg, the Foreign M in i s te r  only 
mentioned the necess ity  fo r  German forces to attack the A l l i e s  through his 
count ry .58
The German b l i t z k r i e g  qu ick ly  defeated the A l l i e d  e f f o r t  re su l t in g  in 
the h u m i l i a t i n g  w i thd raw a l  o f  B r i t i s h  f o r c e s  from Dunk irk  and the 
c a p i t u l a t i o n  o f  France. With Germany and B r i t a i n  s t i l l  a t  war, H i t l e r  
con cen t ra ted  h i s  e f f o r t s  on the B a t t l e  o f  B r i t a i n  du r ing  the summer o f  
1940.59
Meanwhi le ,  H i t l e r  began tu r n in g  h i s  a t t e n t i o n  toward h i s  p r i n c i p a l  
enemy, the S o v ie t  Union. S t a l i n  had t read  upon H i t l e r ' s  i n t e r e s t s  by 
occupy ing  the German p a r t  o f  L i t h u a n ia  in  June 1940.6(  ̂ On 31 J u l y  1940, 
the Fuehrer's deeply held anti-communist views, combined with increas ing 
German-Soviet tension over t e r r i t o r i a l  d isputes in  eastern Europe, prompted 
him to b r i e f  the German Genera l S t a f f  t h a t  the S o v i e t  Union must be 
"smashed" by the spring of 1941.61
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In September 1940, the Fuehrer  sent  R ibben t rop  to meet w i th  Ben i to  
Musso l in i  to encourage a greater I t a l i a n  exert ion  toward defeat ing B r i t a in .  
The Duce, however, had o the r  ideas .  He p r e f e r r e d  to take a c t io n  in  an 
eas tward  d i r e c t i o n  to conquer and expand h i s  power in t o  Yugos lav ia  and 
Greece, The German Foreign M in i s te r  was overwhelmed by the presence o f  the 
F a s c i s t  leader,  and found i t  imposs ib le  to convince him of  concentrat ing 
the war e f f o r t  on B r i t a in . 63
W h i l e  he t r a v e l l e d  one d i r e c t i o n ,  R ibben t rop ,  under H i t l e r ' s  
d i re c t io n s ,  sent Heinr ich Stahmer, a member o f  the Bureau RAM who was the 
fo rmer C h ie f  o f  the Far Eas te rn  S e c t io n  in  the Bureau R ibbent rop ,  as an 
envoy to Tokyo to arrange a m i l i t a r y  a l l i a n c e  w i th  Japan.63 The Fuehre r  
wanted Japanese m i l i t a r y  ass is tance aga inst  B r i t i s h  forces in the B r i t i s h  
Emp ire ,  as w e l l  as to n e u t r a l i z e  the Un i ted  S t a t e s . 64 Impressed by 
Germany's v i c t o r i e s  against  most of Europe and des ir ing  to invade French 
Indoch ina ,  the Japanese government d e s i r e d  to j o i n  the G e rm an - I ta l ia n  
m i l i t a r y  a l l i a n c e . 66 With g rea t  ease Stahmer ach ieved success  in 
n e g o t i a t i n g  the T r i p a r t i t e  Pact  (Germany, I t a l y ,  and Japan),  s igned  in  
B e r l i n  by R ibben t rop ,  Ga leazzo C iano ,  and Saburo Kurusu, the Japanese 
Ambassador to Germany, on 27 September 1940.66
Tension was at a high between Germany and the Sov ie t  Union because of 
t e r r i t o r i a l  squabbles over B es sa rab ia  and Romania dur ing  the f a l l  o f  
1940.67 Ribbentrop wanted to avoid a German-Soviet war at a l l  costs. He 
suggested to H i t l e r  that the Sov ie t  Union j o i n  the T r i p a r t i t e  Pact as a way
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to avo id  war.68 The Fuehrer  r e j e c t e d  such an idea,  but was w i l l i n g  to 
d i s c u s s  German-Sov ie t  t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e r e s t s  in  eas te rn  Europe. Thus, 
on 13 October 1940, R ibbent rop  i n s t r u c t e d  Count Schu lenburg,  the German 
Am bassado r  i n  Moscow to  r e q u e s t  t h a t  S t a l i n  send a d i p l o m a t i c  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  to B e r l i n  to d i s c u s s  " t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  on a wor ldw ide  
s c a le . " 69
Thus, on 12 November 1940, the S o v ie t  Fo re ign  Commissar,  Vyaches lav  
Mo lo tov  a r r i v e d  in  B e r l i n  to d i s c u s s  mat te rs .  Dur ing t h i s  meet ing 
Ribbentrop suggested that S t a l in  look southward towards the Indian Ocean 
f o r  expans ion in s te ad  o f  the B a lk an s .70 However, Mo lo tov  as ton ished  
h is  counterpart  by c a l l i n g  fo r  H i t l e r ' s  recognit ion o f  Sov iet  in te re s ts  in 
the Ba lkans ,  S o v ie t  bases on the Bosphorus and the D a rd ane l le s ,  S o v ie t  
m i l i t a r y  control o f  Bulgar ia  and the en t i r e  area o f  the S t r a i t s ,  as well  as 
a ha l t  to a l l  Germany m i l i t a r y  a c t i v i t y  in F in land.7* These demands were 
reaf f i rmed by Molotov in a statement to the Count Schulenburg in Moscow on 
25 November.72
In the meantime, Musso l in i  had launched an I t a l i a n  invas ion on Greece 
on 28 October 1940. The s h o r t - l i v e d  o f f e n s i v e  bogged down a g a in s t  Greek 
r e s i s t a n c e  w i t h in  a few days,  and I t a l i a n  f o r c e s  had dropped back to 
Albania by 11 November.73 On 4 November, nevertheless , H i t l e r  had decided 
to a s s i s t  the I t a l i a n s  and p u l l  them out o f  an em ba rra ss ing  s i t u a t i o n  by 
launching a German attack aga inst  Greece.74 To accomplish t h i s  the Fuehrer
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needed Yugos la v ia  to e i t h e r  remain n e u t r a l ,  o r  b e t t e r  y e t ,  support  the 
act ion against Greece. Because o f  the geographical posi ion o f  Yugoslavia, 
H i t l e r  would desperate ly need the cooperation o f  Belgrade to carry  out any 
ope ra t io n  aimed a t  Greece. H i t l e r  t h e r e f o r e  met A le k sanda r  C in c a r -  
Markovic, the Yugoslav Foreign M in i s te r ,  at Berchtesgaden, on 28 November 
1940. For coope ra t ion  w i th  the German e f f o r t ,  the Fuehre r  promised the 
Yugos lav government a s s i s t a n c e  in  a cqu i r in g  the seaport o f  Salonika. At 
the same time, he suggested that Yugoslavia j o in  the T r ip a r t i t e  Pact.75
In s p i t e  o f  the G r e e k - I t a l i a n  War, the Fuehre r  f u r t h e re d  h i s  p lans  
a g a in s t  the S o v ie t  Union. On 18 December 1940, H i t l e r  i s sued  o rde rs  f o r  
the armed fo r ce s  to prepare  f o r  Opera t ion  Ba rbarossa ,  des igned to "crush 
S o v ie t  Russ ia  in  a qu ick  campaign . . . even be fo re  the c o n c lu s io n  o f  the 
war a g a in s t  Eng land ."76 A lthough the Genera l S t a f f ,  a c co rd ing  to Barry  
Leach, shared H i t l e r ' s  optimism about the task  f a c in g  them,77 R ibbent rop  
urged H i t l e r  to avo id  war w i th  the S o v ie t  Un ion.78 The Fuehrer  brushed 
a s ide  any such adv ice  and kept  h i s  Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  un informed about 
m i l i t a r y  preparations.79
The s i tua t ion  in the Balkans became more ser ious in ea r ly  1941. The 
B r i t i s h  were deploying troops and a i r c r a f t  to Greece. Rea l i z ing  t h ' s  to be 
the opening o f  a new f r o n t ,  H i t l e r  hastened to coun te r  B r i t i s h  p lans .  On 
21 and 22 January ,  H i t l e r  and R ibbent rop  met M u s s o l i n i  and C iano at  
Salzburg to d iscuss plans for  a German invasion of Greece.88 Three weeks 
l a t e r ,  on 14 Feb rua ry ,  R ibben t rop  met the Yugos lav  M i n i s t e r  P r e s id e n t ,
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Drag isa  C v e t k o v i c ,  and the Yugos lav  Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  at  Fuesch l .  He 
st rong ly  suggested that Yugoslavia j o in  the T r i p a r t i t e  Pact ar.d a s s i s t  in 
the a t t a c k  a g a in s t  Greece.81 P r in ce  Pau l ,  the Regent o f  Y ugo s la v ia ,  met 
with H i t l e r  at Berchtesgaden and discussed p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y  matters on 4
op
March.c t  The Yugoslav government decided in favor of H i t l e r ' s  proposals, 
and jo ined the T r i p a r t i t e  Pact on 25 March 1941.88
The s i t u a t io n  took a s i g n i f i c a n t  turn two days l a t e r  when a group o f  
Yugos lav  Army o f f i c e r s ,  le d  by Genera l Dusan S im ov ic ,  ove r th rew  the 
C ve tkov ic  government.84 That same day, on 27 March, H i t l e r ,  who was 
enraged by such an a c t  a g a in s t  an a l l y ,  ordered the Germany m i l i t a r y  " to  
smash Yugo s la v ia  m i l i t a r i l y  and as a s t a t e . " 85 H i t l e r  t o l d  the Genera l 
S t a f f  and R ibben t rop  t h a t  t h i s  a c t i o n ,  combined w i th  the a t t a c k  a g a in s t  
Greece, would delay Operation Barbarossa by about four weeks.85 According 
to Weizsaecker, H i t l e r  was persona l ly  offended by the putsch: "He decided, 
on the spur o f  the moment, to a t t a c k  Yugos la v ia  and gave m i l i t a r y  o rde rs  
f o r  t h i s  w i t h i n  a few hours ."87 To c rush  Yugo s la v ia ,  H i t l e r  sought 
ass is tance from h is  c l i e n t  states.  He had Ribbentrop discuss the matter 
w i th  Doeme S z t o j a y ,  the Hungarian Ambassador to B e r l i n ,  to encourage 
Hungarian m i l i t a r y  act ion aga inst  Yugoslavia with the promise o f  an o u t le t  
to the A d r i a t i c  as a reward .88 On 5 A p r i l ,  H i t l e r  i n s t r u c t e d  R ibben t rop  
and the Bureau RAM, w ithout the ass is tance o f  Weizsaecker and the Foreign 
O f f i c e ,  to p repare  the d i p l o m a t i c  notes to be handed over the Greek and
OQ
Yugoslav representat ives  the fo l low ing  morning. v
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The German m i l i t a r y  machine began the in v a s io n  o f  Greece and 
Yugoslavia on 6 Ap r i l  1941. Ribbentrop met and expla ined the reasons fo r  
the in v a s io n s  to the Balkan r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  in  B e r l i n .  To the Greek 
ambassador the Foreign M in i s te r  pointed t h e i r  obvious a l l i a n c e  with B r i t a i n  
and acceptance o f  B r i t i s h  fo r c e s  on Greek s o i l . 90 He c i t e d  the re cen t  
putsch by an t i -German o f f i c e r s  a long  w i th  t h e i r  suppor t  f o r  B r i t i s h  
o p e ra t io n s  in  Greece as H i t l e r ' s  reason f o r  an a t t a c k  to the Yugos lav
. Q1representat ive.
Even though the in v a s io n  o f  the Ba lkans  caused a d e la y ,  H i t l e r  
continued to plan fo r  German forces to attack the Sov iet  Union. The fa c t  
tha t  S t a l in  signed a Treaty of F r iendship  with Yugoslavia during the f i r s t  
week o f  A p r i l  1941 on ly  i n f u r i a t e d  the Fueh re r .9  ̂ He would c rush  the 
Sov ie t  Union in a su rp r ise  attack. In Ap r i l  H i t l e r  informed Ribbentrop o f  
h is  m i l i t a r y  plans. The Foreign M in i s te r  objected to H i t l e r ' s  plans; but, 
r e a l i z i n g  the shakiness o f  h is  pos i t ion  w i th in  the Th ird Reich, Ribbentrop 
q u i c k l y  agreed w i th  h i s  mas te r 's  reason ing .  R ibben t rop  d e s c r ib ed  h i s  
pos i t ion  in h is  memoirs:
I m yse l f  a t  any ra te  wanted to t r y  one more d i p l o m a t i c  approach to 
Moscow, but H i t l e r  refused to a l low any fu r the r  demarche, and forbade 
me to t a l k  to anyone about i t ;  no d ip lom acy ,  he s a id ,  would make him 
change h is  mind about Russia's a t t i tude ,  which was quite  c le a r  to him, 
and i t  might well deprive him of the weapon o f  t a c t i c a l  surpr ise  fo r  
an a t t a c k .94
P a i n f u l l y  aware o f  H i t l e r ' s  p lan s  by way o f  c o n f i d e n t s  in  the m i l i t a r y ,  
Weizsaecker and the Wi lhe lmstrasse opposed an invas ion of the Sov ie t  Union. 
The Foreign O f f i c e  bel ieved that  S t a l in  wanted to avoid a c o n f l i c t . 95
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H i t l e r  safeguarded the in v a s io n  p lan s  from h is  a l l i e s  u n t i l  a week 
be fo re  the a t t a c k .  Then, on 15 June 1941, R ibben t rop  met C iano in  Ven ice  
and t o l d  the I t a l i a n  Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  o f  H i t l e r ' s  d e c i s i o n  to a t t a c k  the 
Sov ie t  Union.96
As German fo r ce s  prepared to a t t a c k  the S o v ie t  Union, the Fo re ign  
M in i s t e r ,  under H i t l e r ' s  d i r e c t i o n s ,  avo ided a l l  c o n ta c t  w i th  the S o v ie t  
Ambassador, V l a d im i r  G eo rg ie v ich  Dekanozov.9  ̂ The next day, on 22 June 
1941, as the German m i l i t a r y  machine invaded the Sov iet  Union, Ribbentrop 
had Dekanozov ca l led  to a meeting at the former P res iden t ia l  Palace at  four 
o ' c l o c k  in  the morning. Paul O tto  Schm id t  r e l a t e d  the s i t u a t i o n  in  the 
Foreign M in i s te r ' s  o f f i c e  in h is  memoirs:
I had never seen R ibben t rop  so e x c i t e d  as he was in  the f i v e  
minutes before Dekanosov's (s i c ) a r r i v a l .  He walked up and down h is  
room l i k e  a caged animal. "The Fuehrer i s  abso lu te ly  r ig h t  to attack 
Russ ia  now," he sa id  to h im s e l f  r a t h e r  than to me; he repeated  i t  
again and again as though he wanted somehow to reassure h imse l f .  "The 
Russ ians  would c e r t a i n l y  themse lves  a t t a c k  us, i f  we d id  not do so 
now." He went on w a lk in g  up and down the l a r g e  room in  a s t a t e  o f  
great excitement, h is  eyes f la sh ing ,  and kept repeat ing these words.98
Schm id t  a t t r i b u t e d  R ibben t rop 's  a t t i t u d e  to the f a c t  t h a t  the c r e a t o r  o f
the Naz i-Sov ie t  Pact was now having to destroy h is  work.99 Nevertheless,
upon Dekanozov 's a r r i v a l ,  the Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  q u i c k l y  and p o l i t e l y
in fo rmed  him th a t  "the h o s t i l e  a t t i t u d e  o f  the S o v ie t  Government toward
Germany and the  s e r i o u s  t h r e a t  t h a t  Germany saw in  th e  R u s s i a n
c o n c e n t r a t i o n  on the eas te rn  borde r  o f  Germany, had fo r ced  the Re ich  to
[ t a k e ]  m i l i t a r y  counte rmeasures ."*00 Schm idt  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  R ibben t rop
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p robab ly  thought th a t  t h i s  was the beg inn ing  o f  the end f o r  the T h i r d  
Reich.101 I n i t i a l l y ,  however, the attack was a complete t a c t i c a l  su rp r ise  
a long the whole eas te rn  f r o n t  and German f o r c e s  drove deep in t o  S o v ie t  
t e r r i  t o r y . 10^
The s w i f t  movements o f  events  and German success  a f t e r  June 1941 
threatened Ribbentrop and the Foreign O f f ice  with the prospect o f  becoming 
obsolete. The Foreign M in i s t e r  and the Bureau RAM used th e i r  specia l t r a in  
to f o l l o w  and s tay  c lo s e  to H i t l e r  a t  the ea s te rn  f r o n t . 103 E r i c h  Kord t  
had been dismissed from the Sec re ta r ia t  and sent to Tokyo.104 Johann Georg 
Lohmann took h i s  p la ce  as S en io r  Counse lo r ,  and o th e r s ,  such as Gustav 
H i lge r ,  had jo ined the Bureau RAM.105 As the war progressed Ribbentrop and 
d ip lomacy  became le s s  im po r tan t  to the Fuehrer .  In f a c t ,  the Fo re ign  
M i n i s t e r  c on f id ed  to a subo rd in a te  in  the Bureau RAM o f  ' t h e  in e s ca p a b ly  
lo g ica l  consequence o f  German world supremacy: H i t l e r  would need no Foreign 
M in i s te r . "10  ̂ During the summer o f  1941, H i t l e r  considered plans to reduce 
the s t a f f  o f  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  to the bare minimum.10  ̂ In J u l y  1941, 
upset at h is  lo ss  o f  status,  Ribbentrop o f fered to res ign from h is  post. ° 
A f t e r  H i t l e r ' s  acceptance, Ribbentrop qu ick ly  reconsidered h is  act ion and 
asked f o r  a r e in s t a t e m e n t  to h i s  p o s i t i o n  as F o re ign  M i n i s t e r ,  and was 
granted i t . 10  ̂ Gustave G i lb e r t ,  the p s y c h ia t r i s t  a t  Nuremberg, wrote about 
t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  R i b b e n t r o p  " p a n i c k e d  a t  the t h r e a t  o f  l o s i n g  
fa vo r  . . . [and a f t e r  r e g a in in g  h i s  p o s i t i o n ]  had g iven  h i s  word o f  honor 
never to question h is  [H i t l e r ' s ]  judgment again."110
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A f t e r  t h i s  i n c i d e n t ,  H i t l e r  had R ibben t rop  con cen t ra te  on g e t t i n g  
Japan to attack the Sov ie t  Union, B r i t i s h  possessions in the Far East, and 
the Un ited  S t a t e s . 111 But, the Japanese seemed u n w i l l i n g  to launch a 
s t r i k e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  a g a in s t  the S o v i e t  Union s in c e  they had s igned  a 
nonaggression pact with Moscow in Ap r i l  1941.112 H i t l e r  had pressed Yosuke 
Matsuoka, the Japanese Foreign M in i s te r ,  that  Japan s t r i k e  Singapore and 
Amer ican pos se s s ion s  in the P a c i f i c  R eg io n ,112 d e c l a r i n g  t h a t  "Germany 
would s t r i k e  . . . w i th ou t  de lay  in  case o f  a c o n f l i c t  between Japan and 
America, because the strength of the t r i p a r t i t e  powers l i e s  in  t h e i r  j o i n t  
a c t i o n  . . . .1,114 F o l l o w in g  the in v a s io n  o f  the S o v ie t  Union, R ibben t rop  
cabled Eugen Ott, the German Ambassador to Tokyo, and stressed the need fo r  
him to do h i s  u tmost to get the Japanese to a t t a c k  the S o v ie t s  in  
S ib e r ia .116 On 28 November 1941, Ribbentrop to ld  H iroshi Oshima, the new 
Japanese Ambassador to Ber l in :
I t  i s  essent ia l  that Japan e f f e c t  the New Order in East As ia  without 
lo s ing  th i s  opportunity.  There never has been and probably never w i l l  
be a t ime when c l o s e r  c oope ra t io n  under the T r i p a r t i t e  Pac t  i s  so 
im po r tan t .  I f  Japan h e s i t a t e s  a t  t h i s  t im e ,  and Germany goes ahead 
and e s t a b l i s h e s  her European New Order ,  a l l  the m i l i t a r y  m ight  o f  
B r i t a i n  and the United States w i l l  be concentrated aga inst  Japan.1*6
The German Foreign M in i s te r  added that:
[H]e did not be l ieve that  Japan could avoid a showdown with the United 
States, and that the s i t u a t io n  could hardly even turn more favorable 
to Japan than i t  was now. I t  was h i s  v iew t h a t  when one was s t rong ,  
one should take advantage of i t .  0” a should not hes i ta te  t a c k l in g  the 
Americans r igh t  now. I t  seemed be t te r  at any rate to br ing a problem 
to a head at the r igh t  moment than to keep putt ing  i t  o f f . 1*7
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R ece iv in g  word o f  the Japanese a t t a c k  on Pea r l  Harbor,  H i t l e r  and 
Ribbentrop, at the eastern f ront ,  were taken by su rp r ise .110 The Foreign 
M i n i s t e r  a c t u a l l y  b e l i e v e d  tha t  the in f o rm a t io n  was p robab ly  enemy 
propaganda, which had t r icked  the German press.119 Discovering the t ruth  
on 8 December, Ribbentrop n o t i f i e d  Oshima that  H i t l e r  had issued orders fo r  
the German Navy to a t t a c k  Amer ican s h i p s . 120 Three days l a t e r ,  on 11 
December, H i t l e r  d ec la red  war a g a in s t  the Un i ted  S ta te s .  Commenting on 
H i t l e r ' s  reason f o r  such an a c t i o n ,  Schm idt  s t a t e d  in  h i s  memoirs , "from 
what R ibben t rop  sa id  at  the t ime I got the im p re s s io n  th a t ,  w i th  h i s  
i n v e t e r a t e  d e s i r e  f o r  p r e s t i g e ,  H i t l e r ,  who was e xpec t ing  an Amer ican 
dec la ra t ion  o f  war, wanted to get h is  dec la ra t ion  in  f i r s t . " 121 In h is  own 
memoirs, Ribbentrop described the s i tua t ion :
As soon as the r e p o r t s  about Pea r l  Harbour a r r i v e d - - a  comp le te  
s u r p r i s e  to us--my f i r s t  r e a c t i o n  was t h a t  we had no c o n t r a c t u a l  
ob l iga t ion  to j o in  in the war aga inst  the U.S.A. But when I discussed 
the matter with [F r ie d r ic h ]  Gaus, the head o f  the legal department in 
the Foreign O f f i c e ,  he declared that we could not act in that way and 
t h a t  t h i s  argument would in  p r a c t i c e  mean "the p o l i t i c a l  demise" o f  
the Three-Power Pact .  F.ven so I d id  g ive  the Fuehre r  a sober 
e x p o s i t i o n  o f  the c o n t r a c t u a l  te rms ,  a c co rd in g  to which, I he ld ,  we 
were not bound to declare war on the U.S.A. The tex t  of the Pact only 
p rov ided  f o r  our a i d i n g  Japan i f  she were a t t a c ked  by a t h i r d  Power. 
H i t l e r ,  however, rep l ied :  "The Americans have already opened f i r e  on 
us, so t h a t  a s t a t e  o f  war e x i s t s  even now. Japan w i l l  never f o r g e t  
i f  we do riot take the consequences.  B e s id e s ,  soon, and p robab ly  at  
once, we shal l  be at war with American, fo r  t h i s  has been Roosevelt 's 
aim a l l  along.1^
Even so, Hans Dieckhoff ,  the German Ambassador to the United States (1937- 
38), b e l i e v e d  t h a t  H i t l e r  and R ibben t rop  d id  not take  the Amer icans as a 
ser ious th rea t .  In h is  opinion:
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N e i th e r  H i t l e r  nor R ibben t rop  had any rea l  unders tand ing  o f  the 
s i tu a t ion  in the United States. H i t l e r  counted on the bad experience 
o f  the Amer icans in  the F i r s t  World War [and Amer ican n e u t r a l i t y  
l e g i s l a t i o n ]  a sure h ind rance  to any new Amer ican i n t e r v e r t i o r .  in  
Europe.123
A lthough su cce s s fu l  in  g e t t i n g  Japan to attack B r i t i s h  and American 
po s se s s io n s ,  R ibbent rop  f a i l e d  to net  Tokyo to  a s s i s t  Germany in  the war 
a g a in s t  the S o v ie t  Union. On 9 J u l y  1942, the Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  p leaded 
with the Japanese that " i f  Japan attacked Russ'a now, i t  would lead to her 
f i n a l  mora l  c o l l a p s e ;  . . . n e v e r  a g a in  wou ld  Japan  have such an 
o p p o r t u n i t y  as e x i s t e d  a t  p re sen t ,  to e l im i n a t e  once and f o r  a l l  the 
Russian colossus in  Eastern As ia ."124 In Ap r i l  1943, Ribbentrop to ld  the 
Japanese Ambassador, " th a t  w i th o u t  doubt t h i s  y ea r  p resented  the most 
f a v o r a b le  o p p o r tu n i t y  f o r  Japan . . .  to a t t a c k  Russ ia ,  which c e r t a i n l y  
would never again be as weak as she i s  at  the moment."125 However, he was 
never able to convince the Japanese to f i g h t  a war on two fronts.
Ribbentrop and the Foreign O f f i c e  lacked an important d ip lomat ic  r c le  
by 1943. The Th i rd  Reich was d i p l o m a t i c a l l y  i s o l a t e d  from a l l  but a 
handful of neutra ls  and several vassa l  s t a t e s .  R ibben t rop  had g r a d u a l l y  
l o s t  h is  stage where he could act out h is  ro le  as an important statesman. 
Nonetheless, in the eyes o f  fe l low  dip lomats, Ribbentrop never amounted to 
much. At no t ime was h i s  p o s i t i o n  as F o re ign  M i n i s t e r  secure  from 
opponents. Without repute in Nazi Party c i r c l e s ,  Ribbentrop was t o t a l l y  
dependent upon H i t l e r ' s  pa t ronage .^ 6  Hermann Goeririg, He inr ich  Himmler, 
Mart in  Bormann, Joseph Goebbels, and A l f r ed  Rosenberg a l l  viewed Ribbentrop
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as "haughty, stup id , a foo l . "127 In h is  desc r ip t ion  o f  Ribbentrop, Hans-
Georg von S t i r 'n i t z  o f  the Foreign O f f i c e  Press Department stated:
The Foreign M in i s t e r  has put a l l  he possesses on one ca rd - -H i t le r .  A 
s ing le  frown from Fuehrer Headquarters, and h is  whole world tumbles 
about h is  ears. His greatest  agony occurs when he has been unable fo r  
some considerable t ime to obtain an audience with H i t l e r .  Over him, 
as over a l l  the o th e r  " p a l a d in s , "  hangs the Damoclean sword o f  
d is favour. But h is  sk in i s  th inner than that  o f  the others.128
For f i v e  years Ribbentrop had put up with chal lenges to h is  au tho r i ty
as Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  by members o f  H i t l e r ' s  in n e r  c i r c l e .  He had
con t inua l ly  struggled fo r  control  of fo tc ign  propaganda with Goebbels and
the Propaganda M in i s t r y . 120 f l i p p in g  from favor during the w inter  o f  1942
and 1943, Ribbentrop was now presented a chal lenge fo r  control from w i th in
the Fo re ign  O f f i c e . 180 M a r t in  Lu the r ,  R ibben t rop 's  own hand-p icked
D i r e c t o r  o f  the In te rn a l  A f f a i r s  Department,  t r i e d  to over th row  h i s
s u p e r io r  by s u b m i t t in g  cnarges o f  incompetency  w i th  the a s s i s t a n c e  o f
Himmler's s ta f f .  The Foreign M in i s t e r  discovered the conspiracy, reported
i t  to the Fueh re r ,  and ob ta ined  Lu the r ' s  ban ishment to a c o n c e n t r a t i o n
camp, where Himmler made l i f e  easy fo r  h is  a l l y . 131
With such treason coming from the Wi lhe lmstrasse, Ribbentrop turned
h o s t i l e  a g a in s t  h i s  top Fo re ign  O f f i c e  o f f i c i a l s . 132 He shook up the
Wilhelmstrasse by d ism iss ing  Erns t  von W e iz saecke r ,  E r n s t  Woermann, and
F r ie d r i c h  Gaus as Foreign Secretary , D i re c to r  o f  the P o l i t i c a l  Department,
and D ire c to r  of the Legal Department. Weizsaecker was reassigned as the
Ambassador to the Va t i c an  w h i l e  Woermann was sen t  as the German
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representat ive to the Japanese-contro l led government in Nanking, China.133 
Ribbentrop appointed the loya l  Baron Steengracht von Moyland as the Foreign 
Secretary on 30 March 1943.134 Moreover, the Foreign M in i s te r  employed the 
Gestapo to search the o f f i c e s  and desks as well  as tap the telephone c a l l s  
o f  the Wi! he!mstrasse to c o l l e c t  evidence o f  treasonable ac ts .135
Desp i te  l o s i n g  fa vo r  w i th  H i t l e r ,  R ibben t rop  remained the German 
Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  u n t i l  the l a s t  days o f  the war. Goebbels c o n t i n u a l l y  
pressed the Fuehrer fo r  Ribbentrop's d ism issa l ,  hopiny to become the new 
Foreign M in i s te r  h im se l f .135 Meanwhile, the A l l i e d  ae r ia l  bombardment of 
B e r l i n  des t royed  much o f  the Fo re ign  O f f i c e .  The r a i d  o f  11 August 1943 
r e s u l t e d  in  severe damage to the Wi 1 h e !m s t ra s se ,  r e s u l t i n g  in  Fo re ign  
Secretary Steengracht von Moyland and h is  d ip lomats moving in to  twenty-two 
d i f f e r e n t  b u i l d i n g s  s c a t t e r e d  ac ro ss  the b readth  o f  B e r l i n  in  o rde r  to 
carry  on t h e i r  d ip lomat ic  dut ies .13'7 Ribbentrop, however, spent most of 
the time at the eastern f ron t  c lose  to the Fuehrer,138 but under constant 
c r i t i c i s m  from G oe r ing .13  ̂ The S o v ie t  advance westwards r e s u l t e d  in  
H i t l e r ,  as well  as Ribbentrop, return ing to B e r l in  in  la te  1944.140 A l l i e d  
bombings of the cap i ta l  c i t y  destroyed what was l e f t  of the Foreign O f f ice  
as w e l l  as damaged the fo rmer  P r e s i d e n t i a l  P a l a c e . 141 On 14 A p r i l  1945, 
Fo re ign  O f f i c e  personne l l e f t  the c i t y  f o r  the Sa lzbu rg  area be fo re  the 
a r r i v a l  o f  the Red Army.142 With the war l o s t ,  H i t l e r  f i n a l l y  made the 
dec is ion to r i d  h im se l f  o f  Ribbentrop.143 During the l a s t  few days o f  the
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Third Reich Count Lutz Schwerin von Kros igk,  the former Finance M in i s te r ,  
was appointed as the new German Foreign M in i s t e r .* ^
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CHAPTER V I I I
DIPLOMATS ON TRIAL AT NUREMBERG
Towards the end o f  the war the A l l i e s  made p lan s  to round up and t r y  
key Nazi leaders fo r  war crimes. From the very beginning the A l l i e s  wanted 
to i n d i c t  A do l f  H i t l e r ,  H e in r i c h  H immler ,  Hermann Goer ing ,  Joach im  von 
Ribbentrop, and Joseph Goebbels fo r  t h e i r  crimes aga inst  peace.* However, 
H i t l e r ,  H immler ,  and Goebbels a l l  escaped such a t r i a l  by com m i t t in g  
s u i c i d e  in  the l a s t  days o f  the T h i r d  Re ich .  Th is  l e f t  Goer ing  and 
R ib b e n t r o p  as the  top  two s u r v i v i n g  N a z i s  to  be i n d i c t e d  by the  
In ternat iona l  M i l i t a r y  Tr ibunal at Nuremberg on the charges o f  conspiracy 
to wage wars of aggression, cr imes against  peace, war crimes,  and crimes 
a g a in s t  human i ty .2 Thus, s in c e  H i t l e r ,  the pr ime f o rm u la t o r  o f  German 
fore ign po l i cy ,  was dead, Ribbentrop became the key target  fo r  the A l l i e s  
in condemning the po l i c y  tha t  led to war. At the in s is tence  of the French, 
the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  M i l i t a r y  T r ib una l  a l s o  i n d i c t e d  two o the r  d ip l o m a t s ,  
C o n s ta n t in  von Neurath and F ranz  von Papen, f o r  t h e i r  p a r t  in  the 
conspiracy.2 Although they disagreed, the B r i t i s h  and American o f f i c i a l s  
accepted Neurath and Papen being inc luded as major war c r im in a l s  in  sp i te  
of the fac t  that they did not play key parts in the c r i s i s  per iod tha t  led 
to war.^ Both men were be ing i n d i c t e d  f o r  t h e i r  d i p l o m a t i c  a c t i v i t i e s  
du r ing  1933 to 1938.5 Neurath had served as H i t l e r ' s  f i r s t  F o re ig n
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M in is te r  (1932-38) and Papen as both Vice Chance l lor  (1933-34) and, l a t e r ,  
as the Gernv i  Ambassador to Austr ia  (1934-38). Includ ing these dip lomats,  
the Internat ional  M i l i t a r y  Tribunal ind ic ted  and t r i e d  twenty-two major war 
c r im in a l s  a t  Nuremberg during 1945 and 1946,
In p lann ing  f o r  the m i l i t a r y  t r i b u n a l ,  the A l l i e s  had p icked  the 
c o n sp i r a c y  theme as the bes t  charge to c o l l e c t i v e l y  l e v e l  a t  a group o f  
Nazi leaders represent ing d i f f e r e n t  funct ions w i th in  the German government. 
I t  was the one charge t h a t  they cou ld  e a s i l y  i n d i c t  the m a jo r i t y  o f  the 
defendants.^ With H i t l e r  dead and R ibben t rop  hav ing served as h i s  top 
diplomat during the per iod of German aggression, the A l l i e s  were e spe c ia l l y  
in teres ted  in bu i ld ing  up a s o l id  case against  the former Foreign M in i s te r  
in  o rde r  to denounce the agg re s s iv e  p o l i c y  t h a t  le d  to wo r ld  war. Thus, 
the A l l i e s  p laced  c o n s id e r a b le  emphas is  on R ibben t rop 's  c e n t r a l  r o l e  as 
Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  when they c o l l e c t e d  documents to p rosecu te  the war 
c r im i n a l s  on the c o n sp i r a c y  charge. The importance  o f  c o n v i c t i n g  
Ribbentrop meant that the A l l i e s  would spend a cons iderable  e f f o r t  amassing 
ev idence  a g a in s t  him to ensure an a b s o lu t e l y  unquestionable conv ic t ion. '7 
Such a s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f o r t  by the p ro s e cu t io n  a g a in s t  him, as w e l l  as h i s  
own mental de te r io ra t ion ,  would make i t  v i r t u a l l y  imposs ib le  fo r  Ribbentrop
O
to defend h imse l f  during the t r i a l .
Indicted on the conspiracy charge at Nuremberg, Ribbentrop, Neurath, 
and Papen pleaded not g u i l t y  on 21 November 1945. Although hard on Neurath 
f o r  h i s  a c t i o n s  as H i t l e r ' s  f i r s t  F o re ign  M i n i s t e r ,  the p ro s e cu t io n
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p r i m a r i l y  went a f t e r  R ibben t rop .  They produced an enormous amount o f  
documenta t ion  to support  t h e i r  argument t h a t  R ibben t rop  performed a key 
ro le  in the conspiracy to wage wars o f  aggression. The prosecution argued 
t h a t  h i s  presence a t  so many o f  H i t l e r ' s  meet ings  had g iven R ibben t rop  a 
thorough knowledge of German planning and act ion, and i t  was a l leged, were 
enough to prove his c om p l ic i t y .9
In h is  defense, Ribbentrop argued that he had no in f luence on H i t l e r ' s  
fore ign po l icy .  He to ld  the Nuremberg court ,  "when H i t l e r  gave an order, I 
always ca r r ied  out h is  in s t ru c t ion s  in accordance with the p r in c ip le s  of 
our au tho r i ta r ian  s tate ."10 He s t r e s s e d  t h a t  H i t l e r  kep t  d i p l o m a t i c  and 
m i l i t a r y  m a t te rs  sepa ra te ,  r e s u l t i n g  in  h i s  be ing kep t  out o f  m i l i t a r y  
planning.11 His argument was supported by Goering who to ld  the court  tha t  
Ribbentrop "did not make fore ign p o l i c y , " 10 and General Wilhelm K e i t e l ,  who 
adm it ted  t h a t  the Fuehrer  had not a u th o r i z e d  him to in fo rm  the fo rmer 
Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r  about m i l i t a r y  p l a n s . 10 To defend h im s e l f ,  R ibben t rop  
submitted over 300 documents and ca l l e d  several witnesses,  inc lud ing  Paul 
Otto Schm idt  and Gustav A d o l f  S teeng ra ch t  von Moyland, in  an a t tem p t  to 
prove h is  lack o f  in f luence in fore ign re la t ion s .  The t r ibuna l  refused to 
accep t  w e l l  over  h a l f  o f  R ibben t rop 's  document c o l l e c t i o n ,  c i t i n g  
i r re levance  and the lack of Eng l ish t r a n s la t io n s .14 Defense witnesses to ld  
o f  R ibben t rop 's  devoteness and unques t io nab le  l o y a l t y  to the Fuehrer .  
Steengracht von Moyland, the former Foreign Secretary , to ld  the court  that 
Ribbentrop " f e l t  h imse l f  persona l ly  bound to H i t l e r ,  whom he fo l lowed witn
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s o l d i e r l y  obed ience ,  and he stood under a c e r t a i n  hypno t ic  dependence on 
H i t l e r . " 18 H is  defense stood on the argument t h a t  H i t l e r  was h i s  own 
Fo re ign  M i n i s t e r ,  and R ibbent rop  j u s t  l o y a l l y  c a r r i e d  out h i s  m as te r 's  
i n s t r u c t i o n s . 18
During h i s  own te s t im o ny ,  R ibben t rop ,  a c co rd ing  to many ob se rve rs ,  
found i t  beyond h i s  a b i l i t y  to defend h im s e l f  and H i t l e r ' s  f o r e ig n  
po l i c y .1'7 A f te r  the f i r s t  day of test imony, Neurath and Papen were saying 
that Ribbentrop's performance and evidence showed that  he had no conception 
o f  H i t l e r ' s  p o l i c y . 18 Neu ra th  t o l d  G u s ta ve  G i l b e r t ,  the  p r i s o n  
p s y c h i a t r i s t :  "You can see by the way he t a l k s  t h a t  he d id  not have the 
f a i n t e s t  con cep t ion  o f  f o r e ig n  a f f a i r s  . . . . "19 Another defendant ,  
Hjalmar Schacht, stated that  "Ribbentrop should be hung fo r  h is  s tup id i t y ;  
there i s  no worse crime than s tup id i t y . "20 Even Goering, who had aspired 
to become Foreign M in i s te r ,  stated a f t e r  Ribbentrop's p i t i f u l  d isp lay  that 
he w ished t h a t  du r ing  h i s  own t e s t im o ny ,  which took p la ce  be fo re  
Ribbentrop's, he would have said more about H i t l e r ' s  fore ign po l i c y  so as 
to e n l i g h t e n  the w o r ld . 21 In the f o l l o w i n g  days dur ing  the c r o s s -  
e xam ina t ion ,  S i r  David Maxwel1-F y fe ,  the c h i e f  p ro se cu to r  a g a in s t  the 
former Foreign M in i s te r ,  destroyed what remained o f  Ribbentrop's case with 
r e l a t i v e  ease .22 Commenting on R ibben t rop 's  per fo rmance ,  Papen l a t e r  
wrote:
When he [R ib ben t rop ]  came under c ro s s -exam i  n a t io n ,  he a t tempted  no 
measured defence o f  H i t l e r ' s  p o l i c i e s ,  whose most determined advocate 
he had been f o r  more than tw e lv e  y ea r s .  He re v ea le d  h im s e l f  to the
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wor ld  as what some of  us a l r e ad y  knew him to be, a husk w i th  no 
kernel,  and an empty facade fo r  a mind.23
Thus, as Bradley Smith commented on Ribbentrop's t r i a l :
[W ] i th  the overwhe lm ing body o f  ev idence  a g a in s t  him t a i l o r e d  
p e r f e c t l y  to f i t  the le g a l  c a t e g o r i e s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by the T r ib u n a l ,  
such as p a r t i c ip a t ion  in s p e c i f i c  war planning, nothing Ribbentrop or 
h is  counsel did could conceivably  a f f e c t  the r e su l t . 24
Judgement day came on 30 September 1946. The Internat ional M i l i t a r y
Tribunal found Ribbentrop and Neurath g u i l t y  of conspiracy to wage wars of
aggression, and acquitted Papen.25 R ibben t rop  was sentenced to death by
hanging, and Neurath received a f i f t e en -yea r  prison sentence at Spandau.26
The A l l i e s  executed Ribbentrop at Nuremberg on 16 October 1946. Ref lec t ing
upon R ibben t rop 's  t r i a l ,  A l b e r t  Speer,  another  defendant a t  Nuremberg,
stated:
R ibben t rop 's  g u i l t ,  t h a t  i s ,  d id  not c o n s i s t  in  h i s  hav ing made a 
p o l i c y  o f  war on h i s  own. Rather ,  he was to blame f o r  us ing  h i s  
au thor i ty  as a supposed cosmopoli te to corroborate H i t l e r ' s  p rov inc ia l  
ideas. The war i t s e l f  was f i r s t  and l a s t  H i t l e r ' s  idea and work.2
In a d d i t i o n  to the t r i a l  o f  the major war c r im i n a l s ,  the A l l i e s
planned to t r y  l e s s  im po r tan t  N az is  f o r  t h e i r  p a r t  in  the c o n sp i r a c y  to
wage wars of aggression. The United States Army was respons ib le  fo r  the
conduct of  such t r i a l s  in the American Zone o f  Occupation in  Germany. In
the l a s t  o f  a s e r i e s  o f  t r i a l s  the Amer ican M i l i t a r y  T r ib un a l  i n d i c t e d
twenty-one defendants in what became known as the Mini'■' as Case, held at
Nuremberg dur ing  1947 to 1949.28 E ig h t  o f  the defendants  were fo rmer
o f f i c i a l s  of the German Foreign O f f ice .  Only seven o f  these men, however,
_ . ?9
were i n i t i a l l y  charged with the conspiracy to wage wars of aggression.
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S teeng ra ch t  von Moyland, a fo rmer  Fo re ign  S e c r e t a r y  (1943-45) was not 
i n d i c t e d  on t h i s  charge,  but on the charges o f  war c r im es  and c r im es  
against humanity.30
American o f f i c i a l s  se lected Foreign O f f i c e  defendants based upon t h e i r  
p o s i t i o n  o f  a u t h o r i t y ,  in vo lvem en t  in  the c o n sp i r a c y ,  and a v a i l a b i l i t y .  
Hans-Georg von Mackensen, Neurath's Foreign Secretary (1936-38), had died 
in  an Amer ican p r i s o n  camp in  August 1946. * The Un ited  S ta te s  Army 
a r r e s t ed  E rn s t  von W e izsaecke r ,  R ibbentrop's  Foreign Secretary (1938-43), 
who had stayed a t  the Va t i c an  f o r  more than a y ea r  a f t e r  the war, in  J u l y  
1947.33 He, a long w i th  E rn s t  Woermann, the fo rmer D i r e c t o r  o f  the 
P o l i t i c a l  Department (1938-43),  were the top d ip lom a t s  i n d i c t e d  on the 
conspiracy charge. The Tribunal a lso t r i e d  minor d ip lomat ic  o f f i c i a l s  such 
as W i lhe lm  Kepp le r ,  the S ta te  S e c re ta r y  f o r  S p e c ia l  Du t ie s  (1938-45), 
Edmund Veesenmayer, Keppler's a s s is tan t  (1938-44), Karl R i t t e r ,  Ambassador 
fo r  Special Duties (1939-45), Otto von Ermannsdorff , the Deputy D i re c to r  of 
the P o l i t i c a l  Department (1941-45), and E r n s t  Boh le ,  the S ta te  S e c re t a r y  
f o r  Fo re ign  O rg an i z a t io n  (1937-41).33 Be fo re  long ,  n eve r th e le s s  
Amer ican M i l i t a r y  T r ib una l  dropped the c o n sp i r a c y  charges a g a in s t  
Ermannsdorff and Bohle.3'1 in t e re s t in g ly  enough, no former members o f  the 
Bureau RAM were i n d i c t e d  f o r  the c o n sp i r a c y  to wage wars o f  agg re s s s ion  
despite the presence o f  E r ic  Kordt, Steengracht von Moyland, and Paul Otto
Schmidt at the t r i a l s .
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The d i p l o m a t s  p le a d e d  no t  g u i l t y  to  the  c o n s p i r a c y  c h a rg e .  
We izsaecke r  t o ld  the Amer ican M i l i t a r y  T r ib u n a l  t h a t  the charge o f  a 
d ip lomat ic  conspiracy was a f igment o f  the prosecution's imagination.35 In 
t h e i r  defense,  the d ip lo m a t s  argued t h a t  they had no in f l u e n c e  over  
H i t l e r ' s  formulat ion and conduct of fore ign a f f a i r s .  Weizsaecker to ld  the 
c o u r t ,  "my im p re s s io n  on the ra re  o c ca s io n s  when I d id  see H i t l e r  
p e r s o n a l l y  was r a th e r  tha t  I bored him, p robab ly  w i th  my dryness and 
o b je c t i v i t y . " 36 Both Weizsaecker and Woermann to ld  the Tribunal that  the 
F o r e i g n  O f f i c e  l a c k e d  i n f l u e n c e  w i t h  bo th  H i t l e r  and R ibbent rop .  
R ibben t rop  r e l i e d  upon a sma l l  s e l e c t  group, m a in ly  h i s  S e c r e t a r i a t ,  to 
a s s i s t  him in  the conduct  o f  p o l i c y . 37 In t h e i r  defense ,  Ko rd t  s t r e s s e d  
the oppos it ion to H i t l e r  and Ribbentrop at the Wilhelmstrasse. He to ld  the 
c o u r t  how We izsaecker  and the c a re e r  d ip lom a ts  went to g rea t  l e n g th s ,  
i n c l u d in g  t reason ,  to keep the European peace. In f a c t ,  the Gestapo had 
executed eleven members of the Foreign O f f ice  fo r  t h e i r  ac t ions .33 Kordt, 
the c lose  conf ident of the Foreign M in i s te r ,  professed that  both H i t l e r  and 
R ibben t rop  g r e a t l y  d i s l i k e d  p ro fe s s iona l  d ip lomats, with few exceptions,  
and thus went to g rea t  le n g th s  to bypass the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  in  the 
formulat ion and conduct of  fore ign po l i c y .3  ̂ Schmidt, probably in order to 
avoid any charges against h imse l f ,  kept h is  statements as a defense witness 
b r i e f  and avoided d iscuss ing h is  ro le  in the conduct o f  H i t l e r ' s  p o l i c y .40
In Ap r i l  1949, the American M i l i t a r y  Tr ibunal announced judgement on 
the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  defendants .  W e iz saecke r ,  Woermann, and Kepp le r  were
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found g u i l t y  f o r  t h e i r  p a r t  in  the c o n sp i r a c y  to wage wars o f  agg re ss ion  
aga inst  Aus t r ia ,  Czechoslovakia, and Poland.4* The court  acquitted R i t t e r  
and Veesenmayer.4  ̂ On 13 A p r i l ,  the T r ib una l  sentenced W e izsaecke r  and 
Woermann to seven years in prison wh i le  Keppler received a ten-year pr ison 
sentence based upon his g u i l t  in the conspiracy as well as crimes against  
humanity.4"* The defendants immediate ly f i l e d  a motion for  the Tr ibunal to 
set aside t h e i r  conv ic t ions .44 This request fo r  Weizsaecker and Woermann 
was granted on 12 December 1949.45 Woermann's p r i s o n  sentence,  however, 
was not commuted, but reduced from seven to f i v e  yea rs  because o f  h i s  
conv ic t ion  fo r  crimes against  humanity .4** W e izsaecke r ,  n one the le s s ,  had 
h i s  sentence commuted to t ime  se rved ,  and he was im m ed ia te ly  r e le a s e d ,  
d e s p i t e  the f a c t  th a t  he, too,  had been c o n v i c t e d  f o r  c r im e s  a g a in s t  
human i ty .47 The Un ited  S ta te s  re le a sed  Woermann in  October 1950 and 
Kepp le r  in  January  1951.48 As f o r  C o n s ta n t in  von Neurath, the A l l i e s  
released him from Spandau because o f  poor health in 1954.4  ̂ Ribbentrop, of  
a l l  the d ip lo m a t s ,  was the on ly  one to be he ld  to the f u l l  e x te n t  o f  h i s
sentence.
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CONCLUSION
The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  and Amer ican M i l i t a r y  T r ib u n a l s  c o n v i c t e d  key 
members of the Wi lhelmstrasse fo r  t h e i r  so -ca l led  involvement in the Nazi 
conspiracy to wage wars o f  aggression. These dip lomats were looked upon as 
g u i l t y  fo r  supporting Ado l f  H i t l e r ' s  aggressive fore ign po l icy .  L ikewise, 
d ip lo m a t s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  those from the l o s i n g  s id e ,  Germany, were he ld  
respons ib le  fo r  the outbreak of war in 1914. The in te rna t iona l  world had 
come to the point where i t  would hold d ip lomats, who were t r a d i t i o n a l l y  
the promoters  o f  peace, r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  the p lan s  and a c t i o n s  o f  t h e i r  
p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y  s u p e r io r s .  In Germany, a n a t io n  known f o r  i t s  
m i l i t a r i sm ,  the d ip lomat ic  serv ice  would take as much, i f  not more, blame 
fo r  world wars than the m i l i t a r y  establ ishment.
Beginning with Otto von Bismarck, strong German leaders sought to be 
t h e i r  own Foreign M in is te r .  German d ip lomat ic  success, nevertheless , was 
backed up by a powerful m i l i t a r y .  Even though the Iron Chancel lor created 
Germany through a combination o f  d ip lomat ic  and m i l i t a r y  ac t ion ,  the im­
portance of the army was paramount in  achieving t h i s  accomplishment. None­
the less ,  Bismarck, as Imper ial Chancel lor and Pruss ian Foreign M in i s te r ,  
exerc ised complete control over the a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the Wi lhelmstrasse. He 
dominated every aspect o f  German diplomacy. Replacing the Iron Chancel lor ,
Ka ise r  Wilhelm II es tab l ished  h is  au toc ra t ic  leadersh ip  o f  Germany by the
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l a te  1890s. Emulating h is  predecessor, Wilhelm II,  although heav i ly  under 
the in f l u e n c e  o f  the m i l i t a r y ,  dominated German f o r e ig n  a f f a i r s .  Under 
both Bismarck and the Kaiser,  the Foreign O f f ice  was subservient to the Im­
p e r i a l  l e a d e r s h ip  and served as a mere t e c h n i c a l  appara tus  to c a r r y  out 
fore ign po l i c y  dec is ions. Foreign O f f i c e  o f f i c i a l s  had l i t t l e ,  i f  any, i n ­
f luence on the formulat ion o f  in te rna t iona l  p o l i t i c a l  po l icy .  This changed 
a f te r  the F i r s t  World War when Germany lacked an au toc ra t ic  leader and was 
m i l i t a r i l y  weak. The Wi lhe lmstrasse, e sp e c ia l l y  under Gustav Stresemann, 
acquired considerable in f luence on the making o f  fore ign po l i c y  during the 
Weimar era. German diplomats were viewed as the experts who could gradual­
l y  strengthen Germany's weakened in te rna t iona l  pos i t ion  by negot ia t ing an 
end to the V e r s a i l l e s  r e s t r i c t i o n s .  Becoming C h a n c e l lo r  o f  Germany in  
1933, A d o l f  H i t l e r  q u i c k l y  became a s t rong  le a d e r  and r a p i d l y  worked to 
make Germany d ip lom a t i c a l l y  and m i l i t a r i l y  strong again. Moreover, H i t l e r  
sought to carry on the German t r a d i t i o n  of an au toc ra t ic  leader act ing as 
h is  own Foreign M in i s te r  in the s t y le  o f  both Bismarck and Wilhelm II.
The Fuehre r ,  l i k e  B ismarck  and the K a i s e r ,  appo in ted  men to the top 
d ip lomat ic  post who were loya l  and t rustworthy,  and would not chal lenge h is  
d i p l o m a t i c  l e a d e r s h ip  in  the f o r m u la t i o n  and conduct  o f  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  
B i sm a r ck 's  f o r e ig n  s e c r e t a r i e s ,  excep t  f o r  h i s  son H e rbe r t ,  were no more 
than a d m in i s t r a t i v e  e xpe r t s  th a t  ran the day - to -day  op e ra t io n s  o f  the 
Wi lhelmstrasse. Wilhelm II appointed men, with the exception o f  Chlodwig 
Hohenlohe-Schi l1ings fue rs t  and Bernhard von Buelow, to the top d ip lomat ic
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post  t h a t  knew l i t t l e  about f o r e ig n  r e l a t i o n s .  Leo von C a p r i v i  and 
Theobald von Bethmann-Holl weg both lacked experience in  fore ign re la t ions .  
Under the K a i s e r ' s  ab so lu te  r u l e ,  n e i t h e r  Hohenlohe, Buelow, or Bethmann 
would argue with t h e i r  master's d ip lomat ic  v iewpoint ,  r e a l i z in g  that  they 
could be dismissed as e a s i l y  as Bismarck had been.
In te re s t ing ly  enough, ne i ther Bismarck or Wilhelm II held the d i p l o ­
mats of the Foreign O f f ice  in high esteem. This prejud ice was a lso held by 
H i t l e r .  S h o r t l y  a f t e r  ta k in g  power, H i t l e r  q u i c k l y  began to bypass h i s  
Foreign M in i s te r ,  Constantin von Neurath, and the Wi lhelmstrasse by re ly ing  
upon amateur d ip lom a ts  to c a r r y  out  h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  G ra du a l l y  the 
Fuehrer put f a i t h  in the loya l champagne salesman, Joachim von Ribbentrop, 
to carry  out h is  po l icy .  The inexperienced Ribbentrop u n o f f i c i a l l y  became 
H i t l e r ' s  top d ip lom a t ,  s u pp la n t in g  what l i t t l e  in f luence  Neurath and the 
Foreign O f f i c e  had over H i t l e r ' s  fore ign po l icy .  With complete contro l of 
the Third Reich, H i t l e r  dismissed Neurath and replaced him with Ribbentrop 
as the o f f i c i a l  Foreign M in i s te r  in  1938. During the period o f  c r i s e s  in  
Europe in 1938 and 1939, the Wi lhelmstrasse, as during the t ime o f  Bismarck 
and the Ka iser ,  had l i t t l e ,  i f  any, in f luence  over the formula t ion and con­
duct of H i t l e r ' s  fore ign po l icy .  H i t l e r ,  l i k e  h is  au toc ra t ic  predecessors, 
acted as h is  own Foreign M in i s te r  as we l l  as con t ro l led  m i l i t a r y  planning.. 
A l though l a c k i n g  i n f l u e n c e  over  the f o r m u la t i o n  o f  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y ,  
R ibben t rop ,  none the le s s ,  through h i s  own method o f  i n g r a t i a t i n g  h im s e l f  
with the Fuehrer, u l t im a te ly  swayed H i t l e r ' s  dec is ions  in the aggressive
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a t tem pts  to f u l f i l l  p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e s  t h a t  r i s k e d  a European war. Such 
in f luence was evident during the c r i s i s  over Czechoslovakia and Poland.
Desp i te  in e xpe r ien ced  l e a d e r s h ip  in  i t s  top pos t  dur ing  most o f  the 
W i lh e lm in e  and H i t l e r  p e r io d s ,  the German Fo re ign  O f f i c e  was u s u a l l y  
managed by a career d iplomat that  could supervise both the m in is t ry  and the 
conduct  o f  f o r e ig n  a f f a i r s .  Bernhard von Buelow, A l f r e d  von K i d e r l e n -  
Waechter, and Go t t l ieb  von Jagow served the Ka iser as experienced fore ign 
s e c r e t a r i e s  who a s s i s t e d  t h e i r  u n s k i l l e d  s u p e r io r s .  Not on ly  d id  the 
seasoned diplomat Neurath serve H i t l e r  as Foreign M in i s te r ,  with the vain 
hope o f  m a in t a in in g  the i n f l u e n c e  over  the f o rm u la t i o n  and conduct o f  
f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  acqu i red  du r ing  the Weimar e ra ,  but Bernhard W i lhe lm  von 
Buelow, Hans-Georg von Mackensen, and E r n s t  von We izsaecke r  served as 
h ig h l y  expe r ienced  d ip lom a t s  in  the pos i t ion  o f  Foreign Secretary during 
the Th i rd  Re ich .  Even so, the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  was r i f e  w i th  a t rend  o f  
in s u b o rd in a t i o n  th a t  was ra re  under B ismarck .  In the K a i s e r ' s  t im e ,  
F r i e d r i c h  von H o l s t e in  and K id e r l e n -W a e ch te r  d i v i d e d  the ranks o f  the 
Wilhelmstrasse against t h e i r  masters. Buelow, and to a much le ss  extent 
Neurath, opposed H i t l e r ' s  c o n t r o l  ove r  f o r e ig n  a f f a i r s  du r ing  the e a r l y  
years of the Third Reich. Ernst  von Weizsaecker and Ernst Woermann, among 
others,  were unw i l l i n g  to l o y a l l y  conduct Nazi fore ign p o l i c y  thereafter .  
However, i t  was im p o s s ib l e  to r e s ig n  from the Fo re ign  O f f i c e  by the l a t e  
t h i r t i e s .  E r i c  Kordt to ld  the American M i l i t a r y  Tr ibunal tha t  the career 
d iplomats knew they would be sent to concentrat ion camps because o f  t h e i r
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knowledge o f  s t a t e  se c re ts .*  Wi1h e lm s t r a s se  d ip lo m a t s ,  n one the le s s ,  
committed treasonable acts in e f f o r t s  to avoid a European war. For t h e i r  
t r o u b le s ,  the Nuremberg c ou r t s  t r i e d  and convic ted Neurath, Weizsaecker, 
and Woermann fo r  conspir ing to wage wars o f  aggression. On the other hand, 
the c o u r t s  c o n v i c t e d  the amateur Naz i d ip l o m a t s ,  R ibbent rop  and W i lhe lm  
Keppler, fo r  t h e i r  parts in  the conspiracy. Keppler played a minor ro le  in 
the annexation of A u s t r ia ,2 whereas Ribbentrop served the Fuehrer as the 
top Nazi d iplomat who l o y a l l y  ca r r ied  out h is  master's in s t ru c t ion s .
Possessing extreme arrogance, van ity ,  ambit ion fo r  status and narrow­
mindedness, Ribbentrop was d i s l i k e d  by H i t l e r ' s  inner c i r c l e  as well  as the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  wor ld .  He had few f r i e n d s  o th e r  than the Fuehrer .  He was 
therefore an easy target fo r  c r i t i c i s m  and as a poss ib le  scapegoat fo r  the 
f a i l u r e  of H i t l e r ' s  fore ign po l i c y .3 His arrogant s ty le  of diplomacy had 
offended the conservat ive B r i t i s h  d ip lomat ic  community from the s ta r t .  I t  
was they who submitted Ribbentrop's name towards the top o f  t h e i r  l i s t  of  
persons fo r  t r i a l  in the l a t t e r  stages o f  the war. Neither Ribbentrop or 
the Wil hel mstrasse formulated Nazi fore ign po l i cy ,  however. The Foreign 
M in i s te r ,  nevertheless , had no l i v i n g  f r iends  to support him and p lenty of 
enemies t h a t  wanted to c o n v i c t  him f o r  the r e s u l t s  o f  H i t l e r ' s  f o r e ig n  
po l icy .  Although the prime formulator of fore ign re la t io n s ,  H i t l e r ,  was 
dead, Ribbentrop rea l i zed  at h is  Nuremberg t r i a l  that  he would have to take 
f u l l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  the m is take s  o f  Naz i f o r e ig n  p o l i c y  and pay f o r  
them with h is  l i fe. '*
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In re se a r ch in g  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  a wide v a r i e t y  o f  sources were used to 
examine the involvement o f  the German Foreign O f f ice  in the Nazi conspiracy 
to wage wars o f  agg ress ion .  The Nuremberg m anusc r ip t s  in  the S pe c ia l  
C o l l e c t i o n s  at  the U n i v e r s i t y  o f  North Dakota 's  Ches te r  F r i t z  L i b r a r y  
proved very valuable. The American M i l i l t a r y  Tribunal c o l l e c t i o n  conta ins 
complete t r i a l  t r an s c r ip t s  and many documents concerning Weizsaecker and 
o the r  Fo re ign  O f f i c e  o f f i c i a l s  not h i t h e r t o  pub l i shed .  However, the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  M i l i t a r y  T r ib una l  documenta t ion  conce rn ing  Neurath and 
R ibben t rop  i s  not as complete  as in  the pub l i s hed  ten volume s e r i e s  o f  
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. The Chester F r i t z  a lso possessed complete 
sets o f  the T r ia l  of the Major War C r im ina ls  before the Internat ional M i l i ­
t a r y  T r ib una l  (42 volumes) and T r i a l s  o f  War Cr im ina ls  before the Nurem­
berg M i l i t a r y  Tr ibunals under Control Counci l Law No. 10 (15 volumes). Of 
obv ious  u se fu ln e s s  were the Documents on German Foreign Po l i c y  1918-1945, 
S e r i e s  C and D. Pub l i shed  memoirs and d i a r i e s  o f  im p o r t an t  German, 
B r i t i s h ,  F rench,  I t a l i a n ,  P o l i s h ,  and Amer ican d ip l o m a t i c  personne l 
provided in s ig h t  concerning the a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the German Fo re ign  O f f i c e .  
Of course, the memoirs o f  Bismarck, Ho ls te in ,  Wilhelm II ,  Buelow, Bethmann 
H o l lw e g ,  D i r k s e n ,  W e i z s a e c k e r ,  Papen,  S c h m id t ,  H a s s e l l ,  and the  
unfortunate ly ,  incomplete memoirs o f  Ribbentrop contr ibuted g rea t ly  to my 
e f f o r t .
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